Granting Expert Funding Yet Denying a Continuance: The New Prohibition in Simpson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Introduction

In Ronald Simpson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Supreme Court of Kentucky, Aug-14-2025) the Court confronted a murder conviction marred by procedural missteps and evidentiary improprieties. Ronald Simpson had been found guilty of wanton murder and sentenced to thirty years. On appeal he argued, inter alia, that the trial court:

Erroneously denied his motion to continue trial even after authorising state funds for a forensic medical expert.
Allowed the prosecutor to ask impermissible credibility-assaulting and legal-conclusion questions on cross-examination.
Wrongly refused a directed verdict and admitted prejudicial photographs.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, establishing an important new rule of Kentucky criminal procedure: when a trial court finds an expert witness “reasonably necessary” under KRS 31.185 and authorises funding, it abuses its discretion—and creates reversible prejudice—if it simultaneously refuses a reasonable continuance required to secure that expert’s services.

Summary of the Judgment

Justice Goodwine, writing for a unanimous Court (Lambert, C.J., concurring), held:

Abuse of discretion – continuance: By granting expert funds yet denying the time needed to retain the expert, the trial court placed Simpson “in an untenable position” and inflicted “identifiable prejudice,” satisfying the test in Slone/Taylor.
Cross-examination error: The prosecutor violated Moss and Barrett by repeatedly forcing Simpson to brand other witnesses liars, and further erred by posing a hypothetical that demanded a lay legal conclusion about “murder.” Both errors were deemed non-harmless.
Directed verdict: Viewing the proof in the Commonwealth’s favour, sufficient evidence of “extreme indifference to human life” existed; therefore, denial of the directed-verdict motion stood.
Photograph and cumulative-error issues: The Court declined to reach these because the case was already being remanded, but cautioned trial judges to perform a contextual KRE 403 balance on retrial.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Continuance jurisprudence: Slone v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 851 (Ky. 2012) and Snodgrass/Edmonds supplied the six-factor abuse-of-discretion test; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 611 S.W.3d 730 (Ky. 2020) demanded “identifiable prejudice.” Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 522 (Ky. 2002) allowed denial where the defendant sand-bagged but, crucially, in Pendleton the trial court had not simultaneously found the expert “necessary.” That factual distinction drove the Court to craft the new bar.
Expert-funding cases: McKinney v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 499 (Ky. 2001) and Perry County Fiscal Court, 674 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1984) establish that once “reasonably necessary” services are found, funds must follow. Simpson extends this logic: funds without time are illusory.
Credibility-questioning cases: Moss v. Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1997) bans asking a witness to declare another witness a liar; Barrett v. Commonwealth, 677 S.W.3d 326 (Ky. 2023) reaffirmed and broadened that ban. The Court held the prosecutor’s questions here were even more direct than in Barrett.
Hypothetical/legal-conclusion authority: Although earlier Kentucky cases on lay legal conclusions are unpublished (Whaley; Hatcher), the Court anchored its analysis in KRE 701 and classic hypothetical-question rules (Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343 (Ky. 2005); Hodge, 159 S.W.2d 422 (Ky. 1942)). The lack of evidentiary support for the hypothetical doomed it.
Directed-verdict standards: Benham and the “Brown trilogy” (Brown 1998 & 2005) framed the sufficiency review. The Court applied those precedents to uphold the trial court on that limited point.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Continuance & Expert Funding

The heart of the opinion is the incompatibility between a finding of necessity under KRS 31.185 and a denial of the time required for utilisation. The Court reasoned that:

Such a denial renders the statutory right hollow, effectively stripping the indigent defendant of the expert the court deemed essential.
The prejudice is “identifiable” because the expert’s testimony could have contested the medical examiner’s causation analysis—a central issue in the case.
The trial court’s scheduling order, though enforceable, cannot override a defendant’s constitutional and statutory rights to present a complete defence.

b) Improper Cross-Examination

Repeated “are they lying?” questions place the testifying defendant in an untenable, credibility-destroying posture—exactly what Moss forbids.
The hypothetical murder question offended both KRE 701 and the bar on lay legal conclusions; its facts were invented, unsupported, and designed to inflame.
Because the errors targeted the defendant’s own testimony—often the fulcrum of a self-defence/wantonness dispute—the Court could not declare them harmless under Winstead.

c) Directed Verdict

The Court reaffirmed the high bar for directed verdicts: any evidence, however circumstantial, that supports each element defeats the motion. Here, video of the assaults, eyewitness accounts, and the medical examiner’s “totality of injuries” theory sufficed.

3. Potential Impact

Scheduling Orders vs. Expert Rights: Trial judges must now treat a grant of expert funding as presumptively requiring an adjournment of sufficient length unless the defence expressly waives it. This ruling will likely prompt new local-rule guidance and bench checklists.
Prosecutorial Conduct: Simpson emphatically reiterates that “credibility-assault” questions and lay legal hypotheticals are reversible error when objected to, eroding any lingering ambiguity after Barrett.
Strategic Ramifications: Defence counsel may more confidently seek experts late in litigation when amendments occur, knowing courts face stronger review if they both grant funds and deny time.
Evidentiary Practice: Future litigants should expect stricter enforcement of KRE 403 regarding cumulative photographs, given the Court’s obiter dictum caution.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Continuance: A postponement of trial. Granted when a party shows “sufficient cause,” e.g., needing time for new evidence or witness preparation.
KRS 31.185 expert funding: A statute giving indigent defendants access to state funds for necessary experts when public resources are impractical.
Wanton murder (“extreme indifference”): Killing caused by reckless conduct so egregious it equals intentional murder—e.g., firing a gun into a crowd.
Directed verdict: A ruling that no reasonable jury could convict on the evidence. Judges must view the Commonwealth’s proof as true for this motion.
Moss violation: An impermissible question that forces a witness to label another witness a liar, usurping the jury’s credibility function.
Palpable error: A plain error so grave that an appellate court may reverse even without a contemporaneous objection.

Conclusion

Simpson v. Commonwealth crystallises two vital procedural protections: (1) a defendant’s statutory right to an expert is meaningless without time to secure and prepare that expert, and (2) prosecutors may not, under any guise, coerce a witness into branding others liars or supply lay legal conclusions through inflammatory hypotheticals. The decision strengthens fair-trial guarantees, clarifies trial-management duties, and sets a modern benchmark for cross-examination ethics in Kentucky criminal practice. On remand and in future cases, trial courts must harmonise calendar discipline with defendants’ substantive rights, lest a conviction—like Simpson’s—be undone on appeal.