From Recklessness to Intent: The “Moore Standard” for Inferring Intent under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B)

Introduction

United States v. Moore, No. 24-2161 (10th Cir. 2025) presented the Court of Appeals with a recurring sentencing question: When does the use of a vehicle in an assault show the “intent to cause bodily injury” required for the four-level enhancement in U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B)? Jacquelyn Moore, after consuming a pint of vodka, accelerated her car into a group of Navajo women, severely injuring one victim. She pled guilty to assault resulting in serious bodily injury in Indian country. At sentencing the district court applied the § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) enhancement, concluding that Moore intended to harm the women, and varied upward to impose a 60-month sentence. Moore appealed, contending the evidence showed only recklessness, not intent.

The Tenth Circuit affirmed, crystallising what can now be called the “Moore Standard”: intent may be inferred where the defendant’s use of a dangerous weapon—here, a vehicle—creates a high risk of injury and the surrounding circumstances support a purposeful act, even if the defendant was intoxicated or later claims memory loss. Though the panel labelled its order “non-precedential,” the opinion provides persuasive authority and the clearest articulation to date in the Tenth Circuit on inferring intent for § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B).

Summary of the Judgment

• Issue: Whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Moore intended to cause bodily injury when she used her vehicle as a dangerous weapon, thus triggering the four-level enhancement under § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B).
• Holding: No clear error existed; the evidence supported an inference of intent.
• Key Facts Supporting Intent:
  • Moore slowly approached, then revved and accelerated directly toward the women.
  • She vaulted a concrete barrier before striking the victims.
  • After impact she attempted to flee and uttered threatening statements (“I’m going to get all your people”).
• Standard of Review: Clear-error review under Porter, Craig.
• Outcome: Conviction and 60-month sentence affirmed.

In-Depth Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel canvassed decisions from within and outside the circuit:

• United States v. Dayea, 32 F.3d 1377 (9th Cir. 1994)
  – The Ninth Circuit deemed reckless drunk driving insufficient for the enhancement.
  – Moore cited Dayea; the Tenth Circuit distinguished it, noting Moore aimed her car at known victims.
• United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2003) & United States v. Washington, 552 F. App’x 827 (10th Cir. 2014)
  – Earlier Tenth Circuit opinions hinted that a “high risk of inflicting injury” could satisfy the requirement.
  – The Moore panel relied heavily on this language, elevating it from dictum to operative standard.
• United States v. Porter, 928 F.3d 947 (10th Cir. 2019) & United States v. Craig, 808 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2015)
  – Provided the clear-error lens for reviewing factual determinations at sentencing.
• United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257 (7th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Garcia, 34 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1994)
  – Vehicle-as-weapon cases used to analogise Moore’s conduct and justify the inference of intent.
• Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)
  – Canonical authority for deference: when two views of evidence are permissible, a fact-finder’s choice is not clearly erroneous.

By synthesising Jones, Washington, and the out-of-circuit vehicular-assault cases, the court built a bridge between mere recklessness (as in Dayea) and specific intent: if surrounding facts demonstrate the defendant consciously directed the dangerous instrumentality at victims, intent is inferable.

2. Legal Reasoning Employed

1. Text of Guideline: § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) applies where a “dangerous weapon … was used” with “intent to cause bodily injury” (cmt. n.3). A vehicle qualifies as such a weapon.
2. Circumstantial Proof of Intent: Intent rarely has direct evidence; courts may infer it from actions, acceleration pattern, barrier-hopping, flight, and post-event threats.
3. Clear-Error Gatekeeping: The appellate panel emphasised institutional competence: district judges “hear the witnesses” and are best positioned to resolve credibility, so deference is robust unless the finding lacks evidentiary support.
4. Distinction from Recklessness: Simple intoxication or drifting across a highway (as in Dayea) may be reckless. Deliberately steering toward known persons, combined with threats, crosses into intent.

3. Anticipated Impact

• Sentencing Practice: Prosecutors in the Tenth Circuit now have a clearer roadmap for invoking § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) in vehicular-assault cases. Defense counsel must come forward with evidence negating purposeful steering rather than relying on intoxication alone.
• Standardisation of “High Risk” Language: The panel elevates the “high risk of inflicting injury” test to near-binding authority, narrowing the circuit split with the Ninth Circuit’s stricter standard.
• Tribal and Rural Contexts: The case arose in Indian country, where vehicular assaults often occur in remote settings. The enhancement’s clarified availability may increase sentencing exposure in similar jurisdictions.
• Precedential Weight: Although issued as an “Order and Judgment” (non-precedential under 10th Cir. R. 32.1), the opinion will be citable for its “persuasive value.” District courts frequently rely on such opinions, meaning Moore’s influence is practical even if technically non-binding.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B): A sentencing rule adding four offense levels when a dangerous weapon is used in an aggravated assault and the defendant intended bodily injury.
• Dangerous Weapon: Any object capable of causing serious injury when used in that manner; a motor vehicle qualifies if intentionally directed at people.
• Intent vs. Recklessness:
  • Intent: Conscious objective to cause a result; can be proven by circumstantial evidence.
  • Recklessness: Disregard of substantial risk without desire for a specific outcome.
• Clear-Error Review: An appellate court overturns a finding only when firmly convinced a mistake was made—highly deferential to the trial court.
• Presentence Investigation Report (PSR): Probation’s factual report; undisputed portions are accepted as findings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A).

Conclusion

United States v. Moore sharpens the boundary between recklessness and intent in dangerous-weapon enhancements. By embracing a circumstantial, high-risk framework—the Moore Standard—the Tenth Circuit empowers district courts to infer intent where defendants deliberately wield vehicles (or other objects) in a way that predictably harms others. Although nominally non-precedential, the decision fills a doctrinal gap within the circuit, aligns with the majority approach nationwide, and signals to litigants that intoxication alone will not shield vehicular assailants from the full reach of § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B).