Functional-Scheme Requirement for CSRA Jurisdiction Stripping in Pre-Enforcement Challenges

Introduction

This commentary addresses the Fourth Circuit’s decision in National Association of Immigration Judges v. Sirce E. Owen, 23-2235 (4th Cir. June 3, 2025). The National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) challenged a speech-approval policy issued by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), arguing it violated First and Fifth Amendment rights of immigration judges. The district court dismissed NAIJ’s suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that jurisdictional stripping applies only if the CSRA’s adjudicatory machinery—namely the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and Office of Special Counsel (OSC)—is functioning as Congress intended.

Key issues:

Whether the CSRA forecloses district-court jurisdiction over pre-enforcement constitutional challenges to federal personnel policies.
Whether the MSPB and OSC remain sufficiently independent and operational to carry out the CSRA’s review scheme.

Parties:

Plaintiff–Appellant: National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ).
Defendant–Appellee: Sirce E. Owen, Acting Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion, authored by Judge Berner and joined by Judges Harris and Heytens, follows the two-step framework of Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich (1994) to determine whether Congress intended to strip district courts of jurisdiction over covered federal employees’ challenges. The court held:

The CSRA generally forecloses district-court jurisdiction over constitutional and pre-enforcement challenges to personnel actions, channeling them through the CSRA’s administrative scheme. This intent is “fairly discernible” in the Act’s text, structure, and purpose (citing Fausto (1988) and Elgin (2012)).
At step two, NAIJ’s claims—challenging a “significant change in working conditions” that allegedly infringes constitutional rights—fit squarely within CSRA Chapter 23’s “prohibited personnel practices” scheme, which affords meaningful review and agency expertise, and is not “wholly collateral.”
However, because the CSRA presupposes a functioning, independent MSPB and OSC, and recent developments have called their independence and capacity into question, the court vacated the dismissal and remanded for the district court to (a) determine whether the CSRA review bodies remain sufficiently operational and independent, and (b) re-evaluate jurisdictional issues in light of that finding.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich (510 U.S. 200, 1994): Established the two-step framework to assess whether a statutory scheme precludes district-court jurisdiction—(1) discern congressional intent to strip jurisdiction; (2) determine if the claim falls within the scheme.
United States v. Fausto (484 U.S. 439, 1988): Held that the CSRA’s “painstaking detail” and primacy of the MSPB strip district courts of jurisdiction over covered federal employee claims.
Elgin v. Department of the Treasury (567 U.S. 1, 2012): Confirmed that even constitutional challenges to covered employment actions must proceed through the CSRA’s administrative process and then to the Federal Circuit.
Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (598 U.S. 175, 2023) and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB (561 U.S. 477, 2010): Clarified that structural-constitutionality claims to an agency’s very existence are exempt from jurisdiction-stripping provisions but that ordinary burdens of pursuing administrative review do not qualify for an exception.

Legal Reasoning

The Fourth Circuit applied the Thunder Basin test:

Congressional Intent: The CSRA’s text, structure, and legislative purpose reflect an intent to funnel federal employee challenges—constitutional or otherwise—through MSPB/OSC processes rather than initial district-court suits. However, that intent assumes the MSPB and OSC maintain independence and functionality.
Fit Within the Statutory Scheme:
- The Speech Policy is a “significant change in duties . . . or working conditions” (5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii)).
- CSRA Chapter 23’s prohibited-practice process (OSC charge, OSC “reasonable grounds” finding, MSPB review, Federal Circuit appeal) provides meaningful judicial review.
- The claims are not “wholly collateral” because they seek to reverse covered personnel action.
- The MSPB and OSC possess expertise in merit-system principles, including constitutional safeguards.
Functional-Scheme Requirement: The court recognized that the CSRA depends on a strong, independent MSPB and OSC. Recent Presidential removals and litigation challenging the CSRA’s removal protections potentially undermine that functioning. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit remanded for a factual inquiry into the CSRA bodies’ current operational capacity and independence before resolving jurisdiction.

Impact

This decision establishes a new, practical limitation on CSRA jurisdiction stripping:

Pre-enforcement and constitutional challenges to federal personnel policies remain subject to the CSRA’s administrative channels only if those channels are operational and independent as Congress intended.
District courts now must assess, in the first instance, whether the MSPB and OSC can adequately adjudicate covered claims—adding a preliminary factual inquiry into any jurisdictional analysis.
The ruling may prompt expedited litigation over the status and composition of the MSPB and OSC, especially given high-profile removals that raise separation-of-powers questions.
Future plaintiffs may invoke the “functional-scheme” requirement to justify district-court jurisdiction over CSRA-covered claims when administrative bodies lack a quorum or face governance challenges.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA): A 1978 statute that centralized review of federal employee personnel actions in two independent bodies—the MSPB for disciplinary and appeal processes, and the OSC for prohibited-practice investigations.
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB): A three-member, quasi-judicial body insulated from presidential control; resolves appeals of adverse employment actions and enforces merit-system principles.
Office of Special Counsel (OSC): An independent agency that investigates alleged prohibited personnel practices, protects whistleblowers, and may petition the MSPB for corrective action.
Jurisdiction Stripping: A legislative mechanism by which Congress removes the power of certain courts to hear specified types of cases, funneling them through specialized administrative procedures.
Thunder Basin Framework: A Supreme Court test requiring (1) clear congressional intent to preclude district-court jurisdiction; (2) that the plaintiff’s claims fall within the covered statutory scheme.
Structural-Constitutional Exception: Claims that challenge an agency’s very existence or constitutional authority (e.g., removal structure) may bypass jurisdiction-stripping provisions, but ordinary constitutional claims do not.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in NAIJ v. Owen refines the CSRA’s jurisdiction-stripping doctrine by imposing a “functional-scheme requirement.” While the Act presumptively channels constitutional and pre-enforcement challenges into the MSPB/OSC framework, that presumption holds only if those bodies remain fully operational and independent. The remand serves as a caution that statutory review schemes cannot strip judicial avenues if the administrative machinery collapses or loses its congressionally guaranteed autonomy. This holding will shape future litigation over federal personnel policies, threshold jurisdictional disputes, and separation-of-powers challenges to the CSRA itself.