Generalized “Dear Colleague” Pressure Plus Process Errors, Without Case-Specific Evidence, Does Not Show Title IX Sex Bias
1. Introduction
Loyola University Chicago expelled undergraduate Matthew Metzler in January 2017 after a university hearing board found him responsible for non-consensual sexual contact and penetration reported by fellow student “Jane Roe.” Metzler sued, alleging (i) unlawful sex discrimination under Title IX and (ii) breach of contract based on Loyola’s “community standards,” which both parties treated as the governing contractual framework for the disciplinary process.
The appeal presented a recurring question in campus discipline litigation: when do asserted procedural flaws, credibility disputes, and generalized external pressure on universities permit a reasonable inference that a particular respondent was disciplined “on the basis of sex”? A related issue was whether the same asserted bias or irregularities could defeat Loyola’s broad discretion under Illinois law to impose discipline so long as the decision has a rational basis.
2. Summary of the Opinion
The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Loyola on both claims. On Title IX, the court held that no reasonable factfinder could conclude Loyola expelled Metzler “on the basis of sex.” The record showed (a) generalized public pressure applicable to many universities, (b) credibility determinations the court deemed “divorced from gender,” and (c) at most two arguable procedural errors (non-inclusion of an early Title IX coordinator summary and failure to interview Metzler’s proposed witnesses) that lacked evidence tying them to sex bias rather than ordinary mistake, impatience, or pro-complainant bias.
On breach of contract, the court applied Illinois’s deferential “rational basis”/academic discretion standard and rejected Metzler’s attempt to repackage his Title IX theory as contractual bad faith or arbitrariness. Even assuming errors occurred, Loyola still had a rational basis to expel Metzler based on a substantiated accusation accepted under the preponderance standard by the hearing board.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
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Doe v. Univ. of S. Ind., 43 F.4th 784 (7th Cir. 2022)
Anchored the court’s framework: Title IX targets sex discrimination, not flawed processes; “a plaintiff cannot prove gender discrimination by merely identifying mistakes”; and even multiple errors do not imply bias unless they plausibly connect to sex. The Metzler panel relied heavily on S. Ind. for its cautions against turning federal courts into super-appeals bodies for campus hearings and for the idea that only a “sufficiently lopsided” case—where findings lack an evidence-based reason—might allow an inference of bias. -
Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 933 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2019)
Supplied key limitations: generalized “Dear Colleague” pressure is not enough; plaintiffs must show discrimination “particular to [the] case”; and errors “divorced from sex” do not support a Title IX claim. The court also used Columbia Coll. Chi. to explain that anti-respondent bias or pro-complainant tilt, standing alone, is sex-neutral. -
Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019)
Established that public pressure and the 2011 “Dear Colleague” letter can be relevant background evidence of motive. Metzler invoked Purdue, but the court distinguished it: Purdue involved contemporaneous federal investigations that made pressure “far from abstract,” whereas Metzler offered weaker, more generalized pressure evidence and—critically—no case-specific indicia of sex bias. -
Gash v. Rosalind Franklin Univ., 117 F.4th 957 (7th Cir. 2024)
Provided the court’s most recent articulation of the “totality of the circumstances” test and the line between sex discrimination and lawful alternative explanations (incompetence, impatience, or pro-complainant bias). The Metzler panel repeatedly quoted Gash for the proposition that even arguably unfair actions do not violate Title IX absent a sex-based reason. -
Doe v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 101 F.4th 485 (7th Cir. 2024)
Served as a blunt limiting principle: “Coming to the wrong answer,” interviewing the “wrong” witnesses, or hearing “too few or too many” witnesses is not actionable “unless the defendants treated men worse than women (or the reverse).” Metzler uses this language to frame Title IX as a discrimination statute, not a general due-process code for private universities. -
Joll v. Valparaiso Cmty. Sch., 953 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2020)
Cited (via Gash) for the holistic approach: courts assess the overall likelihood of discrimination, not whether any one item “proves the case by itself.” -
Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018)
Referenced (through Columbia Coll. Chi.) for the requirement of evidence “particular to [the] case” when using public pressure theories. -
Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016)
Used only in a constrained way: the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the concept that an especially “lopsided” record might support an inference of bias if the decision lacks an apparent evidence-based reason, but concluded Loyola’s board gave evidence-grounded reasons. -
Frederick v. Nw. Univ. Dental Sch., 617 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. 1993) and
Raethz v. Aurora Univ., 805 N.E.2d 696 (Ill. 2004)
These Illinois Supreme/Appellate authorities supplied the governing contract/deference rule: courts intervene only when a university’s decision is “without any rational basis,” i.e., arbitrary or in bad faith such that the institution “did not exercise its academic judgment at all.” -
Doe v. Loyola Univ. Chi., 100 F.4th 910 (7th Cir. 2024)
Relevant procedural history: the earlier remand required the district court to address anonymity and mootness; on remand the case proceeded under Metzler’s name and remained justiciable. - The court also cited standard summary-judgment authorities—Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)—and Seventh Circuit gloss such as Vassileva v. City of Chicago, 118 F.4th 869 (7th Cir. 2024) and Upchurch v. Indiana, 146 F.4th 579 (7th Cir. 2025).
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(a) Title IX: separating “bad process” from “sex discrimination”
The opinion’s central move is categorical: Title IX prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex,” not “botched disciplinary proceedings.” That framing drives the treatment of each evidentiary bucket Metzler offered:
- Public pressure evidence is relevant but incomplete. The court accepted that the 2011 Department of Education “Dear Colleague” letter and campus activism can supply context for motive (as in Doe v. Purdue Univ.), but reiterated that public pressure “is not enough on its own.” Without case-specific evidence that decisionmakers acted because the respondent is male, generalized pressure remains background noise.
- Credibility disputes do not equal sex bias. Metzler attacked the board’s credibility assessment and argued it reflected gender stereotyping. The court rejected this because the cited testimony was tied to “sexual inexperience,” not to sex-based assumptions. More importantly, even an incorrect credibility call is not actionable unless the error is attributable to sex.
- Procedural errors must be connected to sex. The court assumed (viewing facts in Metzler’s favor) that two issues could qualify as errors: omission of the deputy coordinator’s early account and failure to interview Metzler’s proposed witnesses. But the court treated both as insufficient because Metzler offered no evidence they were “because he is male,” rather than incompetence, impatience, or pro-complainant bias (which the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly deemed sex-neutral).
- “Totality of the circumstances” cannot be built with speculation. After aggregating all evidence, the court found only generalized pressure + sex-neutral credibility reasoning + unlinked procedural mistakes—an evidentiary package that, under Gash and Columbia Coll. Chi., cannot get past summary judgment.
(b) Contract: Illinois “rational basis” deference defeats a bias-repackaging theory
Metzler’s contract theory depended largely on the same alleged sex bias used for Title IX. Once Title IX failed for lack of sex-based evidence, the contract claim failed as well. The court further held that pointing to procedural errors does not eliminate a rational basis where the university credited a complainant’s account under the preponderance standard and concluded the community standards were violated. In short, even imperfect compliance arguments did not show that Loyola acted arbitrarily, in bad faith, or without exercising academic judgment.
3.3 Impact
- Raises the functional bar for Title IX accused-student claims in the Seventh Circuit. The opinion reinforces an evidentiary demand: plaintiffs must link alleged irregularities to sex, not merely to unfairness, pro-complainant inclination, or external pressure.
- Limits “Dear Colleague letter” pleading-to-proof trajectories. While the letter remains relevant context, Metzler underscores that generalized institutional pressure—especially absent contemporaneous enforcement actions like those highlighted in Purdue—will not substitute for proof “particular to [the] case.”
- Signals deference to university credibility determinations when evidence-based reasons are articulated. The court suggested that only a credibility finding lacking an “apparent reason based in the evidence” might support an inference of bias, narrowing the circumstances in which “lopsidedness” arguments can survive summary judgment.
- Constrains parallel contract claims under Illinois law. By reapplying the “rational basis” deference described in Frederick and Raethz, the opinion makes clear that contract theories cannot easily convert procedural imperfections into judicial second-guessing unless they demonstrate arbitrariness/bad faith—often requiring more than the same record that failed under Title IX.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Title IX “on the basis of sex”: It is not enough that a man was found responsible in a sexual misconduct case. The question is whether he was treated worse because he is male.
- Totality of the circumstances: Courts look at all evidence together, but still require evidence—courts will not supply missing links by speculation.
- Pro-complainant bias vs. sex discrimination: Favoring complainants (even unfairly) is not automatically sex bias because complainants and respondents can be of any sex; the plaintiff must show the favoritism tracks sex.
- Summary judgment: A case can be decided without trial if the non-moving party lacks evidence on an element (here, sex-based causation) such that no reasonable jury could find in that party’s favor.
- Preponderance of the evidence: The decisionmaker asks whether something is more likely than not (just over 50%).
- Illinois “rational basis” review of university discipline: Courts generally defer to university judgment and intervene only if the decision is arbitrary, in bad faith, or without any rational foundation.
5. Conclusion
Metzler v. Loyola University Chicago consolidates the Seventh Circuit’s modern Title IX approach: generalized public pressure, contested credibility calls, and even real procedural mistakes do not create triable sex discrimination claims unless the plaintiff can connect those issues to sex-based decisionmaking in his specific case. The decision also reinforces that, under Illinois law, contract-based challenges to university discipline face steep deference and cannot succeed merely by reasserting allegations of unfairness or external political motivation where the university had an evidence-based, rational ground for discipline.
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