Ghostwriting While Suspended Is Unauthorized Practice Warranting Disbarment; POME Defense Inapplicable Without Pro Se Status

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Amended Opinion of the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge of the Supreme Court of Colorado in People v. Egbune, No. 24PDJ081 (June 11, 2025). The case involves attorney discipline of Respondent, Chuck Odifu Egbune (Reg. No. 26022), culminating in disbarment for the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5(a).

The matter arises from Respondent’s conduct after his three-year disciplinary suspension took effect on June 9, 2023. Despite that suspension, he continued to engage in legal advocacy for his sister, including filing a post-trial motion in the trial court and assisting with appellate filings in the Colorado Court of Appeals. The key issues addressed include: (1) whether ghostwriting and legal assistance by a suspended attorney for a nonlawyer relative constitutes the unauthorized practice of law; (2) whether the First Amendment petitioning doctrine articulated in Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court (POME) shields such conduct; (3) the procedural significance of a default in disciplinary proceedings; and (4) the sanctions framework under the ABA Standards when a suspended lawyer violates a disciplinary order.

The parties were the People of the State of Colorado (Complainant) and Respondent, who appeared pro se at the sanctions hearing. Attorney Erin R. Kristofco represented the People. Presiding Disciplinary Judge Bryon M. Large authored the opinion.

Summary of the Opinion

The Presiding Disciplinary Judge disbarred Respondent, effective upon issuance of the Order and Notice of Disbarment (with the opinion noting a typical thirty-five-day issuance under C.R.C.P. 242.31(a)(6), subject to rule-based variations). The Court found that after being suspended on June 9, 2023, Respondent continued to practice law by:

Filing a July 17, 2023 Rule 59 motion in Douglas County District Court advancing legal arguments on his sister’s behalf; and
Drafting or assisting his sister with appellate filings submitted March 26, 2024 in Colorado Court of Appeals cases 2023CA1721 and 2023CA1722.

The Court concluded that this conduct violated Colo. RPC 5.5(a). It applied ABA Standard 8.1(a) as the presumptive sanction, explaining that knowingly violating a prior disciplinary order generally warrants disbarment. Aggravating factors included Respondent’s prior discipline, refusal to acknowledge wrongful conduct, and substantial experience. The Court found no mitigating factors.

Procedurally, Respondent defaulted by failing to timely answer the People’s complaint, and his later efforts to set aside the default were denied for lack of excusable neglect, absence of a meritorious defense, and inequitable circumstances. His late motion to dismiss premised on POME and anti-SLAPP principles was denied as untimely and, in any event, inapplicable because the allegations and established facts showed he acted in a representative capacity, not pro se. Witness testimony established harm to opposing parties through unnecessary legal fees and burden on the legal system.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

POME (Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court), 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984), and In re Foster, 253 P.3d 1244 (Colo. 2011): The Court addressed Respondent’s argument that his litigation activity was protected petitioning activity, invoking the POME framework (objective baselessness and subjective improper motive). The Court ruled that POME is not jurisdictional but a defense that can be forfeited; Respondent’s default waived it. Moreover, POME applies to sanctions against pro se petitioning, not to representation of others. The facts established Respondent acted on his sister’s behalf, so POME’s heightened standard was inapplicable.
Ferraro v. Frias Drywall, LLC, 2019 COA 123: Respondent invoked Ferraro to suggest the Court could sua sponte test the complaint’s sufficiency and set aside default. The Court rejected this argument as untimely and inapt given default posture and the complaint’s allegations showing representative conduct for his sister. Ferraro did not rescue Respondent from default or convert his representative actions into pro se petitioning.
People v. Zimmermann, 960 P.2d 85 (Colo. 1998): Disbarment was imposed where a lawyer practiced during a disciplinary suspension. The Court analogized to Zimmermann and applied ABA Standard 8.1(a). Zimmermann supports that violating a disciplinary order by practicing law warrants disbarment.
People v. Kargol, 854 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1993): In contrast to Zimmermann, Kargol involved practicing under an administrative suspension, resulting in a suspension under ABA Standard 6.22 (knowingly violating a court order or rule). The Court used Kargol to draw the critical distinction between administrative and disciplinary suspensions, reinforcing that disciplinary-suspension violations are treated more severely.
People v. Redman, 902 P.2d 838 (Colo. 1995), and People v. Ross, 873 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1994): These cases contribute to the jurisprudence on unauthorized practice and discipline, supporting the sanction’s severity when court orders are disregarded.
Hearing Board/O.P.D.J. decisions: People v. Romero, 536 P.3d 353 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2023); People v. Layton, 531 P.3d 34 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2023); People v. Maynard, 483 P.3d 289 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2021): Recent decisions disbarring suspended lawyers for practicing through drafting agreements, acting in representative capacities, or ghostwriting substantiate the Court’s conclusion that similar conduct here warrants disbarment. These cases—involving shadow advising and ghostwriting—closely parallel Respondent’s conduct.
Framework Authorities: In re Roose, 69 P.3d 43 (Colo. 2003) (ABA Standards guide sanctions); In re Rosen, 198 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2008) (aggravating/mitigating factors not applied mechanically); In re Attorney F., 2021 CO 57 (case-by-case discretion emphasized).

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds along four tracks: established facts and rule violation; procedural posture and waiver; sanction selection under the ABA Standards; and rejection of asserted mitigation.

Established Facts and Rule Violation (Colo. RPC 5.5(a)): Respondent’s suspension began June 9, 2023. He thereafter:
- Filed a July 17, 2023 post-trial motion that expressly advanced legal arguments on his sister’s behalf (including arguments under Colorado’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act jurisprudence and citations to Miller v. Kaiser and Emarine v. Haley).
- Assisted with his sister’s appellate filings in March 2024. The Court inferred post-suspension assistance from multiple indicators: the briefs referenced rulings and trial outcomes that were unknown before the suspension; the filings matched Respondent’s writing style and legal sophistication; and the sister lacked legal training and had acknowledged limited understanding of the proceedings. The appellate brief also contained an admission referencing Respondent’s suspension mid-trial and his role in drafting.
On these facts, the Court concluded Respondent engaged in the practice of law during a disciplinary suspension, violating Colo. RPC 5.5(a). The Court treated ghostwriting and behind-the-scenes legal assistance as “practicing law,” especially where done by a suspended attorney for another person’s legal matters.
Procedural Posture and Waiver: Respondent failed to timely answer the complaint under C.R.C.P. 242.26, leading to entry of default under C.R.C.P. 242.27. His attempts to set aside the default under C.R.C.P. 55(c) failed because he showed no excusable neglect, no meritorious defense, and no equitable basis for relief. The Court emphasized that the POME/anti-SLAPP motion was not jurisdictional and, having been raised after default, was untimely and forfeited. Even if considered, the allegations and proved facts plainly showed representative, not pro se, conduct—rendering POME inapposite.
Sanction Selection Under the ABA Standards: The Court applied ABA Standard 8.1(a), which calls for disbarment when a lawyer knowingly violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order, causing injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession. The Court found:
- Duty: Respondent breached professional duties by disregarding the suspension order.
- Mental State: Knowing conduct; Respondent knew he was suspended.
- Injury: Harm to the legal system’s integrity, and concrete financial harm to adverse parties (testimony estimating roughly $25,000–$30,000 in fees for one side and approximately $23,000 for another) due to unnecessary litigation and appeals fueled by unauthorized law practice.
Aggravating factors included three prior public disciplinary matters, refusal to acknowledge wrongful conduct (including explicit lack of remorse), and substantial experience (licensed since 1995). No mitigating factors were found, notwithstanding Respondent’s assertions regarding religious retreat obligations, claimed cooperativeness, character, and health concerns. The Court noted the backdated extension motion and noncompliance with orders, concluding these circumstances did not mitigate the misconduct.
Rejection of POME/Anti-SLAPP Dismissal: Substantively, POME’s heightened standard protects pro se petitioning activity from sanctions absent a showing of objective baselessness and subjective improper motive. The Court underscored that Respondent’s actions were representative, not pro se. Procedurally, the motion was untimely after default and insufficient to halt the sanctions hearing, particularly as the complaint squarely alleged representative conduct (drafting, filing, and assisting on his sister’s behalf).

Impact

The opinion meaningfully develops Colorado’s disciplinary jurisprudence in several respects:

Ghostwriting by suspended lawyers is practicing law. The Court’s findings align with a growing line of O.P.D.J. decisions (Romero, Layton, Maynard) treating behind-the-scenes drafting and “shadow” assistance as unauthorized practice when done by suspended attorneys. The opinion emphasizes that labels do not control; a court may infer unauthorized practice from the content, sophistication, and circumstances of the filings.
POME is not a catch-all shield and must be properly invoked. POME’s protection pertains to pro se petitioning—not to representation of others. It is a defense, not a jurisdictional bar, and can be forfeited by default. Lawyers cannot use a pro se veneer to immunize surrogate representation.
Disciplinary v. administrative suspensions matter to sanction severity. Consistent with Zimmermann and Kargol, violating a disciplinary suspension order presumptively warrants disbarment (ABA Standard 8.1(a)), while practicing during administrative suspension may lead to suspension under Standard 6.22.
Strict adherence to disciplinary procedure and deadlines. The Court’s refusal to set aside default without excusable neglect, a meritorious defense, and equitable grounds reaffirms procedural rigor in C.R.C.P. 242 proceedings. Email spam and late, backdated motions did not justify relief.
Concrete harm counts. Testimony quantifying fees attributable to the unauthorized practice supported the injury analysis and fortified the sanction. The opinion also stresses institutional harm—undermining court authority and public trust.

Anticipated future effects include clearer guidance to suspended and disbarred lawyers that any legal assistance for others—including relatives—risks disbarment, and that undisclosed or “ghost” participation in litigation is especially perilous. Disciplinary authorities will likely continue to rely on stylistic and circumstantial evidence to prove ghostwriting. Courts may also more readily deny late POME/anti-SLAPP invocations where the conduct is plainly representative and defenses are asserted after default.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL): Practicing law without authorization includes not only appearing in court, but also drafting legal documents, providing legal advice, or otherwise advocating for another in legal matters. When a lawyer is suspended, any such conduct on behalf of others is unauthorized.
Ghostwriting: Preparing legal documents for a self-represented party without disclosure. When performed by a suspended attorney, it is treated as the practice of law, and if done for another person, it violates the suspension order. Disclosure does not cure a suspended lawyer’s inability to practice.
Disciplinary vs. Administrative Suspension: A disciplinary suspension is imposed as a sanction for misconduct; violating it is especially serious and commonly leads to disbarment (ABA Standard 8.1(a)). An administrative suspension (e.g., for CLE or registration lapses) is not punitive; practicing during that time is still serious but may be sanctioned under ABA Standard 6.22 with suspension rather than disbarment.
POME Doctrine: Protects the right to petition by requiring heightened showings before imposing sanctions on pro se litigants for their petitioning. It does not insulate a lawyer’s representative conduct for others. It must be timely raised as a defense and can be waived by default.
Default and Setting It Aside (C.R.C.P. 55(c)): To set aside a default, a respondent must usually show excusable neglect, a meritorious defense, and that relief would be equitable. Failing to monitor court orders or allowing emails to go to spam seldom satisfies excusable neglect, especially when coupled with noncompliance with deadlines.
ABA Standard 8.1(a): Provides that disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: These factors can increase or decrease the sanction’s severity. Aggravators here included prior discipline, refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing, and substantial experience. The Court found no mitigators applicable to Respondent’s conduct.

Notable Procedural Rulings

Default Entered; Efforts to Set Aside Denied: Respondent missed the answer deadline and then failed to meet extended deadlines, leading to entry of default. His later motions to set aside and to reconsider were denied for failing to meet the standards under C.R.C.P. 55(c).
POME/Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss Denied as Untimely and Meritless: The motion was filed a week before the sanctions hearing and after default. The Court held the defense was forfeited and, even on the merits, POME did not apply because the conduct was representative.
Sanctions Hearing Proceeded: The Court heard witness testimony (Victor Morales and Matthew Chudacoff) establishing injury and linking the appellate filings to Respondent’s authorship and strategy, thereby corroborating unauthorized practice and harm.

Practical Implications and Guidance

Suspended lawyers must refrain from all legal advocacy for others, including drafting briefs, advising strategy, or ghostwriting. Doing so violates the suspension order and invites disbarment.
Relatives are not an exception. Providing legal assistance to a family member is still “representation of another.”
POME cannot be retrofitted post-default. If POME is applicable, it must be timely asserted, and it will not apply where the lawyer acts in a representative capacity.
Courts and disciplinary authorities will evaluate circumstantial evidence—style, depth of legal analysis, knowledge of the record—to infer ghostwriting or shadow representation.
Procedural diligence matters. Monitor court orders and deadlines; “spam folder” explanations and backdated filings will rarely rescue a default.

Conclusion

People v. Egbune cements a clear rule for Colorado’s disciplinary regime: a suspended lawyer who assists another person—including by ghostwriting post-trial or appellate filings—engages in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of the suspension order and faces disbarment under ABA Standard 8.1(a). The opinion reinforces that POME is not a jurisdictional shield and, in any event, protects pro se petitioning, not surrogate representation. Procedural compliance in disciplinary matters is paramount; defaults will not be set aside absent strict showings, and late, strategically framed motions will not undo forfeitures.

In the broader legal context, the opinion advances the integrity of disciplinary orders, deters covert lawyering by suspended attorneys, and protects opposing parties and the courts from the burdens of unauthorized practice. Its message is unambiguous: once suspended, a lawyer must fully abstain from practicing law for others—openly or in the shadows—or risk the ultimate sanction of disbarment.

Case: People v. Egbune, No. 24PDJ081 (Colo. O.P.D.J. June 11, 2025) — Amended Opinion Imposing Sanctions under C.R.C.P. 242.31(B).