Gentles v. Borough of Pottstown: Third Circuit Re-Affirms the Limits of Terry Stops Predicated on Anonymous Tips and Clarifies the Treatment of “Self-Serving” Affidavits at Summary Judgment

Introduction

In Sekema Gentles v. Borough of Pottstown, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit revisited two recurring themes in Fourth Amendment and civil-rights litigation:

When, and to what extent, police may rely on an anonymous tip to conduct an investigative detention (“Terry stop”).
How district courts must evaluate a plaintiff’s own affidavit—often labeled “self-serving”—when deciding a motion for summary judgment.

The case arose after Pottstown police, acting on a phoned-in anonymous report of a Black man “looking into garage windows,” stopped, handcuffed, searched, and detained homeowner Sekema Gentles, ultimately citing him for disorderly conduct. Gentles sued Officers Jeffrey Portock and Brandon Unruh under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Fourth Amendment and under state law for malicious prosecution. The District Court granted summary judgment to the officers, but the Third Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded, producing a detailed opinion (marked “Not Precedential”) that nonetheless crafts important analytical refinements for future litigants.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit:

Vacated summary judgment on Gentles’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim against both officers, holding that genuine disputes of material fact existed as to (i) whether reasonable suspicion justified the initial stop, and (ii) whether the scope and 20-minute duration of the detention were reasonable.
Vacated summary judgment on Gentles’s state-law malicious-prosecution claim against Officer Portock because a jury could find a lack of probable cause for the disorderly-conduct citation.
Affirmed summary judgment for Officer Unruh on the malicious-prosecution claim (Gentles had conceded Unruh did not institute the citation).
Declined to resolve qualified-immunity and statutory-immunity defenses, finding the factual record insufficiently developed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The court situated its analysis within a rich framework of Supreme Court and circuit authority:

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) – Foundation for investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) – Clarifies that unprovoked flight can contribute to reasonable suspicion.
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) – Anonymous tips must be reliable in their “assertion of illegality,” not merely in identifying a person.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) – Reasonable suspicion requires a “particularized and objective basis.”
United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2006) – Combines tip reliability with officer observation; rejects reliance on tip that simply describes innocuous conduct.
Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2003) – Reminds that legal activity alone cannot form reasonable suspicion without more.
Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2018) – Holds that a non-conclusory affidavit based on personal knowledge cannot be discounted as “self-serving.”
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) – A Terry stop’s scope must remain tailored to its mission.
State-law references: Kelley v. Teamsters (probable cause/malice) and 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5503 (disorderly conduct).

Each precedent fed into two dispositive questions: (1) Did the officers have a sufficiently reliable basis to stop Gentles at all, and (2) once the stop began, did their actions stay within constitutional bounds?

2. Legal Reasoning

a. “Seizure” Timing

The court pinpointed the moment of seizure when Officer Portock told Gentles he was “not free to leave” and Gentles remained in his car—an explicit “show of authority” under Hodari D. This chronology matters because only pre-seizure facts inform the reasonable-suspicion analysis.

b. Reliability of the Anonymous Tip

Applying the Torres multi-factor test, the panel found the phoned-in tip weak: the caller was anonymous and unaccountable; the conduct described was innocuous (looking at garages) and already over; and there were no predictive details. Under J.L., such a tip cannot independently justify a stop.

c. Officer Observations and Alleged Flight

Officer Portock saw Gentles standing by a car with the reported license plate, but that observation only corroborated identity, not illegality. Whether Gentles “rushed” to his vehicle (suggesting flight) or walked normally was disputed. Because mere walking away is not “headlong flight” (Valentine), the supposed evasive act could not bolster a deficient tip at the summary-judgment stage.

d. Scope and Duration of the Stop

Even if initiation were valid, the handcuffing, pocket search, and 20-minute detention demanded justification. The court highlighted facts a jury could view as excessive: no evidence Gentles posed a threat, no effort to ask basic clarifying questions before cuffing, and the officers’ failure to cease the detention promptly once Gentles’s fiancée explained their presence. Under Hiibel and allied cases, such conduct may transform a permissible Terry stop into an unreasonable seizure.

e. Malicious Prosecution – Probable Cause for “Unreasonable Noise”

The panel turned to Pennsylvania law, noting that the statute targets volume, not content. Competing accounts existed: Officer Portock claimed Gentles’s language drew neighbors outside; Gentles said neighbors were already present and he “never became belligerent.” Because credibility determinations are for a jury, probable cause could not be decided as a matter of law.

f. Summary-Judgment Evidentiary Standard

A procedural but vital holding: the District Court erred in dismissing Gentles’s affidavit as “self-serving and conclusory.” The Third Circuit reiterated its rule from Paladino—a first-person, non-conclusory statement is competent evidence and can single-handedly create a triable issue.

3. Impact

Although designated “Not Precedential,” the opinion is citable for persuasive value and offers several practical consequences:

Police Practice: Officers in the Third Circuit must scrutinize anonymous tips more carefully, recognizing that corroboration of identity alone may not ground reasonable suspicion. Proactive questioning, rather than immediate handcuffing, is advisable to contain Terry stops within permissible bounds.
Civil-Rights Litigation: Plaintiffs’ affidavits carry renewed force at summary judgment. District courts must analyze their substance, not dismiss them as “self-serving” boilerplate.
Malicious Prosecution Elements: For state claims, factual disputes over noise level or other probable-cause variables will often preclude judgment as a matter of law.
Qualified Immunity: The court’s willingness to bypass immunity defenses pending factual resolution signals that when material facts are controverted, officers may need to face trial before obtaining immunity determinations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Terry Stop: A brief, on-the-spot detention for investigation, allowed when police have “reasonable suspicion”—less than probable cause but more than a hunch—that crime is afoot.
Reasonable Suspicion: Specific, articulable facts that collectively suggest wrongdoing. It must relate to the person stopped, not just to a general area or type of conduct.
Anonymous Tip: Information from an unidentified caller or informant. Courts evaluate its reliability by considering accountability, contemporaneity, detail, and corroboration.
Probable Cause: Facts sufficient to make a reasonable person believe a suspect committed a crime. Higher threshold than reasonable suspicion and required for arrest or citation.
Malicious Prosecution (Pennsylvania): A civil action alleging that legal proceedings were initiated without probable cause and with malice, later ending in the plaintiff’s favor.
Self-Serving Affidavit: A sworn statement by a party that supports that party’s case. It is admissible evidence if based on personal knowledge and not purely conclusory.

Conclusion

Gentles v. Borough of Pottstown underscores two doctrinal guardrails: (1) anonymous tips, without reliable indicia of criminality, cannot justify detentions, and (2) courts must weigh competent first-person affidavits at the summary-judgment stage. While the opinion’s “non-precedential” label limits its formal binding effect, its reasoning provides a roadmap for litigants and law-enforcement agencies alike. Future cases in the Third Circuit will likely cite Gentles whenever the sufficiency of anonymous tips, the reasonableness of extended Terry stops, or the evidentiary weight of a plaintiff’s affidavit are at issue. Ultimately, the decision reinforces constitutional protections against intrusive policing and preserves the jury’s role as arbiter of contested facts.