Granath v. Monroe County: Clarifying “Reckless Disregard” and Confirming that Lights-and-Sirens Are Not a Pre-Condition to VTL §1104 Immunity

1. Introduction

Granath v. Monroe County, 237 A.D.3d 1594 (4th Dept 2025), arises out of a motor-vehicle collision at a Rochester intersection between a southbound civilian car driven by the plaintiffs and a westbound Monroe County Sheriff’s patrol vehicle driven by Deputy Khadija H. Fong. Deputy Fong entered the intersection against a red light while responding to another accident. The plaintiffs sued Monroe County, the Sheriff, and Deputy Fong for personal injuries. Supreme Court granted defendants summary judgment, holding that Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) §1104 shielded the deputy from ordinary-negligence liability and that her conduct did not rise to “reckless disregard.”

The Appellate Division affirmed in a 3-2 decision, generating a substantial majority opinion and a robust dissent. The judgment revisits—and tightens—the contours of “reckless disregard” for emergency-vehicle drivers under VTL §1104, and clarifies that:

Failure to activate lights, sirens, or an air horn, even if contrary to departmental policy, is not dispositive of reckless disregard; and
Speculative claims about obstructed sight lines will not preclude summary judgment.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Department held that:

The “reckless disregard” standard under VTL §1104(b)(2) applied because the deputy was engaged in an emergency operation while proceeding through a red light.
The defendants’ evidence—showing that Deputy Fong fully stopped, looked in all directions, activated her emergency lights, and entered the intersection slowly—negated reckless disregard as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs failed to raise a triable fact issue; deposition testimony regarding sight obstructions or possible failure to employ lights/sirens was deemed speculative.
Alleged violations of departmental policy, while relevant, did not elevate the conduct to reckless disregard.
Claims against Sheriff Todd Baxter were properly dismissed on separate statutory grounds.

Accordingly, the order granting summary judgment was affirmed in full (with costs) by the majority; two justices dissented and would have reinstated the complaint against Deputy Fong.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494 (1994) – Seminal case defining “reckless disregard” for §1104 purposes and stressing the necessity of weighing precautionary measures against urgency. Both majority and dissent rely on Saarinen’s balancing test.
Frezzell v. City of New York, 24 N.Y.3d 213 (2014) – Re-articulated reckless disregard as conscious indifference to a high probability of harm. Majority quotes Frezzell’s definition; dissent invokes its “fact-specific inquiry” language.
Williams v. City of Buffalo, 229 A.D.3d 1267 (4th Dept 2024) – Reaffirmed exemption from ordinary negligence and elevated reckless-disregard threshold; cited approvingly by majority.
Kabir v. County of Monroe, 16 N.Y.3d 217 (2011) – Court of Appeals clarified scope of §1104 exemptions; majority references Kabir for emergency-operation status.
Other Fourth Department decisions—Martinez (2018), Levere (2019), Nikolov (2012), Hubbard (2020)—provide fact-specific illustrations of when summary judgment is warranted. They supply the analytical bridge to the present outcome.
Cases relied upon by the dissent—Gernatt v. Gregoire (2023), McElhinney v. Fitzpatrick (2021), Ellis v. City of Buffalo (2023)—represent instances where summary judgment was denied because conflicting evidence made reckless disregard arguable. The majority distinguishes them on evidentiary grounds.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Majority

The court’s reasoning unfolds in three steps:

Applicability of §1104 – Uncontested because Deputy Fong was responding to an accident and driving an “authorized emergency vehicle.”
Prima facie Showing – Defendants established compliance with §1104(b)(2) by proving the deputy slowed, stopped, looked, and proceeded cautiously. This shifted the burden to plaintiffs.
Failure of Rebuttal – Plaintiffs’ reliance on (a) potential sight obstruction, (b) timing of emergency-light activation, and (c) lack of siren or air horn was labeled speculative. The majority also held that violating departmental policy does not, by itself, convert negligence into reckless disregard (citing Hubbard and Martinez).

Importantly, the court re-emphasised that §1104 does not statutorily require use of lights or sirens (“a legislatively granted leniency”), though such evidence can be probative. Thus, unless coupled with additional aggravating conduct, omission of audible/visual signals will rarely meet the “high probability of harm” threshold.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation and Emergency-Vehicle Jurisprudence

Higher Bar for Plaintiffs: Litigants must provide concrete, non-speculative evidence—e.g., speed data, dash-cam footage, eyewitness consistency—to survive summary judgment under the reckless-disregard standard.
Departmental Policies vs. Statutory Immunity: While internal SOP violations remain relevant, Granath diminishes their dispositive weight absent additional proof of conscious indifference.
Lights-and-Sirens Debate: The decision solidifies the notion that §1104(c) does not condition immunity on use of both light and audible signals, reinforcing prior holdings but now in a Fourth Department fact pattern squarely raising the issue.
Inter-Department Split Potential: Given the dissent, the issue is ripe for Court of Appeals review. Other Departments may scrutinize whether Granath unduly narrows public-safety protections.
Training and Policy Review: Municipalities might revisit SOP language to harmonize with statutory law, ensuring officers understand that policy infractions may create civil-liability exposure even if not per se reckless.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Vehicle and Traffic Law §1104: A statute granting emergency-vehicle drivers certain privileges—e.g., running red lights—but only when responding to an emergency and subject to avoiding “reckless disregard.”
Ordinary Negligence vs. Reckless Disregard: Ordinary negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable care. Reckless disregard is much higher: an intentional act in the face of a known, great risk, displaying conscious indifference.
Summary Judgment: A procedural device allowing courts to resolve a case without trial when no material factual disputes exist.
Speculative Evidence: Assertions or inferences not grounded in concrete facts or admissible proof; insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Departmental Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs): Internal rules; their violation may inform civil liability but does not automatically establish statutory reckless conduct.

5. Conclusion

Granath v. Monroe County reinforces the demanding “reckless disregard” threshold that plaintiffs must clear when suing emergency-vehicle drivers operating under VTL §1104. The Fourth Department held that stopping, observing, and slowly proceeding—even without demonstrably sounding a siren—can negate reckless disregard as a matter of law, and that speculative conflicts in testimony will not forestall summary judgment. The dissent underscores an ongoing debate over how strictly courts should scrutinize emergency responses. Until the Court of Appeals speaks again, Granath stands as guidance that (1) policy infractions and missing sirens, without more, are seldom enough, and (2) plaintiffs must marshal solid, particularized evidence of conscious indifference to survive dispositive motions. The ruling thus recalibrates New York’s balance between efficient emergency response and public safety, nudging the scales—at least for now—toward operational latitude for first responders.