Goncalves v. Bondi: Clerk‐Receipt Requirement for Timely Petitions for Review Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)

Introduction

In Goncalves v. Bondi, 24-1511 (1st Cir. May 20, 2025), the First Circuit Court of Appeals clarified that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(A)(i), a petition for review of a final order of removal is not “filed” until the clerk of the court receives it within the thirty‐day statutory deadline. The court held that neither the mailbox rule of Houston v. Lack nor any part of Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(i) shifts the moment of filing to the date of mailing, and that Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)(2) bars post hoc extensions of that deadline.

Petitioner Igor Quinn-Goncalves, a Brazilian national ordered removed, filed his petition three days late in receipt, though it was mailed on the last day permitted. He argued that under the mailbox rule and various rules of appellate procedure, his mailing constituted a timely filing and that the court could extend the receipt deadline for good cause. The government contended that “filing” meant receipt by the clerk and that no extension was possible. The panel, in an opinion by Judge Aframe, sided with the government.

Summary of the Judgment

The First Circuit dismissed Goncalves’s petition for review as untimely. It held:

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) and Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(2)(A)(i), a petition for review filed by mail is not “filed” until the clerk receives it, and mailing alone does not satisfy the filing deadline.
Houston v. Lack’s “mailbox rule” (for pro se prisoner habeas appeals) is a narrow exception based on unique hardships that do not apply to immigration petitions or represented litigants with electronic‐filing options.
Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)(2) forbids extending the time to file a petition for review, so the court lacked authority to grant a post hoc extension of the receipt deadline even for good cause.

Because Goncalves’s petition was received three days after the thirty‐day deadline, the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988): The Supreme Court adopted a pro se prisoner “mailbox rule” under 28 U.S.C. § 2107 and Fed. R. App. P. 3(a), 4(a)(1), holding that a prisoner’s notice of appeal is filed upon deposit with prison authorities. The First Circuit distinguished Houston as resting on unique constraints faced by unrepresented inmates—no ability to hand‐deliver, lack of access to postage services, and reliance on prison mail systems—none of which applied in Goncalves.

2. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(A)(i): This provision permits nonelectronic filings by mail but conditions timeliness on clerk receipt “within the time fixed for filing.” The court read the entire subsection as establishing both method (mailing) and timeliness (receipt) as elements of filing.

3. Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(2)(A)(ii) & (iii): These subsections carve out mailbox‐rule exceptions for non‐electronic briefs/appendices and inmate legal mail if filed under institutional procedures. The panel held that these exceptions underscore that the general rule remains a receipt requirement for other pleadings.

4. Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)(2): States unambiguously that courts “may not extend the time to file . . . a petition for review of a decision of an administrative board,” foreclosing post hoc extensions even for good cause.

5. Circuit decisions—including Chao Lin v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 677 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 2012), Navarro‐Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2003), and Sankarapillai v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 2003)—have uniformly held that petitions for review are timely only if received by the clerk before the statutory deadline.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in several logical steps:

Default Rule of Receipt: In civil appeals, “filing” is generally complete upon clerk receipt. The panel relied on a “large body of lower‐court authority” and Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(4), which requires the clerk to accept papers “presented for” filing, confirming that clerk receipt is the relevant event.
Narrow Scope of Houston: Houston’s mailbox rule was designed to alleviate special burdens on pro se prisoners. Goncalves’s ability to arrange private delivery (via UPS), access the clerk’s office, and use electronic filing forecloses extending Houston’s logic here.
Text of Rule 25(a)(2)(A)(i): The panel read “filing may be accomplished by mail” as a statement about permissible method, not about completion. The immediately following clause about timely receipt is a necessary timeliness rule because mailed papers do not arrive concurrently with mailing.
Interaction with Subsections (ii) & (iii): The special mailbox‐rule provisions for briefs, appendices, and inmate legal mail demonstrate that where the drafters intended a mailbox rule, they said so explicitly. The absence of such language in (i) confirms that receipt remains the test.
No Authority to Extend: Rule 26(b)(2)’s plain text prohibits extending the time to file a petition for review. Allowing a post hoc extension for receipt would violate that rule and insert a disparity between mailed and non‐mailed filings that the rule does not countenance.

C. Impact

This decision sharpens the deadline rules for immigration appeals:

Presents a bright‐line rule: petitions must be received within thirty days, not merely deposited in a mailbox.
Remains consistent with a uniform appellate practice—no mailbox rule for immigration petitions except where clearly provided.
Limits equitable arguments for relief based on mailing date or clerical error: Rule 26(b)(2) bars post hoc extensions of the filing deadline.
Encourages use of electronic filing when available, which triggers filing upon electronic submission.

Lower courts and practitioners will need to emphasize in immigration cases that planning to mail on the deadline is insufficient—receipt must occur by day thirty. Clerks’ offices should continue to give clear guidance on acceptance and timestamping.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Filing” vs. “Mailing”: In appellate parlance, “filing” a paper means delivering it so that the court formally accepts it—usually by the clerk stamping it with a filing date. Mailing a paper is only one way to deliver it. Until the clerk actually opens and stamps the envelope, the paper is not “filed.”

Mailbox Rule: A doctrine that, in certain limited contexts (notably Houston v. Lack and Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(2)(A)(ii)/(iii)), treats the date a prison inmate hands a paper to authorities (or the date of postage) as the filing date—even if the court receives it later. It prevents harsh dismissals of pro se prisoner appeals due to postal delays.

Good‐Cause Extensions: Some appellate‐rule deadlines can be extended by a court if the party shows “good cause” (e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)(1)). But for petitions for review of immigration orders, Rule 26(b)(2) says courts “may not extend the time to file,” so no good‐cause exception is available.

Conclusion

Goncalves v. Bondi establishes that, in immigration‐court appeals under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1):

A petition for review mailed on the last day of the filing period is not “filed” until the clerk receives it.
Houston’s pro se prisoner mailbox rule does not apply to immigration petitions or represented appellants with alternative filing methods.
Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)(2) categorically forbids extending the filing deadline for a petition for review, even for good cause.

Practitioners should ensure that petitions for review reach the clerk’s office by the statutory deadline rather than relying on mail‐date presumptions. This decision reinforces the critical importance of understanding both the method and timeliness requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 25(a)(2)(A)(i) and of the non-waivable nature of Rule 26(b)(2).