Goetz Jurisdictional Rule: Wyoming Supreme Court Declares Rule 801 Sanctions for Attorney Tardiness to be Indirect Criminal Contempt Requiring Separate Proceedings

1. Introduction

Case: In the Matter of the Sanction Fee of Christopher Goetz: Goetz v. State of Wyoming, 2025 WY 84, Supreme Court of Wyoming (29 July 2025).

This appeal arose after the Campbell County District Court orally found defense attorney Christopher Goetz in contempt and, in a written order, imposed a $100 monetary sanction and a letter-of-apology requirement under Rule 801 of the Wyoming Uniform Rules for District Courts (U.R.D.C.). The sanction followed Mr Goetz’s late arrival—at 10:16 a.m.—for a 9:30 change-of-plea hearing. The Wyoming Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the district court had jurisdiction to:

• Hold Mr Goetz in contempt; and
• Sanction him under U.R.D.C. 801.

The majority opinion (Gray, J.) reversed, holding that (1) tardiness is an indirect form of criminal contempt; (2) indirect criminal contempt must be prosecuted in a separate criminal proceeding under W.R.Cr.P. 42; and (3) a Rule 801 sanction that is punitive in nature is substantively the same as an indirect criminal contempt sanction, so the district court lacked jurisdiction. Justice Fenn concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that the sanction failed for lack of notice but disagreeing that the monetary sanction was contempt or that tardiness is necessarily indirect contempt.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Wyoming Supreme Court:

1. Held that because attorney tardiness happens outside the court’s presence, it constitutes indirect (not direct) contempt.
2. Declared that indirect criminal contempt must be tried as a separate criminal action compliant with W.R.Cr.P. 42; failure to do so is a fatal jurisdictional defect rendering the contempt judgment void.
3. Determined that the district court’s written “Rule 801” order was, in substance, an order of indirect criminal contempt. Merely labelling it “sanctions” did not alter its character.
4. Reversed the district court’s sanction in its entirety for want of jurisdiction.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Swain v. State, 2009 WY 142 – Reaffirmed that indirect criminal contempt requires a separate action; relied upon as the principal jurisdictional foundation.
• Jensen v. Milatzo-Jensen, 2013 WY 83 – Distinguished civil vs. criminal contempt; majority quoted Jensen for purposes of punishment vs. coercion.
• Horn v. Welch, 2002 WY 138 – Demonstrated reversal where Rule 42 procedures were ignored; cited in support of the “fatal defect” doctrine.
• Meckem v. Carter, 2014 WY 52 – Used to classify a $100 fine payable to the clerk as criminal (not compensatory) in nature.
• Out-of-state authorities (e.g., In re Chandler, 6th Cir.; Wong v. Frank, Haw. Ct. App.) – Cited to show consensus that tardiness or absence occurs outside the court’s view and is therefore indirect contempt.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

a) Classification of the Conduct
The court began by diagnosing the nature of the district court’s oral and written rulings. Paying money to the clerk is punitive, so by definition it is criminal contempt. Because the underlying act (tardiness) took place outside the immediate presence of the judge, it is indirect contempt.

b) Jurisdiction & Procedure
Under both long-standing common-law doctrine and Wyoming precedents, a trial court cannot adjudicate indirect criminal contempt within the original case. W.R.Cr.P. 42 requires issuance of an order to show cause, separate case number, arraignment, opportunity for jury trial where applicable, and possibly a different judge if the contempt is directed toward the sitting judge. None of these protections were afforded.

c) Rule 801 Cannot Circumvent Constitutional Protections
Although Rule 801 explicitly empowers courts to sanction attorneys, the Supreme Court held that the rule is essentially a restatement of existing inherent powers, not an independent source of power to dispense with due-process safeguards. Thus, when a sanction is punitive, it collapses back into the contempt framework.

d) Substance Over Form
Citing Shakespeare’s “rose” metaphor, the Court emphasised that calling the $100 punishment a “Rule 801 sanction” could not disguise its punitive essence. Functional analysis—not labeling—controls.

3.3 Impact on Future Practice

1. Heightened Procedural Demands for Attorney Sanctions
   Trial judges may no longer rely on a quick Rule 801 citation to impose fines for tardiness, missed deadlines, discovery abuses, or similar misconduct when the sanction is non-compensatory. They must launch a separate Rule 42 proceeding or craft purely civil (coercive/compensatory) remedies.
2. Clarification That Tardiness Is Indirect Contempt
   Wyoming now aligns with jurisdictions that treat absence or tardiness as indirect contempt, which means no more summary punishment from the bench for being late.
3. Potential Revision of Rule 801
   Because the concurrence underscores tension between efficient attorney discipline and the procedural rigor of criminal contempt, the decision may prompt the Wyoming Judicial Conference or rule-making bodies to amend Rule 801 to clarify remedial vs. punitive sanctions and incorporate explicit procedures.
4. Professional Responsibility Ripples
   Ethics counsel must inform lawyers that seemingly minor lateness could trigger criminal-contempt-level exposure if the court chooses to seek punitive sanctions correctly.
5. Practical Courtroom Management
   Judges will likely resort more to admonitions, on-record warnings, or compensatory cost-shifting (payable to the opposing party) rather than fines payable to the clerk, unless they are prepared for a Rule 42 prosecution.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Direct vs. Indirect Contempt: Direct occurs in the judge’s immediate view (e.g., shouting at the judge); indirect occurs elsewhere (e.g., disobeying an order outside the courtroom, showing up late).
• Civil vs. Criminal Contempt: Civil aims to coerce compliance or compensate an injured party; criminal aims to punish past acts to vindicate the court’s authority.
• Rule 801 (U.R.D.C.): Wyoming-specific rule setting “Standards of Professional Behavior.” Sanctions available: reprimand, monetary sanctions, or “other” measures, but must follow notice-and-hearing safeguards in 801(a)(8).
• W.R.Cr.P. 42: Wyoming analogue to Fed. R. Crim. P. 42 governing criminal contempt. Requires a separate case, formal notice (order to show cause), and additional procedural rights.
• Jurisdictional Defect: When a court acts without lawful authority, its order is void; no waiver or later consent can cure the defect.

5. Conclusion

Goetz v. State establishes a bright-line rule in Wyoming: when a court fines a lawyer for professional misconduct and the fine is punitive, the sanction is indirect criminal contempt. That triggers W.R.Cr.P. 42 procedures—including a separate criminal action—regardless of whether the court invokes Rule 801 or inherent authority. Any deviation is a jurisdictional nullity.

The decision protects due-process rights but simultaneously complicates day-to-day courtroom management. Judges must now delineate remedial vs. punitive objectives with care, and attorneys must appreciate that even minor lapses, if addressed punitively, can escalate into criminal matters. The case therefore reshapes the intersection of professional-conduct enforcement, contempt jurisprudence, and court administration in Wyoming.