From Defamation to Discipline: Applying the Single Publication Rule to Public Employee Social Media Misconduct — Commentary on Matter of Pearl v. New York State Unified Court System

I. Introduction

The Appellate Division, Second Department’s decision in Matter of Pearl v. New York State Unified Court System, 2025 NY Slip Op 06612 (Nov. 26, 2025), is a significant development at the intersection of:

Public employee discipline;
Contractual limitation periods in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs);
Social media misconduct; and
Doctrines imported from defamation law, most notably the “single publication rule.”

Dave Pearl, a long-serving court officer employed by the New York State Unified Court System (UCS) for approximately 21 years, was terminated for misconduct arising from three Facebook comments that UCS characterized as biased and discriminatory in violation of its anti-bias policies. One of those comments had been posted at least four years before the disciplinary charges were served, while the CBA imposed an 18‑month limitations period for commencing disciplinary proceedings.

The central legal conflict turned on whether that older Facebook comment could be treated as:

A time-barred, one-time act whose “occurrence” was the date of posting, or
A continuing violation so long as the comment remained accessible online, thereby keeping the misconduct “alive” within the limitations period.

The majority held that the CBA’s disciplinary statute of limitations must be analyzed in the same way as the statute of limitations for defamation claims: the misconduct “occurs” at the time of the initial publication, and the mere continued availability of a statement on the internet does not restart or extend the period. In doing so, the court explicitly imported the “single publication rule” from defamation jurisprudence into the realm of public-sector disciplinary law.

A vigorous dissent, however, would have deferred to UCS’s interpretation of the CBA and its own anti-bias rules, accepting a theory of continuing violation and affirming the termination in its entirety.

Beyond resolving Pearl’s individual case, the decision establishes an important precedent for how New York courts will treat old social media content in disciplinary proceedings governed by contractual time limits, and confirms that agencies cannot circumvent bargained-for limitation periods by characterizing static online content as ongoing misconduct.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Employment History and Charges

Pearl had been employed as a court officer by UCS for approximately 21 years. On November 1, 2021, UCS served him with a “notice and specification of charges” alleging that he had engaged in misconduct by posting three Facebook comments that used biased and discriminatory language. These comments were alleged to violate:

The UCS Employee Handbook; and
Rules of the Chief Judge, 22 NYCRR part 50, which require court employees to:
- “Observe and maintain high standards of ethical conduct in the performance of their duties in order to inspire public confidence and trust in the fairness and independence of the courts” (22 NYCRR 50.1[II][A]), and
- Refrain from discrimination and from manifesting bias or prejudice by word or conduct based on race, color, sex, or national origin (22 NYCRR 50.1[II][C]).

UCS claimed the Facebook comments demonstrated an inability to be impartial and to treat individuals fairly, thereby undermining UCS’s “good order and ability to dispense justice fairly and impartially.”

One of the three comments was posted at least four years before the November 1, 2021 service of charges—well outside the 18‑month limitations period in the CBA.

B. The CBA’s 18‑Month Disciplinary Limitation

Article 24.5 of the governing CBA states:

“[N]o removal, disciplinary proceeding or alternative disciplinary procedure shall be commenced more than 18 months after the occurrence of the alleged incompetency or misconduct complained of and described in the charges.”

The key interpretive question was: What constitutes the “occurrence” of the alleged misconduct when the misconduct is a Facebook post that remains visible for years?

C. The Administrative Hearing and Conflicting Rulings on Timeliness

A disciplinary hearing was held in the spring of 2022. Multiple UCS employees and Pearl himself testified. The hearing officer initially:

On March 16, 2022 — granted UCS’s own application to dismiss one of the specified acts of misconduct (the older Facebook comment) as time-barred under the 18‑month CBA limitation; but
On April 6, 2022 — reversed course and reinstated that charge on the ground that he lacked authority to dismiss it as untimely.

The hearing officer then found Pearl guilty of all three charges and recommended termination.

D. UCS’s Determinations

June 23, 2022 — Deputy Chief Administrative Judge Norman St. George adopted the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation, found Pearl guilty of the specified misconduct, and terminated his employment.
March 15, 2023 (Revised Determination) — Judge St. George issued a revised determination again adopting the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation and confirming Pearl’s termination.

Importantly, neither the hearing officer’s report nor UCS’s determinations separated the penalty analysis among the three charges; termination was recommended and imposed based collectively on all three.

E. Article 78 Proceeding

Pearl commenced an Article 78 proceeding challenging the revised determination. His claims included:

A First Amendment challenge (arguing discipline for his Facebook posts violated his free speech rights); and
An argument that one of the three charges was time-barred under CBA § 24.5 and therefore could not lawfully be considered.

Because the proceeding involved review of a quasi-judicial determination made after a hearing, it was transferred to the Appellate Division, Second Department, under CPLR 7804(g).

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

A. Standards of Review

The court began by clarifying the applicable standards of review in Article 78 proceedings:

Substantial evidence (CPLR 7803[4]) governs when reviewing the factual basis of determinations made after a hearing (citing Matter of Lozada v Elmont Hook & Ladder Co. No. 1, 151 AD3d 860, and Matter of Alegre Deli v New York State Liq. Auth., 298 AD2d 581).
Violation of lawful procedure (CPLR 7803[3]) governs when the issue is whether the agency complied with its own rules or internal procedures (citing Matter of Blaize v Klein, 68 AD3d 759).

Relying on Matter of Lehman v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 82 AD2d 832, and Matter of Lipani v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 56 AD3d 560, quoting Matter of Charles A. Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 NY2d 516, the court reiterated a fundamental principle:

An agency’s rules and regulations, once promulgated under statutory authority, are binding on the agency itself as well as on those it regulates; a determination made in violation of such rules must be annulled “even though there is in the record substantial evidence to support the determination.”

B. First Amendment Claim Rejected

The court summarily rejected Pearl’s First Amendment argument, holding that UCS had met its burden under governing public-employee speech doctrine to justify discipline for protected activity, citing Matter of Santer v Board of Educ. of E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 23 NY3d 251, 263–265. Thus, any free speech protections did not bar UCS from imposing discipline for the Facebook comments.

C. Timeliness and the “Single Publication Rule”

The majority focused on Pearl’s argument that one of the three specified acts—that relating to the Facebook comment posted more than four years before the notice of charges—was time-barred under CBA § 24.5. The hearing officer had treated the comment as a continuing violation because it remained visible and discoverable on Facebook.

The Appellate Division rejected that approach and held that:

The CBA’s 18‑month limitations period must be interpreted so that the “occurrence” of the misconduct is the date of the initial posting of the comment.
The ongoing availability of that post online does not constitute a continuing violation or create “new” occurrences that reset the 18‑month clock.

To reach this conclusion, the majority expressly imported the single publication rule from defamation law, quoting Gregoire v Putnam’s Sons, 298 NY 119, 123:

“The publication of a defamatory statement in a single issue of a newspaper, or a single issue of a magazine . . . is, in legal effect, one publication which gives rise to one cause of action and that the applicable Statute of Limitations runs from the date of that publication.”

They further noted that:

The single publication rule applies to internet publications (Firth v State of New York, 98 NY2d 365, 370).
In Firth, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that each “hit” or viewing of an online report constitutes a new publication restarting the limitations period (98 NY2d at 369).
D’Arata v New York Post, 226 AD3d 560, and Nelson v Ardrey, 231 AD3d 179, extended that rule to online media and social media posts.

The majority concluded:

“Here, as in libel actions, the statute of limitations must be measured from the initial date of publication. That a comment is published continuously on a website does not serve to restart the applicable statute of limitations. For these purposes, social media is viewed no differently than any other website.”

Therefore, the older Facebook comment was time-barred under CBA § 24.5 and should not have been considered.

D. Remedy: Annulment and Remittal

Because the disciplinary decision and penalty recommendation did not separate the role of the time-barred charge from the two timely ones, the court could not determine what penalty UCS would have imposed had it considered only the remaining two acts of misconduct.

Accordingly, the court:

Granted the petition; and
Annulled the revised determination; and
Remitted the matter to UCS “for a new determination before a hearing officer” based solely on the remaining two timely acts of misconduct.

Given this dispositive ruling on the timeliness issue, the court found it unnecessary to address Pearl’s remaining contentions.

E. The Dissent

Justice Dowling dissented. She would have:

Upheld UCS’s interpretation of CBA § 24.5 as allowing treatment of the Facebook post as a continuing violation of its anti-bias policies; and
Deferred to UCS’s application of its own rules, given that it had a rational basis and did not disregard the terms of the CBA.

The dissent argued that the majority’s application of defamation’s single publication rule to this disciplinary context was “indiscriminate” and failed to give agencies the required deference in interpreting CBAs and regulations within their expertise. Emphasizing that “every litigant in New York is entitled to enter our State's courthouses to seek justice, free from any taint or stain of bias from any employee,” the dissent would have confirmed the termination.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

1. Agency Compliance with Its Own Rules

The majority’s framework is grounded in classic New York administrative law principles:

Matter of Blaize v Klein, 68 AD3d 759 — When the issue in an Article 78 proceeding is whether an agency complied with its “own internal procedures,” review proceeds under CPLR 7803(3): whether the determination was made “in violation of lawful procedure.”
Matter of Lehman v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 82 AD2d 832 — Agency rules and regulations, once promulgated pursuant to statute, bind the agency itself.
Matter of Charles A. Field Delivery Serv. [Roberts], 66 NY2d 516, as quoted in Matter of Lipani v NYS Div. of Human Rights, 56 AD3d 560 — An administrative determination made in violation of an agency’s own binding rules must be reversed “even though there is in the record substantial evidence to support the determination made.”

Here, the CBA’s 18‑month limitation was treated as an internal procedural constraint UCS was obligated to honor. Once the court found that UCS’s application of a “continuing violation” theory rendered that limitation meaningless—by effectively converting a firm 18‑month period into an indefinite one for online statements—it concluded that UCS acted in violation of lawful procedure.

2. Defamation and the Single Publication Rule

The crucial doctrinal move was the court’s decision to interpret “occurrence of the alleged misconduct” in CBA § 24.5 by analogy to publication in defamation law:

Gregoire v Putnam’s Sons, 298 NY 119 — Established the single publication rule in New York: a defamatory statement in a single edition of a publication counts as one publication, triggering a single cause of action and a single limitations period running from the date of issuance.
Firth v State of New York, 98 NY2d 365 — Applied the single publication rule to online content. The Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the “multiple publication” argument that each “hit” or access or continued availability should restart the limitations period.
D’Arata v New York Post, 226 AD3d 560 — Reaffirmed that continuous online availability does not create a new publication for statute of limitations purposes.
Nelson v Ardrey, 231 AD3d 179 — Clarified that social media content is treated the same way as other online publications for statute of limitations analysis.

The majority borrowed this defamation framework wholesale to interpret a contractual disciplinary limitations clause—not a tort statute of limitations. That is the core doctrinal innovation of the case.

3. Deference to Agency Interpretation of Contracts and Regulations

The dissent invoked a different cluster of precedents emphasizing judicial deference to administrative interpretations:

Matter of Century Operating Corp. v Popolizio, 60 NY2d 483, 488 — Courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation of contract terms unless the interpretation is “without sound basis in reason, and in disregard of the terms of the contract.”
Matter of New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. v State of New York, 94 NY2d 321, 326 — Reinforces that agency interpretations will stand if rational and consistent with the contract.
Matter of Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431; Matter of Aponte v Olatoye, 30 NY3d 693, 698 — General standard: courts must sustain an administrative interpretation if it has a rational basis and is not arbitrary and capricious, even if the court might have reached a different conclusion.
Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222 — Classic articulation of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard: administrative action is arbitrary when it is “without sound basis in reason” and taken “without regard to the facts.”

For the dissent, UCS’s reading—that the Facebook post constituted an ongoing manifestation of bias contrary to anti-bias rules—was a rational interpretation of when the “misconduct” occurred, and thus deserving of deference. The majority, by contrast, treated the issue as a matter of law, not an area where deferential review was appropriate.

4. Public Employee Speech: Matter of Santer

On the First Amendment question, the court relied on:

Matter of Santer v Board of Educ. of E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 23 NY3d 251 — A leading case applying the Pickering-Garcetti balancing framework to public employees in New York.

Santer reaffirmed that when a public employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the employer may still discipline the employee if it demonstrates that its interest in maintaining efficient and unbiased operations outweighs the employee’s interest in the speech, or that the speech meaningfully disrupted the workplace or undermined its mission.

Here, the court found that UCS had met this burden: disciplining a court officer for public, biased social media posts that undermined confidence in his impartiality was constitutionally justified.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Reframing the Issue as “Violation of Lawful Procedure”

By framing the problem as UCS’s failure to comply with its own binding procedures—namely the CBA’s 18‑month disciplinary limitation—the court sidestepped factual questions about whether Pearl committed misconduct and focused solely on when that misconduct legally “occurred.”

This strategic framing:

Shifted the standard of review from “substantial evidence” to “violation of lawful procedure”; and
Allowed the court to treat the interpretation of the CBA limitations clause as a question of law, subject to non-deferential review.

Once the court decided that interpreting the CBA’s limitations clause through a defamation lens was required, UCS’s continuing violation theory was treated as an impermissible circumvention of a binding limitation rather than a reasonable exercise of interpretive discretion.

2. Why the Continuing Violation Theory Was Rejected

The hearing officer—and UCS, supported by the dissent—advanced a “continuing violation” rationale: the misconduct was not only the act of posting the biased comment, but the continued presence and visibility of that comment, which continuously manifested bias and undermined public confidence.

The majority rejected that view for several reasons:

Textual concern with the CBA
Article 24.5 speaks of “the occurrence of the alleged incompetency or misconduct complained of and described in the charges.” The majority read this as pointing to a discrete act or event—here, the posting of the comment—not an open-ended state of affairs that could persist indefinitely.
Analogy to defamation accrual rules
The majority insisted that, like defamation, a social media post is a publication that occurs once, even if the information remains accessible:
- Multiple accesses to or viewings of the content do not reset limitations.
- Extending limitations based on continued online presence would undermine the predictability and finality that limitation periods are intended to promote.
Contractual rights cannot be nullified by characterization
The majority emphasized that, if the “continuing violation” logic were accepted, the 18‑month contractual limitation would be rendered “meaningless” in any case involving online speech:
“[O]nce a statement is published on the internet, it may be permanently available, [so] to follow the rationale of the hearing officer and our dissenting colleague would render the contractual statute of limitations meaningless.”
Uniform treatment of websites and social media
Citing Nelson v Ardrey, the court underscored that social media should be treated “no differently than any other website” for accrual purposes.

3. Why the Single Publication Rule Was Viewed as Controlling

The most consequential passage states:

“Contrary to the contentions of UCS and our dissenting colleague, the statute of limitations applicable to the disciplinary proceeding must be analyzed in an identical manner to that of the publication of an allegedly defamatory statement.” (emphasis added)

That language does three things:

Elevates the single publication rule beyond mere analogy and treats it as a controlling legal principle in this context.
Rejects any deference to the agency’s interpretation that might pull in a different direction.
Signals that, for online speech-related misconduct, courts will look first and foremost to defamation jurisprudence to define the temporal contours of the underlying act.

The majority’s reasoning is thus not simply, “The single publication rule is a useful analogy,” but “the same rule must govern because the nature of online publication is the same whether in tort or in disciplinary contexts.”

4. Treatment of the First Amendment Issue

The First Amendment issue received only a short paragraph in the opinion. The court held that:

The Facebook comments were covered by free speech protections; but
UCS satisfied the balancing test from Santer: its interest in maintaining impartiality, public confidence, and freedom from bias in the courts outweighed Pearl’s interest in maintaining his Facebook comments without employment consequences.

Implicitly, the court found sufficient evidence that the comments impaired public confidence in the courts and Pearl’s ability to treat litigants impartially—a core state interest in the judicial branch context, where even the appearance of bias is highly disfavored.

5. Remedy and Penalty Reassessment

Because the court found that one of the three charges had been unlawfully considered, it could not simply modify the penalty itself. Under Matter of Pell and its progeny, penalty review is highly deferential and depends heavily on the specific mix of sustained charges.

Here:

The hearing officer’s report did not specify how much weight was assigned to each of the three comments in recommending termination.
UCS’s revised determination similarly adopted the report wholesale without disaggregating the penalty analysis.

Given that uncertainty, the court remitted for a new determination by a hearing officer, but limited to:

The two remaining timely acts of misconduct; and
The appropriate penalty, if any, based solely on those two acts.

The underlying findings on those two acts remain intact; what is re-opened on remittal is the sanctioning decision, not the entire merits.

C. The Dissent’s Reasoning and the Deference Debate

1. Framing the Agency’s Interpretation as Rational and Deferentially Reviewable

Justice Dowling framed the question differently: rather than asking whether UCS violated the CBA, she asked whether its interpretation of the CBA and its own rules was arbitrary and capricious or lacked a sound basis in reason.

She stressed:

Courts “must defer to an administrative agency’s rational interpretation of its own regulations in its area of expertise” (Peckham, Aponte).
Agency interpretations of contracts are to be overturned only if “without sound basis in reason, and in disregard of the terms of the contract” (Century Operating, Correctional Officers).

For the dissent, UCS’s view that the relevant “misconduct” was not just posting the comment, but continuously manifesting bias through its ongoing online presence, was rationally grounded in:

The anti-bias provisions of 22 NYCRR part 50; and
The institutional imperative that court employees not project racial or national-origin bias that could undermine litigants’ trust in judicial impartiality.

2. Critique of the Majority’s Use of the Single Publication Rule

Justice Dowling criticized the majority’s reliance on the single publication rule as “indiscriminate” for several reasons:

Defamation statutes of limitations serve policies distinct from those governing disciplinary time limits in employment.
Defamation accrual rules focus on the injury suffered by the victim of the defamatory statement, whereas disciplinary limitations focus on the timing of the employee’s misconduct vis-à-vis the employer’s right to discipline.
Treating UCS as if it were a private defamation plaintiff overlooks the special status and heightened ethical obligations of court employees.

In short, the dissent viewed the majority’s doctrinal transplantation—from tort law to employment discipline—as overly mechanical and insufficiently attentive to context and agency expertise.

3. Emphasis on the Substantive Seriousness of the Misconduct

Justice Dowling ended by underscoring the seriousness of the statements, describing them as “vile” and emphasizing that:

“Every litigant in New York is entitled to enter our State's courthouses to seek justice, free from any taint or stain of bias from any employee.”

That closing signals not just a legal disagreement but a policy concern: that robust enforcement of anti-bias rules should not be hamstrung by technical or imported limitation doctrines.

D. Impact and Implications

1. For Public Employers and CBAs

The decision has direct implications for public employers in New York, especially where:

Disciplinary procedures are governed by CBAs with specific limitation periods; and
Misconduct consists of social media or online speech that may remain accessible indefinitely.

Key consequences:

Contractual limitation periods will be enforced strictly for online speech
Employers cannot resurrect stale disciplinary claims by characterizing a static post as a continuing violation merely because it remains visible. The “occurrence” is the date of posting.
Need for timely investigation and monitoring
If employers become aware (or reasonably should become aware) of problematic online content, they must commence disciplinary proceedings within the CBA’s specified time frame, or risk losing the ability to rely on that content.
Importance of CBA drafting
If unions and employers wish to treat certain forms of misconduct—such as ongoing display of offensive content—as continuing violations, they will need to draft explicit language to that effect. Absent such language, courts are likely to apply a single-occurence rule as in Pearl.

2. For Employees and Unions

Unions and employees gain a clear, enforceable protection:

Old posts or statements outside the contractual limitation period cannot be resurrected simply because they remain online.
CBAs’ disciplinary limitation clauses have meaningful force even in the age of permanent digital records.

At the same time, Pearl confirms that:

Public‑employee online speech can still be disciplined when timely, even if it addresses public issues, provided the employer meets the Santer/Pickering balancing test.

3. For Administrative Law and Judicial Deference

The decision modestly but meaningfully narrows the scope of deference in a specific setting:

Where an agency’s interpretation of a CBA or internal rule would effectively nullify a clearly stated limitations period, courts may treat the issue as a legal one and not defer.
Cross‑pollination from other doctrinal areas (here, defamation) can circumscribe agency interpretive discretion.

This may encourage agencies to:

Align their disciplinary interpretations with well-established external legal doctrines when analogous; or
Explicitly distinguish their rules, in drafting and in adjudication, from those external doctrines if they seek a different temporal regime.

4. For Future Cases Involving Social Media Misconduct

Pearl is likely to be cited in future New York cases involving:

Time-bar arguments against discipline for old social media content;
Debates over whether online/offline misconduct constitutes a continuing violation; and
Efforts to analogize or distinguish defamation law in administrative or employment settings.

Until the Court of Appeals addresses a similar fact pattern, Pearl stands as controlling authority in the Second Department and persuasive authority statewide on the application of the single publication rule to disciplinary limitation clauses.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Article 78 Proceeding

An Article 78 proceeding is a special New York procedural vehicle used to challenge determinations, actions, or inactions of state or local agencies and officers. It allows courts to review:

Whether an agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously;
Whether a determination is supported by “substantial evidence” when made after a hearing;
Whether the agency exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to follow lawful procedure.

2. “Substantial Evidence” vs. “Arbitrary and Capricious” vs. “Violation of Lawful Procedure”

Substantial evidence — A reasonable amount of relevant proof that a reasonable person could rely on. It is less than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but more than mere suspicion. Used when reviewing factual findings after a hearing.
Arbitrary and capricious — An action is arbitrary if it lacks a sound basis in reason or is taken without regard to the facts. This is a deferential standard; courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the agency if the decision can be rationally justified.
Violation of lawful procedure — Occurs when an agency fails to follow legally required steps, such as its own regulations, statutes, or contractual provisions that govern how it must act.

3. Single Publication Rule

In defamation law, the single publication rule means:

One edition of a newspaper, magazine, book, or online post counts as a single “publication”; and
The statute of limitations starts on the date of that initial publication.

Subsequent printings or materially new editions might be new publications, but:

Each viewing or “hit” on a website; or
The ongoing availability of a static online article or post;
does not restart the statute of limitations.

4. Continuing Violation Doctrine

The continuing violation doctrine sometimes allows a plaintiff to treat a series of wrongful acts as one ongoing course of conduct, so that:
- As long as at least one act in the series occurred within the limitations period, earlier related acts may also be actionable.
It is often used in discrimination or harassment cases where wrongdoing is cumulative. In Pearl, the majority refused to extend this doctrine to a static online post, holding instead that the misconduct occurred once, at the time of posting.

5. Public Employee Speech and Santer

Public employees do not lose their free speech rights, but their speech can be limited under certain conditions. Courts apply a balancing test:
- Was the employee speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern?
- Even if so, does the government employer’s interest in efficient operation, impartiality, order, and public confidence outweigh the employee’s interest in speaking?
Santer is a New York case applying that test. In Pearl, the court held that UCS’s interest in maintaining impartial courts and avoiding bias in its employees outweighed Pearl’s interest in making the Facebook comments without employment consequences.

VI. Conclusion

Matter of Pearl v. New York State Unified Court System is a noteworthy decision for several reasons:
- It applies the single publication rule from defamation law to a public‑sector disciplinary limitation clause, holding that misconduct based on a social media post “occurs” — for limitations purposes — on the date of posting, not continuously thereafter.
- It reinforces the principle that agencies must strictly adhere to their own rules and contractually agreed procedures, and that noncompliance constitutes a “violation of lawful procedure” requiring annulment, even if substantial evidence supports their factual findings.
- It confirms that public employers may discipline employees for biased online speech when it undermines public confidence and impartiality, consistent with the First Amendment balancing articulated in Santer.
- It sharpens the boundary between agency deference and judicial control: while agencies are generally entitled to deference in interpreting contracts and regulations, they cannot use interpretive leeway to effectively erase clear limitation periods.
For future cases, Pearl stands for the proposition that:

In the digital age, the permanence of online content does not extend or revive an employer’s right to discipline beyond the time limits it has agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement. Old posts are not perpetual misconduct merely because they remain visible.

At the same time, the case is a reminder to public employees that their social media activity is subject to scrutiny and discipline when timely discovered, particularly where it conflicts with fundamental institutional commitments to impartiality and non-discrimination.

Going forward, this decision will shape how New York courts handle the temporal dimension of social media misconduct in public employment, and it will likely influence how CBAs are drafted and how agencies structure their monitoring and response to online speech by their employees.