Introduction

In this not-for-publication decision, the Sixth Circuit affirms the denial of a motion to suppress following a search that uncovered drugs, firearms, and cash at the defendant’s residence. The court does not decide whether the warrant affidavit established probable cause. Instead, it resolves the appeal under UNITED STATES v. LEON’s good-faith exception, holding that the affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render officers’ reliance on the warrant unreasonable.

The opinion is noteworthy for law enforcement and litigants because it:

• Reaffirms that an affidavit is not “bare bones” when it details surveillance and contemporaneous trash-pull evidence showing drug packaging residue at the residence to be searched.
• Clarifies that prior evidence of drug dealing at an earlier residence, combined with same-day trash evidence at a new address, can supply the minimally sufficient nexus supporting good-faith reliance to search the new residence.
• Addresses staleness by recognizing that ongoing drug activity and a same-day trash pull can “refresh” older investigative observations.

Although nonprecedential, the decision offers practical guidance on how investigative facts— especially trash-pull results—can combine with earlier surveillance to satisfy Leon’s good-faith standard even where probable cause might be debatable.

Background and Procedural Posture

After a confidential informant reported that Alonzo Quant’e Harrison was distributing controlled substances from a Lexington, Kentucky residence, Detective Charles Johnson conducted months-long surveillance. Johnson initially observed activity at a Pine Street residence consistent with hand-to-hand drug transactions. When Harrison moved to Strawberry Fields Road, Johnson continued surveillance and conducted two “trash pulls,” finding multiple plastic “corner baggies” and sandwich bags covered with greyish powder that, based on his training and experience, he described as consistent with heroin or fentanyl packaging.

Johnson applied for and obtained a state search warrant for the Strawberry Fields residence. Officers seized substantial quantities of narcotics, several firearms, and cash. A federal grand jury indicted Harrison on drug and firearm offenses. Harrison moved to suppress, arguing the affidavit lacked probable cause, but the district court denied the motion (without an evidentiary hearing), holding that probable cause existed or, at minimum, that Leon’s good-faith exception applied.

Harrison pleaded guilty while preserving his right to challenge the suppression ruling. The district court imposed a 180-month sentence, and Harrison appealed.

Summary of the Opinion

Reviewing de novo, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the suppression motion. The court declined to decide whether the affidavit established probable cause. Instead, it held that the good-faith exception applies because the affidavit:

• Set out particularized facts (months of surveillance; observations of apparent drug transactions at a prior residence; and two trash pulls—one on the same day as the warrant application—showing baggies with greyish powder), not mere conclusions.
• Supplied a minimally sufficient nexus between drug activity and the Strawberry Fields residence, especially given the trash-pull evidence and the reasonable inference that a drug dealer who kept drugs in a former home would keep them in a current home.
• Did not suffer from fatal staleness, because the affidavit described ongoing activity leading up to the warrant and included same-day evidence from the residence’s trash.

Because the affidavit was not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” suppression was unwarranted under Leon.

Analysis

A. The Legal Framework

The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause to search a residence. Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard requiring reasonable grounds to believe that evidence or contraband will be found at the place to be searched. The court cites District of Columbia v. Wesby and MARYLAND v. PRINGLE to stress that probable cause does not set a “high bar,” and it invokes the Sixth Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Sanders (2024) to emphasize totality-of-the- circumstances review and a holistic assessment.

The exclusionary rule generally bars evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, including when evidence is obtained by state officers but used in federal prosecutions (ELKINS v. UNITED STATES; MAPP v. OHIO; WOLF v. COLORADO). But the rule has limits. Under UNITED STATES v. LEON, the good-faith exception allows use of evidence gathered in reliance on a judge-issued warrant later found invalid, unless reliance was unreasonable. Sixth Circuit cases such as United States v. McCoy and United States v. Frazier explain that “good-faith reliance” requires less than probable cause and tolerates affidavits that supply some particularized facts establishing veracity, reliability, basis of knowledge, and a minimal nexus, while rejecting “bare-bones” affidavits that offer only conclusory assertions (see also United States v. White; United States v. Christian (en banc)).

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• UNITED STATES v. LEON (U.S. 1984) — Establishes the good-faith exception. Evidence obtained under a warrant later invalidated is admissible unless officers’ reliance was unreasonable. The Sixth Circuit’s application of Leon is central: it resolves the case without reaching the probable-cause question.
• United States v. McCoy (6th Cir. 2018) — Clarifies that good-faith reliance requires some particularized facts demonstrating veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge, beyond bare conclusions. The court quotes McCoy to frame the “minimally sufficient nexus” and non–bare-bones inquiry.
• United States v. Frazier (6th Cir. 2005) — Two key contributions: (1) The exclusionary-rule question is discrete from the underlying Fourth Amendment question, legitimizing the court’s decision to apply Leon without adjudicating probable cause; and (2) the reasonable inference that a drug dealer who kept drugs in a former home would keep them in a current home. That inferential link anchors the nexus analysis here.
• United States v. Christian (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) — Emphasizes holistic, contextual probable-cause analysis and distinguishes factual allegations from conclusory suspicions. The court draws on Christian to explain why the affidavit was not bare bones.
• United States v. White (6th Cir. 2017) — Defines “bare-bones” affidavits as purely conclusory. The court uses White to underscore that Johnson’s affidavit contained factual allegations rather than mere conclusions.
• United States v. Abernathy (6th Cir. 2016) — Recognizes that trash-pull evidence may help establish probable cause when combined with other indicators of drug crimes. The court applies this logic to find at least good-faith reliance given the combination of baggies with residue from the trash and prior surveillance of dealing.
• United States v. Spikes (6th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Hython (6th Cir. 2006) — Provide staleness principles. Spikes explains that more recent events can refresh older facts; Hython discusses “ongoing and continuous” criminal activity, which mitigates staleness concerns. Both support the court’s conclusion that the same-day trash pull and ongoing observations overcame staleness arguments.
• United States v. Sanders (6th Cir. 2024) (en banc) — Articulates the modern Sixth Circuit understanding of probable cause: “reasonable grounds to believe” contraband will be found, judged holistically. Although the court ultimately resolves the case via Leon, Sanders informs the court’s framing of the underlying probable-cause inquiry.
• District of Columbia v. Wesby (U.S. 2018) and MARYLAND v. PRINGLE (U.S. 2003) — Reinforce that probable cause is a practical, common-sense standard and not a high bar.
• ELKINS v. UNITED STATES (U.S. 1960); MAPP v. OHIO (U.S. 1961); WOLF v. COLORADO (U.S. 1949) — Ground the exclusionary rule’s application to state searches and its incorporation against the states, setting the platform for federal suppression analysis in a case involving a state-issued warrant executed by state officers.
• United States v. Pasquarille (6th Cir. 1994) — Allows the appellate court to affirm on any ground supported by the record, enabling affirmance based solely on good faith without resolving probable cause.
• SCHNECKLOTH v. BUSTAMONTE (U.S. 1973) — Cited for Fourth Amendment baseline principles, though consent is not at issue here.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps.

1. Good-Faith Exception Controls. The court declines to decide probable cause and instead applies Leon’s good-faith exception. Because a neutral magistrate issued the warrant, suppression is inappropriate unless reliance was objectively unreasonable. This framing follows Frazier’s reminder that exclusion is a distinct question from whether the Fourth Amendment was violated.
2. Not a Bare-Bones Affidavit. Detective Johnson’s affidavit described months of observations, including suspected hand-to-hand transactions at the prior Pine Street residence, the move to Strawberry Fields Road, and two trash pulls—one on the same day as the warrant application—revealing baggies with powder consistent, in the officer’s trained assessment, with heroin or fentanyl packaging. These “particularized facts” exceed conclusory assertions, satisfying McCoy and White. The affidavit thus cleared the “not entirely unreasonable” threshold for reliance.
3. Minimally Sufficient Nexus and Staleness.
   • Nexus: The affidavit tied Harrison’s ongoing drug activity to the Strawberry Fields residence through contemporaneous trash evidence and the reasonable inference recognized in Frazier: a dealer who kept drugs in a former home likely keeps them in the current home. This combination provided a minimally sufficient nexus for reliance.
   • Staleness: Although some observations lacked specific dates, the affidavit’s context placed the events between April and November 2022, and the court deemed the drug-dealing activity “ongoing and continuous” through the time of the warrant. The same-day trash pull refreshed any older facts, consistent with Spikes and Hython.

D. What the Court Did Not Decide

The panel expressly did not resolve whether probable cause existed. That restraint limits the opinion’s reach on the precise sufficiency of trash-pull evidence and prior surveillance to establish probable cause. Instead, the decision clarifies when such facts suffice for good-faith reliance.

E. Practical Impact and Likely Effects

Although nonprecedential, the opinion carries persuasive weight for future Sixth Circuit district courts and litigants:

• For law enforcement: Affidavits should combine surveillance observations, temporal anchors, and training-and-experience explanations with contemporaneous, residence-specific physical evidence (e.g., trash pulls showing packaging with residue). Doing so will often suffice for Leon good faith even if probable cause might be contested.
• For prosecutors: When probable cause is arguable, emphasize the affidavit’s particularized facts and the nexus between the residence and the suspected activity, especially any same-day or close-in-time physical evidence. Cite McCoy, Frazier, Abernathy, and the “minimally sufficient nexus” standard.
• For the defense: A successful suppression challenge must show more than debatable probable cause. Focus on the Leon exceptions—for example, that the affidavit was bare bones, that the magistrate abandoned a neutral role, that the warrant was facially deficient, or that the affiant misled the magistrate with knowingly false or recklessly false statements (Franks-type issues). Mere staleness arguments are difficult where a same-day trash pull exists or the activity is “ongoing and continuous.”
• For magistrate judges: This opinion underscores the importance of clear temporal detail and articulation of the nexus. Where an affidavit aggregates surveillance with physical evidence from the residence, a finding of probable cause is more readily defensible and, at minimum, supports Leon good faith.

In short, the case reinforces a practical blueprint: sustained surveillance + residence-linked physical evidence (trash-pull residue consistent with drug packaging) + officer training-and-experience narratives will typically defeat suppression under Leon.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Probable Cause: A practical, common-sense standard. The question is whether, given all the facts, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a specific place. It is less than a preponderance of the evidence and far below proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Leon Good-Faith Exception: If police obtain a warrant from a judge and reasonably rely on it, evidence need not be suppressed even if the warrant is later found to lack probable cause—unless one of the narrow Leon exceptions applies (e.g., the affidavit was bare bones; the magistrate abandoned neutrality; the affidavit contained knowing or reckless falsity; or the warrant was facially deficient).
• Bare-Bones Affidavit: An affidavit that simply asserts conclusions—“I believe drugs are there”—without concrete, particularized facts (dates, observations, sources, and explanations). Bare-bones affidavits cannot support good-faith reliance.
• Nexus Requirement: There must be some factual connection between the place to be searched and the suspected criminal activity. In drug cases, courts often accept reasonable inferences that evidence will be found where a dealer resides—especially when supported by residence-specific facts like trash-pull findings.
• Staleness: Information can get “stale” if too old to suggest that evidence remains at a location. Courts consider the nature of the crime (e.g., ongoing drug dealing vs. one-off event), the type of items sought (e.g., easily moved consumables vs. durable equipment), and whether recent events “refresh” older observations. A same-day trash pull can defeat staleness.
• Trash Pull: Police retrieval and inspection of garbage left for collection, which the Supreme Court permits without a warrant in most circumstances. Trash-pull results can be powerful when they show drug packaging, residue, or mail linking the trash to the target residence, especially when combined with other indicators of drug activity.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Harrison affirms an important practical point under Leon: where officers document sustained surveillance, provide residence-specific physical evidence (here, baggies with powder residue retrieved in a same-day trash pull), and articulate the inferences supported by training and experience, the affidavit will not be deemed “bare bones,” and reliance on a judge-issued warrant will be reasonable. The opinion further clarifies that prior evidence of drug dealing at an earlier residence, coupled with contemporaneous trash-pull findings at a new residence, can establish the minimally sufficient nexus for good-faith reliance notwithstanding staleness arguments.

While the court intentionally leaves the precise probable-cause question unresolved, the ruling provides a clear roadmap for law enforcement affidavit drafting and for litigants assessing suppression prospects. In the Sixth Circuit, the combination of ongoing activity and same-day trash-pull evidence linking a residence to drug distribution robustly supports Leon good-faith reliance, making suppression unlikely absent one of the narrow exceptions to the good-faith rule.