Geographic Limits on “Underground Coal Mine” Status Under the Black Lung Benefits Act: Commentary on Fairfield Southern Co. v. Director, OWCP

Geographic Limits on “Underground Coal Mine” Status Under the Black Lung Benefits Act: Commentary on Fairfield Southern Co. v. Director, OWCP

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Fairfield Southern Company v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, No. 24‑10651 (11th Cir. Dec. 8, 2025), confronts a recurring but under‑analyzed question in Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) litigation: when, exactly, is a miner working “in one or more underground coal mines” for purposes of the fifteen‑year presumption in 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4)?

The case lies at the intersection of statutory definition, agency regulation, and administrative fact‑finding. It involves:

  • A railroad worker, Billie Barr, who spent over fifteen years transporting coal for U.S. Steel and Fairfield Southern Company.
  • His later years working at an aboveground coal preparation plant (the Concord plant), connected by over five miles of conveyor belts to the Oak Grove underground coal mine.
  • The question whether that aboveground, geographically separate facility counts as work “in” the Oak Grove underground coal mine, entitling him (and, after his death, his widow) to the favorable § 921(c)(4) presumption.

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion does two analytically distinct things:

  1. It joins the Tenth Circuit in holding that aboveground work can qualify as work “in” an underground coal mine for § 921(c)(4), so long as the work occurs within the physical bounds of that underground mine.
  2. It imposes a geographic constraint derived from the statutory definition of “coal mine”: facilities can be part of a single coal mine only if they are “upon, under, or above the surface of” the same “area of land.” A remote preparation plant five miles away, connected only by conveyor belts and intervening undeveloped land, cannot be treated as part of the underground mine on purely functional grounds.

This commentary unpacks the court’s reasoning, its deployment of statutory text and administrative law principles, and the implications for future BLBA claims, particularly those involving surface facilities, preparation plants, and extended coal‑handling infrastructure.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Barr’s Employment and Exposure History

Billie Barr worked as a railroad engineer from 1965 to 1997, first for U.S. Steel and later for Fairfield Southern Company. His work history breaks down into three key periods:

  1. 1965–1981: U.S. Steel – Concord Underground Mine
    Barr transported railcars to the Concord underground mine; miners loaded them with coal; Barr then moved the coal to other facilities. He had multiple extended absences during this time. While working, he was regularly exposed to coal dust.
  2. 1982–1984: Transition at Concord Site
    The Concord underground mine closed, and the site was converted into a coal preparation plant (the Concord preparation plant). Coal was delivered to this plant from the Oak Grove underground mine via a miles‑long conveyor belt system. The land between Oak Grove and the Concord plant was “forested and undeveloped,” apart from the conveyors.
  3. 1984–1987: Fairfield – Concord Preparation Plant
    Now employed by Fairfield, Barr picked up prepared coal from the aboveground Concord plant and transported it by rail to other facilities. In 1987 he stopped hauling prepared coal from Concord but continued working as a rail transport operator until 1997, with no further coal hauling.

Medically, Barr:

  • Smoked about 1.5 packs of cigarettes daily for 40 years.
  • Developed progressive breathing problems and filed a BLBA claim in 1994.
  • By 1997 required supplemental oxygen at least eight hours per day.
  • Died before the administrative proceedings concluded; his widow, Earlene Barr, continued the claim for survivor’s benefits.

B. Administrative Proceedings

Barr’s entitlement to benefits depended heavily on securing one of the BLBA’s statutory presumptions, in particular the fifteen‑year presumption in § 921(c)(4). That presumption, if triggered, would shift the burden to Fairfield to disprove that Barr’s disabling respiratory impairment was caused by coal‑related pneumoconiosis.

1. First ALJ Decision

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits, primarily because he found Barr could not invoke § 921(c)(4):

  • Underground mine work duration: The ALJ concluded Barr had fewer than fifteen years of work “in an underground mine” with U.S. Steel between 1965 and 1981, after accounting for his intermittent absences.
  • Concord plant not part of an underground mine: The ALJ held that Barr’s work for Fairfield at the Concord preparation plant did not constitute work “in an underground mine.” The Concord plant was at least five miles from Oak Grove, separated by undeveloped land, and he found it was not “appurtenant” to Oak Grove for purposes of the regulatory definition of “underground coal mine.”
  • No “substantial similarity” for surface‑mine presumption: Because the Concord plant was not part of an underground coal mine, it was treated (at most) as a “coal mine other than an underground mine.” On that premise, Barr would need to show that conditions at the Concord plant were “substantially similar” to conditions in an underground mine to benefit from § 921(c)(4). The ALJ found he had not made that showing.

On this basis, the ALJ held Barr ineligible for the fifteen‑year presumption and denied benefits.

2. Benefits Review Board’s First Decision

The Benefits Review Board reversed. Its key move was to reinterpret the regulatory term “appurtenant” in 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30):

  • The regulation defines an “underground coal mine” as a coal mine where the overburden is not removed and includes all land, buildings, and equipment “appurtenant thereto.”
  • The Board concluded that the ALJ had effectively adopted a “strictly distance‑based construction” of “appurtenant,” focusing on the five‑mile separation.
  • According to the Board, “appurtenant” turns primarily on “shared functions and relationships between properties,” not geographic proximity.
  • Because:
    • the Concord preparation plant and Oak Grove mine were owned by the same company,
    • they were physically connected by a conveyor belt system, and
    • they collectively prepared coal for sale,
    the Board held the Concord plant was “appurtenant” to Oak Grove “regardless of the distance separating them.”

On that legal premise, the Board held that Barr’s work at the Concord plant counted as work “in an underground coal mine” and that he therefore satisfied the fifteen‑year threshold for the § 921(c)(4) presumption. It expressly declined to reach an alternative argument that the Concord site remained an “underground mine” even after becoming inactive, and likewise did not reach the “substantially similar”‑conditions route.

3. ALJ on Remand and Second Board Decision

On remand, proceeding under the Board’s legal determination that Barr was entitled to the § 921(c)(4) presumption, the ALJ held Fairfield had failed to rebut the presumption and awarded benefits. The Board affirmed that award.

Fairfield then petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review, challenging:

  1. The notion that aboveground work can qualify as work “in one or more underground coal mines.”
  2. The Board’s conclusion that the Concord plant was part of the Oak Grove underground mine notwithstanding the five‑mile separation.
  3. The failure to reinstate the original denial rather than remanding for further proceedings.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

The Eleventh Circuit grants Fairfield’s petition, vacates the Board’s decision, and remands. Its holdings can be distilled into three core propositions:

  1. Aboveground work can be “in an underground coal mine.”
    The court “join[s] the Tenth Circuit” in holding that a miner may work “in an underground coal mine” even if his tasks are performed above ground, provided that work occurs within the boundaries of the underground coal mine as defined by statute and regulation.
  2. But remote preparation plants are not automatically part of an underground mine.
    Relying on the statutory definition of “coal mine” in 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2), which speaks of an “area of land” and property placed “upon, under, or above the surface of such land,” the court holds that geographic proximity matters. A preparation plant five or more miles away, separated by undeveloped land and connected only by conveyors, is not necessarily part of the same “coal mine.” The Board’s functional, distance‑insensitive reading of “appurtenant” conflicts with the statute and is therefore invalid.
  3. The ALJ’s factual finding that Concord was not part of Oak Grove is supported by substantial evidence.
    Given the record—showing a five‑plus‑mile separation and undeveloped land in between—the ALJ reasonably concluded the two sites were too far apart to be a single “area of land.” The Board exceeded its role by overturning this fact finding. However, instead of reinstating the denial outright, the Eleventh Circuit remands so that the ALJ and Board can consider, if appropriate, whether conditions at the Concord plant were “substantially similar” to those in an underground mine, which would open an alternative path to § 921(c)(4).

IV. Legal Analysis

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

The Black Lung Benefits Act provides benefits to miners disabled by pneumoconiosis—“a chronic dust disease of the lung and its sequelae” arising out of coal mine employment. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 902(b), 922(a)(1).

Key statutory definitions and provisions:

  • “Miner” – 30 U.S.C. § 902(d): includes individuals working “in coal mine construction or transportation in or around a coal mine” to the extent they were exposed to coal dust.
  • “Coal mine” – 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2): an “area of land” where coal is extracted from its natural deposits, plus all structures and equipment “placed upon, under, or above the surface of such land” and “used in, or resulting from, the work of” extracting or preparing coal. It also “includes custom coal preparation facilities.”
  • § 921(c)(3): an irrebuttable presumption applies if the miner has “complicated pneumoconiosis”—effectively deemed totally disabling as a matter of law.
  • § 921(c)(4): a rebuttable presumption applies if a miner:
    • is totally disabled due to a respiratory or pulmonary impairment; and
    • worked fifteen years “in one or more underground coal mines,” or in “a coal mine other than an underground mine” where conditions were “substantially similar” to those in underground mines.

Implementing regulations further define:

  • Eligibility elements – 20 C.F.R. § 725.202(d): a claimant must establish:
    1. the existence of pneumoconiosis,
    2. its causal relationship to coal mine employment,
    3. that it contributed to total disability, and
    4. total disability itself.
  • “Underground coal mine” – 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30): “a coal mine in which the earth and other materials which lie above and around the natural deposit of coal (i.e., overburden) are not removed in mining.” This definition includes “all land and buildings, and equipment, shafts, slopes, tunnels, and other appurtenances thereto.”

Crucially, early regulations (1971) already provided that work “in an underground coal mine” may occur “above the surface at the mine.” See 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(i)–(j) (1971).

B. Aboveground Work and the Meaning of “In an Underground Coal Mine”

1. The Court’s Adoption of a Broad, Text‑Based Reading

The central statutory phrase is “in one or more underground coal mines.” The Eleventh Circuit, tracking the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Sunnyside Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 112 F.4th 902 (10th Cir. 2024), rejects the employer’s contention that “in” requires the miner to be physically underground.

The court’s reasoning has three main pillars:

  1. The definition of “coal mine” already includes aboveground structures.
    Because § 802(h)(2) expressly includes buildings and equipment “upon, under, or above the surface of such land,” any “underground coal mine” (as a subset of coal mines) must also include its aboveground components. Relying on general linguistic logic that adjectives select subsets without altering the basic category, the court cites:
    • Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 586 U.S. 9, 19 (2018) (“‘critical habitat’ must also be ‘habitat’”), and
    • Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334, 341 (2019) (“full costs” still are “costs”).
    Thus, “underground coal mine” = a coal mine whose extraction occurs underground, but it remains a coal mine with both sub‑surface and surface elements.
  2. The word “in” must have a consistent meaning across § 921(c)(4).
    Section 921(c)(4) uses “in” twice, in immediate proximity:
    • “in one or more underground coal mines” and
    • “in a coal mine other than an underground mine.”
    The employer urged that “in” means “inside of” (enclosed within) in the first phrase. But that sense makes little sense in the second—“in a coal mine other than an underground mine”—because such mines are typically open‑pit or surface mine operations by definition. The court instead takes “in” to mean “within the boundaries of,” a usage supported by contemporary dictionaries.

    Applying the canon that the same word used in the same statute usually carries the same meaning, the court holds that in both phrases “in” refers to being within the spatial boundaries of a given coal mine, not to being physically under the surface.
  3. Longstanding regulations treat surface workers at underground mines as “in” the underground mine.
    The 1971 regulations defined “underground coal mine” to include aboveground land, buildings, and equipment, and expressly contemplated that miners could work “in an underground coal mine” while working “above the surface at the mine.” The current regulations preserve that structure. Given the Supreme Court’s recalibration of deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), the Eleventh Circuit does not defer automatically to these regulations but finds them persuasive as contemporaneous, consistent interpretations of the statute, citing Perez v. Owl, Inc., 110 F.4th 1296, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2024).

Together, these considerations lead the court to conclude that a miner can work “in” an underground coal mine while above ground, so long as he is working within the physical bounds of that mine as defined by § 802(h)(2).

2. Rejection of Fairfield’s Counterarguments

Fairfield advanced three main counterarguments, each of which the court systematically rejected.

  1. Purpose‑based limitation to underground workers.
    Fairfield argued that Congress’s purpose was to focus on underground workers, who face higher dust exposure, and therefore that § 921(c)(4) should be limited to workers physically beneath the surface. The court responds that the statute’s “best evidence of purpose is its text,” and even if a different policy goal could be hypothesized, an abstract “purpose can’t overwrite [the] ordinary understanding” of the words used, citing Gorecki v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration, 143 F.4th 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2025).
  2. Redundancy with the complicated‑pneumoconiosis presumption (§ 921(c)(3)).
    Fairfield worried that a broader reading of “in an underground coal mine” would blur the lines between § 921(c)(3) and § 921(c)(4). The court explains that the two provisions target distinct factual predicates and confer different presumptions:
    • § 921(c)(3) applies only to miners with complicated pneumoconiosis and creates an irrebuttable presumption of total disability.
    • § 921(c)(4) applies to miners with other, less severe respiratory impairments who can show total disability plus a qualifying 15‑year work history, and it creates a rebuttable presumption that pneumoconiosis caused the disability.
    Those differences remain whatever the precise spatial scope of “in one or more underground coal mines.”
  3. Alleged Supreme Court resolution in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.
    Fairfield contended that Usery, 428 U.S. 1 (1976), had already read § 921(c)(4) as limited to miners who worked underground. The Eleventh Circuit disagrees. Usery addressed the constitutionality of the presumption—specifically whether the evidentiary predicate bore a rational connection to the presumed fact. The Court noted evidence that disease prevalence increases with years worked underground, but did not resolve the statutory question whether the phrase “in one or more underground coal mines” is limited to miners physically under the surface. That interpretive issue remained open and is now resolved in favor of including aboveground work at underground mines.

3. Alignment with Other Circuits

The Eleventh Circuit’s approach:

  • Expressly aligns with the Tenth Circuit’s reading in Sunnyside Coal, which held that work at the surface facilities of an underground mine can qualify as work “in” an underground coal mine for § 921(c)(4) purposes.
  • Converges in result with earlier Fourth and Sixth Circuit decisions—Island Creek Kentucky Mining v. Ramage, 737 F.3d 1050 (6th Cir. 2013); Kanawha Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 539 F. App’x 215 (4th Cir. 2013)—which, under the pre‑Loper Bright regime, had deferred to the agency’s interpretation of “underground coal mine.” The Eleventh Circuit achieves a similar substantive result but grounds it more firmly in statutory text and long‑standing regulatory context, not Chevron deference.

    C. The “Area of Land” Limitation and the Status of the Concord Preparation Plant

    1. The Statutory “Area of Land” Requirement

    The opinion’s second major holding constrains how broadly agencies and courts may define a single “coal mine.” Section 802(h)(2) defines “coal mine” as:

    “an area of land and all structures, facilities, equipment, machines, tools, or other property, real or personal, placed upon, under, or above the surface of such land by any person, used in, or to be used in, or resulting from, the work of extracting in such area bituminous coal, lignite, or anthracite from its natural deposits in the earth by any means or method, and the work of preparing the coal so extracted, and includes custom coal preparation facilities.”

    Two elements are critical:

    1. Geographic element: “an area of land” and items placed “upon, under, or above the surface of such land.” By ordinary definition, an “area” is “a definitely bounded piece of ground set aside for a specific use or purpose” or a particular extent of space. The court cites contemporary dictionaries to underscore that a coal mine is tied to a specific geographic tract, not to a network of functionally related properties spread over indefinite distances.
    2. Functional element: the covered property must be used in, or result from, extracting or preparing coal, and “custom coal preparation facilities” are expressly included as coal mines in their own right.

    Thus, whether a given facility is part of a particular “coal mine” depends on both:

    • whether it lies on the same “area of land” as the extraction site, and
    • whether it is functionally tied to extraction or preparation of coal from that area.

    The Eleventh Circuit emphasizes that the Board erred in treating the functional test as effectively controlling “regardless of the distance separating” facilities. The statute does not contemplate an open‑ended, purely functional definition severed from geographic boundaries.

    2. The Board’s Reliance on “Appurtenant” and the Court’s Rejection

    The Board based its reversal on the regulatory term “appurtenant” in 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30), concluding that “appurtenant” primarily concerned functional relationships, not closeness in distance. In property law, “appurtenant” typically signifies that something is accessory to, or legally attached to, a dominant property or right (for example, an easement appurtenant to a parcel of land).

    The Eleventh Circuit holds that the Board’s use of “appurtenant” was impermissible because it conflicted with the statute’s geographic limitation:

    • Whatever “appurtenant” means in the regulation, it cannot be stretched so far that it obliterates the “area of land” requirement in § 802(h)(2).
    • When a regulation is interpreted in a way that conflicts with the statute, the statute controls. The court cites United States v. Marte, 356 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 2004), for the principle that a regulation cannot trump a clear statutory constraint.

    Accordingly, the Board’s proclamation that a facility could be part of a mine “regardless of the distance separating them” is labeled “a matter of law” error. Geographic separation is not dispositive in every case, but it is inherently relevant and cannot be ignored.

    3. Application to Concord and Oak Grove

    Applying this statutory framework and the proper standard of review, the court holds that the ALJ’s conclusion—that Concord was not part of the Oak Grove underground mine—is supported by substantial evidence:

    • There was “very little record evidence about the scope of the ‘area of land’ that constituted the Oak Grove coal mine.”
    • The record was “unequivocal” that:
      • the Oak Grove mining site and the Concord plant were at least five miles apart, and
      • the intervening land was forested and undeveloped apart from the conveyor belt system.

    On these facts, a reasonable fact‑finder could conclude that:

    • Oak Grove and the Concord plant occupied different “areas of land”; and
    • the conveyor belts, though physically linking the sites and functionally connected to coal preparation, did not make them a single coal mine under § 802(h)(2).

    Under the Longshore Act standard (incorporated into the BLBA) in 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3), an ALJ’s factual findings are “conclusive if supported by substantial evidence” in the record as a whole. The Eleventh Circuit therefore concludes that the Board should have deferred to the ALJ’s finding on this point and had no basis to replace it with its own functional, distance‑insensitive judgment.

    At the same time, the court emphasizes:

    • The Concord preparation plant is itself a “coal mine,” because § 802(h)(2) includes custom coal preparation facilities in the definition of “coal mine.”
    • It is simply not part of the Oak Grove “underground coal mine.” It is, for § 921(c)(4) purposes, a “coal mine other than an underground mine.”

    This classification is decisive for how Barr’s years at Concord can (or cannot) support the § 921(c)(4) presumption.

    D. Remedy and the “Substantially Similar” Alternative

    1. Why the Court Did Not Reinstate the ALJ’s Denial

    Fairfield urged the Eleventh Circuit not only to vacate the Board’s award but also to reinstate the ALJ’s original denial. The court declines for a procedural and doctrinal reason: the alternative “substantially similar” path to the presumption under § 921(c)(4) has not been fully adjudicated in a manner it can review.

    Recall the structure of § 921(c)(4):

    • Miners who worked “in one or more underground coal mines” for fifteen years get the presumption automatically if otherwise qualified.
    • Miners who worked in “a coal mine other than an underground mine” can get the same presumption only if they show workplace conditions were “substantially similar” to underground conditions.

    The ALJ initially found:

    • Concord was not part of an underground mine; and
    • Conditions there were not substantially similar to underground mine conditions.

    But the Board’s first reversal eliminated the need to address the “substantially similar” question, because it classified Concord as part of Oak Grove’s underground mine. The Board explicitly indicated that, if its “underground mine” analysis later proved incorrect, it would remand to the ALJ for reconsideration of the “substantial similarity” issue.

    The Eleventh Circuit notes:

    • A Board order remanding for further factual findings is ordinarily not a reviewable “final order.” See Redden v. Director, OWCP, 825 F.2d 337 (11th Cir. 1987); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Director, OWCP, 826 F.2d 1011 (11th Cir. 1987).
    • Circuit courts generally do not decide issues the agency has not fully addressed. The opinion cites United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1088 (11th Cir. 2009), and Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 368 F.3d 1300, 1303 n.7 (11th Cir. 2004).

    Because the Board never actually reached the “substantially similar” issue (and had indicated it would remand if necessary), the Eleventh Circuit refuses to pass on that factual/legal question in the first instance. Instead, it vacates the Board’s decision and remands for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

    On remand, therefore, the ALJ and Board must:

    • Treat Barr’s time at Concord as time worked “in a coal mine other than an underground mine,” and
    • Determine, on a properly developed record and applying the correct legal standards, whether the conditions there were “substantially similar” to conditions in underground mines for purposes of § 921(c)(4).

    V. Precedents and Authorities Cited: Their Role in the Decision

    The opinion situates its reasoning within a broader web of statutory‑interpretation and administrative‑law precedents. The following are particularly influential:

    A. Black Lung and Related Cases

    • Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976)
      Usery upheld the constitutionality of the BLBA’s presumptions against due process challenges. The Eleventh Circuit relies on Usery to describe the structure of § 921(c)(3)-(4) and to emphasize that the Supreme Court in Usery did not resolve the interpretive question presented here—whether “in one or more underground coal mines” requires that a miner work physically underground.
    • Oak Grove Resources, LLC v. Director, OWCP, 920 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2019)
      Cited for a straightforward description of the § 921(c)(4) presumption and its application. It confirms that, once the presumption applies, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut specific presumed facts.
    • William Bros. v. Pate, 833 F.2d 261 (11th Cir. 1987); Lollar v. Alabama By‑Products Corp., 893 F.2d 1258 (11th Cir. 1990)
      These cases articulate the standard of review:
      • Courts review the Board’s legal conclusions and statutory interpretations de novo.
      • The Board must accept ALJ factual findings if supported by “substantial evidence.”

    B. Statutory‑Interpretation and Administrative‑Law Authorities

    • Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 586 U.S. 9 (2018); Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334 (2019)
      These decisions support the linguistic principle that when a noun is modified by an adjective (“critical habitat,” “full costs”), the result is still a subset of the original noun category (“habitat,” “costs”). The Eleventh Circuit uses this logic to argue that an “underground coal mine” is still a “coal mine,” and thus includes aboveground features already covered by the broader definition.
    • Regions Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2019); In re Cumbess, 960 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2020); Sunshine State Regional Center, Inc. v. Director, USCIS, 143 F.4th 1331 (11th Cir. 2025)
      These cases stand for standard textual canons: that statutes should be read as a whole, that words are presumed to carry the same meaning throughout, and that structure and context matter in interpretation. The court employs these canons to harmonize the two uses of “in” in § 921(c)(4).
    • Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024); Perez v. Owl, Inc., 110 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir. 2024)
      Loper Bright significantly scales back Chevron‑type deference to agency statutory interpretations. Perez explains that courts may still find agency interpretations “especially useful” if they are contemporaneous with the statute and consistently applied. The Eleventh Circuit uses this framework to treat the early BLBA regulations as persuasive—not binding—authority supporting its reading of “underground coal mine.”
    • State v. Meadows, 88 F.4th 1331 (11th Cir. 2023); Jimenez v. Department of Homeland Security, 119 F.4th 892 (11th Cir. 2024); Gorecki v. Commissioner, SSA, 143 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2025)
      Cited for the proposition that statutory “purpose” cannot override clear text. The court relies on these cases to reject Fairfield’s invitation to narrow § 921(c)(4) based on a perceived policy focus on underground workers.
    • United States v. Marte, 356 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2004)
      Quoted for the principle that interpretive conflict between a regulation and its authorizing statute must be resolved in favor of the statute. This underpins the court’s rejection of the Board’s broad “appurtenant” construction when it treated distance as irrelevant.

    C. Finality and Issue‑Preservation Cases

    • Redden v. Director, OWCP, 825 F.2d 337 (11th Cir. 1987); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Estate of Verderane, 729 F.2d 726 (11th Cir. 1984); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Director, OWCP, 826 F.2d 1011 (11th Cir. 1987)
      These cases establish that Board orders remanding to ALJs for further findings are generally not “final orders” subject to appellate review. The Eleventh Circuit uses this to explain why it will not short‑circuit the Board’s contemplated remand on the “substantially similar” question.
    • United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082 (11th Cir. 2009); Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 368 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2004)
      These cases restate the “general rule” that appellate courts do not decide issues not passed on below. The Eleventh Circuit invokes them to justify declining to adjudicate the “substantial similarity” issue before the Board has done so.

    VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

    This section distills key technical concepts in more accessible terms, useful for non‑specialists or newer practitioners.

    A. Pneumoconiosis and the BLBA Presumptions

    • Pneumoconiosis is commonly called “black lung”—a chronic lung disease caused by inhaling coal dust, leading to scarring and loss of lung function.
    • Complicated pneumoconiosis is a severe form, often visible on x‑rays as large opacities. Under § 921(c)(3), if a miner has complicated pneumoconiosis, the law conclusively presumes (irrebuttably) that he is totally disabled by it.
    • The § 921(c)(4) fifteen‑year presumption benefits miners with less severe lung disease who:
      • proved total disability from a respiratory or pulmonary condition, and
      • worked fifteen years in qualifying coal mine employment (either underground, or in a surface mine with substantially similar conditions).
      For them, the law presumes that pneumoconiosis caused the disability, but the employer can rebut that presumption.

    B. “In an Underground Coal Mine” vs. “In a Coal Mine Other Than an Underground Mine”

    Section 921(c)(4) draws a crucial distinction:

    • Underground coal mines: If a miner worked at least fifteen years “in one or more underground coal mines,” he automatically qualifies for the presumption (subject to rebuttal).
    • Other coal mines (surface mines, preparation plants, etc.): If a miner worked at least fifteen years “in a coal mine other than an underground mine,” he must also show his working conditions were “substantially similar” to underground mines. This often requires evidence of dust levels, ventilation, enclosed spaces, or comparable exposure risks.

    The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion clarifies two things:

    1. Aboveground work on the premises of an underground mine—e.g., at the mine’s tipple, surface conveyors, or loadout—is still work “in” that underground coal mine.
    2. But not every facility that handles coal for an underground mine qualifies. If a plant sits on different land, miles away, it is a separate “coal mine” and falls into the “other than an underground mine” category for § 921(c)(4), unless its conditions qualify under the “substantially similar” route.

    C. “Coal Mine” and the “Area of Land” Concept

    A “coal mine” under § 802(h)(2) is not just the physical hole in the ground; it is:

    • a particular parcel or tract of land used for mining, and
    • all the buildings and machinery on, under, or above that land used for extracting or preparing coal.

    A company can thus operate:

    • multiple separate “coal mines,” including distinct surface plants or loadout facilities,
    • even if they are functionally connected and owned by the same operator.

    Fairfield Southern confirms that the statute cares about geography: to be part of the same mine, facilities must share the same “area of land,” not just a functional relationship via conveyors or rail.

    D. “Appurtenant”

    In many legal contexts, “appurtenant” means “attached to” or “belonging to” something more important. For instance, a driveway easement “appurtenant” to Lot A benefits whichever owner holds Lot A.

    In the BLBA regulations, “appurtenant” appears in the definition of “underground coal mine” as including all land, buildings, and equipment “appurtenant thereto.” The Board had treated “appurtenant” as largely functional—anything functionally connected to a mine counted, no matter how far away. The Eleventh Circuit clarifies that “appurtenant” cannot be read in a way that ignores the statute’s requirement that all parts of one mine be on the same “area of land.”

    E. “Substantial Evidence” and the Roles of ALJ, Board, and Court

    In BLBA and Longshore‑type cases:

    • The ALJ hears testimony, weighs evidence, and makes factual findings.
    • The Benefits Review Board reviews the ALJ’s legal conclusions de novo, but must uphold factual findings if supported by “substantial evidence.”
    • The court of appeals reviews the Board’s application of law and whether it respected the substantial evidence standard.

    “Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” It is more than a mere scintilla but less than the weight that would be required to convince the fact‑finder beyond a reasonable doubt.

    In Fairfield Southern, the Eleventh Circuit held that:

    • the ALJ’s finding—that the Conccord plant was not part of the Oak Grove mine—was supported by substantial evidence (primarily the five‑plus‑mile separation and undeveloped intervening land), and
    • the Board erred by effectively substituting its own view of the evidence (based on functional connections) for the ALJ’s geographically grounded finding.

    F. Post‑Chevron Deference (Loper Bright) and Persuasive Agency Interpretations

    Under the former Chevron doctrine, courts often deferred to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Loper Bright reshaped this landscape by curtailing automatic deference, emphasizing:

    • Courts must exercise independent judgment in interpreting statutes.
    • Agency interpretations can still be persuasive, especially if contemporaneous with the statute and consistently applied.

    In Fairfield Southern, the Eleventh Circuit:

    • Does not simply defer to the Department of Labor’s definitions of “underground coal mine.”
    • But finds early regulations persuasive because they align with the statutory text and have been consistently applied, especially the idea that surface facilities at underground mines are part of those mines.
    • Declines to accept the Board’s more recent, expansive reading of “appurtenant” because it conflicts with the unambiguous “area of land” language in § 802(h)(2).

    VII. Impact and Future Implications

    A. Effects on BLBA Claims in the Eleventh Circuit

    For miners, survivor‑claimants, and employers within the Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida, Georgia), Fairfield Southern establishes a two‑sided precedent.

    1. Broader Eligibility for Aboveground Workers at Underground Mines

    The decision is favorable to miners in that it:

    • Confirms that work above ground but at the premises of an underground mine—such as:
      • railroad engineers moving cars at the mine site,
      • tipple workers,
      • surface conveyor operators,
      • surface maintenance crews—
      counts as time worked “in an underground coal mine.”
    • Allows such aboveground years to be aggregated with sub‑surface years toward the fifteen‑year threshold without requiring proof of “substantial similarity.”

    2. Stricter Geographic Limits on Remote Facilities

    The decision is favorable to employers in that it:

    • Prevents remote preparation plants, loadouts, or other coal‑handling facilities, separated by appreciable distances and undeveloped land from the mine, from automatically being treated as part of an underground coal mine based solely on functional ties (same ownership, conveyors, or rail lines).
    • Requires claimants to use the “substantially similar” route for § 921(c)(4) when their work is at such remote facilities, which can be factually demanding.
    • Encourages employers to develop detailed record evidence of mine boundaries, property deeds, maps, and distances to argue that particular facilities are distinct “coal mines” rather than parts of an underground mine.

    B. Guidance for ALJs and the Benefits Review Board

    The opinion sends a clear message about institutional roles:

    • ALJs should:
      • make explicit factual findings about the geographic scope of each “coal mine” involved, including distances and physical features separating sites; and
      • address both the “underground mine” and “other mine with substantially similar conditions” routes to § 921(c)(4) where relevant, to avoid later remands.
    • The Board must:
      • respect the substantial‑evidence standard and avoid reweighing facts under the guise of legal interpretation; and
      • interpret regulatory terms like “appurtenant” consistently with the statute’s “area of land” limitation, keeping geographic factors in the analysis.

    C. Doctrinal Significance Beyond Black Lung Cases

    The opinion illustrates broader themes in current federal jurisprudence:

    • Textualism and statutory structure: The court’s analysis of “in,” “coal mine,” and “area of land” exemplifies a text‑first, structure‑sensitive approach that is increasingly dominant in the Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit.
    • Post‑Chevron deference: The court’s treatment of longstanding DOL regulations as persuasive but not controlling under Loper Bright provides a blueprint for how lower courts might handle similar regime shifts in other regulatory statutes.
    • Geographic constraints on regulatory categories: The insistence that a legally defined site (here, a “coal mine”) is tied to a specific geographic “area of land” may influence disputes in other contexts (e.g., environmental regulation, occupational safety, or benefits cases) where agencies seek to group multiple, spatially separated facilities into a single regulatory “unit” based primarily on functional integration.

    D. Potential for Future Circuit Splits or Supreme Court Review

    Although Fairfield Southern aligns with the Tenth Circuit’s Sunnyside Coal and is broadly consistent with pre‑Loper Bright decisions in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, there remains room for future divergence:

    • Other circuits may adopt different thresholds for what counts as the same “area of land,” potentially leading to inconsistent outcomes for multi‑site operations.
    • Centralized preparation facilities, river terminals, or rail loadouts located some intermediate distance from underground mines may generate closer cases and varied fact‑patterns.
    • If substantial differences emerge about how far a mine’s “area of land” can reasonably extend, or about how to weigh conveyors and easements, the issue could eventually warrant Supreme Court review or prompt further DOL rulemaking.

    VIII. Conclusion

    Fairfield Southern Co. v. Director, OWCP is a significant Black Lung Benefits Act decision that clarifies both who may invoke the fifteen‑year presumption and where that work must occur.

    Its key contributions are:

    • It holds that the statutory phrase “in one or more underground coal mines” is not limited to work physically underground; aboveground workers at an underground mine can qualify, consistent with the broad statutory definition of “coal mine” and long‑standing regulations.
    • It insists that the definition of “coal mine” is tied to a specific “area of land,” thereby imposing meaningful geographic limits on what facilities count as part of a given mine. A remote preparation plant several miles away, connected only by conveyors and shared ownership, is treated as a separate coal mine, not part of the underground mine.
    • It reinforces the division of authority in BLBA adjudication: ALJs are primary fact‑finders whose determinations must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence; the Board may correct legal errors but may not rewrite factual findings on thin or policy‑driven grounds.
    • It leaves open, on remand, the possibility that work at a remote preparation plant can still support the § 921(c)(4) presumption via the “substantially similar conditions” path for non‑underground coal mines.

    In the broader legal landscape, the case exemplifies a post‑Loper Bright approach that privileges statutory text and structure, treats agency regulations as informative but not controlling, and resists agency interpretations that drift beyond clear statutory boundaries. For BLBA practitioners, it provides concrete guidance on how to frame evidence and argument about mine boundaries, site relationships, and the pathways to the fifteen‑year presumption for miners who work in complex, multi‑facility coal operations.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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