From “Merely Incidental” to “Substantial”: Missouri Supreme Court Redefines the Kidnapping Element in State v. Dustin Curtis Winter

Introduction

In State of Missouri v. Dustin Curtis Winter, No. SC100847 (Mo. banc Aug. 12, 2025), the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed Dustin Curtis Winter’s convictions for first-degree murder and first-degree kidnapping but—more importantly—recalibrated Missouri kidnapping law. The Court discarded three decades of appellate precedent that had required the State to prove that the victim’s confinement was “more than merely incidental” to another crime and that it increased the “risk of harm.” By overruling State v. Sistrunk and kindred cases, the Court restored the statutory language’s plain meaning: confinement for a “substantial period” is all that is required.

The decision also clarifies the limited evidentiary nature of the corpus delicti doctrine, re-emphasizes the standard for deliberation in first-degree murder, and addresses sentencing discrepancies through a nunc pro tunc directive.

Summary of the Judgment

Murder conviction—affirmed. The Court held that ample direct and circumstantial evidence supported each element, especially “deliberation.”
Kidnapping conviction—affirmed. The Court jettisoned the “merely incidental / increased risk” gloss and found the evidence sufficient to show confinement for a “substantial period.”
Sentencing error—vacated in part and remanded. A written judgment listing “999 days” was corrected nunc pro tunc to reflect oral pronouncements of life sentences.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State v. Jackson-Bey, 690 S.W.3d 181 (Mo. banc 2024): Restated the sufficiency-of-evidence review framework, which the Court rigorously applied.
State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511 (Mo. banc 2003) & State v. Madorie, 156 S.W.3d 351 (Mo. banc 2005): Provided the modern articulation of the corpus delicti rule as an evidentiary, not substantive, requirement. Winter’s attempt to elevate it to an element failed.
State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. banc 1997) & State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751 (Mo. banc 2002): Outlined the four evidence categories (planning, bad-blood, complicated design, failure to act) from which deliberation may be inferred.
State v. Sistrunk, 414 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. App. 2013) and progeny (Williams, Taylor, Brock, Shelton, etc.): Required proof that confinement was “more than merely incidental” and increased risk of harm. Overruled.
State v. Jackson, 703 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. App. 1985): Identified the “merely incidental” language, but in a double-jeopardy context. Misapplied by later courts, according to Winter.

B. Legal Reasoning of the Court

1. Corpus Delicti—Evidence Rule, Not Element

Winter argued that absent a body the State failed to establish corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court clarified:

“Corpus delicti is simply a rule of evidence that guards against convictions based solely on a defendant’s extrajudicial admissions. It never enlarges statutory elements, and it requires only ‘slight’ corroboration, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Because Winter did not object to admission of his text messages, and independent evidence (blood, rope, disappearance, DNA) “more than slightly” corroborated a homicide, the doctrine played no substantive role.

2. Deliberation in First-Degree Murder

Applying Roberts, the Court found deliberation through:

Planning evidence: rented U-Haul, arranged zip ties, lured victim by text.
Bad-blood evidence: motive of revenge for alleged robbery and rape.
Complicated design: moving victim to secluded locales, researching body disposal.
Failure to act: Victim remained alive and injured for hours, yet Winter sought no aid.

3. Redefining “Substantial Period” in Kidnapping

This is the opinion’s doctrinal centerpiece. The Court observed that §565.110.1 requires only:

“unlawfully confining another person for a substantial period for the purpose of facilitating a felony or inflicting injury/terror.”

It declared that earlier courts had confused interpretation with application. Where statutory text is unambiguous, no judicial gloss is warranted. By importing “merely incidental” and “increased danger” from double-jeopardy cases, Sistrunk and its line had effectively re-written the statute. The Court overruled them, holding that:

“Substantial” carries its ordinary meaning: “considerable in amount, essential, not illusory.”
No additional proof of heightened risk or non-incidental conduct is required for sufficiency review.

Applying the corrected test, the Court found confinement of at least two hours—while the victim was bound, injured, and transported—undeniably substantial.

4. Nunc Pro Tunc Correction

The discrepancy between oral (two life sentences, consecutive) and written (999-day) sentences was a clerical error. Under State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, oral pronouncement controls. The Court remanded solely to amend the judgment.

C. Impact on Missouri Law and Future Litigation

Kidnapping prosecutions: Prosecutors no longer must engage in the complex “incidental vs. increased-risk” analysis. Defense strategies predicated on those arguments lose force.
Double-jeopardy analysis remains intact: The Court’s overruling is confined to sufficiency review. When defendants claim multiple-punishment violations, the “merely incidental” concept may still be relevant, but only within that constitutional framework.
Corpus delicti challenges curtailed: The opinion re-emphasizes that the doctrine is merely an admissibility threshold, preventing invocation as a pseudo-element at the appellate stage.
Appellate clarity: The decision draws a bright line between ambiguous statutory language (inviting “construction”) and broad language (inviting factual “application”), guiding future courts to resist creative embellishments.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Corpus Delicti: Latin for “body of the crime.” A rule that the State must offer some independent evidence a crime occurred before it can admit a defendant’s out-of-court confession. Not an element of any crime.
Deliberation: “Cool reflection” for any length of time, however brief. Evidence of planning, motive, complex execution, or failure to aid a victim can show deliberation.
Substantial Period (Kidnapping): No magic number of minutes; the confinement must be “considerable” rather than momentary. Winter’s two-plus-hour kidnapping easily qualifies.
Nunc Pro Tunc: Latin for “now for then.” A judicial order that corrects the written record to match what was actually said or decided in open court.

Conclusion

State v. Dustin Curtis Winter is a watershed decision for Missouri kidnapping jurisprudence. By restoring fidelity to the statutory text, the Court simplifies proof burdens for prosecutors and provides clearer guidance to trial judges and juries. The opinion also reinforces the limited nature of corpus delicti, clarifies deliberation analysis, and models precision in correcting sentencing records. Going forward, litigants will confront a leaner, text-centered standard: Did the defendant unlawfully confine the victim for a substantial period? Ancillary debates about incidental confinement and risk elevation are relegated to constitutional-overlap contexts, not sufficiency reviews. In short, the Court has trimmed interpretive overgrowth and replanted Missouri kidnapping law firmly in the language enacted by the General Assembly.