From “Good Government” to Concrete Harm: Wyoming Supreme Court Reaffirms Limits on Declaratory and Taxpayer Standing in Williams v. Board of County Commissioners

I. Introduction

In Christopher Williams; Amy Williams; Cindy Barlow; Charles Huson; Lois Huson; Marianne Ferrari; and Sharon Smallwood v. Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County; Wyoming Department of Audit; and Justin Chavez, 2025 WY 127 (Dec. 2, 2025), the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed a recurring and increasingly important question in state public-law litigation: when, if ever, may ordinary taxpayers and residents use the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) to compel state and local officials to comply with fiscal statutes and auditing obligations?

The plaintiffs—seven Johnson County residents, property owners, and taxpayers—asserted numerous statutory and constitutional violations in the County’s financial management and the Department of Audit’s oversight. They sought sweeping declaratory relief, judicial “oversight and direction,” and even a court-ordered forensic audit of Johnson County.

The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Chief Justice Boomgaarden’s opinion does more than resolve a local budgeting dispute; it:

Reaffirms that Wyoming standing is a jurisprudential, not jurisdictional, requirement.
Clarifies that being a taxpayer, resident, and critic of government financial practices does not, by itself, create an “interest” sufficient for declaratory relief under the UDJA.
Refuses again to recognize broad taxpayer standing and insists on a non-speculative, concrete increase in tax burden before the Court will even consider such a doctrine.
Confirms that a generalized desire for “good government” or “legal spending of tax dollars” is a generalized grievance, not a justiciable injury.

Taken together, the opinion significantly narrows the path for “private attorney general” style litigation in Wyoming directed at fiscal management and auditing practices of governmental entities.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court was presented with a single issue: whether the Appellants had standing to pursue their declaratory judgment claims challenging Johnson County’s financial practices and the Department of Audit’s oversight.

The Appellants alleged that:

The County Board misused general cash reserve funds and made unlawful inter-fund transfers, in violation of multiple provisions of the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act (UMFPA) (e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16‑4‑105, 16‑4‑108, 16‑4‑120, 16‑4‑121, 16‑4‑123).
The Department of Audit and its Director failed to enforce those statutes, failed to require corrections, and failed to refer alleged legal violations to the Attorney General.
The County’s distribution of $182,192 in COVID-19 “charitable relief” violated Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 6 (Count VI).

They sought declarations that these statutes and constitutional provisions were violated, court-supervised “oversight and direction,” including a forensic audit, and attorney’s fees, costs, and damages.

To justify standing, the Appellants asserted they were:

“Impacted taxpayers” who had experienced “tangible damage and loss,” including higher property taxes, license fees, and sales taxes.
Holders of a “fundamental right to protection from government abuse,” a “right to legal spending of their tax dollars,” and a “legal right to good government.”

The Board and the Department moved to dismiss, arguing lack of prudential standing, statutory standing, and taxpayer standing, and contending that Appellants were improperly attempting to act as private attorneys general. The district court granted the motions.

On appeal, the Supreme Court:

Affirmed the dismissal under the Brimmer prudential standing test applied to UDJA actions.
Held that Appellants had failed to allege any tangible, particularized injury that distinguishes them from the public at large.
Rejected their asserted “right to good government” and similar formulations as unsupported, amorphous, and legally insufficient to establish standing.
Declined once again to recognize taxpayer standing, holding that even Appellants’ allegation of “tangible” tax increases was conclusory and rested on speculation.
Reiterated that while issues of public importance may justify some relaxation of standing requirements, they cannot substitute for the core Brimmer requirements of injury and redressability.

Accordingly, the Court held the Appellants lacked standing under the UDJA and affirmed dismissal of the complaint.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence on the Decision

1. Brimmer v. Thomson and the Brimmer Test

At the heart of the opinion is the Brimmer test, first articulated in Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 (Wyo. 1974), governing justiciability in Wyoming declaratory judgment actions. The test requires:

Parties with existing and genuine (not theoretical) rights or interests.
A controversy on which a judgment may effectively operate, not a purely political or academic disagreement.
A judicial determination that will operate as a final judgment on the rights, status, or legal relations of the real parties in interest, or be of such overriding public moment as to be its legal equivalent.
Proceedings that are genuinely adversarial, not merely a disputation.

The Court characterizes this as its “prudential standing test” or simply the Brimmer test (¶10). In UDJA cases, the statutory requirement that the plaintiff be an “interested person” (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1‑37‑103) is implemented through Brimmer (¶10).

In Williams, the Court applies Brimmer in a focused way: it concentrates on the first (tangible interest), then explains how failure of that element necessarily undermines the second and third (effective operation of judgment and effect on rights) (¶¶12, 18).

2. Allred v. Bebout and the Retreat from Broad “Public Interest” Standing

Allred v. Bebout, 2018 WY 8, 409 P.3d 260, is the central modern standing case the Court relies upon. There, legislative plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a bill and invoked separation-of-powers concerns, claiming a right to insist that the legislature act within constitutional limits. The Court in Allred rejected standing, emphasizing:

Standing is rooted in separation of powers, and courts address actual harm, not abstract oversight of “good government” (¶9, quoting Allred and Lewis v. Casey).
Assertions that plaintiffs have a right to ensure government obedience to the Constitution, without a specific personal injury, are insufficient (¶15, quoting Allred ¶44).
The Court has “retreated from [a] liberal application of the public interest factor” (¶11, summarizing Allred’s discussion of William F. West Ranch and earlier cases).

In Williams, the Court uses Allred in two key ways:

To reject the Appellants’ amorphous claims to a “fundamental right to protection from government abuse” or a “legal right to good government” as indistinguishable from the unsuccessful claims in Allred (¶¶14–15).
To reaffirm that even where an issue is of genuine public importance, the Brimmer requirements—especially a tangible, personal interest—still must be met (¶¶11, 18).

This alignment with Allred signals continuity and a deliberate refusal to let the UDJA become a vehicle for broad structural challenges based solely on public interest assertions.

3. William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrell and the “Public Importance” Factor

In William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrell, 2009 WY 62, 206 P.3d 722, the Court addressed water administration issues of unquestioned public significance. It acknowledged that historically it had sometimes relaxed standing requirements in cases of “great public importance,” but:

Held that even there, the plaintiffs failed the second Brimmer element because a judgment would not effectively operate on their rights (¶11).
Quoted earlier warnings that the “great public interest” exception must be applied with caution to avoid judicial overreach (¶11, quoting Jolley v. State Loan & Inv. Bd. and Cranston v. Thomson).

Williams leans heavily on this retreat from expansive public-interest-based standing. The Court:

Affirms that “a great public interest alone is insufficient” to warrant judicial action (¶11).
Holds that even assuming the case concerns a matter of great public importance, that cannot overcome Appellants’ failure to show a personal, tangible harm (¶18).

Thus, Williams further entrenches the idea that “public importance” is a narrow safety valve, not a broad door for generalized grievances.

4. Village Road Coalition v. Teton County Housing Authority and Taxpayer Standing

In Village Road Coalition v. Teton County Housing Authority, 2013 WY 38, 298 P.3d 163, the Court noted in dicta that a taxpayer generally may not maintain a declaratory judgment action absent a showing that the challenged statute or act would increase the taxpayer’s burden as a taxpayer (¶16).

Allred reiterated that Wyoming had “not yet expressly recognized taxpayer standing,” and declined to consider it because the plaintiffs there had not alleged any such increased burden (¶16, quoting Allred ¶32).

Williams continues this line:

The Court again acknowledges that it has not yet adopted taxpayer standing in Wyoming (¶16).
It again declines to consider adopting it, because the Appellants failed to adequately allege that the challenged conduct increased their tax burden in a non-speculative way (¶¶16–17).

Crucially, the Court scrutinizes the factual basis for the Appellants’ allegation of a “tangible increase” in taxes and finds it wholly conclusory—tied to speculative assumptions about discretionary mill levies or voter-approved tax changes (¶17). This practical pleading requirement sharply narrows any future avenue toward taxpayer standing.

5. Matter of Adoption of L‑MHB and the Jurisprudential Nature of Standing

In footnote 1, the Court invokes Matter of Adoption of L‑MHB, 2018 WY 140, 431 P.3d 560, to “reiterate the jurisprudential, as opposed to jurisdictional nature of standing” in Wyoming (n.1).

L‑MHB clarified:

The Wyoming Constitution does not itself make standing a component of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Standing, absent express statutory direction to the contrary, is a judge-made, prudential doctrine.
Lack of standing should normally result in dismissal for failure to state a claim (akin to Rule 12(b)(6)), not dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(1)).

Here, the district court had treated standing as jurisdictional. The Supreme Court:

Corrects that characterization as inconsistent with L‑MHB.
Emphasizes that this mislabeling does not affect the outcome because the Court reviews dismissal de novo and may affirm “on any basis supported by the record” (n.1, ¶7).

This reinforces, for trial courts and practitioners, the technical but important distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and prudential standing in Wyoming procedure.

6. Other Authorities: Protect Our Water Jackson Hole, Lujan, and “Speculative” vs. “Perceptible” Harm

The Court also relies on:

Protect Our Water Jackson Hole v. Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, 2025 WY 36, 566 P.3d 181, for the articulation that standing is easiest when “the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or foregone action) at issue,” quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (¶12).
The Tavern, LLC v. Town of Alpine, 2017 WY 56, 395 P.3d 167, and Carnahan v. Lewis, 2012 WY 45, 273 P.3d 1065, for the principle that harm must be “perceptible rather than speculative” (¶17).

By using these cases, the Court sets a high bar: plaintiffs must show that they themselves are the object of the challenged conduct or that the conduct causes a reasonably concrete and non-speculative harm. Merely predicting that “if government were more efficient or compliant with law, our taxes would probably be lower” does not suffice.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Framework: UDJA “Interested Person” and Brimmer Standing

The Appellants invoked the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1‑37‑101 et seq., which permits “any person interested” under a statute to seek a declaration of rights, status, or legal relations. The Court has long held that this “interested” requirement incorporates the Brimmer justiciability test (¶10).

Thus, the threshold question was: are these Johnson County taxpayers “interested persons” under the UDJA because they have:

a genuine, existing, personal right at stake, and
a controversy on which a judicial declaration will effectively operate upon their rights or legal relations?

2. The First Brimmer Element: Tangible, Particularized Interest

The Court devotes most of its analysis to the first Brimmer element, which it describes functionally as requiring a personal stake (¶12). Several points are emphasized:

It is not enough to “care deeply” about an issue (¶12).
A plaintiff whose interest is shared in exactly the same way by the general public fails this requirement (¶12).
Standing is easiest where the challenged law or action is directly applied to the plaintiff (¶12).

Applied to the complaint:

Only Mr. Williams is even mentioned beyond the caption, and then only to describe his financial expertise and his role in reviewing audits and corresponding with the Department (¶13).
The other six plaintiffs are identified only as “residents, property owners and taxpaying citizens of Johnson County” (¶13).
The complaint asserts, in conclusory terms, that:
- They have experienced “tangible damage and loss” as “impacted taxpayers,”
- They have experienced “a tangible increase in personal property tax bills,” and
- They have “genuine rights at issue under the Wyoming Constitution and Wyoming statutes” (¶13).

On appeal, the Appellants reframe their interest as:

A “fundamental right to protection from government abuse,”
A “right to legal spending of their tax dollars,” and
A “legal right to good government” (¶14).

The Court rejects these formulations for multiple reasons:

They lack legal grounding. The Appellants cite no authority for such rights, and the Court finds none (¶14).
They lack doctrinal rigor. The Appellants do not engage in the kind of careful analysis usually required when asking a court to recognize a new fundamental right (¶14, citing Vaughn v. State).
They mirror disapproved claims in Allred. The Court notes the similarity to Allred, where plaintiffs asserted a general “right to protect their liberty interests by calling upon the judiciary to confine the legislature to its constitutional limits” (¶15, quoting Allred ¶44). Those claims failed then and fail now.

The key doctrinal move is the Court’s insistence that:

“While [Appellants] may have a genuine and sincere desire to hold the government to a high standard of efficiency and fiscal responsibility, their concerns are no different than any resident and taxpayer of Johnson County. We do not doubt their desire for a ‘good government,’ but that desire alone does not create an interest sufficient to pursue this declaratory action.” (¶15)

In other words, a generalized interest in lawful, efficient, or constitutionally careful government—no matter how sincerely held—is a generalized grievance, not a Brimmer-compliant interest.

3. Turning to Taxpayer Standing

Because the only concrete way the Appellants described harm was in their role as taxpayers, the Court considers whether they might have standing in that capacity (¶15–16).

The Court:

Reaffirms that Wyoming has never affirmatively recognized taxpayer standing (¶16).
Recalls that in prior cases it has only suggested in dicta that, if recognized, such standing would require a showing that the challenged act increases the plaintiff’s tax burden (¶16).
Refuses again to consider adopting taxpayer standing because, as in Allred, Appellants did not adequately plead the necessary increased burden (¶16).

On the pleadings:

Although the complaint declares a “tangible increase” in taxes, this is deemed a “mere conclusion” (¶17).
The factual allegations concern the spending and monitoring of tax dollars, not their collection (¶17).
The Appellants suggest their taxes would be lower if the County complied with fiscal laws, but the only taxes that might actually be reduced are:
- Discretionary mills the Board may or may not levy (¶19 n.4), and
- Local excise taxes that require voter approval (¶19 n.4).

Thus, any tax reduction depends on speculative future decisions by:

The County Board (in exercising mill levy discretion), and/or
The electorate (in approving or disapproving sales/excise tax questions).

Standing, however, requires a “perceptible rather than a speculative harm” (¶17, quoting The Tavern and Carnahan). Because Appellants’ alleged financial harm is contingent, indirect, and speculative, it is insufficient.

This is a crucial refinement: even if Wyoming were to recognize taxpayer standing in the future, this case clarifies that:

Plaintiffs must plead specific facts showing that challenged conduct directly increases their tax burden.
A generalized claim that better management would reduce taxes someday does not meet that threshold.

4. Consequences for the Remaining Brimmer Elements

Once the Court determines that Appellants have not satisfied the first Brimmer element (tangible personal interest), the remaining elements fall in quick succession:

Without a showing of harm, there is no “live controversy” in which a judgment may effectively operate on the plaintiffs’ rights, as required by the second element (¶9, ¶18).
Without an affected “right, status or other legal relationship,” a declaratory judgment cannot have the force of a final judgment on the parties’ legal relations, as required by the third element (¶18, citing Allred ¶53).
Adversarial zeal cannot cure the lack of injury or redressability; “no amount of militancy with which the parties advance their positions can . . . suffice to overcome the absence of the other prongs of justiciability” (¶18, quoting Allred ¶54).

In short, without an actual, personal stake, what the Appellants seek is a judicial review of government performance, not adjudication of a legal controversy. That is precisely what the separation-of-powers–based standing doctrine is designed to prevent.

5. The Limited Role of Public Importance

The Appellants argued that their case presented an issue of “great public importance” and thus justified relaxed standing requirements. The Court:

Does not seriously dispute the public importance of government financial management and audit compliance (¶11, ¶18).
Nevertheless holds that “even where a case presents a matter of great public interest or importance, a party seeking relief under the [UDJA] must still make a basic showing that he meets the Brimmer requirements for standing” (¶11).
Emphasizes that public interest “does not outweigh our interest in adhering to our long-established standing requirements” (¶18).

Thus, public importance is not a freestanding gateway to judicial review; it can only operate, if at all, at the margins of otherwise-satisfied Brimmer elements.

C. Impact and Future Implications

1. UDJA Litigation Against Government Financial Practices

Williams has significant implications for would-be litigants seeking to challenge public entities’ budgeting, accounting, and auditing practices:

The UDJA cannot be used as a tool of general oversight over public financial management.
Citizens wishing to enforce compliance with fiscal statutes (such as the UMFPA) through the courts must identify:
- a concrete way in which a specific statutory or constitutional violation personally injures them, and
- a remedy that will alter their legal position or obligations, not just improve government operations in the abstract.
Requests for judicially ordered “forensic audits” or ongoing “oversight and direction” will be viewed skeptically where plaintiffs cannot show a direct, personal stake.

This effectively channels concerns about improper public spending or auditing toward political and administrative remedies:

Electoral processes (voting officials in or out).
Administrative oversight mechanisms (state audits, Attorney General referrals, legislative oversight).
Public records and transparency advocacy.

Courts will remain largely unavailable to resolve such disputes unless plaintiffs can identify injuries that go beyond a generalized interest in “legal spending of tax dollars.”

2. The Future of Taxpayer Standing in Wyoming

Williams continues Wyoming’s cautious approach to taxpayer standing:

The Court once more declines to adopt, reject, or comprehensively define taxpayer standing as a doctrine (¶16).
Instead, it reiterates that such standing, if recognized, would require a showing that the challenged conduct increases the taxpayer’s burden (¶16).
At the same time, the Court shows that merely reciting an increased burden in conclusory terms is insufficient (¶17).

For future taxpayer suits, the opinion implicitly demands:

Detailed factual allegations linking a specific governmental action to a concrete, quantifiable increase in the plaintiff’s taxes (e.g., a new mandatory levy, loss of a statutory cap, or automatic rate increase).
Non-speculative causation, not dependent on subsequent discretionary policy choices or voter actions.

Practically, this makes successful taxpayer standing in Wyoming—if it ever emerges—narrow and difficult to establish.

3. Clarification of Procedural Practice: Standing as a Rule 12(b)(6) Issue

By correcting the district court’s characterization of standing as jurisdictional (n.1), the Supreme Court:

Reinforces that challenges to standing should typically be brought as failure to state a claim, not lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Signals to practitioners that the proper analytical framework is prudential and merits-related, not jurisdictional ouster.

This distinction can matter for:

Standard of review and burden shifting.
Amendment opportunities (it is often easier to cure pleading defects relating to standing than true jurisdictional defects).
Preclusion and future litigation strategy.

4. Constraints on “Private Attorney General” Style Litigation

The Appellees argued below that the Appellants were improperly attempting to act as private attorneys general (¶6). Although the Supreme Court does not dwell on that characterization, the reasoning of Williams functionally limits such attempts.

By insisting on a personal, tangible injury:

Individuals or groups cannot invoke the courts simply to enforce public statutes or constitutional provisions in the abstract.
Efforts to obtain broad structural or supervisory orders (like a forensic audit of an entire county) will face formidable standing barriers unless tied to specific injuries to the plaintiff.

In effect, Williams preserves a traditional distinction:

The executive branch (e.g., Attorney General, Department of Audit) is charged with broadly ensuring governmental compliance with law.
The judicial branch is limited to resolving concrete disputes in which particular individuals’ rights are affected and can be remedied.

5. Separation of Powers and Judicial Restraint

Consistent with Allred and William F. West Ranch, Williams reinforces that standing is not just a technical pleading rule, but an embodiment of separation-of-powers principles:

Courts must not assume a general supervisory role over the “performance” of other branches (¶9).
Enforcement of broad public norms (like fiscal prudence and lawful public spending) primarily belongs to the political branches (¶9).

This case thus reflects a deliberate judicial strategy: managing docket and institutional role by confining the courts to disputes in which there is an actual, personal stake and a concrete remedy within the judicial competence.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Standing

The legal requirement that a person bringing a lawsuit must have a sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged. In Wyoming, standing is a jurisprudential

Prudential Standing / Brimmer Test

Wyoming’s four-part test from Brimmer v. Thomson that decides whether a dispute is appropriate for court resolution in a declaratory-judgment action:

Real, existing rights or interests at stake.
A controversy on which a court judgment will effectively operate.
A decision that will have the effect of a final judgment on the parties’ rights or be of overriding public importance.
Genuine adversarial presentation.

Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA)

A statute allowing courts to issue declarations about the meaning of statutes or the parties’ rights and legal relations. It is not a free-standing license to ask courts “how government should behave.” The plaintiff must be an “interested person,” which, in Wyoming, means satisfying the Brimmer test.

Generalized Grievance

A complaint shared by all or most members of the public—for example, dissatisfaction with how carefully the government adheres to statutes. Courts typically do not hear such cases because the injury is not particularized.

Taxpayer Standing

A potential doctrine (recognized in some jurisdictions but not yet in Wyoming) that allows taxpayers to challenge illegal public expenditures. Williams reaffirms that Wyoming has not embraced this broadly and that, if ever recognized, it would require a concrete showing that the challenged act increases the taxpayer’s burden.

Jurisdictional vs. Jurisprudential

A jurisdictional rule limits the court’s power to hear a case at all; if jurisdiction is lacking, the case must be dismissed and cannot proceed under any circumstances. A jurisprudential rule, like standing in Wyoming, is a judge-made limitation on when the court will exercise its power, but it does not mean the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction in the constitutional sense.

Speculative vs. Perceptible Harm

Perceptible harm is concrete, real, and reasonably likely to happen—or has already happened. Speculative harm depends on a chain of uncertain future events or assumptions, such as “if government managed money better, taxes might go down.” Courts typically require perceptible harm for standing.

Private Attorney General

A term describing a plaintiff who seeks to enforce public legal norms on behalf of the general public, rather than vindicating a personal injury. Williams reflects Wyoming’s reluctance to allow such litigation under the UDJA absent a concrete, personal stake.

V. Conclusion

Williams v. Board of County Commissioners of Johnson County is a significant reaffirmation and refinement of Wyoming’s standing jurisprudence in the context of declaratory judgment actions targeting governmental fiscal practices.

The key takeaways are:

No standing for generalized “good government” claims. A sincere desire for legal and efficient public finance does not create a justiciable interest.
Strict enforcement of Brimmer. Even in matters of public importance, plaintiffs must allege a tangible, personal injury and a remedy that will effectively operate upon their rights.
Taxpayer status, by itself, is insufficient. Wyoming still has not recognized taxpayer standing, and speculative claims that taxes might be lower under better management do not satisfy the requirement of a perceptible increased tax burden.
Standing is jurisprudential, not jurisdictional. Dismissals for lack of standing should be treated as failures to state a claim, not as subject-matter jurisdiction defects.
Court as adjudicator, not auditor. The judiciary will not assume ongoing supervisory roles over local governments’ finances absent concrete, individualized injuries properly brought before it.

For practitioners and public-interest advocates, Williams serves as a clear signal: to bring Wyoming courts into disputes about governmental fiscal conduct, one must move beyond generalized grievances and political dissatisfaction to allege—and ultimately prove—a concrete, personal stake and a non-speculative harm that a court’s judgment can directly remedy.