Full Interview Recordings Can Cure Suppression-Hearing Playback Gaps: Arkansas Supreme Court Clarifies Record-Settlement Sufficiency and Reaffirms Purposeful-Discharge Mens Rea for Drive-By Capital Murder

Case: Keenan Hudson v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 129 (Ark. Sept. 25, 2025), Supreme Court of Arkansas, per Associate Justice Courtney Rae Hudson.

Introduction

In this capital murder appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of Keenan Hudson for the shooting death of Zyrique “Zack” Geans in Stuttgart, Arkansas. A jury sentenced Hudson to life imprisonment without parole, plus a fifteen-year firearm enhancement. On appeal, Hudson advanced three arguments: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support capital murder under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(10); (2) the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress in-custody statements in light of a head injury; and (3) the appellate record could not be settled because the exact portions of video-recorded interviews played at the suppression hearing were not captured verbatim.

The Court rejected each claim. As to sufficiency, it held that eyewitness testimony, forensic matching of “RIP” 9mm bullets, and gunshot-residue findings supplied substantial evidence that Hudson purposely discharged a firearm from a vehicle at a person and thereby caused death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. On suppression, the Court conducted de novo review and agreed with the circuit court that Hudson’s Miranda waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary notwithstanding a visible head injury, where the recorded interviews showed a coherent, responsive suspect who did not request medical care or exhibit impairment. On the record-settlement issue, the Court clarified that a reconstructed record is sufficient for full appellate review of a suppression ruling where the entire video recordings and their transcripts are included in the record, even if the precise clips played during the hearing cannot be pinpointed—especially when the circuit court considered the recordings in their entirety by agreement of the parties.

Summary of the Opinion

Conviction affirmed. The State presented substantial evidence that Hudson fired from a moving vehicle toward the victim (or an occupied residential area where the victim stood), and the RIP bullet fragments recovered from the victim’s body matched the category of ammunition linked to Hudson’s shots and casings found in and along the Camaro.
Mens rea clarified (reaffirmed). For capital murder under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(10), the “purposeful” mental state attaches to the act of discharging the firearm—not to an intent to kill—consistent with prior precedent.
Suppression denied. Hudson’s Miranda waiver was valid. The video showed he understood his rights, signed a written waiver, spoke coherently, and did not request medical attention; the State met its burden to show a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver despite his head injury.
Record settlement sufficient. The appellate record, as supplemented with full recordings and transcripts of the interviews considered by the circuit court, provided an adequate basis for review even though the transcript did not identify the exact time stamps of video segments played at the suppression hearing.
Preservation matters. Hudson’s intent-to-kill sufficiency argument and his challenge to the jury’s rejection of justification were not preserved by his directed-verdict motions; his complaint about a written statement introduced at trial fell outside the suppression ruling; his challenge to a later interview (Nov. 18, 2019) was deemed abandoned on appeal.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Bush v. State, 2024 Ark. 77, 687 S.W.3d 570; Brooks v. State, 2016 Ark. 305, 498 S.W.3d 292; Smith v. State, 2024 Ark. 1, 680 S.W.3d 711.
These cases establish the sufficiency-of-the-evidence review: the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and defers to the jury on credibility and conflicts. Applied here, the Court credited eyewitness testimony that Hudson stood up in the Camaro and shot toward the victim and home, and it allowed the jury to resolve any contradictions (including Hudson’s self-defense narrative).
Thomas v. State, 2020 Ark. 154, 598 S.W.3d 41.
Thomas controls the mens rea analysis under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(10), holding that the “purposeful” element applies to the act of discharging a firearm, not to an intent to kill. The Court relied on Thomas to reject Hudson’s appeal to Thornton (premeditation case) and to underscore that the drive-by form of capital murder does not require proof of premeditated and deliberate intent.
Thornton v. State, 2014 Ark. 157, 433 S.W.3d 216.
Distinguished. Thornton involved reversal for insufficient evidence of premeditated-and-deliberated purpose to kill—an element not required under the drive-by subsection charged here. The Court explained this doctrinal mismatch to dispose of Hudson’s reliance on Thornton.
Haynie v. State, 2025 Ark. 46, 709 S.W.3d 46.
Preservation principle: a defendant is bound by the grounds raised in directed-verdict motions and cannot change them on appeal. This foreclosed Hudson’s late-blooming “intent” sufficiency theory and any challenge to the rejection of justification not embedded in his directed-verdict motions.
Nelson v. State, 2025 Ark. 11, 705 S.W.3d 876; Griffin v. State, 2015 Ark. 340, 470 S.W.3d 676; Clark v. State, 374 Ark. 292, 287 S.W.3d 567 (2008); Bishop v. State, 2023 Ark. 150, 675 S.W.3d 869; Halliburton v. State, 2020 Ark. 101, 594 S.W.3d 856; Jackson v. State, 2013 Ark. 201, 427 S.W.3d 607.
These cases frame suppression review: the State bears the burden to prove by a preponderance that a custodial statement is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; the appellate court independently assesses voluntariness based on totality of the circumstances while deferring to circuit court fact findings and credibility determinations. The Court applied these principles, focusing on the content and demeanor captured on video.
Thrower v. State, 2018 Ark. 256, 554 S.W.3d 825; Ward v. State, 321 Ark. 659, 906 S.W.2d 685 (1995); Hood v. State, 329 Ark. 21, 947 S.W.2d 328 (1997).
Thrower provides the yardstick for reconstructed records: the question is whether the supplemented record allows full appellate review. Ward exemplifies when reversal is required (multiple unrecorded bench conferences and missing jury-instruction discussions). Hood underscores heightened scrutiny where a life sentence is imposed. The Court distinguished Thrower/Ward by emphasizing that the entire interviews and transcripts were now in the record and that the trial court had considered them in full.
Lewis v. State, 2017 Ark. 211, 521 S.W.3d 466; Mister v. State, 2022 Ark. 35, 639 S.W.3d 331.
These cases reinforce core preservation and abandonment rules: issues not presented to, or ruled upon by, the circuit court are not preserved; issues not argued on appeal are abandoned. The Court used these to limit consideration of Hudson’s complaints about a written statement not encompassed in the suppression ruling and his later interview claim not pursued on appeal.
Taffner v. State, 2018 Ark. 99, 541 S.W.3d 430.
Confirms that sufficiency must be reviewed first to avoid double jeopardy concerns—explaining the Court’s sequencing of issues.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Sufficiency of the Evidence for Capital Murder (Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(10))

The statute criminalizes purposely discharging a firearm from a vehicle at a person, or at a vehicle/occupiable structure known or reasonably believed to be occupied, and thereby causing death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. The State’s proof included:

Three eyewitnesses who saw Hudson standing up in the Camaro and firing toward the victim and the victim’s residence; one heard Hudson declare, “Let’s handle this.”
Forensic shell-casing analysis showing a trail of 9mm casings (mostly RIP bullets) in and along the Camaro’s path; nine 9mm casings were inside the car, largely in the backseat area—consistent with discharge from within the vehicle.
Gunshot residue on Hudson’s clothing and on the Camaro’s rear-passenger seat and passenger-side headrest.
Autopsy evidence that the victim died from a wound consistent with 9mm RIP ammunition—the same class of ammunition linked to the casings by the Camaro.

Hudson admitted firing from the Camaro but claimed he did so defensively after “machine gun” fire disabled the vehicle. The jury was not required to credit that narrative. Applying the light-most-favorable standard, and recognizing the jury’s role as sole arbiter of credibility and conflict resolution, the Court held the evidence substantial. It also emphasized (per Thomas) that the “purposeful” mens rea attaches to the act of discharging the firearm—not to an intent to kill. To the extent Hudson argued failure of proof of intent to kill, that argument was both legally misplaced and unpreserved because it was not included in his directed-verdict motions. Similarly, any complaint about the jury’s rejection of justification (self-defense) was not preserved.

Notably, Hudson’s argument that the State failed to prove the victim was in an “occupiable structure” misreads the disjunctive statute: it suffices that the discharge was “at a person” (as the eyewitnesses testified). The State was not obligated to prove the alternative “structure” prong given the person-directed shooting.

b) Suppression: Voluntariness of Miranda Waiver Despite Head Injury

The Court performed a de novo review of voluntariness, deferring to the circuit court’s fact findings, and held the State met its burden to show a valid waiver. Key facts:

Officers administered Miranda warnings orally and in writing; Hudson initialed each right, signed a waiver, and agreed to speak.
Although a visible bump and small laceration on Hudson’s head were discussed, the video showed he was alert, responsive, and coherent; he did not request medical care during the interviews and did not claim confusion or inability to understand.
The circuit court found (and the videos confirmed) that Hudson could narrate events in detail and adjusted his account in response to developing information—further demonstrating comprehension and lucidity.

Because Hudson did not allege intimidation, coercion, or deception, and the record reflected understanding and voluntariness, the waiver was valid and suppression was properly denied. The Court also confined its review to what was litigated below: a separate written statement introduced during Hudson’s trial cross-examination was not part of the suppression ruling and thus could not be challenged on appeal; and any challenge to the later November 18, 2019 interview was abandoned.

c) Record-Settlement: When a Reconstructed Record Is Enough for Appellate Review

Hudson argued the record was insufficient because the exact clips of the February 13 and November 18 video interviews played at the suppression hearing were not identified in the transcript or by timestamps. After remand to settle the record, the circuit court admitted the interviews as exhibits, ensured complete transcription, and confirmed that both interviews were played from the beginning at the suppression hearing (though the endpoint was not precisely recalled). The parties had also agreed at the hearing that the court would receive and review the recordings in their entirety.

Applying Thrower and related cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court held the record, as supplemented, permitted full appellate review:

Full recordings of the interviews and corresponding transcripts were in the record.
The critical portions bearing on voluntariness—Miranda warnings, the signed waivers, Hudson’s condition and demeanor, and his narrative—were included.
The Court contrasted this situation with deficiencies warranting reversal (e.g., missing bench conferences, jury-instruction discussions, or unrecorded trial segments central to appellate issues) and emphasized the life-sentence “heightened concern” while concluding the record here was adequate.

This clarification is important: when a suppression dispute centers on recorded interviews, inclusion of the full videos and their transcripts—particularly where the trial court considered the recordings in full by agreement—can cure the lack of precise hearing-playback timestamps for appellate purposes.

3) Impact and Practical Implications

a) Substantive Criminal Law

Drive-by capital murder mens rea reaffirmed. Prosecutors need not prove intent to kill under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(10). The purposeful element is satisfied by proof that the defendant purposely discharged a firearm from a vehicle at a person or occupied vehicle/structure and thereby caused death under circumstances of extreme indifference.
Evidence synthesis matters. Eyewitness accounts, GSR, and ammunition-type forensics (e.g., RIP bullets) can corroborate purposeful discharge and causation. The jury’s credibility determinations will be respected on appeal.
Extreme indifference can be inferred from firing multiple rounds of fragmenting ammunition from a vehicle into an area where people are present—especially near a residence.

b) Suppression Practice

Recorded interviews are powerful. Video evidence of Miranda warnings, signed waivers, and a suspect’s lucidity can carry the State’s burden on voluntariness—even when the suspect has a minor injury.
Injury is not dispositive. A visible injury alone does not render a waiver involuntary absent evidence of impairment, coercion, or confusion. Defense counsel should build a record of impairment (medical evidence, requests for care, disorientation) if challenging voluntariness on medical grounds.
Scope of suppression rulings matters. If a particular statement or interview was not encompassed by the suppression motion and ruling, it will be difficult to challenge later.

c) Appellate Procedure and Record Management

Reconstructed records can be sufficient. When suppression hinges on recorded interviews, a complete set of those recordings and their transcripts in the appellate record will generally permit full review, even if the transcript lacks precise timestamps of what was played at the hearing—especially where the trial court considered the entire recordings.
Preservation discipline is critical. Specific grounds must be included in directed-verdict motions to preserve them for appeal (e.g., intent theories, justification). Failure to do so will preclude appellate review.
Rule 4-3(a) review remains robust. Even under heightened scrutiny for life sentences, the Court will affirm where the supplemented record enables comprehensive review of adverse rulings.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Capital murder—drive-by variant (Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(10)). This form of capital murder focuses on purposefully firing a gun from a vehicle at a person or occupied target, causing death with extreme disregard for human life. The State does not need to prove the shooter meant to kill.
“Purposeful” mens rea here. “Purposeful” relates to the act of shooting from a vehicle, not an intent to kill a specific person.
“Extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Conduct so reckless and dangerous that it shows a blatant disregard for human life—e.g., spraying bullets near people or homes.
Miranda rights and waiver. Police must advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to counsel. A waiver is valid if made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily—free from coercion, with sufficient understanding. Minor injuries do not automatically negate voluntariness; the totality of circumstances controls.
Gunshot residue (GSR). Particles left on people or surfaces after a gun is fired. Positive GSR can corroborate that a person fired or was near a fired gun.
“RIP” bullets. Radically Invasive Projectiles are designed to fragment and cause more damage. Matching bullet fragments to casings and ammunition type can link a shooter’s weapon to a victim’s wounds.
Preservation via directed-verdict motions. To challenge the sufficiency of evidence on appeal, the defendant must make a specific directed-verdict motion at trial, identifying each element or theory (e.g., intent, justification) claimed to be unsupported.
Record settlement and reconstructed record. If parts of the transcript are missing or unclear, the parties and court can supplement the record with exhibits (like videos) and transcripts. The appellate court asks whether the augmented record allows full review of the issues presented.
Firearm enhancement. Arkansas law permits additional prison time when a firearm is used in committing a felony; here, a 15-year enhancement was imposed consecutively.

Conclusion

Keenan Hudson v. State is principally notable for two points. First, it reinforces that the drive-by capital murder provision requires a purposeful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, not a premeditated intent to kill—solidifying Thomas’s mens rea framework. On a robust evidentiary record combining eyewitness accounts, GSR, and ballistic associations with RIP ammunition, the Court had little difficulty affirming substantial evidence of guilt while rejecting unpreserved intent and justification arguments.

Second, and with broader procedural significance, the Court clarifies that appellate review of suppression rulings is not derailed by an imprecise hearing playback record when the entire recorded interviews and their transcripts are included in the appellate record and were considered by the trial court. This pragmatic approach balances the ideal of a verbatim record with the realities of digital evidence and ensures that life-sentence cases remain reviewable on a complete substantive basis.

The opinion thus offers a clear roadmap for trial practitioners—preserve specific sufficiency grounds, litigate suppression with a full, clear record (especially when injuries are alleged), and ensure that digital exhibits are made part of the record—and for appellate courts, it provides a workable standard for handling reconstructed records in suppression contexts without undermining meaningful review.