General Objections and Rule 56.1 Noncompliance Waive Appellate Review of Summary-Judgment Dispositions in the Eleventh Circuit

Introduction

In Carolyn Wright v. Georgia Student Finance Commission (11th Cir. Jan. 27, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Georgia Student Finance Commission (“GSFC”) and a supervisor, Wendel Brown, on a pro se former employee’s Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for race discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The appeal centered less on the substantive elements of discrimination law and more on procedural defaults: (1) failure to properly contest a movant’s statement of undisputed facts under Northern District of Georgia Local Rule 56.1; (2) failure to show affidavits were “sham affidavits” warranting striking; and critically (3) failure to make specific objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (“R&R”), triggering waiver under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1.

Key issues

Whether the district court properly deemed the defendants’ statement of facts admitted under N.D. Ga. R. 56.1(B)(2).
Whether affidavits submitted at summary judgment should have been stricken as “sham affidavits.”
Whether Wright abandoned certain appellate arguments by perfunctory briefing.
Whether Wright waived appellate review of merits by lodging only general (non-specific) objections to the R&R.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held:

The district court did not abuse its discretion by deeming defendants’ facts admitted because Wright failed to file the required paragraph-by-paragraph refutation under N.D. Ga. R. 56.1(B)(2), and her reliance on her deposition was not a compliant substitute.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to strike because Wright did not show the affidavits contradicted the affiants’ prior testimony (as required by the sham affidavit rule) or were otherwise improper.
Wright abandoned challenges to the denial of her own summary-judgment motion and dismissal of claims against other manager defendants by raising them only in passing and without developed argument or authority.
Wright waived appellate review of the merits of the summary-judgment ruling because she made only general objections to the magistrate judge’s R&R; and she could not obtain “plain error” review because she did not argue in her initial brief that such review was “necessary in the interests of justice.”

In a footnote, the court added that even absent waiver, the record supported summary judgment: Wright failed to identify a proper comparator and failed to show harassment was race-based; and GSFC’s stated reason for termination was her refusal to attend a performance review.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Enforcing Rule 56 procedure and local rules

United States v. McLean, 802 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2015): Used to emphasize the “great deference” given to a district court’s interpretation/application of its local rules and the appellant’s burden to show a clear error of judgment. This supported affirmance of deeming facts admitted under Local Rule 56.1.
Ass'n of Disabled Ams. v. Neptune Designs, Inc., 469 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam): Provided the abuse-of-discretion framework—wrong legal standard, wrong procedures, or clearly erroneous findings—underpinning the court’s refusal to second-guess the district court’s local-rule enforcement.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986): Cited for the baseline summary-judgment standards (no genuine dispute of material fact; the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovant). These authorities contextualize why admitted facts (through Rule 56.1 noncompliance) can be outcome-determinative.
Burton v. Tampa Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001): Cited for de novo review of summary judgment and the rule to view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant—though the opinion underscores that procedural defaults can prevent reaching disputed-evidence questions at all.

2) Motions to strike and the sham affidavit doctrine

Telfair v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 216 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2000): Supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing denial of a motion to strike.
Van T. Junkins & Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656 (11th Cir. 1984): Provided the “sham affidavit” rule: a court may disregard an affidavit that “flatly contradicts, without any explanation,” clear prior deposition testimony of the same declarant. Wright’s argument failed because she asserted only that affidavits contradicted her testimony, not that affiants contradicted their own earlier testimony.

3) Limits of liberal construction for pro se litigants

Campbell v. Air Jam., Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014): Cited to reaffirm that while courts liberally construe pro se filings, they do not serve as counsel or rewrite deficient submissions. This reinforced strict adherence to Local Rule 56.1 and proper objection requirements.

4) Appellate abandonment through inadequate briefing

Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2004): Used for the rule that unbriefed claims are abandoned.
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014): Added that perfunctory, passing references without supporting argument or authority also constitute abandonment. This disposed of Wright’s challenges to denial of her own summary judgment and dismissal of other defendants.

5) Waiver from failing to specifically object to the R&R

Smith v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc., 106 F.4th 1091 (11th Cir. 2024): The central authority interpreting Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1. The panel relied on it to hold that general objections do not preserve issues for appeal and that “plain error” review is an exceptional civil-case remedy— unavailable here because Wright did not argue in her initial brief that such review was necessary “in the interests of justice.”

6) No amendment by briefing

Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam): Cited to reject Wright’s attempt to recast her case as a free-speech claim; plaintiffs cannot amend the complaint via a summary-judgment brief.

Legal Reasoning

The opinion is a procedural enforcement decision with a clear sequence:

Local Rule 56.1 consequences are real and enforceable. Under N.D. Ga. R. 56.1(B)(2) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2), failure to specifically refute numbered facts allows the court to deem them admitted. The panel treated Wright’s noncompliance as dispositive on the factual record governing summary judgment.
“Sham affidavit” is narrow. The court applied Van T. Junkins & Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc. as a doctrine aimed at a witness contradicting herself, not at conflicts between opposing witnesses. Without showing an affiant contradicted their own prior testimony (and did so “flatly,” without explanation), the motion to strike failed.
Appellate review requires preserved objections. The decisive holding was waiver under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1 as explained in Smith v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc.: Wright’s general objections to the R&R were insufficient, so she forfeited appellate review of the merits of her discrimination/retaliation/harassment claims.
No “plain error” backstop without an “interests of justice” argument. Even though Rule 3-1 allows discretionary plain-error review, the panel declined to invoke it because Wright did not request it in her initial brief (as Smith requires).
Independent procedural pruning. Through Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co. and Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., the court separately eliminated issues that were not adequately briefed.

Impact

Although unpublished, the decision reinforces—and operationalizes—several practice-critical points in Eleventh Circuit employment appeals:

Rule 56.1 compliance is outcome-determinative. In districts with strict local summary-judgment rules (like N.D. Ga.), failure to file a proper response can effectively concede the factual record.
R&R objections must be specific to preserve appellate review. Litigants (including pro se parties) must make targeted, issue-by-issue objections to avoid Rule 3-1 waiver.
Plain-error review in civil cases is not automatic. If a party hopes to obtain plain-error review of waived R&R objections, they must affirmatively argue in the opening brief why “the interests of justice” require it; otherwise, appellate courts will typically decline.
“Sham affidavit” motions should be tightly framed. The doctrine is not a vehicle to strike evidence merely because it conflicts with the opposing party’s account; it targets self-contradiction by the same witness.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts: A required, numbered list of asserted undisputed facts supporting summary judgment. The opponent must respond to each numbered fact with a specific admission/denial and citations to record evidence. If the opponent does not, the facts may be treated as admitted.
Summary judgment (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56): A pretrial decision for the court (not a jury) when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the nonmovant fails to properly contest the movant’s facts, the court may proceed on the movant’s version of the record.
Sham affidavit: A narrow rule allowing a court to disregard an affidavit when the same witness previously gave clear deposition testimony and later submits an affidavit that flatly contradicts it without explanation (a tactic sometimes used to manufacture a fact issue).
Abandonment on appeal: If an appellant fails to meaningfully argue an issue (with supporting reasoning and authority), the appellate court treats the issue as given up and will not decide it.
Waiver under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1: When a magistrate judge issues an R&R, a party must file specific objections to preserve appellate review. General objections (or none) typically waive challenges to those findings or recommendations.
“Plain error” review in civil cases: A limited, discretionary review of waived issues. The Eleventh Circuit emphasizes it “rarely applies in civil cases,” and here it was unavailable because the appellant did not argue that such review was necessary “in the interests of justice.”

Conclusion

The decision’s significance lies in its procedural lessons: in the Eleventh Circuit, litigants—pro se included—must (1) comply with local summary-judgment rules, (2) use the sham-affidavit doctrine only within its narrow boundaries, (3) fully brief issues on appeal, and (4) file specific objections to a magistrate judge’s R&R to preserve appellate review. Substantive employment-discrimination claims can fail on the merits, but this case shows they can also fail earlier—through procedural defaults that lock in the factual record and foreclose appellate scrutiny.