Generalized Policy Disagreements Are Not “Extraordinary and Compelling” Under the 2023 § 1B1.13 Amendments

Introduction

In United States v. Washington, No. 24-5124 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2024), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a pro se federal prisoner’s fourth motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The decision addresses how the Sentencing Commission’s November 1, 2023 amendments to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 interact with longstanding limits on compassionate release, clarifies the scope of the new “catch-all” clause in § 1B1.13(b)(5), and reiterates that generalized disagreements with congressional sentencing policy—here, the crack/powder cocaine penalty ratio—do not qualify as “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for a sentence reduction.

The case also underscores basic procedural rules: claims not presented in the district court are forfeited on appeal, and rehabilitation alone cannot establish “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances, a constraint Congress codified in 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a panel that included Judges Kethledge, Larsen, and Mathis, Judge Larsen affirmed the district court’s denial of Brian Washington’s compassionate-release motion. The court:

Reiterated the three-step framework for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions and the abuse-of-discretion standard of review.
Held that a generalized policy disagreement with the statutory crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity (18:1) is not an “extraordinary and compelling” reason under the amended § 1B1.13, including its catch-all at § 1B1.13(b)(5).
Emphasized the Commission’s 2023 policy: changes in sentencing law are generally not extraordinary and compelling, with a narrow exception in § 1B1.13(b)(6) (unusually long sentence, at least 10 years served, and a gross disparity if sentenced today).
Found Washington’s age and mental-health arguments forfeited because they were not raised below and rejected his invitation to plain-error review.
Recognized Washington’s significant rehabilitation, but reaffirmed that rehabilitation alone cannot justify relief (28 U.S.C. § 994(t)).

Because Washington failed at the “extraordinary and compelling” step, the panel did not need to reach the policy-statement consistency or § 3553(a) factors. The judgment was affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

I. Statutory and Guideline Framework

Section 3582(c) generally prohibits modifying a sentence once imposed. Compassionate release in § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides a narrow exception, requiring:

Extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction,
Consistency with applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements, and
A favorable weighing of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

Before the First Step Act of 2018, only the Bureau of Prisons could file such motions, and the then-applicable policy statement in § 1B1.13 focused on limited defendant-specific grounds, such as certain medical conditions, age, and family circumstances. After the First Step Act authorized defendants to file directly, the Commission did not initially update § 1B1.13, and the Sixth Circuit held in Jones and Hunter that the policy statement did not apply to defendant-initiated motions, though courts retained constrained discretion to define “extraordinary and compelling.”

Effective November 1, 2023, the Commission amended § 1B1.13 to apply to all compassionate-release motions, regardless of who filed them. The revised policy statement:

Enumerates four categories: medical circumstances, age, family circumstances, and abuse suffered in custody (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)-(4)).
Introduces a rephrased “Other Reasons” catch-all in § 1B1.13(b)(5), allowing relief for other circumstances “similar in gravity” to the enumerated categories.
States at § 1B1.13(c) that changes in sentencing law ordinarily are not extraordinary and compelling.
Adds a narrow exception at § 1B1.13(b)(6): if the defendant has served at least 10 years of an unusually long sentence and a nonretroactive change in law would create a gross disparity with the likely sentence today.

II. Precedents and Authorities Cited

United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 2021): Sets the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing compassionate-release denials.
United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2021): Clarifies abuse-of-discretion occurs when a court relies on clearly erroneous facts, uses the wrong legal standard, or misapplies the law.
United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555 (6th Cir. 2021): During the gap between the First Step Act and the Commission’s 2023 amendments, the policy statement did not constrain defendant-filed motions, though courts’ discretion remained limited by statute and precedent.
United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc): Held that nonretroactive changes in sentencing law are not “extraordinary and compelling.” McCall expressly reserved whether a future Commission policy could validly define “extraordinary and compelling” inconsistently with the court’s statutory interpretation—a question the Washington panel again leaves open because it is unnecessary to decide here.
United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2021): Quoted for the point that there is nothing “extraordinary” about leaving intact the penalties Congress prescribed; serving a lawful sentence is routine, not compelling.
Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021): Provides the four-part plain-error standard; Washington did not satisfy it to overcome forfeiture of new arguments raised on appeal.
28 U.S.C. § 994(t): Congress’s directive that rehabilitation alone cannot constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (2023): The Commission’s amended policy statement governing both BOP- and defendant-filed motions, including the “similar in gravity” catch-all, the general prohibition on using changes in law, and the narrow “unusually long sentence” exception.

III. Application to Washington’s Claims

A. The crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity

Washington’s principal argument was that the federal 18:1 crack/powder ratio is unjustified, lacks scientific grounding, and its continued existence is itself an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument for multiple, reinforcing reasons:

Nature of the catch‑all clause: The revised § 1B1.13(b)(5) requires “other” reasons to be “similar in gravity” to the enumerated categories, which focus on defendant-specific circumstances—serious illness, advanced age, essential family caregiving duties, or abuse while incarcerated. A generalized challenge to a statutory sentencing policy is categorically different; it is not personal to the movant.
Routine punishment is not extraordinary: Echoing Thacker and McCall, the court underscored that there is nothing extraordinary about serving the lawful term that Congress prescribed; routine punishment is not “compelling.”
Commission’s 2023 guidance on changes in law: The Commission has now codified that “changes in sentencing law” are generally not extraordinary and compelling (§ 1B1.13(c)), and carved out only a narrow path in § 1B1.13(b)(6). If a nonretroactive change in law typically cannot qualify, Congress’s choice not to change the law—i.e., a policy disagreement—likewise does not qualify.

The panel thus held that the crack/powder disparity cannot be the basis for compassionate release under the revised policy. The decision positions § 1B1.13(b)(5)’s “similar in gravity” requirement as a meaningful constraint, ensuring the catch‑all does not become a vehicle for broad, policy-based resentencing.

B. Age and mental health

Washington asserted on appeal that his age and mental-health conditions (anxiety, insomnia, depression) support release and that older inmates are less likely to reoffend. Because he did not present these grounds in the district court, the Sixth Circuit deemed them forfeited. Although Washington asked the court to review for “plain error” in the interests of justice, he did not attempt to satisfy, much less carry, the Greer four-part plain-error test (error that is plain, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings). The panel therefore declined review.

C. Rehabilitation

Washington documented significant rehabilitative achievements, including courses and work experience, a paralegal certificate, and progress toward a bachelor’s degree. The court commended these efforts but reaffirmed the statutory directive: “Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason” (28 U.S.C. § 994(t)). With no other qualifying basis, rehabilitation could not carry his motion.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The opinion proceeds in the familiar sequence for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions. It begins with the threshold inquiry—whether the defendant has shown “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The analysis turns on the text and structure of the amended § 1B1.13:

Textual focus on individualized hardship: The enumerated categories target circumstances unique to the defendant or his family, and the catch-all expressly limits “other reasons” to those “similar in gravity” to the enumerated categories. A generalized critique of congressional sentencing policy does not share that individualized character or gravity.
Commission’s treatment of law changes: The Commission’s default rule—changes in law are not extraordinary and compelling—signals a strong presumption against using systemic legal developments as a basis for relief, absent the narrow § 1B1.13(b)(6) criteria. The court reasons that if a nonretroactive change in law typically fails, an absence of change cannot be enough.
Continuity with Sixth Circuit precedent: The decision aligns with McCall’s holding that nonretroactive legal changes ordinarily do not qualify. While McCall reserved whether a later Commission policy could adopt a contrary definition, Washington’s case does not present that conflict because the Commission’s new policy itself maintains the general bar, with a narrow exception the defendant did not invoke or satisfy.

Having resolved the motion at step one (no extraordinary and compelling reasons), the panel did not reach policy-statement consistency or the § 3553(a) factors.

V. Unresolved Questions and Doctrinal Framing

The opinion notes but does not decide a potentially significant issue flagged in McCall: whether and to what extent a Sentencing Commission policy statement could validly define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” in a manner that departs from a circuit’s interpretation of § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Commission’s 2023 amendments include a narrow exception (§ 1B1.13(b)(6)) that differs in tone from McCall’s broad prohibition on nonretroactive changes-in-law arguments. Washington did not rely on that exception, and the panel found the case resolvable without addressing the scope of Commission authority. That question remains open in the Sixth Circuit.

VI. Practical Implications

Washington has several notable practical takeaways for litigants and courts:

Catch-all is narrow: Under § 1B1.13(b)(5), “other reasons” must be similar in gravity to the enumerated categories, which are personal and acute. Abstract or generalized policy critiques—even on serious topics like the crack/powder ratio—are not within the catch-all’s ambit.
Changes-in-law arguments face a high bar: The Commission’s default rule disfavors them (§ 1B1.13(c)). The only recognized pathway, § 1B1.13(b)(6), requires at least ten years served, an unusually long sentence, and a likely gross disparity if sentenced under current law. Movants must present evidence and analysis on each element.
Preserve issues in the district court: Arguments about age, medical or mental-health conditions, and other individualized factors must be raised and supported in the trial court record. New grounds introduced on appeal will be forfeited absent a showing under the stringent plain-error standard.
Rehabilitation helps—but not alone: While rehabilitation may support release when combined with qualifying circumstances, it cannot serve as the sole basis for relief (28 U.S.C. § 994(t)).
Individualized, evidence‑based motions: Successful motions should closely track § 1B1.13’s enumerated categories, with documentation of diagnosis, prognosis, caregiving needs, or abuse, and should be accompanied by a strong § 3553(a) presentation if step one is satisfied.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Extraordinary and compelling reasons: Special, uncommon circumstances—typically personal to the defendant (serious illness, advanced age with deterioration, essential caregiver status, abuse in custody)—that justify early release.
Policy statement (§ 1B1.13): The Sentencing Commission’s guidance that interprets and channels how courts identify “extraordinary and compelling” reasons. Since Nov. 1, 2023, it applies to all compassionate-release motions.
Catch‑all (“similar in gravity”): A safety valve for other compelling situations—but only those comparable in seriousness and individualized nature to the listed categories.
Nonretroactive change in law: A legal change that does not apply to already-final sentences. By default, such changes do not justify compassionate release, unless the strict § 1B1.13(b)(6) criteria are met.
Forfeiture vs. plain error: If you do not raise an argument in the district court, you generally forfeit it on appeal. To overcome forfeiture, a party must meet the demanding plain-error standard: an obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness or integrity of proceedings.
Rehabilitation alone: Congress has barred courts from granting compassionate release solely because a defendant has rehabilitated; rehabilitation may support relief only when combined with other qualifying grounds.
Career offender: A guideline designation that increases the advisory sentencing range for defendants with certain prior convictions. It can affect sentence length but, by itself, does not supply an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.

Conclusion

United States v. Washington reinforces a central theme of federal compassionate-release law after the Sentencing Commission’s 2023 amendments: the statute and policy statement continue to focus on individualized, defendant-centered hardships. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion squarely holds that generalized policy disagreements—here, with the federal crack/powder sentencing ratio—are not “extraordinary and compelling,” even under the catch‑all provision of § 1B1.13(b)(5). The decision also illustrates routine but important appellate principles: unpreserved arguments will be forfeited absent plain error, and rehabilitation, however commendable, cannot alone justify a sentence reduction.

The court leaves for another day a potential clash between McCall’s treatment of nonretroactive law changes and the Commission’s narrow exception in § 1B1.13(b)(6). For now, the path for compassionate release in the Sixth Circuit remains clear but narrow: movants should anchor their claims in the enumerated categories or present truly comparable, individualized circumstances, and they must build and preserve a robust evidentiary record in the district court.