From “Proximate Cause” to “Contributory Nexus”: Shepherd v. Rhode Island State Police and the Re-Calibration of Heart-Attack Disability Pensions

1. Introduction

Shepherd v. Rhode Island State Police, No. 2024-99-Appeal (R.I. July 10, 2025), concerns Lieutenant Staci K. Shepherd’s quest for a 75 % accidental-disability pension after suffering a debilitating heart attack during mandatory firearms re-qualification. The Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police (then-Colonel James M. Manni) denied her claim, finding an insufficient causal nexus between her employment and the cardiac event. The Superior Court reversed, and the State appealed.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed, but on a striking doctrinal basis: whenever the pertinent facts are undisputed, the question whether an injury occurred “in the course of performance of duties” under G.L. 1956 § 42-28-21(a) is a question of law reviewed de novo. Applying that lens, the Court substituted a “contribute-to-the-injury” test—rather than strict proximate cause—to heart-attack claims, borrowed from workers’-compensation jurisprudence (Mulcahey v. New England Newspapers, Inc.).

The majority thus lowered the evidentiary bar for state troopers (and, by analogy, other public-safety officers) seeking disability pensions based on cardiac episodes, while two vigorous dissents warned that the decision erodes the “great discretion” traditionally accorded to superintendents.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s declaration that Lt. Shepherd is entitled to a 75 % disability pension, retroactive to August 29, 2020.
• Key holding: Undisputed facts + causation inquiry = pure question of law; thus the Supreme Court may review the superintendent’s causation determination de novo.
• Heart-attack cases require only that “the conditions and nature of the employment contributed to the injury”—not that the work be the sole or proximate cause.
• The Superintendent applied too stringent a “because/caused by” standard, ignoring Mulcahey’s more flexible contribution test; that legal error entitled the Court to substitute its own analysis.
• Given the record (training-range exertion, acknowledged occupational stress, unusual hours, diet, etc.), the Court found only one legal conclusion possible: the job contributed to the heart attack.

3. Analytical Commentary

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Mulcahey v. New England Newspapers, Inc., 488 A.2d 681 (R.I. 1985) – Workers’-compensation ruling that in heart-attack cases “causal relationship” ≠ negligence proximate cause; contribution suffices. The majority treats Mulcahey as controlling for § 42-28-21 claims.
• Gartner v. Jackson’s, Inc., 95 R.I. 489 (1963) – Early workers’-compensation heart-attack case emphasizing causal nexus; relied upon by Superintendent but re-interpreted by majority.
• Canario v. Culhane, 752 A.2d 476 (R.I. 2000) & Rhode Island Troopers Association v. Division of State Police, 316 A.3d 1140 (R.I. 2024) – Prior decisions stressing superintendent’s “great discretion” and arbitrary-and-capricious review standard. Dissents argue these mandate deference; majority distinguishes them because the dispute here is purely legal.
• Workers’-Compensation Trilogy (Lomba, DeNardo, Corry) – Establish that where facts are undisputed, “arose out of and in the course of employment” is a legal issue, supporting de novo review.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Characterisation of the Question Presented
   Because the parties agreed on all material facts (date of heart attack, training context, medical findings), only the legal effect—whether the heart attack fell “in the course of” duties—remained. Thus, following Lomba et al., the Court treated the issue as a pure question of law.
2. Misapplication of Standard by Superintendent
   Superintendent Manni placed on Shepherd the burden to prove the attack occurred “because” she was on duty, i.e., a proximate-cause standard. Through a lexical analysis (“because” vs. “contribute”), the Court found this inconsistent with Mulcahey.
3. Substitution of Correct Standard
   Adopting the contribution test, the Court looked to undisputed evidence of immediate symptom exacerbation during firearms qualification, chronic job stress, irregular hours, and poor meal options. Even the State’s own cardiologist acknowledged these factors may “have been contributors.” Hence the legal criterion was met.
4. Supervisory Powers and Practicality of Remand
   Given a purely documentary record and inability to remand to the agency in a declaratory-judgment posture, the Court exercised inherent supervisory power to resolve the matter definitively.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Judgment

• Lower Bar for Cardiac-Related Pensions: Troopers and other officers can now rely on a “substantial contribution” showing, not proximate cause. Expect more successful claims, especially where direct medical certainty is elusive.
• Judicial Review Standard in Flux: Although the Court claims consistency, dissenters note a drift from the “great discretion” doctrine. Future litigants may invoke Shepherd to invite de novo review whenever an “incorrect legal standard” is alleged.
• Collective-Bargaining Interplay: While the CBA’s heart-attack presumption was technically inapplicable to lieutenants, the majority’s reasoning mirrors that presumption, potentially pressuring the State to extend similar protections to supervisory ranks in future negotiations.
• Fiscal and Policy Implications: A relaxed standard could increase pension system liabilities. Legislators may revisit § 42-28-21 to clarify intent, while the State Police may revise internal procedures to document occupational stress factors more rigorously.
• Cross-Pollination with IOD Statutes: The opinion cites § 45-21.2-9, foreshadowing that Workers’ Compensation Court appeals might import the same contribution standard, aligning disability and IOD doctrines.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

Shepherd v. Rhode Island State Police recalibrates both substantive and procedural aspects of disability-pension litigation for public-safety officers. Substantively, it cements a lenient “contribution” test for heart-attack cases. Procedurally, it signals that appellate courts may intervene de novo when a superintendent employs an incorrect legal standard, narrowing—but not eliminating—the superintendent’s historically broad discretion.

The decision thus offers a more realistic pathway for officers facing medically murky cardiac events to secure financial protection, while simultaneously inviting renewed debate over the proper scope of judicial oversight and the fiscal sustainability of public-safety pension systems in Rhode Island.