Georgia Aggravated Assault with Deadly Weapon as a “Crime of Violence” Under Sentencing Guidelines §4B1.2(a)(2)

Introduction

United States v. Omar Miller, decided January 13, 2025 by the Eleventh Circuit, addresses a recurring sentencing-guidelines question in felon-in-possession cases: whether a defendant’s prior convictions for Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualify as “crimes of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) sentencing enhancements. Omar Miller, a convicted felon, pled guilty to possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court imposed an 84-month term of imprisonment—based on a Guidelines calculation that elevated Miller’s base offense level to 24 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which requires at least two prior “crimes of violence”—followed by three years of supervised release. Miller contested the classification of his two prior Georgia aggravated-assault convictions as “crimes of violence,” and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on its precedents—including United States v. Morales-Alonso and United States v. Hicks—that bind panels to treat the Georgia offense as a qualifying predicate.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that:

Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon falls squarely within the enumerated-offense clause of the Sentencing Guidelines’ definition of “crime of violence” (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)), because “aggravated assault” is explicitly listed and the state statute’s elements “substantially correspond” to the generic definition.
Binding precedent—specifically, Morales-Alonso (2018) and Hicks (2024)—already resolved that the Georgia offense qualifies under a nearly identical Guidelines provision, and the prior-panel-precedent rule forbids re-litigation of the categorical correspondence or mens-rea arguments.
Miller’s reliance on Shepard v. United States to demand formal charging documents or indictments was misplaced: undisputed statements in the presentence investigation report (PSI) suffice for determining the statutory elements of his prior convictions.
Consequently, the district court correctly applied a base offense level of 24 under § 2K2.1(a)(2), and Miller’s 84-month prison term and three-year supervised release were affirmed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) – Held Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 2L1.2’s enumerated-offenses clause, because the state elements correspond to the generic offense.
United States v. Hicks, 100 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2024) – Extended Morales-Alonso’s reasoning to § 4B1.2(a)(2), affirming that Georgia’s aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is a “crime of violence” for career-offender purposes and reinforcing stare-decisis binding.
United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc) – Confirmed de novo review of Sentencing Guidelines interpretations, and that commentary is followed absent conflict with the Guidelines text.
United States v. Harrison, 56 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2023) – Clarified that whether an offense is a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines is reviewed de novo.
United States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024) – Addressed ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition; distinguished because no prior holding bound the panel on the statutory sub-clauses at issue.
United States v. Penn, 63 F.4th 1305 (11th Cir. 2023) – Similar ACCA “serious drug offense” question; found no binding precedent on the specific provision challenged.
United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019) – Described the “prior-panel-precedent” rule and rejected an overlooked-argument exception.
In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789 (11th Cir. 2015) – Reiterated that prior panels bind subsequent ones absent en banc contrary authority.
United States v. McCloud, 818 F.3d 591 (11th Cir. 2016) – Held that undisputed PSI statements satisfy Shepard requirements for determining the statutory elements of prior convictions.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court applied a multi-step analysis rooted in the categorical approach:

Identify the Guidelines provision. Section 2K2.1(a)(2) specifies a base offense level of 24 when a felon-in-possession has two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. It directs us to the definition in § 4B1.2(a) and its commentary.
Consult § 4B1.2(a) “crime of violence” definition. It contains two clauses: the “elements” clause (use of force) and the “enumerated-offenses” clause. Aggravated assault appears among the enumerated offenses.
Employ the “categorical” comparison. We compare the statute’s elements (O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon) to the generic federal offense. The question: are the elements “the same as, or narrower than,” the generic counterpart? If so, the conviction qualifies.
Respect binding precedent. Morales-Alonso concluded the Georgia offense corresponds to generic aggravated assault under § 2L1.2’s enumerated-offenses clause. Hicks extended that to § 4B1.2(a)(2). Under the prior-panel-precedent rule, those holdings bind this panel, regardless of arguments not previously advanced (such as specific mens-rea differences).
Shepard compliance. Miller argued the government needed formal Shepard documentation. The Court relied on McCloud to hold that undisputed PSI allegations suffice to identify the precise statutory provisions of his prior convictions.

3. Impact

This decision reaffirms and cements several key principles in federal sentencing practice:

Stare Decisis in Guidelines Interpretation. Panels remain bound by prior published panel decisions on the same statutory language unless overturned en banc—constraining relitigation of categorical correspondence and mens-rea arguments.
Clarity for Practitioners. Defense practitioners and sentencing courts in the Eleventh Circuit may no longer challenge Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a predicate crime of violence in § 2K2.1 cases.
Consistent Application of the Categorical Approach. The ruling underscores the boundary-point: if a state statute’s elements match or are narrower than the generic definition, the conviction qualifies—even if the state statute’s mens-rea language appears less specific.
Reliance on PSI Statements for Shepard. Reinforces that undisputed PSI descriptions of the statutory subsection are sufficient for determining predicate-offense eligibility.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical Approach: Instead of examining the defendant’s actual conduct, courts compare the legal elements of the state statute (e.g., “aggravated assault by means of a deadly weapon”) to the federal “generic” offense to decide if it qualifies as a crime of violence.
Generic Offense: A federal sentencing term that defines the baseline elements of certain crimes (like aggravated assault) for sentencing enhancement purposes.
Enumerated-Offenses Clause: A list of specific crimes (aggravated assault, robbery, etc.) in § 4B1.2(a)(2) that automatically count as “crimes of violence.”
Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, published panel decisions bind subsequent panels on questions of law, unless overruled en banc or by higher authority.
Shepard Documents: Under Shepard v. United States, courts may look only at certain official records (indictments, plea agreements, plea colloquies) to determine the statutory elements of past convictions for sentencing enhancements. Uncontested PSI statements are among those records.

Conclusion

United States v. Omar Miller crystallizes the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to defining “crime of violence” predicates under § 2K2.1(a)(2) and § 4B1.2(a)(2). It reinforces the binding nature of Morales-Alonso and Hicks in holding that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon meets the generic definition of aggravated assault. The decision affirms that mens-rea arguments and alleged overbreadth cannot escape established precedent, and that uncontested PSI language suffices under Shepard. Going forward, this ruling ensures consistency and predictability in the sentencing of felon-in-possession cases within the Eleventh Circuit and underscores the powerful role of stare decisis in federal sentencing jurisprudence.