Guardrails for Video Evidence: Michigan Supreme Court Signals Limits on Non‑Perceiving Officer Narration (People v. Johnson)

Introduction

In People of Michigan v. Trashawn Demarqus Johnson (SC 168242), the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal from a January 13, 2025 Court of Appeals judgment and denied a motion to remand. Although the Court issued no precedential opinion, Justice Thomas authored a concurrence that squarely addresses a recurring trial issue in the era of ubiquitous cameras: whether, and under what limits, a police officer who lacks first‑hand knowledge may narrate or interpret video evidence for a jury.

The concurrence synthesizes Michigan’s foundational evidence rules—MRE 602 (personal knowledge) and MRE 701 (limits on lay opinion)—with emerging approaches from other jurisdictions, and warns that unguarded narration risks “watering down” the jury’s fact‑finding role. While the concurrence emphasizes that any error in this particular case was likely harmless given the limited nature of the testimony and the overall facts (see MCR 2.613(A)), it calls on Michigan trial courts to develop and enforce clear guardrails when juries watch videos accompanied by commentary from witnesses who did not perceive the events recorded.

Summary of the Order and Concurrence

Disposition: Application for leave to appeal denied; motion to remand denied.
No binding new rule: The Court’s order is nonprecedential; however, Justice Thomas’s concurrence offers persuasive guidance on video‑evidence narration.
Core concern: A police officer without personal knowledge narrated a video for the jury. The concurrence cautions that such narration can improperly prime jurors and leverage the “authority” of law enforcement to steer factual conclusions, thereby intruding on the jury’s province.
Doctrinal anchors: The concurrence grounds its analysis in MRE 602 (personal knowledge requirement) and MRE 701 (lay opinion must be rationally based on perception and helpful), and reiterates the longstanding principle that “the jurors are the judges of the facts.”
Bottom line in this case: Even if error, it appears harmless given the limited scope of narration and the case’s facts; thus, not an appropriate vehicle to set definitive statewide rules.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Influence

People v Lintz, 244 Mich 603 (1928): The concurrence quotes the bedrock principle that “The jurors are the judges of the facts.” This frames the entire concern: narration by a non‑perceiving officer can displace or unduly influence the jury’s independent viewing of a video.
MRE 602 (Personal Knowledge): A witness may testify only if they have personal knowledge of the matter. Where a narrator did not witness the events depicted, this rule is immediately implicated.
MRE 701 (Lay Opinion): Lay opinion must be rationally based on the witness’s perception and helpful to understanding the testimony or determining a fact in issue. The concurrence reiterates Michigan’s caution that it is error to allow opinion when the jury is as capable as anyone else of drawing the conclusion from the same evidence.
People v Perkins, 314 Mich App 140 (2016), vacated in part on other grounds; People v Drossart, 99 Mich App 66 (1980): These cases supply the Michigan articulation that a witness should not offer their interpretation where the jury is equally positioned to decide what the evidence shows. They support limiting lay narration of videos absent a qualifying foundation.
Janetsky v Saginaw Co (2025) and People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508 (1992): Cited for the broader institutional point that appellate courts do not decide questions of fact—a reminder that fact‑finding belongs to juries, reinforcing why trial courts must guard against narration that supplants jurors’ own assessments.
Out‑of‑state cases shaping the proposed guardrails:
- Cuzick v Commonwealth (Ky 2009): Lay testimony about a video is permissible only if rooted in personal knowledge and rational observation and is truly helpful; otherwise it risks invading the jury’s province.
- Rossana v State (Nev 1997): Identification or interpretation requires “something more”—a basis to conclude the witness is more likely to be correct than the jury (e.g., special familiarity with the person or scene).
- Mills v Commonwealth (Ky 1999), overruled in part on other grounds: Allowed descriptive testimony tied to the witness’s presence at the scene during the investigation—connecting narration to personal knowledge.
- State v Watson (NJ 2023) and State v Allen (NJ 2023): The New Jersey Supreme Court recognizes that in rare cases—e.g., low‑quality or complex recordings—a non‑perceiving witness may supply limited narration. But it disapproves “continuous commentary,” “subjective interpretations,” views on reasonably disputed facts, and inferences drawn from outside evidence while narrating.
- Nadeau v Hunter Lawn Care, LLC (D. Mass. 2022): A witness cannot testify to what he “saw” on the video if he did not perceive those events as they happened—underscoring the MRE 602 principle.
Social science and practice literature: The concurrence synthesizes research showing that people often over‑credit video, that camera angle, playback speed, and framing affect perception, and that cognitive phenomena like inattentional blindness can distort what viewers think they “see.” This literature supports cautious evidentiary handling and careful jury instructions.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Thomas’s analysis proceeds from first principles. Jurors, not witnesses, decide what a video shows. Two core rules of evidence police the boundary:

MRE 602—Personal knowledge: If a police officer did not witness the recorded events, their narration often lacks the personal knowledge required for testimony. This rule prevents an authority figure from substituting a post‑hoc interpretation for actual perception.
MRE 701—Lay opinion: Even if testimony qualifies as lay opinion, it must be both rationally based on the witness’s perception and helpful. Where a video is clear and the jury can view it, a non‑perceiving narrator’s interpretation is typically not “helpful” because the jury is equally (or better) positioned to interpret it without priming.

The concurrence stresses the risks of narration by an authority figure: it can “prime” jurors to adopt a particular account as the video plays and can carry the “invisible cloak of credibility” associated with law enforcement. These dynamics threaten to “water down” the jury’s role. Accordingly, the concurrence endorses a need for guardrails, harmonizing with other courts:

Require a showing that the witness has “something more” than the jury—e.g., personal presence at the scene (during or after the events), specialized familiarity with the location or individuals, or involvement in the investigation that gives context confined to facts within personal knowledge.
For difficult recordings (e.g., low‑quality footage, complex scenes with many people or overlapping incidents), allow only the minimal descriptive scaffolding necessary to help the jury orient itself; avoid interpretive gloss.
Disallow continuous, real‑time commentary, subjective interpretations, statements on reasonably disputed facts, and inferences drawn from other evidence while “narrating” the video.

Applying these principles to Johnson, Justice Thomas notes that this case is not an optimal vehicle to set a comprehensive rule—given the limited nature of the narration and the overall record, any error appears harmless (MCR 2.613(A)). Still, the concurrence flags the issue as increasingly salient and urges Michigan courts to engage it directly.

Impact

Although the order denying leave creates no binding precedent, the concurrence is likely to influence Michigan trial practice and appellate briefing in several concrete ways:

Stricter foundations for narration: Trial courts will likely require a specific foundation demonstrating personal knowledge (MRE 602) or a reason why the narrator is better situated than the jury (MRE 701’s “helpfulness”). Expect more frequent objections and pretrial motions in limine limiting narration to matters within personal knowledge.
Reduced “voice‑of‑God” commentary: Continuous or interpretive commentary by non‑perceiving officers while a video plays is apt to be curtailed. Courts may direct counsel to elicit only discrete, non‑interpretive facts (e.g., identifying locations based on the witness’s prior familiarity or explaining investigative steps the witness personally performed that appear in the video).
Increased reliance on jury autonomy: Where the video is clear, judges may prefer to play it without narration, then allow factual testimony from percipient witnesses and argument from counsel. This preserves the jury’s primacy in evaluating what the recording shows.
Tailored use in complex recordings: For low‑quality or complex scenes, courts may permit limited orientation testimony while barring conclusions, inferences, or commentary on disputed facts—echoing the Watson/Allen guardrails from New Jersey.
Harmless‑error assessments on appeal: Even where narration slips in, appellate courts may apply MCR 2.613(A) to affirm if the record shows the commentary was limited and unlikely to have affected the verdict. Defense counsel should build a record on prejudice where possible.
Potential development of Michigan guidance: Expect litigants to cite this concurrence alongside Michigan’s MRE 602/701 jurisprudence and supportive out‑of‑state authority, pressing for a Michigan‑specific articulation of permissible and impermissible narration practices.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Lay vs. Expert Testimony: Lay testimony (MRE 701) comes from ordinary perception and cannot rely on specialized knowledge; it must be helpful and grounded in what the witness actually perceived. Expert testimony (MRE 702) involves specialized knowledge and different foundational requirements. An officer who did not see the events and offers interpretations risks exceeding lay limits without qualifying as an expert.
Personal Knowledge (MRE 602): A witness can speak only to what they personally observed. Watching a video later is not the same as perceiving the events as they happened.
“Province of the Jury”: Jurors decide what the evidence shows. If a witness tells jurors what a video “really” depicts, the witness may be usurping the jury’s role, especially when jurors can observe the same recording firsthand.
Priming and Authority Bias: Real‑time narration can “prime” jurors to see events through the narrator’s lens. When the narrator is a police officer, jurors may give the account extra weight simply because of the badge, independent of the evidence.
Inattentional Blindness and Video Pitfalls: People can miss salient visual information, and perception can be distorted by camera angle, frame rate, and what the lens does not capture. Videos rarely “speak for themselves” without context—and context must be provided carefully, within evidentiary boundaries.
Harmless Error (MCR 2.613(A)): Even if a court admits improper narration, the conviction stands unless the error affected substantial rights. Limited or nonprejudicial commentary may be deemed harmless on appeal.

Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court’s order in People v. Johnson sets no binding rule; however, Justice Thomas’s concurrence offers a timely and persuasive roadmap for trial practice in cases involving video evidence. The message is clear: when videos are played for juries, narration by witnesses who did not personally perceive the recorded events must be circumscribed—rooted in personal knowledge, genuinely helpful under MRE 701, and scrupulously respectful of the jury’s primacy.

Drawing on Michigan’s own evidence rules and persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, the concurrence points toward practical guardrails: avoid continuous or interpretive commentary; demand a concrete foundation showing why any narration helps beyond what jurors can glean; and permit limited orientation testimony in truly complex or low‑quality recordings while barring inferences and disputed factual conclusions. Given the ubiquity of cameras and the power of video to shape verdicts, these principles, even in nonprecedential form, are likely to influence Michigan courts and practitioners, sharpening how video evidence is presented and protecting the integrity of the jury’s fact‑finding function.