From “De Minimis” to “Objective Substantial Hardship”
Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation, 7th Cir. (2025)

1. Introduction

John M. Kluge, an Indiana high-school orchestra teacher, objected on religious grounds to using transgender students’ chosen first names. Brownsburg Community School Corporation initially allowed him to address all students by last names only. After complaints from students, parents, and staff, the school rescinded the accommodation and required compliance with its “PowerSchool Name Policy.” Kluge resigned and sued under Title VII for failure to accommodate and for retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to Brownsburg. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit – interpreting the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Groff v. DeJoy – reversed in significant part and remanded.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Undue-Hardship Ruling Reversed. Applying Groff, the panel (Judge Brennan writing; Judge Rovner dissenting) held that factual disputes remain as to whether permitting the last-names-only practice imposed a “substantial cost” on Brownsburg’s business.
• Objective-Harm Requirement Announced. Emotional distress cited by an employer must be objectively reasonable and causally linked to the accommodation, not merely subjectively perceived.
• Mission Evidence Limited. A school may not rely on post-hoc or undocumented statements of institutional “mission” to justify hardship at summary-judgment stage.
• Sincerity Question for Jury. Kluge’s single deviation at an awards ceremony creates a triable issue as to the sincerity of his religious belief, precluding his own motion for summary judgment.
• Retaliation Claim Closed. The court refused to reopen the retaliation claim, deeming it waived in earlier briefing.
• Remand Ordered. The case returns to the district court for trial (or renewed motion practice) on the Groff undue-hardship standard, with discretion to reopen discovery.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Trans World Airlines v. Hardison (1977) – Long-standing “de minimis cost” test for religious accommodation.
• Groff v. DeJoy (2023) – Replaced Hardison with “substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of the employer’s particular business.” Kluge is the Seventh Circuit’s first deep application in the public-school context.
• Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha USD (2017) & A.C. v. Martinsville (2023) – Title IX precedents on treatment of transgender students; the panel distinguished them, noting that Kluge’s practice was facially neutral and not obviously differential treatment.
• Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) and related student-speech cases – invoked for “material disruption” analogy; court stressed different doctrinal tests.
• Burlington Northern, Davis v. Monroe County – cited for objective reasonableness yardstick in harassment and Title IX contexts, which the panel imports into undue-hardship analysis.

3.2 Key Elements of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Re-defining the Employer’s Burden Post-Groff
   • Employer must show both existence and cause of the hardship.
   • Hardship must be “excessive or unjustifiable,” measured against “nature, size, and operating cost.”
   • “Coworker dislike” or “mere fact of accommodation” cannot constitute hardship.
2. Causation & Objectivity
   The panel insisted that Brownsburg prove (a) students’ emotional distress, and (b) that the distress stemmed from the accommodation itself, not from alleged deviations or third-party gossip. Purely subjective offense is insufficient.
3. Documented Mission Matters
   Because Indiana statute requires formal board action for school policy, the panel was skeptical of “after-the-fact” invocations of a mission to “affirm transgender identity.” Employers must ground hardship arguments in pre-existing, demonstrable policy.
4. Title IX “Razor’s Edge” Defense Narrowed
   Potential exposure to sex-discrimination suits can justify denying an accommodation only if liability is more than speculative. Given fact disputes over differential treatment, threat of Title IX liability was deemed too uncertain for summary judgment.
5. Sincerity Still a Low Bar but Not Automatic
   A single inconsistent act can create a jury question; however, courts must avoid “theological determinations.” The panel reaffirmed Adeyeye: perfect consistency is not required.

3.3 Broader Impact

• Emotional-Distress Evidence Elevated. Employers must present objective, often expert-supported evidence (surveys, psychologists, attendance data, disciplinary incidents) to prove hardship based on mental-health impact.
• Policy Documentation Imperative. Public entities – and private ones by analogy – should contemporaneously memorialize core missions and accommodation limits to survive litigation.
• School-Context Guidance. First appellate blueprint for balancing teachers’ religious objections with transgender students’ rights after Groff; will influence districts in Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin immediately.
• Narrowing of Title IX “pre-emptive liability” arguments. Schools cannot rely on hypothetical lawsuits to escape accommodation duties without concrete evidence of statutory violation.
• Strategic Litigation Lessons. Plaintiffs must prove sincerity; defendants must marshal data, not anecdotes. Early discovery into “objective” effects will be critical.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Undue Hardship

Under Title VII, an employer can decline a religious accommodation only if it would impose substantial costs compared with normal business operations. “Substantial” now means significant, measurable, and non-speculative.

Burden-Shifting Framework

Employee must show a sincere conflict between work rule and religion; burden then shifts to employer to show undue hardship.

Objective vs. Subjective Harm

Subjective harm is how someone feels; objective harm asks whether a reasonable person in the same situation would find the conduct harmful. The court demands objective evidence for hardship arguments.

Title IX & “Razor’s Edge”

Schools can argue that accommodating an employee would put them in imminent legal jeopardy (the “razor’s edge”), but they must show a realistic, not hypothetical, risk.

Mission Evidence

A school’s or company’s “mission” can justify certain business costs, but the Seventh Circuit indicates it must be documented or clearly established before litigation.

5. Conclusion

Kluge v. Brownsburg transforms religious-accommodation litigation in three ways. First, it operationalizes Groff by demanding that employers substantiate hardship with objective proof tied to their documented business purpose. Second, it signals that emotional discomfort alone will rarely defeat accommodation without corroborating evidence of serious, business-level disruption. Third, it cautions schools and other public entities that potential clashes between employee religion and student civil rights must be analyzed through a fact-rich, not fear-based, lens. Going forward, plaintiffs will still bear the low threshold of sincerity, but defendants must prepare for a markedly higher evidentiary bar. The Seventh Circuit has thus shifted the accommodation dialogue from “how little can we bear?” to “how objectively serious is the burden?” – a recalibration that will reverberate well beyond the classroom.