Gladstone v. Owens and the Jurisdictional Barriers to Federal Injunctions Against State Court Orders

I. Introduction

Gladstone v. Owens, No. 25-1345 (10th Cir. Dec. 1, 2025), is a nonprecedential but instructive decision from the Tenth Circuit addressing the limits of federal court intervention in ongoing or completed state domestic relations and property proceedings. The case sits at the intersection of several significant doctrines:

• The standard for preliminary injunctive relief under Winter v. NRDC.
• Younger abstention when federal relief would interfere with ongoing state proceedings.
• The Rooker–Feldman doctrine when federal relief would effectively overturn final state judgments.
• The scope of absolute judicial immunity in the context of purely prospective injunctive relief.
• Procedural rules limiting the scope of appellate review after Rule 59(e) motions.

The plaintiff, Stephen Gladstone, acting pro se, invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to sue two Colorado state judges, alleging constitutional violations in child custody and property partition proceedings. He sought emergency and preliminary injunctive relief aimed squarely at undoing or halting state court orders. The district court denied that relief, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that Gladstone failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits because his claims are jurisdictionally barred—either by Younger abstention (if state proceedings are ongoing) or by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine (if they are concluded).

Although the panel ultimately affirms, it also corrects an important error by the district court: the improper invocation of absolute judicial immunity to bar claims seeking only prospective injunctive relief against state judges. The panel clarifies that judicial immunity does not extend that far, but finds the error harmless given the more fundamental jurisdictional problems under Younger and Rooker–Feldman.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Gladstone filed a pro se civil complaint in the District of Colorado on August 13, 2025, alleging that:

• A state judge in a child custody case violated his due process and equal protection rights by:
  • Issuing a no-contact parenting order without clear evidence.
  • Ignoring evidence that he was a fit parent.
  • Participating in a coordinated effort to sever his relationship with his child, including alleged suppression of exculpatory evidence and tolerance of perjury.
  • Coercing him into therapy with providers who allegedly had conflicts of interest.
• A second state judge in a property dispute violated his right to a jury trial by taking “a series of improper procedural actions” in partition proceedings.

Contemporaneously with his complaint, Gladstone moved for:

1. A Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (the “TRO/PI Motion”) to:
   • Suspend enforcement of a January 31, 2025 “unconstitutional no-contact parenting order.”
   • Stay partition proceedings (including sale or division of property) until his unjust enrichment/fraudulent ownership claim could be resolved by jury verdict.
2. Later, an “Emergency Motion to Remove Improper ACP Enrollment” (the “ACP Motion”), seeking:
   • Immediate removal of his child and the child’s mother from Colorado’s Address Confidentiality Program (ACP).
   • Reinstatement of reunification therapy.

The district court:

• August 27, 2025 (Order): Denied the TRO/PI Motion, holding that Gladstone had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits because:
  1. Younger abstention may bar his challenge to the state proceedings.
  2. To the extent he sought to overturn final state orders, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine deprived the court of jurisdiction.
  3. Absolute judicial immunity barred his claims against the state judges.
• August 28, 2025 (Minute Order): Denied the ACP Motion, characterizing it as a request for injunctive relief and rejecting it “for the same reasons” as the August 27 Order.

Gladstone moved for reconsideration of both rulings (timely under Rule 59), then filed a notice of appeal before the district court ruled on those motions. The Tenth Circuit abated the appeal until the reconsideration motions were decided. The district court then denied reconsideration on September 11, 2025. Gladstone did not file a new or amended notice of appeal.

B. Scope of Appellate Review

Applying Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) and Matney v. Barrick Gold of N. Am., 80 F.4th 1136 (10th Cir. 2023), the Tenth Circuit holds that:

• Gladstone’s reconsideration motions are treated as Rule 59(e) motions (Price v. Philpot).
• Because he filed his notice of appeal before the Rule 59 motions were decided and he did not file a new or amended notice of appeal afterward, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review the order denying reconsideration.
• Thus, the only rulings properly before the court are:
  • The August 27, 2025 Order (denying TRO/PI Motion, as to its preliminary injunction aspects).
  • The August 28, 2025 Minute Order (denying the ACP Motion).

C. Standard of Review and Injunction Framework

The court reviews denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, a “high” standard. A district court abuses its discretion if it:

• Applies an erroneous view of the law.
• Makes a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.
• Or acts arbitrarily, capriciously, or whimsically.

Citing Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008), and Tenth Circuit cases such as Schrier and Beltronics, the panel reiterates the four requirements for a preliminary injunction:

1. Substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
2. Irreparable injury absent the injunction.
3. Balance of harms weighs in movant’s favor.
4. Injunction is not adverse to the public interest.

Because all four factors must be satisfied (Winter; Denver Homeless Out Loud v. Denver), failure on the first factor—likelihood of success—is dispositive.

D. The Four Appellate Arguments and the Court’s Disposition

1. Alleged misapplication of the Winter test.
   The panel rejects Gladstone’s claim that the district court failed to apply Winter. The court correctly identified the four-factor test and focused on the “likelihood of success” prong. It did not need to reach the remaining factors once it found Gladstone could not prevail on the merits.
2. Failure to conduct a separate Winter analysis for the ACP Motion.
   Gladstone argued that ACP enrollment caused independent harm and therefore demanded a separate injunction analysis. The panel holds that, since the district court had already concluded he lacked a likelihood of success on the merits (due to jurisdictional bars), it was not required to analyze irreparable harm or the other factors anew for the ACP Motion. Denial “for the same reasons” was not an abuse of discretion.
3. Failure to make Rule 52(a) findings of fact.
   Gladstone invoked Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), arguing that the court was required to make explicit factual findings. The panel explains that Rule 52(a) requires findings on “ultimate facts” only when the court is resolving factual disputes. Here, the district court denied relief based entirely on legal doctrines (Younger, Rooker–Feldman, judicial immunity), accepting the complaint’s allegations for purposes of the analysis. Thus formal findings of fact were unnecessary.
4. Wrongful conclusion on likelihood of success: Younger and Rooker–Feldman.
   Gladstone’s core challenge is to the district court’s conclusion that he could not likely prevail because his case is barred by Younger abstention or Rooker–Feldman. The panel disagrees with him and upholds the district court’s core jurisdictional reasoning, while correcting its overreliance on judicial immunity.

E. Holding

The Tenth Circuit affirms the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, holding:

• If the state child custody and property proceedings are still ongoing, Younger abstention applies because Gladstone seeks federal relief that would directly interfere with those proceedings.
• If the proceedings are concluded, Rooker–Feldman applies because Gladstone is essentially asking the federal court to vacate and overturn final state judgments that allegedly violated his constitutional rights.
• Either way, he is unlikely to succeed on the merits, so preliminary injunctions cannot issue.
• Absolute judicial immunity does not bar purely prospective injunctive relief against judges (Pulliam v. Allen), so that part of the district court’s reasoning is erroneous but harmless.
• Ancillary motions (for injunctions pending appeal and for judicial notice) are denied, largely as moot, and partly because the proffered material (a demand letter) is not a proper subject of judicial notice under Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Doctrines Cited

1. Preliminary Injunction Standard – Winter and Tenth Circuit Cases

• Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)
  The Supreme Court sets the modern standard: a plaintiff must demonstrate likelihood of success, likely irreparable harm, balance of equities, and consistency with the public interest. Winter rejects relaxed probability-of-success formulations for injunctions that significantly affect public interests.
• Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2005)
  The Tenth Circuit emphasizes that preliminary injunctions are an extraordinary remedy and the movant’s right to relief must be “clear and unequivocal.”
• Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2009)
  Rearticulates the four-factor test and confirms movants must carry their burden on each element.
• Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2016) and Denver Homeless Out Loud v. Denver, 32 F.4th 1259 (10th Cir. 2022)
  Used to support the panel’s view that failure to prove any one factor (here, likelihood of success) defeats the request; the court need not reach the others.

In Gladstone, the panel reaffirms a consistent theme: district courts may, and often should, deny preliminary injunctions at the threshold if the movant cannot show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. This is significant in abstention and jurisdictional contexts, where the “merits” issue is whether the court has authority to hear the case at all.

2. Younger Abstention – Younger, Sprint, Elna Sefcovic, Chapman

• Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
  Originally addressing federal interference with ongoing state criminal prosecutions, Younger holds that principles of comity and federalism generally bar federal courts from enjoining such prosecutions, subject to narrow exceptions (e.g., bad faith, harassment).
• Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013)
  Clarifies that Younger abstention is confined to three “exceptional” categories:
  1. Ongoing state criminal prosecutions.
  2. Certain civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions.
  3. Civil proceedings involving orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.
• Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660 (10th Cir. 2020)
  The Tenth Circuit explains that the third Sprint category is implicated when federal relief would “directly or indirectly thwart state court compliance processes” or otherwise interfere with state courts’ performance of their judicial functions.
• Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747 (10th Cir. 2006)
  Distills Younger’s requirements in the Tenth Circuit into a three-part test:
  • There is an ongoing state proceeding (criminal, civil, or administrative).
  • The state forum provides an adequate opportunity to raise the federal issues.
  • The proceeding implicates important state interests.
• Hunt v. Lamb, 427 F.3d 725 (10th Cir. 2005); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992)
  Establish the principle that domestic relations (including child custody and visitation) are traditionally a matter for state courts; federal courts are reluctant to exercise jurisdiction in this field.
• Bank of N.Y. v. Mehner, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (D.N.M. 2005)
  Cited to illustrate federal reluctance to intervene in local real estate disputes, another core area of state concern.

The panel applies these precedents by classifying Gladstone’s case within the third Sprint category. His requested relief—vacating a no-contact custody order and staying partition proceedings—would directly interfere with active state court orders and the state courts’ own processes for managing domestic relations and real property. That is precisely the kind of interference Younger is designed to prevent.

3. Rooker–Feldman – K.A. v. Barnes, Atkinson-Bird, Anderson

• K.A. v. Barnes, 134 F.4th 1067 (10th Cir. 2025)
  The panel quotes K.A. for the core Rooker–Feldman rule:
  • Federal district courts lack jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
  • It bars claims that the state judgment itself violates the plaintiff’s federal rights.
  • An action seeking to “void a state-court judgment is a quintessential case for application of Rooker-Feldman.”
• Atkinson-Bird v. Utah Div. of Child & Fam. Servs., 92 F. App’x 645 (10th Cir. 2004)
  Reinforces that a litigant cannot circumvent Rooker–Feldman by styling a challenge to a state court judgment as a civil rights action under § 1983. Rooker–Feldman is “most frequently applied” in that precise context.
• Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1986)
  Holds that federal courts lack jurisdiction over a § 1983 suit that “essentially [seeks] to undo the custody decision of the Colorado state court,” directly analogous to Gladstone’s effort to void custody orders.

In Gladstone, the panel treats the question of whether state proceedings are “ongoing” as uncertain; Gladstone’s complaint suggested they were, while a later filing suggested he had “exhausted” state remedies. The panel does not resolve the factual ambiguity because:

• If the proceedings are ongoing → Younger applies.
• If they are complete → Rooker–Feldman applies.

In either scenario, the federal district court is not a proper forum for what is, in substance, an attack on state court orders and judgments and an invitation to set them aside.

4. Judicial Immunity – Pulliam v. Allen

• Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984)
  Holds that absolute judicial immunity does not bar suits for prospective injunctive relief against judicial officers acting in their judicial capacity. Judicial immunity is directed primarily at shielding judges from damages liability—not from prospective orders aimed at preventing ongoing constitutional violations.

The district court erroneously extended absolute judicial immunity to bar Gladstone’s claims altogether. The Tenth Circuit corrects this misstep, recognizing that:

• Gladstone seeks only injunctive relief, not damages, against the state judges.
• Under Pulliam, judicial immunity therefore does not bar his suit on that ground.

However, this doctrinal clarification does not help Gladstone, because his suit is independently barred by Younger and Rooker–Feldman. The panel characterizes the immunity error as harmless.

5. Procedural Rules – Rule 52(a), Rule 59(e), FRAP 4, Judicial Notice

• Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)
  Requires a court deciding a case on a bench trial, or granting/denying an interlocutory injunction, to “find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.” The panel cites:
  • Att’y Gen. of Okla. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769 (10th Cir. 2009) – clarifying that the court must state the factual basis for its conclusions and the legal standard applied, but only as to “ultimate facts.”
  • Featherstone v. Barash, 345 F.2d 246 (10th Cir. 1965) – noting no formal findings are needed when there is no factual dispute and the complaint’s allegations are accepted as true.
  • Beacon Hill CBO, II, Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset Mgmt. LLC, 314 F. Supp. 2d 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) – suggesting formal findings are unnecessary when the injunction decision turns entirely on legal questions.
• Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and FRAP 4(a)(4)(B)(ii)
  
  • Rule 59(e) allows a motion “to alter or amend a judgment” within 28 days; Gladstone’s “motions for reconsideration” are treated as Rule 59(e) motions (Price v. Philpot).
  • FRAP 4(a)(4)(B)(ii), interpreted in Matney v. Barrick Gold, requires a party who wishes to challenge an order resolving a Rule 59 motion to file a new or amended notice of appeal after that order.
  • Because Gladstone did not file a new/amended notice of appeal after his reconsideration motions were denied, those denials are not reviewable on this appeal.
• Judicial Notice – Fed. R. Evid. 201; High Desert Relief, Inc. v. United States, 917 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2019)
  
  • Courts may take judicial notice of facts “not subject to reasonable dispute,” typically in official public records, whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
  • Gladstone submitted a demand letter he himself wrote to a state agency, asking for records. The panel correctly rejects judicial notice because such a document does not qualify as an indisputably accurate public record under Rule 201(b)(2).

B. Legal Reasoning in Depth

1. Why the Court Did Not Need to Analyze All Winter Factors

A common misconception among litigants is that a court must weigh and explicitly discuss each Winter factor for every injunction request. The panel clarifies that:

• Each factor is a necessary, not merely suggestive, requirement.
• Once a court soundly finds that the plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits (including because of jurisdictional bars), it is unnecessary—and often inefficient—to evaluate irreparable harm, balance of harms, or public interest.

In both the TRO/PI Motion and ACP Motion, Gladstone’s underlying claims rest on alleged constitutional defects in state court decision-making. Because those claims run into Younger and Rooker–Feldman, the district court correctly determined that he was unlikely to obtain relief on the “merits” in federal court, and thus could not satisfy Winter’s first prong.

2. Why the ACP Motion Did Not Require a Separate Analysis

Gladstone argued that the Address Confidentiality Program (ACP) inflicted distinct harm independent of the no-contact custody order. But for preliminary injunction purposes, the first question remains: “Is the underlying claim one the federal court can adjudicate?” The panel’s logic is:

• The ACP Motion, like the TRO/PI Motion, effectively attacks state court–related actions and orders (e.g., the conditions under which the child and mother are listed in ACP, and the associated therapy orders).
• If those claims are jurisdictionally barred by Younger or Rooker–Feldman, then Gladstone cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits in federal court—no matter how severe the alleged ACP harms.
• Therefore, a separate evidentiary or balancing analysis is unnecessary when the foundational jurisdictional obstacles remain the same.

3. Why Rule 52(a) Findings Were Not Required

Rule 52(a) ensures transparency in fact-intensive bench decisions—courts must reveal what facts they found and how those facts support their legal conclusions. But here:

• The district court did not resolve conflicting factual accounts, hold an evidentiary hearing, or weigh witness credibility.
• Instead, it assumed (or at least did not dispute) Gladstone’s factual narrative for preliminary purposes and held that, even taking his allegations as true, federal jurisdiction was lacking due to Younger and Rooker–Feldman.
• Thus, the “ultimate facts” themselves were not in dispute; the correctness of the district court’s decision turned on pure matters of law.

Under Tyson Foods, Featherstone, and similar authorities, that kind of purely legal disposition does not require formal Rule 52(a) fact findings.

4. Younger Analysis: Interference with State Custody and Property Proceedings

The panel’s Younger analysis proceeds in two steps:

1. Do the Chapman criteria apply?
   • Ongoing state proceeding? The complaint suggests yes; the later “exhaustion” notice suggests possible completion. The panel admits the record is unclear and expressly declines to resolve the ambiguity, because an alternative doctrine (Rooker–Feldman) would control if the proceedings are complete.
   • Adequate opportunity to raise federal issues? The panel notes “the Colorado state court proceedings offer Gladstone an adequate opportunity to litigate any federal constitutional issues.” Indeed, Gladstone concedes he raised constitutional issues in those state cases.
   • Important state interests? Domestic relations (custody, visitation, parental relationships) and local property law (partition and ownership of real estate) are classic areas in which states have primary responsibility.
2. Does the case fall within one of the three Sprint categories?
   • Gladstone argued his case fits none of the three. The panel disagrees, locating it squarely in category (3): civil proceedings involving orders that are “uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.”
   • The requested federal relief—vacating a no-contact parenting order and staying property partition proceedings—would “unquestionably interfere” with state courts’ ability to manage their dockets and enforce their own judgments.
   • That kind of relief is the paradigmatic scenario for Younger abstention in the civil context.

Hence, if the state proceedings are in fact ongoing, the federal court is obliged to abstain and cannot grant the injunctive relief Gladstone seeks.

5. Rooker–Feldman Analysis: Attempts to Void State Judgments

Assuming instead that the state proceedings have concluded by the time of the federal suit, the panel turns to the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The analysis rests on two key points:

1. Nature of the Injury Alleged.
   Rooker–Feldman applies when:
   • The plaintiff is a “state-court loser.”
   • The federal complaint alleges injuries caused by the state court judgment itself (as opposed to some independent wrong).
   • The requested federal relief would require review and rejection (or modification) of that state judgment.
   Gladstone’s complaint explicitly asks the federal court to “vacate” state orders (particularly the no-contact parenting order and partition-related orders) as unconstitutional. That is a direct attack on the validity of state judgments.
2. Labeling the Claim as a § 1983 Action Does Not Avoid Rooker–Feldman.
   Citing Atkinson-Bird and Anderson, the panel underscores that many Rooker–Feldman cases precisely involve § 1983 claims. It is the substance—an invitation to undo state judgments—that matters, not the caption or statutory reference.

Given that Gladstone’s core request is to have federal courts declare state judicial decisions unconstitutional and to set them aside, Rooker–Feldman strips the district court of jurisdiction if the state proceedings have ended.

6. Judicial Immunity: Correct Doctrine, Harmless Error

The district court had treated judicial immunity as a separate bar against the claims. The Tenth Circuit corrects that:

• Absolute judicial immunity primarily insulates judges from personal liability for damages for judicial acts within their jurisdiction.
• Under Pulliam, that immunity does not bar suits seeking prospective injunctive relief—for example, an order prohibiting future enforcement of a practice alleged to be unconstitutional.
• Because Gladstone seeks only injunctive relief, his claims are not barred by judicial immunity, at least in principle.

However, the panel finds no reversible error because:

• The dispositive jurisdictional ground (Younger/Rooker–Feldman) independently requires dismissal or abstention.
• Even if the district court had not invoked judicial immunity, it would still have to deny the requested injunctions for lack of jurisdiction.

C. Impact and Significance

1. For Litigants Challenging State Domestic Relations or Property Orders

The decision sends a clear signal to would-be federal plaintiffs, particularly pro se litigants dissatisfied with state custody or property decisions:

• Federal courts are not appellate bodies for state court decisions.
• Once a state court has ruled in a custody or property matter, the federal courthouse is almost never a proper forum for attacking that ruling—whether the attack is framed as a due process, equal protection, or other constitutional claim.
• Any federal complaint that seeks to vacate, overturn, or enjoin state court orders is highly likely to trigger Younger or Rooker–Feldman, or both.

2. For Federal Courts and Judicial Administration

The opinion reinforces several important institutional points:

• District courts may short-circuit preliminary injunction requests when jurisdiction is doubtful or lacking, without a full Winter analysis.
• Care must be taken not to misapply judicial immunity; judges are protected from damages, but not necessarily from prospective injunctive relief. However, jurisdictional doctrines are often the more appropriate tools for disposing of such cases.
• Domestic relations and local property questions remain areas where federal judicial intervention is most disfavored.

3. For Appellate Practice: Notices of Appeal After Rule 59 Motions

The decision also underscores a procedural trap:

• If a party files a Rule 59(e) motion and later wishes to appeal that ruling, FRAP 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) requires a new or amended notice of appeal to bring that post-judgment order within the appellate court’s jurisdiction.
• Failing to do so, as Gladstone did, confines the scope of the appeal to the original order—and precludes review of the reconsideration order, even if it might contain additional reasoning or corrections.

4. For the Doctrine of Judicial Immunity

The panel’s explicit reliance on Pulliam serves as a reminder that:

• Judicial immunity is not an all-purpose shield against all forms of relief.
• However, even where injunctive relief against judges is theoretically permissible, it will often be barred by other doctrines—especially abstention and Rooker–Feldman—when the relief would functionally override or preempt state court orders.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Younger Abstention (in Plain Terms)

Younger abstention is a rule that says: if you are involved in an ongoing case in state court, and that case deals with important state matters, the federal courts will usually refuse to step in and interfere—especially by issuing orders that stop or change what the state court is doing. This protects the balance between state and federal courts.

2. Rooker–Feldman Doctrine

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine is about timing and function:

• If a state court has already issued a final judgment against you, and you then go to federal district court asking the federal judge to say the state judgment was wrong or unconstitutional and to undo it, the federal court must refuse—only the U.S. Supreme Court can review state supreme court decisions.
• So, you can’t use a § 1983 lawsuit as a “back door appeal” of a state court judgment.

3. Preliminary Injunctions

A preliminary injunction is an emergency court order that temporarily requires someone to do something or stop doing something while the main lawsuit is still being decided. To get one, you must show:

1. You are likely to win in the end.
2. You will be hurt in a way that can’t be fixed later if the order is not granted now.
3. The balancing of harms favors you.
4. The public interest will not be harmed (and often will be helped).

Courts call this an “extraordinary remedy,” meaning you must clear a high bar to get it.

4. Absolute Judicial Immunity

Absolute judicial immunity normally protects judges from being sued for money damages for things they do as judges (like issuing orders) unless they act completely without jurisdiction. However:

• This immunity generally does not stop a lawsuit that asks only for an order telling a judge to stop or change certain practices in the future.
• But even such lawsuits may fail for other reasons, such as Younger or Rooker–Feldman.

5. Rule 52(a) Findings of Fact

When a judge decides a case without a jury, or decides a preliminary injunction, Rule 52 usually requires the judge to:

• Say which facts the judge believes and why.
• Explain how those facts lead to the legal conclusion.

But if the judge assumes the plaintiff’s facts are true and then decides, purely as a matter of law, that the court has no jurisdiction or that the claim is barred, the judge does not need to make detailed findings about the facts.

6. Rule 59(e) and Notices of Appeal (Practical Point)

If you ask the trial judge to reconsider a judgment under Rule 59(e) and then want to appeal both the original judgment and the denial of reconsideration:

• You must file a new or amended notice of appeal after the judge rules on your reconsideration motion.
• Failing to do so means the appellate court cannot review the reconsideration ruling.

V. Conclusion

Gladstone v. Owens is a compact but rich illustration of how federal courts handle efforts to use § 1983 and preliminary injunctive relief to revisit or interrupt state court child custody and property decisions. The Tenth Circuit affirms the denial of injunctive relief not because the underlying allegations are necessarily unfounded, but because federal courts lack jurisdiction—or must abstain—from the kind of relief Gladstone seeks.

The opinion underscores four main lessons:

1. Preliminary injunctions are disfavored and will be denied where the movant cannot show a clear likelihood of success, particularly when foundational jurisdictional doctrines (Younger, Rooker–Feldman) stand in the way.
2. Federal district courts generally cannot interpose themselves into ongoing state court custody and property proceedings, nor can they serve as appellate tribunals to overturn completed state judgments.
3. Absolute judicial immunity does not bar suits seeking only prospective injunctive relief against judges—but such suits will often fail anyway due to jurisdictional and abstention doctrines.
4. Procedural rules governing Rule 59(e) motions and notices of appeal strictly limit what appellate courts may review; litigants must handle timing and filings with care.

Although designated as nonprecedential, Gladstone is likely to be cited for its clear and concise synthesis of Younger, Rooker–Feldman, and judicial immunity in the context of attempts to obtain federal injunctive relief against state court orders in domestic relations and property disputes. It reinforces that the appropriate route for challenging such orders typically lies within the state appellate system, with the U.S. Supreme Court as the only federal court authorized to review final state judgments.