Guam Supreme Court Adopts the Ninth Circuit’s Objective Abandonment Test and Enforces Strict Preservation for Inevitable Discovery in Cell-Phone Searches

Guam Supreme Court Adopts the Ninth Circuit’s Objective Abandonment Test and Enforces Strict Preservation for Inevitable Discovery in Cell-Phone Searches

Introduction

In People of Guam v. Joseph Quichocho Taimanglo II, 2025 Guam 7, the Supreme Court of Guam affirmed a suppression order that excluded methamphetamine discovered when an officer removed the protective case from a cell phone found at the scene of a high-speed crash. The defendant, a passenger who fled from the wreck but was only detained—not arrested—admitted the phone was his as an officer held it. Without probable cause and before any arrest, a second officer removed the phone’s case “to look for ID/bank cards” and instead uncovered a small baggie of methamphetamine. The trial court suppressed, rejecting the government’s abandonment and inventory-search theories.

On appeal, the People argued the trial court applied the wrong legal standard for “abandonment” and pivoted to new theories—“lost property” and “inevitable discovery.” Writing for a unanimous court, Associate Justice F. Philip Carbullido clarified and cemented Guam’s Fourth Amendment doctrine in two important ways:

  • First, the court formally adopted the Ninth Circuit’s objective abandonment test for Fourth Amendment purposes—focusing on whether, judged by words, acts, and other objective indicators, a person relinquished a reasonable expectation of privacy, with “denial of ownership” and “physical relinquishment” as “important factors.”
  • Second, the court announced and applied a strict preservation rule: given the fact-intensive nature of inevitable discovery, the Supreme Court of Guam will decline to consider the government’s inevitable-discovery arguments (and similar late-blooming theories, like “lost property”) raised for the first time on appeal from a suppression ruling.

Beyond the holdings, the opinion includes pointed guidance for law enforcement: pre-arrest “inventory” rummaging and broad “safekeeping” seizures of innocuous personal property—especially phones—are constitutionally suspect absent a valid, written policy that meaningfully cabins officer discretion. The court also flagged a widely recognized principle in other jurisdictions that searches of genuinely lost property are permissible only to the limited extent necessary to identify the owner.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The trial court correctly used the Ninth Circuit framework (United States v. Nordling) to assess abandonment, which examines objective manifestations that a person has relinquished a reasonable expectation of privacy, considering denial of ownership and physical relinquishment.
  • On these facts, the government failed to prove abandonment by a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant never denied ownership and the violent crash made inadvertent loss at least as likely as intentional discarding.
  • The People’s new “lost property” theory and inevitable-discovery argument were not preserved in the Superior Court and were therefore not reviewable on appeal. The court emphasized that inevitable discovery is fact-intensive and cannot be entertained without a developed record.
  • Affirmance followed: the warrantless removal of the phone case—a search—was unreasonable, and the resulting contraband must be suppressed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Fourth Amendment bedrock and “effects”: The court reiterates the basic rule that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable absent a narrow exception (Arizona v. Gant; People v. Camacho), and that cell phones are protected “effects” (In re Application for Telephone Information; United States v. Wurie, aff’d sub nom. Riley v. California). This frames any search of a phone or its container as constitutionally significant.
  • Abandonment doctrine: While the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized no Fourth Amendment protection for abandoned property (Abel v. United States; Hester v. United States), it has not supplied a single test. The Guam Supreme Court expressly adopts the Ninth Circuit’s objective test (United States v. Nordling) that looks to outward manifestations of intent and highlights two recurring indicators: denial of ownership and physical relinquishment. Supporting Ninth Circuit precedents include United States v. Stephens (abandonment must be voluntary), United States v. Kendall (objective manifestations govern), and United States v. Lopez-Cruz (mere disavowal, without more, does not necessarily equal abandonment).
  • Comparative authority: The opinion engages California decisions (People v. Parson; People v. Daggs; In re Baraka H.) to show that California’s “objective intent” framing fits comfortably with Nordling’s factors, underscoring that there’s no real conflict between the approaches. The Seventh Circuit’s taxonomy in United States v. Basinski usefully groups abandonment cases into (i) flight/discarding, (ii) “garbage,” and (iii) denial-of-ownership scenarios—reinforcing Nordling’s two-factor focus.
  • Burden of proof: The government bears the burden to prove a warrant exception by a preponderance (United States v. Linn), and whether property was abandoned is a factual question reviewed for clear error (United States v. Gonzales). The government did not challenge the trial court’s non-abandonment finding, effectively conceding the point.
  • Lost property: Although not decided on the merits due to forfeiture, the court canvasses persuasive authorities that owners of lost or mislaid property retain a reasonable expectation of privacy diminished only to the extent necessary to identify the owner (State v. Hamilton; State v. Ching; Commonwealth v. Raboin; State v. Lewis; State v. Valles). This signals the likely contours if Guam later confronts the issue directly.
  • Inevitable discovery: The standard originates with Nix v. Williams and, in the Ninth Circuit, requires the government to prove by a preponderance (United States v. Andrade) based on “demonstrated historical facts” (Nix) that lawful discovery was inevitable and non-speculative (United States v. Holmes; United States v. Boatwright). The court also cites state and federal authorities declining to consider unpreserved inevitable-discovery arguments in suppression appeals (Holmes; People v. Chapman).
  • Inventory searches and “safekeeping”: While the People abandoned their inventory-search theory on appeal, the opinion reflects the well-established requirement that inventory searches be conducted in good faith under standardized, written criteria that meaningfully limit officer discretion and are not a ruse for general rummaging (see United States v. Stitt and related cases). The court doubts a sweeping GPD policy authorizing seizure of innocuous property “for safekeeping” from a non-arrested person could withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny, echoing concerns in Williams v. State (Md. Ct. Spec. App.).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds from the constitutional touchstone of “reasonableness.” Once the inventory-search theory fell away on appeal, the government needed either a valid abandonment showing or a preserved alternative theory. It had neither.

  • Abandonment applied: The trial court used the Nordling test correctly. Objectively viewed, no officer observed the defendant discard the phone; he immediately claimed it when he saw it in the officer’s hand; and the vehicle had gone airborne and spun twice. On those facts, it was equally or more plausible the phone was ejected by force or inadvertently lost during exit. Abandonment must be voluntary; chance ejection or confusion after a crash does not suffice.
  • Burden and standard of review: The government’s burden was preponderance. And because abandonment is a factual finding reviewed for clear error, the absence of any appellate challenge to the trial court’s finding that the phone was not abandoned was fatal. Even if challenged, the record supported the finding.
  • Lost property theory forfeited: The People reframed their argument on appeal, characterizing the phone as “lost” and positing a diminished expectation of privacy limited to identifying information. But the Superior Court never heard or decided that theory, leaving no factual findings as to “lost” status, the scope of any “limited” identification search, or whether removing a phone case fits within such limits. The Supreme Court therefore declined review under its general preservation principles and the special care applied in Fourth Amendment cases to guard against “unbridled discretion to rummage.”
  • Inevitable discovery forfeited: Inevitable discovery turns on concrete historical facts—what would have happened had the police not conducted the unlawful search. The People mentioned the doctrine only in a single conclusory sentence at the end of the hearing and never developed the record. The court held that such a skeletal, last-minute reference does not preserve the issue. Importantly, the court announced a clear appellate stance: given the doctrine’s fact-intensive nature, it will not entertain the government’s inevitable-discovery arguments raised for the first time on appeal when the government seeks to overturn suppression.
  • Rummaging prohibition and cell phones: Quoting Galpin and Coolidge, the court described the officer’s conduct—removing the phone case to look for IDs or cards—as the sort of “general, exploratory rummaging” the Fourth Amendment forbids, particularly with modern cell phones that are quintessential private effects. The baggie was not in plain view; its discovery resulted from a warrantless search unsupported by an established exception.

Impact

This opinion sets two durable markers in Guam’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and police practice:

  • Objective abandonment standard now governs Guam: Law enforcement and prosecutors must evaluate “abandonment” through Nordling’s lens. The two “important factors”—denial of ownership and physical relinquishment—are not talismans, but they will frame the analysis across contexts, including vehicle chases and crash scenes. Accidental loss is not abandonment; disclaimers, standing alone, may be insufficient; and the government bears the proof burden.
  • Strict preservation for inevitable discovery (and similar late theories): Prosecutors appealing suppression must build the record and clearly present inevitable-discovery arguments in the Superior Court. The Supreme Court signaled it will not decide such fact-bound questions in the first instance. The same logic applies to “lost property” framing and other exceptions pivoted to on appeal.

Operational consequences for law enforcement:

  • Pre-arrest “inventory” rummaging is perilous: Inventory exceptions have historically attached to lawfully impounded vehicles or post-arrest processing under written, standardized policies. The opinion’s skepticism about pre-arrest, scene-wide “safekeeping” seizures of innocuous personal property—especially when the owner is present and unarrested—indicates such practices may fail Fourth Amendment scrutiny in Guam.
  • Phones and containers: Removing a phone’s case to look for IDs is a search. Absent probable cause and a warrant—or a narrow, well-supported exception—officers risk suppression. Any future “lost property” rationale would be limited to minimally intrusive steps objectively necessary to identify the owner, not a license to rummage through containers or digital contents.
  • Training and policy: Departments should promulgate and train to written inventory policies that meaningfully limit discretion and confine scope to caretaking objectives. “Catch-all” safekeeping doctrines that authorize general seizure and inspection of personal effects without arrest or impoundment are unlikely to pass muster.

Litigation practice consequences:

  • Defense counsel should aggressively develop the record on voluntariness, ownership claims, and the mechanics of any “loss” versus intentional discarding, especially in chaotic settings (e.g., crashes, flight).
  • Prosecutors must plead and prove exceptions with specificity, anticipate alternative theories early, and avoid attempting to retrofit the record on appeal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Abandonment (Fourth Amendment sense) versus property law: In this context, “abandonment” is not about title ownership. It asks whether a person, objectively viewed, gave up a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item at the time of the search. Two telltale signs often matter: did the person deny it was theirs, and did they physically discard it?
  • Reasonable expectation of privacy (Katz): The Fourth Amendment protects what a person actually expects to keep private (subjective) when society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable (objective). Abandonment generally negates that privacy expectation; loss does not necessarily do so.
  • Lost property: Many courts allow finders (including police) to look only as far as reasonably necessary to identify the owner. It is not a green light to search for evidence of crime.
  • Inventory search: A narrow, non-investigatory exception that allows officers to catalog property (often post-arrest or upon lawful impoundment) for caretaking purposes—protecting the owner’s property and the police from claims. It must be done under standardized, written procedures that limit discretion and cannot be used as a pretext for investigation.
  • Inevitable discovery: Even if evidence was found illegally, it may be admitted if the government proves, by a preponderance of evidence and without speculation, that it would inevitably have been discovered through lawful means. It’s a fact-heavy inquiry that must be developed in the trial court.
  • Standards of review:
    • Clear error: Appellate courts defer to trial-court fact findings unless the whole record leaves a firm conviction that a mistake was made.
    • De novo: Pure legal questions are reviewed anew, with no deference.

Conclusion

People v. Taimanglo II is a consequential Fourth Amendment decision for Guam. It adopts the Ninth Circuit’s objective abandonment test, confirms the government’s burden to prove warrant exceptions by a preponderance, and reinforces the constitutional prohibition on “general, exploratory rummaging” of personal effects—especially cell phones—absent a valid, well-defined exception. Equally important, the court lays down a firm preservation principle: the government cannot rescue an unlawful search on appeal with new, undeveloped theories such as lost-property or inevitable discovery. The opinion thus advances both doctrinal clarity and practical discipline: officers must respect the limits of caretaking functions and obtain warrants when in doubt; prosecutors must build their suppression records carefully; and courts will guard against attempts to retrofit justification for invasive searches after the fact. The result is a reaffirmation that Fourth Amendment protections apply with equal force to the innocent and the guilty—and that in Guam, reasonableness, not expedience, is the “ultimate touchstone.”

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