Full Resentencing Discretion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 After Vacatur: United States v. Lamar Clancy

Introduction

United States v. Lamar Clancy, 25a0156n.06 (6th Cir. Mar. 21, 2025), addresses the scope of district‐court authority when resentencing a defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 after a collateral attack succeeds. The appellant, Lamar Clancy, had been convicted in 2019 of attempted robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence (§ 924(c)), receiving a total term of 243 months’ imprisonment. After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor (596 U.S. 845 (2022)) held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence” under § 924(c), Clancy sought relief under § 2255. The district court vacated his firearm conviction but resentenced him on the robbery count to 240 months. Clancy appealed, claiming that the court should have left his original term on the robbery conviction intact and should have granted a greater reduction.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit unanimously affirmed. It held that:

The plain text of § 2255 requires a district court that vacates any part of a multi‐count sentence to conduct full resentencing on the remaining counts—it may not simply leave the original aggregate term intact.
In resentencing, the court must recalculate the Sentencing Guidelines range, reapply the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and exercise its sentencing discretion anew.
The district court did not err in applying a firearms‐use enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A), as the sentencing judge remains free to find by a preponderance of the evidence the factual basis for enhancements that do not increase statutory mandatory minimums (Apprendi/Alleyne principles).
The 240‐month sentence imposed was substantively reasonable in light of the severity of Clancy’s conduct and his extensive criminal history.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Taylor (596 U.S. 845 (2022)): Rejected attempted Hobbs Act robbery as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c), prompting collateral relief for Clancy.
Deal v. United States (508 U.S. 129 (1993)): Clarified that a single criminal case yields a single judgment even if multiple counts are involved.
United States v. Augustin (16 F.4th 227 (6th Cir. 2021)): Confirmed that resentencing under § 2255 is akin to an original sentencing proceeding, requiring recalculation of Guidelines and § 3553(a) analysis.
Pasquarille v. United States (130 F.3d 1220 (6th Cir. 1997)) and its sister decisions in other circuits: Uniformly hold that vacating a multi‐count judgment reopens the entire sentence for resentencing under § 2255(b).
Apprendi v. New Jersey (530 U.S. 466 (2000)) and Alleyne v. United States (570 U.S. 99 (2013)): Establish that facts increasing statutory minimums or maximums must be found by a jury, but they do not preclude judge‐found facts for advisory Guidelines enhancements inside statutory ranges (see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).

2. Legal Reasoning

The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning unfolded in three key steps:

Scope of § 2255 Relief: The court emphasized that § 2255(a) authorizes a collateral attack on a “sentence,” which the Supreme Court and the circuit courts interpret as the aggregate sentence imposed by the judgment. Once a § 2255 motion succeeds, § 2255(b) directs the district court to “vacate and set aside the judgment” and to “resentence” or “correct” the entire sentence “as may appear appropriate.” The court rejected Clancy’s invitation to treat the vacatur as limited to his § 924(c) count and to preserve the original 63‐month term for the Hobbs Act conviction.
Guidelines & Factual Findings: On resentencing, the district court recalculated the Guidelines range. It applied a two‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A) for discharging a firearm during the robbery, based on uncontroverted video and witness evidence. Clancy’s Apprendi/Alleyne objections failed because that enhancement did not increase a statutory minimum or maximum. Under Booker’s advisory Guidelines regime, district judges may find sentencing facts by a preponderance of the evidence.
Substantive Reasonableness: Reviewing under the deferential abuse‐of‐discretion standard, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court reasonably considered the severity of the shoot‐out robbery, Clancy’s extensive criminal history (including juvenile offenses not counted in the Guidelines), and the § 3553(a) factors. A 240‐month term was well within that discretion.

3. Impact

This decision clarifies and cements two important principles:

Full Resentencing under § 2255: Any successful § 2255 motion vacating part of a multi‐count sentence triggers a complete resentencing on the remaining counts, including recalculation of the Guidelines and a fresh § 3553(a) analysis. Defendants may not pick and choose which portions of their original sentence remain intact.
Judicial Fact‐Finding for Guidelines Enhancements: District judges retain broad authority to find facts—so long as they do not increase mandatory minimums or maximums—for advisory Guidelines enhancements in the post‐Booker regime. The decision reaffirms that Apprendi/Alleyne do not curtail this judge‐found‐facts authority for advisory ranges.

Complex Concepts Simplified

28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion: A federal prisoner may challenge the legality of his sentence on constitutional or statutory grounds. If granted, the judge must vacate the existing judgment and may resentence the defendant.
Sentencing Guidelines Range: A framework that recommends sentencing ranges based on offense characteristics and criminal history; advisory since Booker (2005).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors: Statutory factors guiding sentencing judges to impose a sentence that is “sufficient but not greater than necessary” to achieve sentencing purposes (e.g., punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation).
Apprendi and Alleyne Principles: Require jury findings for any fact that increases a statutory mandatory minimum or maximum, but do not prevent judges from finding facts to guide an advisory Guidelines range.
Variance vs. Departure: A variance is a sentence outside the advisory Guidelines range but justified by § 3553(a) factors; a departure is an out‐of‐range sentence based on an identified Guidelines policy statement.

Conclusion

United States v. Lamar Clancy reaffirms that a successful collateral challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 opens the entire sentence to reexamination, ensuring that district courts may—and indeed must—conduct a full resentencing on the remaining counts. It also underscores that in the advisory Guidelines era, judges retain the power to make sentencing‐relevant factual findings so long as those findings do not trigger new statutory minimums or maximums. Finally, the decision confirms that courts enjoy broad discretion under § 3553(a) to impose substantively reasonable sentences tailored to the defendant’s conduct and history. This precedent will guide both defendants and sentencing courts in future § 2255 proceedings and sentencing appeals.