FTCA Equitable Tolling Requires Plaintiff Diligence: Agency May Rely on SF-95 Address and Need Not Infer Counsel’s Move from Email Signatures

I. Introduction

In Cassius Standifer Peak v. United States of America (11th Cir. Jan. 27, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of an FTCA medical-negligence suit as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). The case arose after Cassius Standifer Peak—an Army veteran—underwent a cystoscopy at the VA Medical Center in Atlanta and alleged that the surgical team injured his neck while he was under anesthesia.

The central issue was procedural but dispositive: whether Peak could invoke equitable tolling where the VA mailed the administrative denial letter by certified mail to the attorney address listed on the Standard Form 95, even though counsel had moved offices and later received the denial only via email—after which counsel still waited months to file suit.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that Peak’s complaint was time-barred because the VA mailed its final denial on March 29, 2023, triggering the FTCA’s six-month filing deadline, which expired September 29, 2023. Peak filed suit on February 2, 2024—more than four months late.

Although the FTCA’s time bars are subject to equitable tolling, the court concluded Peak failed to meet his burden to show both (1) extraordinary circumstances beyond his control and (2) reasonable diligence. The VA had no affirmative duty to “notice” a new address in counsel’s email signature and update its records; counsel also failed to act diligently even after receiving the denial by email on October 5, 2023.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2012): Cited for the Rule 12(b)(6) posture—accepting complaint allegations as true and construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. It frames the appellate lens, but does not alter the statutory time-bar analysis.
Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014): Supports considering documents attached to the complaint on a motion to dismiss; here, the Standard Form 95 was central because it contained the address the VA used for certified mailing.
United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015): Establishes that FTCA time limits are nonjurisdictional and thus potentially subject to equitable tolling. Peak could seek tolling, but only under strict standards.
Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2006): Reinforces that equitable tolling is an “extraordinary remedy” to be applied sparingly—setting a high threshold for relief.
Stamper v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 863 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2017): Supplies the Eleventh Circuit’s two-part tolling formulation requiring extraordinary circumstances “beyond [the plaintiff’s] control” and “unavoidable even with diligence.”
Cadet v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 853 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2017): Clarifies that diligence and extraordinary circumstances are separate elements; satisfying one cannot compensate for failing the other. This mattered because Peak’s showing was weak on both fronts—especially diligence after actual notice.
Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89 (1990): The Supreme Court’s warning that equitable tolling does not extend to “garden variety” excusable neglect. The opinion treats counsel’s failure to ensure receipt of a deadline-triggering notice as the type of routine neglect Irwin excludes.
Dotson v. United States, 30 F.4th 1259 (11th Cir. 2022): The closest factual analogue: a denial letter was mailed to an address provided by prior counsel; current counsel did not receive it and still failed to show diligence (e.g., inquiring with the agency or prior firm). Peak’s situation was viewed as materially similar.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory trigger: “date of mailing” controls.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), an FTCA action must be filed “within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim.” The Eleventh Circuit treated March 29, 2023—the date the VA mailed the denial by certified mail— as the operative trigger, regardless of counsel’s non-receipt.

2. Equitable tolling is available in theory, but demanding in practice.
Relying on United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, the court acknowledged the limitations period is nonjurisdictional and tollable. But under Arce v. Garcia, tolling remains “extraordinary,” and under Stamper v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd. and Cadet v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., Peak had to prove both extraordinary circumstances and diligence.

3. No extraordinary circumstances: counsel’s address-management failures are “garden variety.”
Peak argued the VA should have mailed the denial to counsel’s current address because counsel filed a change-of-address form with the post office and because the VA’s lawyer saw the new address in an email signature block. The court rejected this as an attempt to shift the burden of diligence onto the government, concluding the VA had no affirmative duty to infer an address change from such indirect cues. Echoing Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affs., the court characterized the problem as, at most, excusable neglect—not an extraordinary circumstance.

4. No diligence—especially after actual notice.
Even assuming non-receipt of the mailed letter could support tolling in some cases, the court emphasized the additional lapse: Peak’s counsel received the denial by email on October 5, 2023, yet waited until February 2, 2024 to sue. That delay strongly undercut any claim of reasonable diligence and independently supported denying tolling.

5. Dotson supplies the governing practical rule.
As in Dotson v. United States, the court faulted the absence of proactive steps—no alleged direct notification to the VA of the new address, and no allegation that counsel affirmatively informed VA counsel of the move during communications. The opinion treats such omissions as dispositive in assessing both diligence and extraordinariness.

C. Impact

Although designated “Not for Publication,” the decision reinforces (and operationalizes) a stringent approach to equitable tolling in FTCA cases:

Mailing to the SF-95 address is highly consequential. Claimants and counsel should assume the agency will rely on the address supplied on Standard Form 95 unless directly notified otherwise.
Indirect notice is insufficient. A postal forwarding request or an email signature block does not shift responsibility to the agency to update contact information.
Post-denial delay is fatal to tolling. Even where receipt is delayed, waiting months after obtaining actual notice will likely defeat any equitable tolling claim in the Eleventh Circuit.
Practice pointer for future FTCA litigants. Counsel should: (i) directly notify the agency in writing of address changes, (ii) confirm in writing with agency counsel, and (iii) periodically request status of pending administrative claims to avoid being surprised by a denial.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A statute allowing lawsuits against the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees, but only after presenting an administrative claim and adhering to strict timing rules.
Administrative “final denial” and the six-month clock: After an agency denies an FTCA claim, the claimant has six months to file suit. The clock runs from the date the denial is mailed by certified or registered mail—not necessarily the date it is received.
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal: A motion arguing the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Here, the time bar was apparent from the pleaded dates and the attached SF-95.
Equitable tolling: A doctrine that can pause a filing deadline, but only when the plaintiff proves both extraordinary circumstances beyond control and diligent efforts to comply. Ordinary attorney oversight typically does not qualify.
Nonjurisdictional deadline: A deadline that does not limit the court’s power to hear a case, but still bars relief if not met—unless equitable tolling applies.

V. Conclusion

Peak reaffirms a strict, claimant-centered view of diligence under FTCA limitations law: the VA satisfies § 2401(b) by mailing the denial by certified mail to the address provided, and equitable tolling will not rescue a late-filed action where counsel fails to directly update the agency and then delays even after receiving actual notice. The decision, drawing heavily on Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affs. and Dotson v. United States, underscores that equitable tolling remains exceptional—and that routine address or calendaring failures are not enough.