FTCA Judgment Bar Precludes Bivens Claims for the Same Underlying Conduct

Introduction

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Justin Longworth v. A. Mansukhani, 21-7609 (4th Cir. Apr. 16, 2025), establishes that a final judgment under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) bars any subsequent or pending Bivens action against individual federal employees for the same subject matter. In this case, federal inmate Justin Longworth sued Bureau of Prisons officials directly under Bivens for alleged sexual assault and deliberate indifference, while separately suing the United States under the FTCA for negligence arising from the same facts. After the district court entered a final judgment dismissing his FTCA claim on the merits, Longworth pressed his ongoing Bivens appeal. The Fourth Circuit dismissed that appeal, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2676’s “judgment bar” provision forecloses any action against the individual employees based on the same conduct once an FTCA judgment has been entered.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel, in an opinion by Judge Nachmanoff joined by Judges Agee and Richardson, confronted a straightforward statutory command. Section 2676 provides that “an FTCA judgment is a complete bar to any action by the claimant … against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” Longworth’s FTCA suit (filed August 2021) proceeded to a merits-based dismissal in September 2022 for failure to plead that the tortfeasor acted within the scope of employment. Although Longworth never appealed that FTCA judgment, he then sought to press his earlier-filed—but still pending on appeal—Bivens claims. The Fourth Circuit held that § 2676 applies whenever there is a final FTCA judgment on the merits, regardless of filing order, and thus the pending Bivens appeal “must be dismissed.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents (403 U.S. 388 (1971)): Recognized an implied damages remedy against federal agents for Fourth Amendment violations.
Unus v. Kane (565 F.3d 103 (4th Cir. 2009)): Clarified that FTCA and Bivens remedies are non‐exclusive but that an FTCA judgment triggers the § 2676 judgment bar against a subsequent Bivens action for the same conduct.
Brownback v. King (592 U.S. 209 (2021)): Held that a dismissal for lack of FTCA subject‐matter jurisdiction can qualify as a “final judgment on the merits” for purposes of § 2676.
Ziglar v. Abbasi (582 U.S. 120 (2017)): Established the framework for analyzing whether a new context is appropriate for extending Bivens; the district court relied on Abbasi to dismiss Longworth’s claims, though that analysis proved moot once § 2676 applied.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds from the plain text of § 2676. Once an FTCA claim reaches a final judgment on the merits—even if that judgment is a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim on FTCA elements—that judgment “is a complete bar” to any action “against the employee” based on “the same subject matter.” Longworth argued that retroactivity concerns should prevent application of the bar to his earlier-filed Bivens appeal. The panel rejected that argument, explaining that the statute’s use of the term “action” encompasses any judicial proceeding, including a pending appeal. Because Longworth’s Bivens claims remained alive only by virtue of his appeal, and because an FTCA judgment on the merits had been entered, the Bivens action could not proceed.

The panel distinguished between the chronology of filing and the existence of two parallel avenues of relief. While plaintiffs may pursue Bivens and FTCA remedies concurrently or sequentially, they do so at the risk that any final FTCA disposition will foreclose further litigation against the individual actors. This reading effectuates Congress’s intent to protect federal employees from duplicative litigation and binds plaintiffs to an either-or choice once one avenue reaches finality.

Impact

This decision underscores several important points for litigants and practitioners:

Strategy in Parallel Suits: Plaintiffs who bring both Bivens and FTCA claims must carefully consider which action they allow to reach final judgment first, since an adverse FTCA ruling will bar any subsequent Bivens suit on the same subject matter.
Scope of “Final Judgment”: A dismissal of an FTCA claim for lack of subject‐matter jurisdiction or failure to plead scope‐of-employment allegations qualifies as a “final judgment on the merits” under Brownback, thus activating the judgment bar.
Limits on Bivens Extensions: Even before reaching the merits of Abbasi’s special‐factors test, courts may enforce § 2676 to truncate Bivens claims. This decision signals judicial reluctance to allow protracted constitutional‐tort litigation alongside FTCA claims.
Congressional Control: The FTCA judgment bar reflects congressional intent to centralize liability for federal‐employee torts in the United States rather than exposing individuals to repeated personal‐capacity suits.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Bivens Remedy: A judicially implied right to sue federal officers for constitutional violations (e.g., Fourth or Eighth Amendment). Bivens does not arise from a statute but from the courts’ inference of Congress’s intent to provide such a remedy.
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A statutory scheme allowing plaintiffs to sue the United States for certain torts committed by government employees, substituting the federal treasury as defendant.
Judgment Bar (28 U.S.C. § 2676): Provides that once an FTCA action results in a final judgment, the claimant cannot bring any further suit “by reason of the same subject matter” against the individual employees involved.
“Final Judgment on the Merits”: A disposition that resolves the substantive validity of a claim, even if styled as a jurisdictional dismissal, so long as it leaves no district‐court remedy available.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Longworth v. Mansukhani crystallizes the rule that a final FTCA judgment—whatever its procedural basis—precludes ongoing or subsequent Bivens claims against the same federal employees for the same underlying misconduct. By strictly enforcing the judgment bar of 28 U.S.C. § 2676, the court has clarified litigants’ strategic choices and reinforced Congress’s design to channel federal‐employee liability through the FTCA once a final ruling issues. This decision will guide counsel in crafting coordinated FTCA and constitutional‐tort strategies and alerts courts to apply the bar irrespective of the order in which parallel suits are filed.