Good‑Faith Misinterpretation of Unsettled State Law Does Not Trigger § 1983 Liability: Fourth Circuit in Swart v. Miyares Channels Overdetention Claims to the Fourteenth Amendment

Introduction

In Hamilton Hall Swart, III v. Jason S. Miyares, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether state officials may be held personally liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for overdetaining inmates based on a legal interpretation of an unsettled state statute that later proved wrong. The Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) kept two inmates—Hamilton Hall Swart III and Richard Earl DaSilva—incarcerated for roughly a year after a sentence‑credit expansion law took effect, relying on an advisory opinion from Virginia’s Attorney General, Jason Miyares. The Supreme Court of Virginia later held that the inmates were entitled to the enhanced credits and thus to release. The plaintiffs sued Miyares and VDOC Director Harold Clarke for damages under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging deliberate indifference and conscience‑shocking conduct.

The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that:

Overdetention claims of this sort are better understood under the Fourteenth Amendment than the Eighth.
Neither the Attorney General nor the VDOC Director acted with the requisite culpable mental state for an Eighth Amendment violation, because the advisory opinion and the Director’s reliance on it were grounded in conventional legal analysis amid genuine ambiguity.
The conduct did not meet the “shocks the conscience” threshold required for substantive due process liability under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As a matter of federalism, imposing § 1983 damages on state officials for a reasonable, good‑faith resolution of an unsettled question of state law would be “inimical to the federal‑state relationship.”

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Wilkinson affirmed dismissal of the complaint:

On the Eighth Amendment: The court explained that claims challenging the fact or length of incarceration, as opposed to prison conditions, do not fit neatly within the Eighth Amendment’s ambit. Even assuming an Eighth Amendment framework applied, plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege “deliberate indifference,” which requires a mental state akin to criminal recklessness. The Attorney General’s analysis—though ultimately rejected by the Virginia Supreme Court—had a reasoned basis in law and employed familiar tools of statutory interpretation, defeating any inference of deliberate indifference. The Director’s reliance on that advice was likewise reasonable.
On the Fourteenth Amendment: Substantive due process liability arises only for conduct that “shocks the conscience.” Offering a careful but ultimately incorrect advisory opinion on a contested legal question, and following that opinion, is not conscience‑shocking. The court emphasized that the Constitution is not a general federal tort regime and that state courts exist to correct state‑law mistakes.
Federalism: The opinion underscores the impropriety of awarding federal damages for routine, good‑faith state‑law decision making by state officials. Where state law is unsettled, the proper avenue of correction is through state courts, not federal damages actions against state officers.

Analysis

I. Statutory and Factual Background

Virginia’s sentence‑credit regime permits inmates to reduce incarceration time through “good time” credits. Historically capped at 4.5 credits per 30 days, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 5148 in 2020 to expand eligibility to 15 credits per 30 days, retroactively effective July 1, 2022. But the statute excluded inmates convicted of enumerated offenses from the enhanced credits, leaving them at the 4.5‑credit rate.

The legal dispute centered on whether inmates convicted of inchoate offenses related to aggravated murder—attempt and conspiracy—were excluded. Then‑AG Mark Herring opined that solicitation to commit murder was an enumerated exclusion, but attempts and conspiracies to commit aggravated murder were not excluded and thus eligible for enhanced credits. After Jason Miyares took office, VDOC Director Harold Clarke requested a new advisory opinion. Miyares disagreed as to inchoate offenses, reasoning it would be irrational for the legislature to treat solicitation more harshly than attempts or conspiracies to commit aggravated murder, and advised that none of the inchoate aggravated murder offenses should be eligible for enhanced credits.

The Supreme Court of Virginia later resolved the question in Prease v. Clarke, 302 Va. 376 (2023), holding that attempted aggravated murder is eligible for enhanced credits, emphasizing that the aggravated‑murder statute was “conspicuously absent” from H.B. 5148’s list of enumerated exclusions and that the “absurd results” canon did not apply because the statute was not internally inconsistent nor incapable of operation.

VDOC had initially planned to release Swart and DaSilva in July 2022 under Herring’s reading, but reversed course based on Miyares’s advice and released them after Prease in July 2023. The plaintiffs sued Miyares and Clarke under § 1983 for damages, alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed; the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

II. Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Campbell v. Florian, 972 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2020): Crucial to two points. First, the court echoed Campbell’s observation that claims contesting the fact or length of confinement sit uncomfortably within the Eighth Amendment. Second, Campbell’s reasoning counsels caution in inferring culpability from an “incorrect legal opinion,” noting that even careful legal interpretations are often overturned in an adversarial system; an incorrect outcome does not imply negligence or recklessness.
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institute, 407 U.S. 245 (1972): The Supreme Court recognized that detention beyond the term of a sentence violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit leaned on this to say the Fourteenth Amendment is the “better vehicle” for overdetention claims, aligning with other circuit approaches.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) and Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968): Cited for the Eighth Amendment’s orientation toward the “method or kind of punishment,” not necessarily the legality of continued custody per se.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994): Defines “deliberate indifference” as akin to criminal‑law recklessness, requiring subjective awareness of a substantial risk and disregard of that risk. The court applied Farmer to reject the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment theory.
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998): Supplies the “shocks the conscience” standard for substantive due process claims. The court concluded routine, reasoned legal advice and adherence to it falls well below that threshold.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976): Reinforces that the Constitution does not federalize general tort law—supporting the court’s reluctance to transform a state‑law interpretive error into a federal tort via § 1983.
Tri County Paving, Inc. v. Ashe County, 281 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 2002) and Front Royal & Warren County Industrial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 1998): Employed to emphasize federalism: state courts are the appropriate fora for redressing state‑law transgressions, not federal damages suits against state officers for reasonable state‑law interpretations.
Prease v. Clarke, 302 Va. 376 (2023) and City of Charlottesville v. Payne, 299 Va. 515 (2021): Prease resolved the underlying state‑law question, focusing on statutory text and a restrained view of the “absurd result” canon (as reinforced in Payne). The Fourth Circuit used Prease as context but refused to treat Miyares’s prior, contrary reading as evidence of constitutional culpability.
Other circuit decisions acknowledged for context: Burke v. Johnston (7th Cir. 2006), Parker v. LeBlanc (5th Cir. 2023), Hurd v. Fredenburgh (2d Cir. 2021), and Werner v. Wall (7th Cir. 2016), illustrating that overdetention claims have been analyzed under differing constitutional rubrics across circuits. The Fourth Circuit aligned itself with a Fourteenth Amendment framing.

III. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Eighth Amendment (Cruel and Unusual Punishments)

The court first explained why the Eighth Amendment is not the natural home for claims challenging the fact of ongoing incarceration. The Eighth Amendment primarily assesses the nature and method of punishment, whereas the legality of continued custody—especially one driven by legal interpretation—is better addressed by due process principles.

Even assuming the Eighth Amendment applies, plaintiffs had to plausibly allege “deliberate indifference” under Farmer. The court concluded they did not. Key points:

Reasoned, conventional analysis: Miyares “approached the interpretive task before him as a careful attorney would,” engaging with text, legislative intent, and familiar canons. While he weighted certain factors (irrationality concerns) differently than Herring, both opinions inhabited the realm of plausible legal disagreement.
Disagreement ≠ recklessness: That the Virginia Supreme Court later disagreed does not imply that Miyares was negligent or reckless in the constitutional sense. As Campbell noted, incorrect legal positions are common in an adversarial system and do not, without more, support an inference of deliberate indifference.
No inference from political opposition: Miyares’s prior vote against H.B. 5148 while a legislator did not plausibly suggest bad faith or constitutional recklessness in his later executive role. The court resisted a rule that would force broad recusals or presume bias from prior legislative service.
Director’s reliance was reasonable: Clarke’s decision to accept the then‑sitting Attorney General’s advisory opinion on a contested question of state law was not patently inadequate, even though an earlier advisory opinion took the opposite view.

B. Fourteenth Amendment (Substantive Due Process)

The plaintiffs also alleged a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The court emphasized that substantive due process liability is “disfavored and rare,” requiring conduct that “shocks the conscience” under Lewis—usually conduct intended to injure without justification, and not negligent or even grossly negligent behavior.

Against this stringent benchmark, the court found no constitutional violation:

Routine, reasoned legal advice: The Attorney General provided advice in fulfillment of his statutory duty (Va. Code § 2.2‑505(A)). Advising on unsettled state law, and following that advice, is the opposite of conscience‑shocking.
Immediate compliance with judicial clarification: The inmates were released after Prease resolved the statutory question, underscoring the absence of arbitrary or oppressive disregard for the law.
Federalism cut against liability: Imposing federal damages for non‑egregious state‑law interpretive errors would improperly entangle federal courts in supervision of ordinary state legal processes and chill the provision of legal advice by state law officers.

C. The Federalism Throughline

One of the opinion’s central themes is federalism. The court stated it would be “inimical to the federal‑state relationship” for a federal court to award damages against state officials merely for having reached the wrong conclusion on an unsettled question of state law. State courts are open to correct such errors. Turning routine, good‑faith legal interpretation into federal tort liability risks transforming § 1983 into a general tort vehicle, contrary to Paul v. Davis.

D. What the Court Did Not Decide

Qualified immunity and other immunities: The court affirmed on failure to state a constitutional claim and did not address immunities (qualified, absolute, or otherwise). Those issues remain unaddressed in this opinion.
Procedural due process: The opinion discusses substantive due process but does not analyze a distinct procedural due process theory. The holding thus should not be read to foreclose all procedural due process arguments in different factual postures (for example, ignoring binding court orders or failing to provide process once entitlement is clear).
Liability after clarity: The court’s reasoning turns on the unsettled nature of state law prior to Prease and the reasonableness of the state officials’ analysis. Continued detention in defiance of clearly established state law or binding judicial decisions may present very different constitutional questions.

IV. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Overdetention Litigation in the Fourth Circuit

Constitutional vehicle: The court signals that overdetention claims are better analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs should expect Eighth Amendment theories to face skepticism when the claim targets the legality of ongoing custody rather than conditions of confinement.
High culpability threshold: To state a damages claim, plaintiffs must plausibly allege more than erroneous legal interpretation. They must show culpability approaching criminal recklessness (Eighth Amendment) or conscience‑shocking conduct (Fourteenth Amendment). Routine but mistaken legal advice will not suffice.
Importance of legal context: Where state law is unsettled and officials employ standard interpretive tools, courts will be reluctant to infer constitutional culpability—even if a state supreme court later disagrees.

B. For State Attorneys General and Corrections Officials

Advisory functions protected when reasoned: This decision reassures that providing careful advice on unsettled state law and following such advice will not ordinarily subject officials to § 1983 damages.
Document the analysis: The court repeatedly noted the use of conventional legal reasoning. Maintaining records that show textual analysis, consideration of canons, legislative history or intent, and reasoned weighing of competing readings can be dispositive at the pleadings stage.
Respond to clarifying rulings: Prompt compliance with state supreme court decisions resolving ambiguity cuts against any inference of deliberate indifference or conscience‑shocking behavior.

C. For Plaintiffs and Counsel

Focus on clarity and notice: Strong § 1983 overdetention claims will likely involve detentions contrary to clear statutory text, binding precedent, court orders, or after officials were on explicit notice of illegality.
Consider state‑law remedies: The court expressly flagged that “state courts are open” to redress violations of state law. Damages or other remedies under state law may be more promising where the wrong is fundamentally a state‑law interpretive error.
Plead specific facts of culpability: Bare disagreement with an advisory opinion will not do. Concrete allegations showing knowledge of illegality and disregard (e.g., ignoring court directives or evidence of intentional delay) will be necessary to survive a motion to dismiss.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Inchoate offenses: Crimes that are preparatory or incomplete, such as attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation. They are separate offenses from the completed crime and may carry different penalties.
Enhanced sentence credits: Statutorily authorized “good time” credits that reduce the time an inmate must serve. H.B. 5148 increased the rate for eligible inmates from 4.5 to 15 days credit per 30 days served, with enumerated exclusions.
Deliberate indifference: A stringent Eighth Amendment mental‑state standard akin to criminal recklessness. The official must subjectively recognize a substantial risk and disregard it.
Substantive due process and “shocks the conscience”: A Fourteenth Amendment doctrine that condemns only the most egregious executive action—conduct intended to injure unjustifiably, or action so outrageous it offends fundamental notions of fairness.
Absurd results canon: A tool of statutory interpretation allowing courts to deviate from literal text to avoid truly absurd outcomes. Virginia’s high court limits this to interpretations that render a statute internally inconsistent or inoperable; mere policy disagreement is insufficient.
Federalism/dual sovereignty: The structure of American government dividing authority between federal and state systems. Federal courts are cautious about converting state‑law errors into federal torts, especially where state courts can correct such errors.
§ 1983: A federal statute enabling suits against state actors for violations of federal rights. It is not a vehicle to enforce state-law norms or to remedy ordinary negligence.

Conclusion

Swart v. Miyares sets a clear, two‑part marker in the Fourth Circuit. First, overdetention claims challenging the legality or duration of confinement are properly framed under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth. Second, state officials do not incur § 1983 damages liability for reasoned, good‑faith legal interpretations of unsettled state law—even if later held incorrect by the state’s highest court. Absent allegations of criminal‑recklessness‑level culpability (Eighth Amendment) or conscience‑shocking conduct (Fourteenth Amendment), such claims will not proceed past the pleadings.

The court’s emphasis on federalism is more than rhetorical: it channels disagreements about state statutes to state courts and preserves space for state legal officers to advise and act without the omnipresent threat of federal damages for every reasonable, if ultimately mistaken, interpretive choice. For practitioners, the opinion underscores the need to distinguish between ordinary legal error and constitutional wrong—and to tailor claims and remedies accordingly.