Generic National Sentencing Statistics Do Not Prove “Unwarranted Disparity” Without Apples-to-Apples Comparability

Introduction

In United States v. Oscar Pena-Sanregre (11th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 46-month within-Guidelines sentence for methamphetamine distribution and possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii). The defendant—Oscar Pena-Sanregre—argued the sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court (1) gave insufficient weight to mitigation (mental health and financial hardship) and (2) created an unwarranted sentencing disparity by declining to vary downward to align with national averages/medians he located in the Judiciary Sentencing Information database.

The central issues were (a) the scope of deference owed to a district court’s weighing of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors on substantive-reasonableness review, and (b) what a defendant must show to establish an “unwarranted disparity” under § 3553(a)(6) when relying on generalized national sentencing statistics.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held the sentence was substantively reasonable. The district court: (1) considered the defendant’s mitigation evidence, but found it not extraordinary; (2) emphasized the seriousness and circumstances of the offense—multiple meth sales over months, high purity meth, and additional drugs stored at home where family lived; and (3) rejected the claimed disparity because the defendant’s statistics did not account for transaction-specific circumstances, failing the “apples to apples” requirement for § 3553(a)(6) comparisons.

The panel stressed that disagreement with how the district court weighed factors does not establish abuse of discretion, particularly where the court acknowledged it considered the § 3553(a) factors and the defendant’s arguments and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the advisory range (46–57 months).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Provided the governing standard—substantive-reasonableness review considers the totality of circumstances under a deferential abuse-of-discretion framework. The panel used Gall to anchor deference to the sentencing court’s judgment, especially for within-Guidelines sentences.
• United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008): Reinforced the “considerable discretion” district courts possess in sentencing. Here, it supported the idea that a defendant must show more than a plausible alternative weighing of factors.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010): Supplied the Eleventh Circuit’s articulation of abuse-of-discretion errors in sentencing: failing to consider important factors, giving weight to improper factors, or making a clear error of judgment in balancing proper factors. The panel evaluated the district court’s decision through this tripartite lens.
• United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2009): The key comparator principle: a disparity claim “assumes that apples are being compared to apples.” The opinion relied on Docampo to reject generic data that does not establish defendants are similarly situated.
• United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2011): Used to underscore the practical difficulty of evaluating national comparisons without sufficient factual detail and to signal skepticism toward treating sentencing as a “national grade curve.” This supported the district court’s insistence on transaction-specific comparability.
• United States v. Sotis, 89 F.4th 862 (11th Cir. 2023): Reinforced that courts analyze the concrete facts of other cases (crime circumstances, conduct details) to determine whether defendants are truly similarly situated—precisely what the defendant’s aggregate statistics did not provide.
• United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2018) and United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009): Both emphasize “due deference” to a district court’s weighing of § 3553(a) factors and variance decisions, supporting affirmance where the court addressed the core arguments and acted within the realm of reasonable sentencing choices.
• United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310 (11th Cir. 2024): Stood for the proposition that a district court need not explicitly discuss each § 3553(a) factor so long as it acknowledges considering them and the defendant’s arguments. This undercut any suggestion that the court’s explanation was inadequate because it did not canvass every factor.
• United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Central to the court’s response to mitigation arguments—district courts may attach “great weight” to some factors over others, and appellate courts generally will not reweigh those considerations.
• United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007): Offered the “definite and firm conviction” standard for overturning a sentence as substantively unreasonable—helping frame why a bottom-of-range sentence, supported by articulated concerns, fell comfortably within “the range of reasonable sentences.”

Legal Reasoning

1. Within-Guidelines, bottom-of-range sentence + articulated reasons = strong deference. The district court adopted a 46–57 month advisory range and chose 46 months. While not presumptively reasonable as a formal rule, such sentences typically receive substantial deference when the record reflects consideration of relevant § 3553(a) factors.
2. Mitigation was considered, but found not extraordinary. The court addressed the defendant’s mental health and financial circumstances, but deemed them not “extraordinary” and “not at all unusual” relative to typical sentencing presentations. It further reasoned that the Guidelines already accounted for:
   • lack of criminal history (criminal history category I and “zero-point offender” credit),
   • acceptance of responsibility, and
   • safety-valve eligibility (allowing sentence “without regard” to the 60-month mandatory minimum via 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)).
   On appeal, the panel treated this as classic discretionary weighing rather than an omission of relevant factors.
3. “Unwarranted disparity” requires comparability in conduct, not just offense level/category labels. The defendant relied on national average and median sentences for similarly scored meth defendants. The district court rejected the inference because those statistics did not distinguish between single-transaction defendants and defendants engaging in multiple transactions with additional drugs at home. Citing the “apples to apples” framework, the Eleventh Circuit agreed: without circumstance-specific comparators, the claim is too indeterminate to show an “unwarranted” disparity under § 3553(a)(6).
4. District court’s own inquiry into sentencing data can support the § 3553(a)(6) assessment. Notably, the district court stated it did “its own research” and found that lower sentences “often” involve one-transaction defendants. The panel accepted this as reinforcing (rather than substituting for) the basic point: disparity analysis turns on similarly situated conduct, and the defendant’s proffer did not establish it.

Impact

• Heightened practical burden for statistics-based disparity arguments. Defendants in the Eleventh Circuit seeking a variance based on national sentencing data should expect to provide richer context—e.g., number of transactions, drug purity, quantities, presence of additional controlled substances, role in the offense, weapons, co-conspirators, and supervision violations—so the court can determine true similarity.
• Affirms broad discretion to reject “median/mean” comparisons lacking transaction detail. The decision signals that aggregate statistics—without a mechanism to control for offense conduct—may be treated as “apples to oranges,” limiting their persuasive power under § 3553(a)(6).
• Reinforces deference to district court weighting of mitigation. Even sympathetic factors (mental health, family hardship, deportation consequences) will not compel a variance absent a showing that the district court ignored them or made an irrational balancing decision.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantive reasonableness: Whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of all the circumstances and the § 3553(a) purposes—distinct from procedural issues like guideline calculation errors.
• Abuse of discretion (sentencing): A high bar. The appellate court does not ask what it would have done; it asks whether the district court’s decision falls outside the range of reasonable outcomes.
• § 3553(a)(6) “unwarranted disparities”: The law targets unjustified differences between defendants with similar records who committed similar conduct. If key facts differ (e.g., repeated sales vs. a one-time deal), different sentences may be “warranted.”
• “Apples to apples” comparison: A shorthand for requiring meaningful similarity. Matching only the guideline offense level and criminal history may be insufficient if offense conduct differs materially.
• Variance vs. departure: A departure is a Guidelines-based adjustment authorized by the Guidelines themselves; a variance is a sentence outside the Guidelines range based on § 3553(a). Pena-Sanregre sought a downward variance.
• Safety valve (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)): A statutory mechanism allowing qualifying defendants to avoid an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum and be sentenced under the Guidelines framework.

Conclusion

United States v. Oscar Pena-Sanregre reinforces two durable Eleventh Circuit themes: (1) district courts receive substantial deference in weighing § 3553(a) factors, especially when imposing a bottom-of-Guidelines sentence after addressing the defendant’s arguments; and (2) sentencing-disparity claims under § 3553(a)(6) require genuinely comparable defendants and conduct—aggregate national averages and medians, without transaction- and conduct-level detail, are typically insufficient to show an “unwarranted” disparity.