Gatekeeping Successive Habeas Petitions Under §2244(b)(2)(A): Retroactive Application of Miller in Harjo v. Harding

Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s order in Harjo v. Harding (No. 25-5023, May 27, 2025) addresses the procedural gatekeeping rules for second or successive federal habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Richard Harjo, an Oklahoma inmate serving a juvenile life‐without‐parole (LWOP) sentence, sought relief under the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama (567 U.S. 460 (2012))—which prohibits mandatory LWOP for juveniles—and its retroactive application in Montgomery v. Louisiana (577 U.S. 190 (2016)). After previously filing a § 2254 petition in 1999 and state collateral challenges in 2013 and 2018, Harjo filed a new § 2254 petition in 2024. The district court dismissed it as an unauthorized successive petition and time-barred. Harjo then sought a Certificate of Appealability (COA) and authorization to file the successive petition. The Tenth Circuit denied COA on the procedural ruling but granted authorization to file under § 2244(b)(2)(A).

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit’s order delivers three key results:

Certificate of Appealability Denied. Harjo failed to show that reasonable jurists would debate whether the district court erred in dismissing rather than transferring his unauthorized successive petition.
Authorization Granted. The court authorized Harjo to file a second or successive § 2254 petition because his claim rests on the new constitutional rule announced in Miller, made retroactive by Montgomery.
Timeliness Not Addressed. The appellate court clarified that its gatekeeping role under § 2244(b) does not include assessing the one-year statute of limitations in § 2244(d)(1).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012): Held that mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016): Ruled that Miller is retroactive on collateral review.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A): Permits successive petitions when the claim is based on a new constitutional rule made retroactive by the Supreme Court.
In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2008): Explains district courts lack jurisdiction over successive habeas claims without appellate authorization and the discretion to transfer under § 1631.
Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339 (10th Cir. 1997): Expresses concern that dismissal of successive petitions might jeopardize timely filing under the one-year limitations period.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000): Establishes the standard for COA where procedural rulings are involved.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolds in two parts:

1. Dismissal vs. Transfer

Under § 2244(b)(3)(A), a prisoner must obtain circuit authorization before filing a second or successive § 2254 petition. When authorization is absent, the district court “may transfer the matter” under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 or dismiss it. The Tenth Circuit held that because Harjo’s Miller‐based challenge to his juvenile LWOP sentence would be time-barred under § 2244(d)(1), there was “no risk that a meritorious successive claim would be lost” by dismissal. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing rather than transferring.

2. Authorization under § 2244(b)(2)(A)

To qualify for authorization, a successive petition must “rely[] on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” Having shown that Miller announced a new rule and Montgomery made it retroactive, Harjo satisfied § 2244(b)(2)(A). The court therefore granted him leave to file a second or successive petition, noting that timeliness remains a merits issue for the district court upon filing.

Impact

This decision clarifies and confirms several important points for future habeas practice:

District courts have discretion to dismiss—not necessarily transfer—unauthorized successive petitions when the limitation period has run and no timeliness risk exists.
The appellate gatekeeping role under § 2244(b) is distinct from merits review under § 2244(d): authorization does not require a preliminary timeliness analysis.
Prisoners relying on new, retroactive Supreme Court rules (e.g., Miller) can secure authorization under § 2244(b)(2)(A) even if the underlying petition may later be time-barred.
Future litigants must continue to monitor both authorization and limitations requirements separately.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Successive Petition: A habeas petition filed after the first one has been adjudicated. Federal law requires appellate authorization before a court can consider its merits.
Certificate of Appealability (COA): A judge’s permission to appeal a final order in a habeas case. When the lower court’s ruling is procedural, the appellant must show reasonable jurists could debate both the constitutional claim and the procedural ruling.
One-Year Statute of Limitations (§ 2244(d)(1)): Generally, habeas petitions must be filed within one year of “the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized.” Retroactivity rulings (e.g., Montgomery) do not reset the clock.
Gatekeeping (§ 2244(b)) vs. Merits Review (§ 2244(d)): § 2244(b) governs whether a successive petition may be filed at all; § 2244(d) governs whether that petition is timely.
Transfer Under § 1631: Allows a district court to send an unauthorized successive petition to the court of appeals for authorization. Transfer is discretionary, especially when timeliness is at issue.

Conclusion

Harjo v. Harding provides a detailed roadmap for handling second or successive § 2254 petitions based on new, retroactive constitutional rules. It confirms that:

District courts need not transfer petitions when dismissal poses no timeliness risk.
Authorization under § 2244(b)(2)(A) depends solely on showing reliance on a new, retroactive Supreme Court rule.
Statute of limitations questions remain for the merits phase and do not affect the appellate gatekeeping inquiry.

By delineating these procedural boundaries, the Tenth Circuit ensures consistent and fair treatment of habeas petitioners seeking to invoke groundbreaking Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for juvenile offenders.