Full Municipal Indemnification for Compensatory §1983 Damages Under Ohio Rev. Code §2744.07

Introduction

This case arises from the wrongful conviction and decades-long imprisonment of Roger Dean Gillispie, who was ultimately exonerated and released after it was discovered that exculpatory reports had been suppressed by the investigating officers. Gillispie sued Detective Matthew Scott Moore and Miami Township, Ohio under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Brady violations (suppression of exculpatory evidence), suggestive identification procedures, fabricated evidence, malicious prosecution, and related state-law claims. After a jury awarded $45 million in compensatory damages to Gillispie, Miami Township was held liable to indemnify Detective Moore the full amount under Ohio rev. code § 2744.07(B). Miami Township and Moore each appealed various rulings of the district court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in full, establishing that (1) Monell supervisory liability claims against the Township failed on summary judgment, (2) the jury’s large compensatory award did not exceed the bounds of reason, (3) Ohio law requires a political subdivision to indemnify its employee the entire compensatory judgment absent a finding of bad faith or action outside the scope of employment, and (4) the Township’s late constitutional challenge to § 2744.07 was untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of Gillispie’s Monell claims (ratification and failure to train theories) against Miami Township.
The $45 million compensatory damage award was upheld as supported by a preponderance of the evidence and not so excessive as to “shock the conscience.”
Miami Township’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to reduce or remit the verdict was denied; the jury’s broad discretion to award for emotional and reputational harm was respected.
Miami Township’s Rule 50 motion challenging its duty to indemnify Detective Moore was denied; the jury reasonably found Moore acted in good faith and within the scope of employment.
Detective Moore’s requests for additional jury instructions and directed verdict were not reversible error or forfeited by failing to renew the Rule 50(b) motion.
Miami Township’s late-filed constitutional challenge to Ohio rev. code § 2744.07(B) was untimely under Rule 5.1 and prejudicial, and therefore not considered.
Ohio rev. code § 2744.07(B) unambiguously requires a political subdivision to indemnify an employee the full amount of compensatory judgments obtained against the employee, unless the employee acted in bad faith or outside the scope of employment.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court’s Monell analysis relied primarily on:

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): Municipal liability attaches only when a policy or custom is the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. Respondeat superior is insufficient.
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989): Deliberate indifference in training can establish municipal liability.
Paterek v. Village of Armada, 801 F.3d 630 (6th Cir. 2015): Ratification theory requires a final policymaker’s specific approval of the constitutional violation.
Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 2019): Deliberate-indifference standard for inadequate training claims—prior pattern or obvious risk test.
Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2009): Federal § 1983 Brady claims do not require bad-faith showing—but Ohio indemnification law does.
Ayers v. City of Cleveland, 156 N.E.3d 848 (Ohio 2020): The indemnification right under § 2744.07 is personal to the employee, but does not limit the amount recovered against the municipality.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1: Constitutional challenges to state statutes require timely notice to the state attorney general.

Legal Reasoning

1. Monell Claims. The court found no evidence of a municipal policy or final-decision-maker ratification of bad identification practices or Brady suppression. Nor was there proof of deliberate indifference in training, because Miami Township maintained investigatory guidelines, photo-lineup instructions, a state-approved police academy curriculum, and routine Brady/prosecutor disclosure practices.

2. Jury Award. The jury heard extensive testimony about decades of wrongful incarceration—violence in a maximum-security prison, loss of reputation, family life, registration as a sex offender, and psychological trauma. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, compensatory damages for “intangible” harms are not easily quantified, and the award did not exceed the permissible range.

3. Municipal Indemnification (Ohio rev. code § 2744.07). Absent a finding that Moore acted in bad faith (fraudulent or conscious wrongdoing) or manifestly outside the scope of employment (self-serving acts unrelated to official duties), the Township must indemnify “in the amount of any judgment” for compensatory damages. The statute’s plain text imposes no offset or cap based on an officer’s personal ability to pay.

4. Rule 5.1 Notice. Miami Township did not include its constitutional challenge to § 2744.07 in its initial complaint, waited ten months after the verdict to raise it, and never served the Ohio Attorney General per Rule 5.1. Allowing the challenge at that late stage would have unfairly prejudiced Moore and the State.

Impact

This decision clarifies that municipal subdivisions in Ohio must indemnify public officers the full amount of compensatory § 1983 damages unless a jury finds bad faith or a manifest out-of-scope act.
Monell supervisory liability against Ohio townships remains difficult: plaintiffs must tie constitutional violations to final policymakers or prove deliberate indifference through obvious patterns or risks.
The Sixth Circuit continues to afford wide deference to jury awards in § 1983 compensatory-damages cases, especially for emotional and reputational harm.
Parties challenging the constitutionality of state indemnification statutes must comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1 at the earliest pleading stage to avoid forfeiture.
Law enforcement agencies should ensure robust training and clear policies on evidence preservation, Brady obligations, and unbiased identification procedures to avoid § 1983 liability and large indemnification outlays.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Monell Liability: To sue a city or township under § 1983, the plaintiff must show the municipality’s own custom, policy, or official approval caused the constitutional harm—individual mistakes or isolated misconduct are not enough.
Deliberate Indifference: A high bar for failure-to-train claims: either prior similar violations put the city on notice, or a single predictable risk went unaddressed, proving the city ignored an obvious danger.
Bad Faith vs. Recklessness: Under Ohio law, “bad faith” for indemnification means conscious wrongdoing or moral obliquity, not merely negligent or reckless errors.
Scope of Employment: Acts taken to further the employer’s business—police investigations—are in-scope unless they are purely self-serving or unrelated to official duties.
Rule 5.1 Notice: If you challenge a state statute’s constitutionality in federal court, you must promptly send notice to the state’s attorney general at the time you first file the challenge.

Conclusion

This decision affirms that municipalities in Ohio face strict indemnification obligations for compensatory § 1983 damages, subject only to narrow exceptions for bad faith or out-of-scope conduct. It reinforces the Sixth Circuit’s broad deference to jury assessments of intangible harms and underscores the importance of procedural compliance when mounting constitutional challenges to state statutes. Public entities and officers must maintain robust training, transparent investigatory policies, and timely compliance with evidence-preservation duties to mitigate the risk of multi-million-dollar judgments and indemnification liabilities.