Guideline Invariance Does Not Defeat Plea-Bargaining Prejudice: Third Circuit Requires § 2255 Hearing on Alleged “Career Offender” Misadvice

Introduction

In United States v. Reginald Stephens, the Third Circuit vacated the summary denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim arising from the plea-bargaining stage. The case involves a street-level dealer affiliated with the “Harlem Boys” gang who, after going to trial and receiving a 300-month sentence, alleged that he would have accepted a 240-month plea offer but for his counsel’s incorrect advice that he was a “career offender” subject to a 20-year mandatory minimum. The district court denied the motion without a hearing, reasoning that the “career offender” status would not have affected Stephens’ advisory guideline range and therefore could not have caused prejudice. The Third Circuit disagreed, emphasizing that prejudice in the plea context turns on whether bad advice reasonably affected the defendant’s decision to accept an offer and whether the outcome would have been less severe—not on whether the guideline range would have remained the same.

Although the opinion is designated “not precedential,” it provides a detailed roadmap for district courts evaluating § 2255 petitions that allege plea-stage misadvice: unless the record conclusively forecloses relief, an evidentiary hearing is required. The decision reinforces the governing standards from Strickland v. Washington and Lafler v. Cooper, and it reiterates the Third Circuit’s low threshold for § 2255 hearings.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Judges Restrepo, Rendell, and Smith, with Judge Rendell writing) vacated the denial of Stephens’ § 2255 motion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Applying Strickland’s two-prong ineffective assistance test and Lafler’s articulation of prejudice in the plea-bargaining context, the court held that:

• The record does not conclusively show Stephens is not entitled to relief; his allegations are plausible and not contradicted by the record.
• Even if the “career offender” designation would not have changed the advisory guideline range, misadvice that the career offender guideline carries a “mandatory minimum” could be constitutionally deficient and prejudicial if it influenced the decision to reject a favorable plea.
• Because § 2255(b) requires a hearing unless the files and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief, the district court abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

The court emphasized that the relevant prejudice inquiry is whether accurate advice would have led the defendant to accept the offer, whether the prosecution would have kept it open, whether the court would have accepted it, and whether the sentence would have been less severe than the one imposed. Here, a 240-month offer contrasted with a 300-month sentence, and the record contained statements suggesting that misapprehensions about “career offender” status and “mandatory minimums” affected the decision to go to trial.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Provides the two-part test for ineffective assistance—deficient performance and prejudice. The Third Circuit applied both prongs to plea-bargaining conduct and emphasized that the prejudice analysis focuses on decision causation and outcome differential.
• Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012): Clarifies how to measure prejudice when ineffective assistance causes a defendant to reject a plea. The defendant must show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the offer, the prosecution would not have withdrawn it, the court would have accepted it, and the sentence would have been less severe than the one actually imposed. The Third Circuit used Lafler’s framework to reject the district court’s guideline-centric prejudice analysis.
• United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1992): Establishes that competent representation in plea bargaining requires familiarity with guideline structure and career offender implications. The court used Day to underscore that misadvising a client that the career offender provision imposes a mandatory minimum falls below prevailing professional norms.
• 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b), and Third Circuit cases on the hearing requirement—Solis v. United States, 252 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Arrington, 13 F.4th 331 (3d Cir. 2021): These authorities instruct that the § 2255 hearing threshold is low: a hearing is required unless the files and records conclusively show no entitlement to relief. The panel leaned heavily on this standard to find an abuse of discretion in the summary denial.
• United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1997): Cited to explain why, absent a district court hearing, appellate courts typically remand rather than resolve ineffective assistance claims outright. The Third Circuit declined Stephens’ request for immediate reversal and chose remand.

Legal Reasoning

The Third Circuit’s reasoning unfolds in three steps: the standard for a § 2255 hearing, the deficiency prong, and the prejudice prong.

1) Hearing standard under § 2255(b)

Section 2255(b) directs courts to hold an evidentiary hearing unless the motion and record “conclusively” show the prisoner is not entitled to relief. Third Circuit cases describe this as a “not demanding” standard. When allegations are non-frivolous and not clearly contradicted by the record, they must be accepted as true for purposes of deciding whether a hearing is necessary. The panel stressed that dismissal without a hearing is an abuse of discretion when the record is inconclusive on entitlement to relief.

2) Deficient performance

In the plea-bargaining context, Day requires counsel to understand the Guidelines’ basic structure and the implications of career offender status. The Government itself acknowledged that the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. Thus, if counsel affirmatively told Stephens that “career offender” status carried a 20-year mandatory minimum—treating an advisory guideline provision as if it imposed a statutory floor—this would be “unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.”

The record contains powerful corroboration for Stephens’ claim. At sentencing, counsel stated that if Stephens had known he was not a career offender and that his “mando” was just ten years (after carjacking was dropped), he “may never have” gone to trial. This aligns with Stephens’ allegation that he declined a 20-year offer based on bad advice about career offender consequences. At this stage, those allegations must be credited for purposes of determining whether a hearing is required.

3) Prejudice in the plea-bargaining setting

The district court focused on the fact that career offender status would not have changed Stephens’ guideline range and that even an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction would not have altered the advisory range. The Third Circuit identified the flaw: Lafler requires a different inquiry. The prejudice question is whether, with competent advice, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have accepted the plea, the prosecution would not have withdrawn it, the court would have accepted it, and the resulting sentence would have been less severe.

Here, the alleged offer was 240 months. The imposed sentence was 300 months. The defendant’s allegations, buttressed by his counsel’s statements, plausibly show that incorrect advice about a supposed “mandatory” 20-year penalty discouraged him from accepting the offer. The record does not conclusively establish that Stephens knew his guideline range before trial; indeed, the opinion notes the absence of evidence that counsel told him. Because the decisive factor could have been the misadvice about a mandatory minimum—not the advisory guideline ceiling—the Third Circuit held that prejudice cannot be rejected without a hearing.

Impact

A. On § 2255 practice in the Third Circuit

• Reinforces the low bar for evidentiary hearings: when plea-stage misadvice is plausibly alleged and not conclusively refuted by the record, denying a hearing is an abuse of discretion.
• Clarifies that “guideline invariance” (i.e., the guideline range being unchanged by the disputed advice) does not defeat prejudice where the misadvice may have altered the plea decision and yielded a harsher sentence.

B. On defense counsel obligations

• Confirms that counsel must accurately distinguish between advisory guideline enhancements (like career offender) and statutory mandatory minimums.
• Encourages early, documented communication to clients about sentencing exposure: advisory ranges, statutory floors, and effects of charge changes (e.g., dropping carjacking reduced the statutory minimum from 20 years to 10 years here).

C. On prosecutorial and judicial practices

• Prosecutors should avoid imprecise shorthand that might be interpreted as “mandatory” when discussing guideline status, and should promptly correct any known defense misunderstanding.
• District courts should not resolve close factual disputes on paper where credibility and historical advice are contested; a hearing is the proper vehicle.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Career Offender Guideline vs. Statutory Mandatory Minimum:
  • The career offender provision (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1) is part of the advisory Guidelines. It can increase the advisory offense level and criminal history category, but it does not itself impose a mandatory minimum sentence.
  • Statutory mandatory minimums are created by Congress in the U.S. Code. Judges cannot go below them absent a legal mechanism (e.g., substantial assistance, safety-valve where applicable).
• Advisory Guidelines:
  • Since United States v. Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory. Judges must consider them but may vary, subject to reasonableness review.
• Strickland’s Two Prongs:
  • Deficiency: Was counsel’s performance objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms?
  • Prejudice: Is there a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different?
• Lafler Prejudice in Plea-Bargaining:
  • The question is whether, with competent advice, the defendant would likely have accepted the offer, the government would have kept it open, the court would have accepted it, and the resulting sentence would have been lower.
• § 2255(b) Hearing Threshold:
  • A hearing is required unless the motion and record conclusively show the prisoner is not entitled to relief. Credibility disputes or unresolved factual issues typically necessitate a hearing.
• Acceptance of Responsibility:
  • Many plea agreements include a three-level guideline reduction for acceptance of responsibility. In some cases, due to high offense levels or other enhancements, that reduction may not change the advisory range—but the plea can still matter if it carries a lower specified sentence than the post-trial result.

What the Evidentiary Hearing Should Address

• Exactly what advice counsel gave about “career offender” status and whether he described it as imposing a mandatory minimum.
• Whether and when counsel advised Stephens of his advisory guideline exposure before trial.
• The terms, timing, and duration of the 240-month plea offer; whether the government would have maintained the offer; and whether the court would have accepted it.
• Why Stephens rejected the offer and whether accurate advice would likely have changed that decision.
• Documentary corroboration: communications between counsel and client, any plea letters or proffers, notes, emails, and prosecutor representations.

Key Takeaways and Significance

• Plaintiffs alleging plea-stage misadvice need not prove their case in the papers to obtain a § 2255 hearing; they must present non-frivolous, record-consistent allegations that, if true, would satisfy Strickland/Lafler.
• District courts should avoid equating “no change in guideline range” with “no prejudice” in plea cases. Prejudice concerns the decision to plead and the sentence actually imposed.
• Mischaracterizing advisory guideline provisions as imposing mandatory minimums is likely deficient performance, and it can be prejudicial even if the ultimate advisory range is unaffected.
• Although this disposition is not precedential under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, it is a clear application of established Supreme Court and Third Circuit principles to a common and consequential claim: ineffective assistance in plea negotiations.

Conclusion

United States v. Stephens underscores two fundamental points in federal post-conviction practice. First, § 2255(b) imposes a low bar for evidentiary hearings: unless the record conclusively forecloses relief, factual disputes—especially about advice during plea bargaining—require live testimony and credibility assessments. Second, in the plea context, Strickland prejudice is governed by Lafler: the focus is whether bad advice reasonably caused rejection of a favorable plea and resulted in a harsher outcome, not whether the advisory guideline range would have been the same. The Third Circuit therefore vacated and remanded for a hearing, ensuring that the core Sixth Amendment protections in plea bargaining are tested on a complete factual record.