From Ignition to Immunity: The Eleventh Circuit Holds That Starting a Parked Vehicle Can Justify Deadly Force and Florida Self‑Defense Immunity
I. Introduction
The Eleventh Circuit’s published decision in Kimberley Diane Settle v. David Collier, No. 24‑12436 (11th Cir. Dec. 9, 2025), addresses the recurring and highly contested question of when law enforcement officers may use deadly force against a driver in or near a vehicle. Specifically, the court considers whether a deputy’s decision to fire two shots into a truck—parked in a dark, cluttered backyard and, according to the plaintiff, never actually moving—constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, and whether the deputy is shielded by Florida’s statutory “self‑defense” immunity.
The plaintiff, Kimberley Diane Settle, acting as personal representative of the estate of Jacob Joseph Settle Sr., brought federal and state claims against Escambia County Deputy David Collier after Collier fatally shot Settle during an attempt to execute outstanding arrest warrants. The district court denied Collier’s motion for summary judgment on both qualified immunity (federal excessive‑force claim) and state immunity (Florida battery claim), finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Collier’s use of deadly force was unreasonable against a non‑moving truck that did not pose an immediate threat.
In a divided opinion authored by Chief Judge William Pryor, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. The majority holds, as a matter of law, that even assuming the truck never moved and that Collier stood roughly eight to ten feet away and not directly in front of the vehicle, the deputy’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Because the majority finds no constitutional violation at all, it grants qualified immunity and, by extension, Florida statutory immunity. Judge Abudu dissents, emphasizing unresolved factual disputes regarding the truck’s movement and Collier’s position, and arguing that these disputes must be resolved by a jury rather than on summary judgment.
This decision significantly clarifies, and arguably expands, Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence on when a parked, not‑yet‑moving vehicle can be treated as a “deadly weapon” for purposes of justifying lethal force, and how closely Florida’s self‑defense immunity tracks the Fourth Amendment excessive‑force standard.
II. Summary of the Opinion
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
On the night of November 14, 2020, Deputies David Collier and Raymond Hart went to 2242 Handy Road in Escambia County, Florida, to execute arrest warrants for Jacob Settle (for driving with a suspended license) and his wife, Sophronia Whitehead (for failure to appear, destroying evidence, parole violations, and driving with a suspended license). The officers had no prior personal encounters with Settle, though Collier knew Settle had a “narcotics violation history.”
The home’s front door was boarded up, so Settle had earlier exited via the back door and Whitehead via a bedroom window when they decided to leave. When deputies arrived, the truck was parked in the backyard, parallel to the porch, with its front end “almost up against” the house and an air conditioning unit sitting just behind the truck, roughly perpendicular to the rear wheel. The backyard was “pitch black” due to lack of lights and cluttered with “debris and trash … stacked up against the porch.” The only illumination came from the officers’ flashlights.
As the deputies approached, Settle and Whitehead got into the truck, Whitehead on the passenger side, Settle on the driver’s side. They initially ducked down. Collier came up to the driver’s window; Hart approached the passenger side. Collier saw them “slumped over,” tried the driver’s door (it was locked), and—after Settle sat up—announced they were from the sheriff’s office, identified Settle by name, and ordered him out. Collier then warned that if they did not open the doors, he would “bust [the] windows out.”
Settle attempted to deceive the officers by denying his identity. Collier saw Settle reaching around the center console and heard keys jingle. He began striking the driver’s side window to try to break it. Settle then started the truck. Both deputies and Whitehead saw Settle put the truck into a gear. Collier dropped his flashlight and pushed away from the truck. Seconds later, Collier fired two shots through the driver’s side window, from approximately eight to ten feet away. Both bullets struck Settle in the shoulder/arm area; he died at the scene. Whitehead was injured by gunpowder; later toxicology revealed methamphetamine and THC carboxy in Settle’s blood.
Key factual disputes emerged in discovery:
- Whether the truck moved: Whitehead testified that after Settle started the engine and shifted gears, “the truck never moved an inch,” speculating that he might have put it in neutral. Collier’s statements implied the truck was going into reverse or otherwise posed imminent movement.
- Collier’s position: An expert for the estate, forensic technician Kelly Timms, opined that Collier was not directly in front of the truck but roughly in line with the “A‑pillar”—the metal frame between the windshield and driver’s door—when he fired.
- The timing and warning: Whitehead said the gunshots and the engine starting were almost simultaneous, and she did not hear shots over the “pipes” of the truck. There was no separate warning immediately before the shots beyond the earlier threat to break the windows.
The estate sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment excessive force and under Florida law for battery. The district court dismissed claims against Hart and the sheriff, leaving only the two claims against Collier. It denied Collier’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity and on Florida statutory immunity, finding a reasonable jury could conclude that Collier shot into a “non‑moving truck that did not pose a risk” and that he acted in wanton and willful disregard of Settle’s safety.
On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity and state‑law immunity de novo, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the estate as the non‑movant.
B. The Majority Holding
The majority reverses the district court and directs entry of summary judgment for Collier on both claims. The opinion proceeds in two main steps:
- Fourth Amendment excessive force / qualified immunity.
- The court assumes Collier was acting within his discretionary authority, shifting the burden to the estate to show a violation of clearly established constitutional rights.
- It resolves the case at the first step: there was no constitutional violation. Under Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner, deadly force was objectively reasonable because Collier had probable cause to believe Settle’s actions (starting the engine and putting the truck into gear in a dark, narrow space while resisting arrest) posed an immediate threat of serious harm to him and Hart, even if the truck never actually moved.
- The court explicitly rejects any categorical rule that deadly force is unreasonable unless the vehicle moves or has previously been used dangerously.
- Given the tense, rapidly evolving encounter, and Collier’s limited visibility and physical confinement between house, truck, and debris, a warning before firing was not feasible.
- Florida statutory self‑defense immunity.
- Under Fla. Stat. § 776.032(1) (self‑defense immunity) and § 776.012(2), a person (including an officer) is immune from civil liability for deadly force reasonably believed necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.
- Relying on Penley v. Eslinger, the court holds that § 776.012 is at least co‑extensive with the Fourth Amendment standard.
- Because Collier’s force was not excessive under the Fourth Amendment, he is likewise immune from the battery claim under Florida law.
C. The Dissent
Judge Abudu dissents. She emphasizes that at the summary‑judgment stage the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the estate and may not resolve genuine factual disputes:
- She identifies material disputes over (1) whether Collier was in the truck’s path or trapped, and (2) whether, and in what direction (if at all), the truck moved when Collier fired.
- Under Underwood v. City of Bessemer and Morton v. Kirkwood, such disputes about vehicle movement and officer position go directly to whether a driver presented an immediate threat of serious harm and therefore must be resolved by a jury.
- Because the excessive‑force question is fact‑bound, Florida’s self‑defense immunity—which tracks the same standard—also cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
In her view, the district court correctly recognized that a reasonable jury could find that Settle’s truck did not present an immediate threat and that Collier’s deadly force was unreasonable. She would affirm the denial of summary judgment and allow the case to proceed to trial.
III. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision
1. Core Supreme Court Framework: Graham, Garner, and Barnes v. Felix
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
The foundation for all excessive‑force claims during seizures. It establishes:
- Claims are judged under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard, not under a subjective or due‑process lens.
- Courts must consider the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, without “20/20 hindsight.”
- Factors include the severity of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat, and whether he is actively resisting or attempting to flee.
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
Garner supplies the specific deadly‑force rule:
“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”
The Eleventh Circuit applies Garner in a vehicular context, stating that the rule:- covers situations where (1) a suspect uses a vehicle as a weapon against the officer, or (2) the vehicle otherwise presents an immediate threat of serious physical harm.
- Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353 (2025). Cited for the proposition that the “severity of the crime” underlying the encounter is a relevant, though not controlling, factor in the reasonableness analysis. Here, the warrants were for non‑violent offenses, but the majority holds that, given the split‑second nature of the encounter, Collier could not realistically recalibrate force levels based on the non‑violent nature of the underlying charges at the precise moment Settle started the engine and shifted gears.
2. Eleventh Circuit “Vehicle as Deadly Weapon” Line
The majority synthesizes a line of Eleventh Circuit cases addressing police shootings into vehicles:
- Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2007).
A mentally unstable man stole a police cruiser and began backing down a driveway. The officer, knowing the man’s instability and the theft, fired as the car began to move. The court held:
- The car had not yet been used as a “deadly weapon,” but the suspect’s condition, theft, and act of starting to drive gave the officer reason to believe he was dangerous.
- The officer was not required to wait until the car actually ran someone over before using deadly force.
- Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2002).
After a high‑speed chase, the suspect’s car was stopped; he did not aim the car at the officers or attempt to run them over. Nonetheless, deadly force was upheld because:
- By then, he had already used the car in a manner that gave officers probable cause to believe it was a deadly weapon.
- He never left the car or turned off the engine, so he remained “armed” with the vehicle.
- Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005). The officer stood four feet from the front of a car in a narrow space between two vehicles when the suspect accelerated toward him at 1–2 mph. The court approved deadly force and refused to hold that the officer “perhaps could have escaped unharmed” with perfect hindsight. Settle relies on Robinson to emphasize that officers in narrow, confined spaces need not calculate precise paths of escape or vehicle trajectories before firing.
- Tillis v. Brown, 12 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2021).
Following a high‑speed chase ending in a crash, an officer exited his cruiser near the suspect’s car. When the car’s reverse lights came on and the car moved past him, the officer fired. The court emphasized that:
- The officer was “on foot next to the vehicle” and “exposed to danger.”
- He could not know whether the car would continue straight or swerve toward him, nor did he have time to “calculate angles and trajectories.”
- Baxter v. Santiago‑Miranda, 121 F.4th 873 (11th Cir. 2024).
Involving suspected car theft, Baxter reinforces that:
- Deadly force may be reasonable even where the underlying crime is non‑violent, if the suspect’s driving creates an immediate threat.
- Courts must avoid “20/20 hindsight” and evaluate from the on‑scene perspective.
3. Countervailing Eleventh Circuit Cases: Morton, Underwood, and Vaughan
- Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2013).
The plaintiff was in a park, coasted slowly in his car, then stopped and raised his hands after an officer shouted. While the car was stationary and the driver apparently complying, another officer shot him several times. The court found a Fourth Amendment violation because an objectively reasonable officer could not see the plaintiff as an immediate threat.
The majority distinguishes Morton on critical facts:- In Morton, the suspect’s stationary car resulted from compliance with police commands, and the driver’s actions were de‑escalatory.
- In Settle, the truck was stationary from the start, Settle refused to exit, and then escalated by starting the engine and shifting into gear.
- Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2021).
There, a suspect’s car “coast[ed]” slowly toward an officer “as if to stop” when the officer—standing about eight feet away—shot into the vehicle. The panel held that, taking plaintiff’s version as true, a reasonable jury could find no immediate threat, though qualified immunity ultimately applied due to lack of clearly established law at the time.
The Settle majority distinguishes Underwood on two fronts:- Underwood’s vehicle behavior—slowing as if to stop—was non‑threatening and suggested compliance, whereas Settle’s act of starting the engine and shifting into gear, after refusing orders, is viewed as escalatory.
- Although both cases place the officer roughly eight feet from the car, feasibility of a warning depends on context: the majority considers a warning more feasible in Underwood (a coasting, slow vehicle on a roadway) than in the dark, cluttered, confined backyard here.
- Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2003).
An officer drove alongside a fleeing stolen vehicle on a highway for 30–45 seconds before shooting into it. The court found that this extended period gave “time and opportunity to warn,” and the failure to do so was significant.
Settle uses Vaughan to frame the warning requirement as fact‑specific:- Where there is time and relative stability (a 30–45‑second parallel chase), a warning may be required.
- Where escalation occurs in mere seconds (starting the engine and shifting gear while the officer is next to the car in darkness), a warning may not be feasible.
4. Florida Self‑Defense Immunity: Penley v. Eslinger
- Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843 (11th Cir. 2010).
The Eleventh Circuit held that Florida’s deadly‑force justification statute, Fla. Stat. § 776.012, is “at least co‑extensive” with the Fourth Amendment standard. In other words, if an officer’s use of force is reasonable under Garner/Graham, it will also be justified under § 776.012 and thus immune from civil liability under § 776.032.
Settle reaffirms that linkage: because Collier’s force was not excessive under the Fourth Amendment, he is also immune from the battery claim under Florida’s self‑defense immunity statute.
B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning
1. The Objective Reasonableness Analysis
The majority’s central conclusion is that Collier’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable as a matter of law under the Fourth Amendment, even when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the estate. The court’s reasoning turns on three core features of the encounter:
- Escalation by the suspect.
The majority frames Settle’s conduct as escalating the situation:
- He resisted orders to exit the truck despite multiple commands.
- He attempted to mislead officers about his identity.
- He began “dig[ging] and reach[ing] around” the console and jingling keys, suggesting he was about to start the truck.
- He then started the engine and, undisputedly, placed the transmission into some gear immediately before the shots.
- Environmental context: darkness and confinement.
Collier was “on foot next to” the truck, in a “narrow space” between the truck and the house, with an air conditioning unit and debris limiting escape routes. The backyard was “pitch black” and Collier had dropped his flashlight. Under these circumstances:
- The court deems it unreasonable to expect Collier to “calculate angles and trajectories” to determine whether he was just outside harm’s way or to locate a safe path of retreat.
- Given the proximity and lack of visibility, the court accepts that Collier could reasonably fear that the truck, if put in motion forward or in reverse, could strike him or Hart.
- Immediacy and split‑second timing.
The entire sequence—from engine ignition to shots fired—occurred within seconds. The majority emphasizes:
- There was at least “some amount of time” after Settle started the truck and put it into gear before the shots, enough for Collier to perceive a threat.
- However, there was not enough time, given the immediacy and danger, to require additional warnings without increasing risk to Collier and Hart.
Under Garner, the key inquiry is whether the officer had probable cause to believe that the suspect posed a threat of serious physical harm. The majority holds that Collier did:
- Even if the truck “never moved an inch,” the combination of engine start + shift into gear + confined, dark location + proximity sufficed to convert the truck into a “deadly weapon” with which Settle was “armed.”
- Collier was not required to wait until the truck actually moved or until he was physically struck to act, consistent with Long.
- There is no bright‑line requirement that the officer be literally standing in front of the car or that the car already be moving: reasonableness is fact‑specific.
2. Rejection of a Movement‑Based Bright‑Line Rule
A central doctrinal point is the court’s rejection of any rule that deems deadly force unreasonable whenever:
- the vehicle has not yet moved; or
- the suspect has no prior history of dangerous driving in the incident.
The estate conceded that Eleventh Circuit precedent allows deadly force even when the vehicle is not currently moving or the officer is not in its direct path—but argued that those cases all involved prior dangerous driving that had already transformed the car into a deadly weapon (as in Pace or Baxter).
The majority explicitly rejects that limitation. It stresses that:
- Excessive‑force analysis is “necessarily fact specific” and “not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.”
- Officers must often act before a suspect’s threatened use of force is fully realized; they need not wait for actual collision or clear vehicular assault before firing.
- A parked vehicle, in the hands of a resisting suspect who starts the engine and shifts into gear in a confined space, can reasonably be seen as an imminent deadly weapon even without prior dangerous driving.
3. Position and Path of the Vehicle: Officer’s Perspective vs. Hindsight
The estate argued that Collier was not in the truck’s path, relying heavily on Timms’s expert testimony placing him near the A‑pillar and eight to ten feet away from the truck. The majority responds by re‑framing the question:
- The issue is not where Collier actually was in relation to an objectively “safe” path, but whether a reasonable officer in his position could have perceived himself as in danger.
- Given the darkness, clutter, proximity, and potential for the truck to move forward or backward unpredictably, Collier could reasonably fear being hit, even if forensic reconstruction later suggests he might have avoided harm.
- Following Robinson and Tillis, the court refuses to impose a duty to compute precise trajectories or to rely on post‑hoc reconstruction when assessing split‑second judgments.
4. Failure to Warn Before Firing
The estate also faulted Collier for failing to issue a specific, imminent warning (“I am going to shoot”) before firing and for not displaying his weapon beforehand. The majority applies Eleventh Circuit precedent interpreting Garner’s admonition that officers should give a warning “if feasible”:
- Davis v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305 (11th Cir. 2022). Establishes that warnings are required only when feasible and that this is not an inflexible rule when warnings might “easily have cost the officer his life.”
Applying that standard:
- In a confined, dark space with the engine just started and the truck in gear, the majority finds a warning not feasible, because any delay risked allowing the truck to lurch forward or backward.
- Vaughan is distinguished on timing grounds; there the officer had 30–45 seconds to warn, whereas Collier had only seconds between ignition and perceived threat.
- Underwood is distinguished because the vehicle’s behavior (coasting as if to stop) allowed a window for warning; Settle’s actions signaled escalation, not deceleration.
5. Florida Statutory Immunity Mirroring Fourth Amendment Reasonableness
Florida’s self‑defense immunity statute, Fla. Stat. § 776.032(1), grants civil immunity to any person who uses deadly force as permitted in § 776.012(2), which allows deadly force when one “reasonably believes” it necessary to prevent “imminent death or great bodily harm,” with no duty to retreat.
Relying on Penley, the majority adopts a simple equivalence:
- If the officer’s use of force is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment—i.e., if there is no excessive force—then it is also justified under § 776.012, and § 776.032 confers immunity from civil battery claims.
Having found no constitutional violation, the majority thus summarily extends that conclusion to the state‑law claim.
C. The Dissent’s Reasoning and Its Points of Tension with the Majority
Judge Abudu’s dissent focuses not on legal standards (which she largely accepts) but on how those standards should be applied at the summary‑judgment stage. She emphasizes:
- Summary judgment standards.
Under Christmas v. Harris County, Sconiers v. Lockhart, and Marbury v. Warden, courts must:
- View facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the non‑moving party.
- Deny summary judgment if there is a genuine dispute of material fact—i.e., a dispute that could change the outcome and on which a reasonable jury could rule for the non‑movant.
- Material factual disputes.
The dissent identifies three factual conflicts:
- Whether officers verbally identified themselves as law enforcement before trying to open/break windows.
- Whether Settle actually started driving (or tried to drive) the truck, as opposed to simply starting it and shifting to neutral.
- Whether Collier was in the vehicle’s path or was in a position (as Timms suggests, near the A‑pillar and closer to the end of the porch) that was not in immediate danger.
- Reliance on Underwood and Morton.
Judge Abudu reads these cases as emphasizing that:
- Where evidence suggests the vehicle is moving slowly, coasting, or stationary in a way that appears non‑threatening, a jury may reasonably find no immediate threat.
- In those scenarios, granting summary judgment for the officer on the first prong (no constitutional violation) is improper when key facts are in dispute.
- Florida immunity rises and falls with the federal claim. Because Florida’s self‑defense immunity follows the same “reasonable belief” standard as the Fourth Amendment analysis, Judge Abudu concludes that unresolved factual disputes about the truck’s movement and Collier’s danger level also preclude summary judgment on state‑law immunity.
In short, the dissent does not necessarily contest that a parked vehicle could ever be a deadly weapon; instead, it argues that whether this particular truck, with these undisputed and disputed facts, posed an immediate threat is a factual question for the jury, not a legal determination for the appellate court.
D. Impact on Future Cases and on the Relevant Area of Law
1. Expansion of “Vehicle as Deadly Weapon” Doctrine
The most significant doctrinal impact of Settle v. Collier is its explicit holding that:
- A vehicle may be treated as a deadly weapon warranting deadly force even if it has not yet moved at all,
- when a resisting suspect in a confined, dark space starts the engine and shifts into gear while an officer is in close proximity on foot.
This takes prior cases like Long, Pace, and Baxter—where prior dangerous driving played a central role—and extends their logic to a scenario with no prior vehicular assault but a strong potential for imminent harm. It underscores that:
- Movement of the vehicle is not a prerequisite to reasonable deadly force.
- Actual prior dangerous driving is helpful but not necessary; intent and imminent capacity may suffice.
2. Strengthening Officers’ Position at the First Qualified‑Immunity Step
Unlike many cases resolved on the “clearly established” prong of qualified immunity, the Eleventh Circuit here finds no constitutional violation at all. That:
- Strengthens officers’ ability to secure summary judgment in future vehicle‑related shootings by arguing that, under Settle, ignition and gear‑shifting in confined spaces inherently create objective probable cause of danger.
- Weakens plaintiffs’ ability to survive summary judgment merely by contesting movement, path, or officer positioning, unless they can show significant de‑escalatory conduct akin to Morton (e.g., stopping when ordered, raising hands).
3. Clarifying the “Warning if Feasible” Requirement
Settle pushes the Eleventh Circuit’s warning jurisprudence cautiously toward greater deference to on‑scene officers:
- Warnings are required only when genuinely feasible; mere physical distance (e.g., eight feet) is not decisive if the temporal window is extremely short and the threat is immediate.
- This may make it harder for plaintiffs to argue that failure to warn, standing alone, shows unreasonableness in fast‑moving vehicle contexts.
4. Reinforcing Co‑Extensiveness of Florida Self‑Defense and Federal Reasonableness Standards
By tying Florida’s civil immunity under § 776.032 directly to the federal excessive‑force standard, the court confirms a powerful shield for Florida officers:
- If a plaintiff cannot establish a Fourth Amendment violation, they will almost invariably lose on any related Florida battery claim involving deadly force during an arrest.
- This linkage incentivizes plaintiffs to focus heavily on building a record that shows not merely negligence or tactical error, but objective unreasonableness under Graham/Garner.
5. Tension with the Jury’s Role and with Underwood/Morton
The dissent highlights a structural tension: how far appellate courts may go in resolving close, contextual reasonableness questions on summary judgment without infringing on the jury’s role as factfinder. After Settle:
- District courts may feel more justified in granting summary judgment to officers in similar confined‑space, vehicle‑related shootings, even when some details (e.g., precise movement, exact position) are disputed, provided the general scenario suggests imminent danger.
- Plaintiffs will need to show not just disputes about small details, but a fundamentally different narrative of the encounter—especially about whether the driver’s conduct was objectively de‑escalatory or posed no immediate threat.
- The boundary between Morton / Underwood-type fact patterns (where summary judgment is dubious) and Settle-type patterns (where deadly force is reasonable as a matter of law) will likely be heavily litigated.
IV. Complex Concepts Simplified
A. Qualified Immunity (Federal § 1983 Claim)
Qualified immunity is a legal doctrine that protects government officials, including police officers, from being sued for money damages unless:
- They violated a constitutional right, and
- That right was “clearly established” at the time of their conduct.
Courts can decide these steps in any order. In Settle, the Eleventh Circuit stopped at step one and held there was no constitutional violation at all because Collier’s use of force was objectively reasonable. Once that is decided, there is no need to ask whether the law was clearly established.
B. Fourth Amendment “Excessive Force”
When officers use force while making an arrest or seizure, the question is whether that force was “objectively reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. This means:
- Would a reasonable officer, with the same facts and time pressure, have thought the same amount of force was necessary?
- Courts weigh the severity of the crime, the immediate threat to officers or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting or trying to flee.
- They must put themselves in the officer’s shoes at the time, not use hindsight.
C. Deadly Force and Vehicles as “Deadly Weapons”
Deadly force (like shooting a gun) is allowed when an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a serious threat of death or severe injury. A vehicle can be treated as a “deadly weapon” because it can kill or seriously injure when driven aggressively or recklessly.
Key points:
- The car does not have to be moving for the officer to reasonably fear it will become a deadly weapon imminently.
- The officer does not have to wait until the driver actually runs someone over.
- Context (darkness, confined space, past driving behavior, proximity) matters greatly.
D. Summary Judgment and “Genuine Dispute of Material Fact”
Summary judgment lets a court decide a case without a full trial. It is granted only if:
- There is no real dispute about any important facts (those that could change the outcome), and
- The moving party is entitled to win under the law.
If reasonable jurors could look at the evidence and disagree about what actually happened in a way that matters to the legal outcome, summary judgment must be denied, and a jury must decide the facts at trial. The debate between the majority and dissent in Settle is largely about whether such fact disputes exist here.
E. Florida Self‑Defense Immunity (§ 776.032 and § 776.012)
Florida law provides civil and criminal immunity to people who use deadly force in legitimate self‑defense:
- § 776.012 says a person can use deadly force if they reasonably believe it is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm, and they have no duty to retreat.
- § 776.032 gives immunity from prosecution and civil suits if the use of force is justified under § 776.012.
For police officers, this means:
- If their use of deadly force is reasonable under the same standard used for the Fourth Amendment (probable cause to believe there is an imminent threat of serious harm), they cannot be sued in Florida civil court for battery based on that shooting.
V. Conclusion
Settle v. Collier is a significant Eleventh Circuit decision at the intersection of Fourth Amendment excessive‑force doctrine, police shootings into vehicles, and Florida’s expansive self‑defense immunity. The court holds that an officer’s split‑second decision to fire into a parked truck—before it moves at all—can be objectively reasonable where the suspect escalates by starting the engine and shifting into gear in a dark, cramped, debris‑filled environment, with the officer on foot nearby and uncertain of escape routes.
By rejecting a bright‑line rule that requires actual vehicle movement or prior dangerous driving, the majority broadens the circumstances in which officers may lawfully treat vehicles as deadly weapons and obtain summary judgment on excessive‑force claims. It also reconfirms that Florida’s statutory self‑defense immunity is tightly linked to federal reasonableness standards: no constitutional violation generally means state‑law immunity.
The dissent highlights the enduring tension between judicial deference to on‑scene police judgments and the constitutional role of juries in resolving disputed facts. Going forward, Settle will likely be a key citation in Eleventh Circuit litigation whenever officers confront suspects in vehicles in confined spaces, especially cases where the vehicle has not yet moved but is poised to do so. It signals a willingness to decide close reasonableness questions as a matter of law, while leaving open room—through cases like Morton and Underwood—for plaintiffs to reach a jury where clear evidence of de‑escalation and non‑threatening conduct exists.
In the broader legal context, Settle underscores both the power and limits of constitutional protections in fast‑moving encounters involving vehicles: it affirms robust immunity for officers facing perceived vehicular threats, even in the absence of actual movement, and it reaffirms the centrality of objective reasonableness and fact‑specific analysis in excessive‑force cases.
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