From Declaratory Judgments to “Any Other Action”: The Georgia Supreme Court Broadens the Attorney General Service Requirement in Chestnut Ridge, LLLP v. Hall County Board of Tax Assessors

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Chestnut Ridge, LLLP v. Hall County Board of Tax Assessors, S25A1240 (Dec. 9, 2025), is not really about the merits of a property tax dispute or the contours of Georgia’s Conservation Use Value Assessment (“CUVA”) program. Instead, it becomes a significant procedural decision about how constitutional challenges to Georgia statutes must be litigated after the 2022 amendment to OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c).

Chestnut Ridge, a limited liability limited partnership (LLLP), challenged the imposition of a substantial CUVA breach penalty after it sold part of its Lake Lanier property to another entity that did not continue the CUVA covenant. In superior court and on appeal it argued, among other things, that:

the Hall County Board of Tax Assessors (“the Board”) failed to comply with statutory procedures (including a required physical inspection) before declaring a CUVA breach;
OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l) (the CUVA penalty provision applied to it) is unconstitutionally vague under the Georgia Constitution; and
it was subject to the wrong penalty subsection because its CUVA covenant was allegedly a renewal, which would trigger a less severe penalty under OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(x).

The trial court granted summary judgment to the Board on all counts. On appeal, the Supreme Court initially took the case because it appeared to present a novel constitutional question. But the case takes a procedural turn: the Board, for the first time on appeal, argued that the superior court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction over the constitutional claim because Chestnut Ridge did not serve the Georgia Attorney General as required by OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c).

The Supreme Court agreed and held that, after the 2022 amendment, OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) requires service on the Attorney General whenever a party challenges the constitutionality of a state statute “in an action for declaratory judgment or as a part of any other action.” Failure to comply deprives the trial court of subject‑matter jurisdiction over that constitutional challenge. The Court therefore vacated the portion of the superior court’s order addressing the constitutional vagueness claim and remanded for proper service on the Attorney General.

This commentary examines the decision in depth, focusing on the expansion of the Attorney General service requirement, the Court’s use of precedent and statutory interpretation, and the broader implications for constitutional litigation in Georgia, including in tax and other “special statutory” proceedings.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Property and the CUVA Covenant

In March 2005, Bartow Morgan, Jr. purchased a 59.3‑acre tract on Lake Lanier. Shortly before his purchase, the prior owner had successfully applied for and obtained a CUVA covenant on 58.3 of those acres under OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4.

Under CUVA:

Eligible property owners enter into a 10‑year covenant to maintain their land in a qualifying “conservation use.” OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(d).
In return, the property is taxed on its “current use value” rather than fair market value, with the assessment still at 40%, but on the reduced value. See OCGA § 48‑5‑7(c.2).
A breach of the covenant during the covenant term typically triggers substantial penalties and “catch‑up” taxes.

The opinion indicates that at some point a new covenant period began in tax year 2015; the Board’s notice referred to “the covenant entered into beginning in tax year 2015.” Whether this 2015 covenant was an original covenant or a renewal is central to Chestnut Ridge’s argument about which CUVA penalty subsection applies, but that merits issue is not resolved in this appeal.

B. The Sale and Alleged CUVA Breach

In July 2022, Chestnut Ridge sold 43.05 acres of the CUVA‑encumbered property to Athletic Club Drive, LLC. The opinion notes that the sole member of Athletic Club Drive is apparently a citizen of the United Kingdom. That fact matters because CUVA law requires proof of U.S. citizenship when a legal entity seeks to enter or continue a CUVA covenant, and the Board’s correspondence repeatedly emphasized a citizenship documentation requirement.

On January 13, 2023, the Board sent letters to both Chestnut Ridge and Athletic Club Drive warning that:

If Athletic Club Drive did not apply by April 1, 2023 to continue the CUVA covenant on the portion it purchased, a covenant breach would occur; and
Proof of U.S. citizenship would be required when such an application was filed, including for each person with an interest in the corporation.

Athletic Club Drive did not apply by the stated deadline and apparently did not provide the required citizenship documentation.

On May 2, 2023, the Board sent both owners “Notice of Intent to Assess Penalty for Breach of a Conservation Use Covenant,” referencing OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(k.1). That subsection provides, in part:

In the case of an alleged breach of the covenant, the owner shall be notified in writing by the board of tax assessors. The owner shall have a period of 30 days from the date of such notice to cease and desist the activity alleged in the notice to be in breach of the covenant or to remediate or correct the condition or conditions alleged in the notice to be in breach of the covenant. Following a physical inspection of property, the board of tax assessors shall notify the owner that such activity or activities have or have not properly ceased or that the condition or conditions have or have not been remediated or corrected.

Thus, the statutory process for an alleged breach involves:

Written notice of the alleged breach;
A 30‑day opportunity to cure; and
A follow‑up physical inspection, after which the Board must notify the owner whether the breach has in fact been remedied.

The May 2 letter also said that Athletic Club Drive could still avoid the breach if it signed an application continuing the existing CUVA covenant by June 1, 2023, again with a requirement for proof of U.S. citizenship for anyone with an interest in the LLC.

Ultimately, the CUVA breach penalty was imposed and reflected in the 2023 property tax bills:

Chestnut Ridge’s tax statement totaled $524,820, of which $519,632.14 was attributed to the breach penalty.
Athletic Club Drive’s tax statement totaled $79,651.03, with $52,061.20 attributed to the breach. Athletic Club Drive paid its portion of the penalty.

C. Administrative Appeal and Superior Court Proceeding

On October 2, 2023, counsel for Chestnut Ridge wrote to the Board, stating that:

No physical inspection of the property had occurred, despite OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(k.1)’s requirement; and
Without waiving any objections, Chestnut Ridge would treat the 2023 property tax statement as the Board’s notification that the alleged breach had not been cured.

Chestnut Ridge then filed an administrative appeal to the Hall County Board of Equalization (“BOE”) under OCGA § 48‑5‑311, challenging the Board’s findings and the CUVA breach penalty.

On March 26, 2024, the BOE denied Chestnut Ridge’s appeal. Chestnut Ridge timely appealed to the Superior Court of Hall County under OCGA § 48‑5‑311(g), which provides a detailed procedure for judicial review of tax assessments and related determinations.

In the superior court, the Board moved for summary judgment, contending that Chestnut Ridge breached the covenant and that the penalty was properly assessed. Chestnut Ridge filed a cross‑motion for summary judgment, arguing that:

The Board failed to follow mandatory statutory steps—most notably the physical inspection requirement—before declaring a breach and assessing a penalty;
OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l) is unconstitutionally vague under the Georgia Constitution’s due process clause; and
The Board relied on the wrong CUVA penalty provision by applying OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l) rather than the less severe OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(x), which applies to renewals.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board on all issues. Chestnut Ridge appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

D. The Supreme Court Appeal and the New Jurisdictional Question

The Supreme Court initially accepted the appeal because it raised a novel constitutional issue: whether OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l) is unconstitutionally vague. Under the Georgia Constitution, the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in “all cases involving the construction of the Constitution of Georgia.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II(1).

However, on appeal the Board raised—for the first time—a challenge to the trial court’s subject‑matter jurisdiction over the constitutional claim. It argued that Chestnut Ridge had failed to serve the Attorney General with a copy of the proceeding as required by OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) when a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional.

Chestnut Ridge responded that OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) applied only to declaratory judgment actions, not to the special statutory tax appeal proceeding under OCGA § 48‑5‑311(g). The Supreme Court rejected that narrow view in light of the 2022 amendment to OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c), and that conclusion drives the outcome of the case.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Justice McMillian, writing for a unanimous Court, focused almost entirely on one issue: whether the superior court had subject‑matter jurisdiction to decide Chestnut Ridge’s constitutional vagueness challenge to OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l), given the failure to serve the Attorney General under OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) as amended in 2022.

Key points of the holding:

OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c), as amended in 2022, applies to constitutional challenges raised “as a part of any other action,” not just in declaratory judgment suits.
Chestnut Ridge’s tax appeal under OCGA § 48‑5‑311(g) is a “civil action” and therefore falls within the scope of OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c).
Because Chestnut Ridge did not serve the Attorney General before the superior court ruled on the constitutional issue, the superior court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the vagueness challenge.
The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the superior court’s order that addressed the constitutional challenge and remanded so that Chestnut Ridge can serve the Attorney General and the Attorney General can decide whether to appear and defend the statute.
The Court expressly declined to rule on either the constitutional issue itself or Chestnut Ridge’s other, non‑constitutional challenges (e.g., the physical inspection requirement and which CUVA penalty subsection applies).

The Court further made clear that:

The lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal.
Ignorance of the 2022 statutory amendment does not excuse noncompliance, as Georgia law provides that statutes are binding on all inhabitants once in effect. OCGA § 1‑3‑6.
On remand, if service is properly made and the Attorney General has an opportunity to be heard, the superior court can decide the constitutional issue anew, and Chestnut Ridge may later pursue a subsequent appeal that can also revisit its non‑constitutional claims.

IV. Precedents and Statutory Framework

A. The Pre‑2022 Version of OCGA § 9‑4‑7 and Its Judicial Limitation

OCGA § 9‑4‑7 originated in Georgia’s 1945 Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The earlier version provided, in relevant part:

If a statute of the State, any order or regulation of any administrative body of the State, or any franchise granted by the State is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney General of the State shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and shall be entitled to be heard.

Although the text did not explicitly say it applied only to declaratory judgment cases, Georgia appellate courts consistently construed the requirement as limited to declaratory judgment actions brought under the Act.

The opinion traces that line of authority:

Williams v. Kaylor, 218 Ga. 576 (1963) — The Court held that where service is not made on the Attorney General as required under the declaratory judgment statutes in a case attacking the constitutionality of a state statute, the trial court “does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the case, the subject matter being whether the statute in question is constitutional.”
Daniel v. Federated Nat’l Mtg. Ass’n, 231 Ga. 385 (1973) — The Court noted that no Georgia law requires service on the Attorney General “in other than declaratory judgment proceedings.”
Woodes v. Morris, 247 Ga. 771 (1981) — The Court held that the Attorney General service requirement did not apply to appeals from probate court to superior court, even if the case raised the constitutionality of a statute, because the action was not a declaratory judgment proceeding.
Daniel v. Amicalola Elec. Membership Corp., 289 Ga. 437 (2011) — The Court explained the purpose of the service requirement: to ensure the State has an opportunity to defend its laws before they are invalidated, and clarified that the statute does not specify how or when service must occur, only that it happen in time for the Attorney General to be heard before the court rules.

In short, for decades the statute’s Attorney General service requirement was understood—by caselaw—to apply only in declaratory judgment actions, not in all litigation raising constitutional issues.

B. The 2022 Amendment to OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c)

In 2022, the General Assembly amended subsection (c) of OCGA § 9‑4‑7. The new language, quoted by the Court, reads:

If an Act of the General Assembly, a statute of the state, any order or regulation of any administrative body of the state, or any franchise granted by the state is alleged in an action for declaratory judgment or as a part of any other action to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the Attorney General of the state shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and shall be entitled to be heard in defense of said Act, statute, order, regulation, or franchise, which may include appearing as a party as of right as he or she determines is appropriate.

The critical addition is the phrase “or as a part of any other action.” The Court emphasizes two interpretive principles:

Changed language indicates changed meaning. Citing Allen v. State, 319 Ga. 415 (2024), the Court notes that when the General Assembly alters statutory language, it generally intends to change the statute’s meaning.
Plain text governs. Citing Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170 (2013), the Court reiterates that it must give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, read in context, and if the text is clear and unambiguous, “our search for statutory meaning is at an end.”

Applying those principles, the Court holds that OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c), by its plain terms, now requires Attorney General service whenever a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional in either:

an action for declaratory judgment; or
“as a part of any other action”.

There is no textual limitation to particular types of cases, and nothing in the amended statute ties it solely to the declaratory judgment framework.

C. Defining “Any Other Action” and Its Application to Tax Appeals

To determine whether a tax appeal under OCGA § 48‑5‑311(g) is an “action” within the meaning of OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c), the Court turns to other Code provisions:

OCGA § 9‑2‑1 defines “action” broadly as “the judicial means of enforcing a right.”
OCGA § 9‑11‑2 provides that “[t]here shall be one form of action, to be known as ‘civil action.’”

The Court concludes that the special statutory proceeding at issue—an appeal from the BOE to superior court under OCGA § 48‑5‑311(g)—is:

a “judicial means of enforcing a right”; and
a “civil action.”

Accordingly, it is an “action” within the meaning of OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c). Thus, whenever a party in such a tax appeal alleges that a statute is unconstitutional, that allegation is made “as a part of [an] other action,” and the Attorney General must be served with a copy of the proceeding.

D. Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction and the Effect of Noncompliance

The Court reiterates two important legal propositions about subject‑matter jurisdiction and the Attorney General service requirement:

Subject‑matter jurisdiction defects may be raised at any time. Citing State v. Federal Defender Program, Inc., 315 Ga. 319, 343 (2022), the Court notes that a lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time even on appeal.
Failure to serve the Attorney General deprives the trial court of subject‑matter jurisdiction over the constitutional question. Drawing from Williams v. Kaylor and Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 225 Ga. 607 (1969), the Court explains that when the Attorney General is not served as required, the trial court “was without jurisdiction to render any judgment except one of dismissal” on the constitutional issue.

The Court also cites Daniel v. Amicalola EMC to clarify that:

The statute does not specify the method or timing of service, as long as the Attorney General has notice and an opportunity to be heard before a ruling is made on the constitutional claim.
Service need not be documented in the record by a particular form, though as a practical matter that is wise practice.

In Daniel v. Amicalola EMC, the Court held that the service requirement was satisfied where:

The lack of service was first raised at a summary judgment hearing;
The Attorney General was served the next day; and
The trial court waited five months before ruling, giving the Attorney General adequate opportunity to appear.

In Chestnut Ridge, by contrast, the parties conceded at oral argument that the Attorney General had not been served at all before the trial court ruled on the constitutional vagueness claim. Thus, the superior court did not have subject‑matter jurisdiction to decide that issue.

E. Ignorance of the Amendment is No Excuse

The Court acknowledges that “it may have been difficult for parties to a tax dispute to readily appreciate the impact” of the 2022 amendment to OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c). Nonetheless, it invokes OCGA § 1‑3‑6:

After [statutes] take effect, the laws of this state are obligatory upon all the inhabitants thereof. Ignorance of the law excuses no one.

In other words, lawyers and litigants are charged with knowledge of statutory changes once they are effective, and failure to adapt litigation practice accordingly does not excuse noncompliance.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Detail

A. Why the Attorney General Service Requirement Is Jurisdictional

The service requirement is treated as jurisdictional for constitutional challenges because:

It protects a distinct sovereign interest: giving the State, through the Attorney General, an opportunity to defend its statutes, regulations, and franchises before they are declared invalid.
The Attorney General is the State’s chief legal officer; the legislature has assigned this gatekeeping function to ensure uniform and authoritative defense of state law.
Without service, the court risks invalidating statewide legislation without the State’s participation—raising separation‑of‑powers concerns and undermining the presumption of constitutionality.

By tying the requirement to subject‑matter jurisdiction, the Court underscores that:

The requirement is not a waivable procedural nicety or a technical defect that can be ignored if the parties fail to raise it.
Courts themselves have an independent obligation to ensure compliance before ruling on the validity of state laws.

B. Extending OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) Beyond Declaratory Judgments

The key interpretive move is the Court’s reading of the phrase “or as a part of any other action” in the amended statute. The Court reasons:

The original statute’s text did not expressly limit itself to declaratory judgments, but judicial decisions had effectively done so as a matter of construction.
The General Assembly, aware of that decisional history, added new text that directly addresses constitutional challenges raised outside declaratory judgment actions.
Under principles of statutory interpretation, a deliberate textual expansion should be given meaningful effect; it cannot be read as surplusage.

Thus, the Court treats the amendment as a conscious legislative choice to:

Override earlier case law that confined OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) to declaratory judgments; and
Extend the service obligation to all civil actions in which a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid.

This reasoning firmly grounds the result not in policy, but in textualism: the Court is simply applying the statute “in its most natural and reasonable way.”

C. Applying the Statute to the Chestnut Ridge Tax Appeal

Once the Court determines that “any other action” includes all civil actions, the application to Chestnut Ridge’s tax appeal is straightforward:

The tax appeal is a “civil action” commenced by petition for review under OCGA § 48‑5‑311(g).
Within that action, Chestnut Ridge alleged that OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l) is unconstitutionally vague under Georgia’s due process clause.
Therefore, the action squarely falls within OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c)’s ambit, and the Attorney General had to be served with a copy of the proceeding.

Because Chestnut Ridge did not serve the Attorney General before the trial court ruled on the constitutional issue, the superior court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction to make that ruling. As in Plantation Pipe Line, the only permissible judgment on that point would have been dismissal of the constitutional claim.

D. The Remedy: Partial Vacatur and Remand

The Court’s remedy is carefully tailored:

It vacates only that portion of the superior court’s order addressing the constitutional question.
It remands so that Chestnut Ridge may now serve the Attorney General and give the Attorney General an opportunity to appear.
It makes no ruling on the merits of the constitutional challenge or on any of the non‑constitutional issues.

This approach reflects several considerations:

Respect for the Attorney General’s prerogative. The Court will not opine on the validity of the CUVA penalty statute until the State’s chief legal officer has had a chance to defend it.
Preservation of the parties’ rights. Chestnut Ridge is not barred from pursuing its constitutional challenge; it must simply comply with the statutory procedure. Nor is it barred from reasserting its non‑constitutional grounds in a future appeal.
Institutional competence and jurisdiction. Because the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in this case was predicated on the presence of a live constitutional question, and because the trial court never had jurisdiction over that question, the Supreme Court itself cannot decide the constitutional merits at this juncture. Addressing the other, purely statutory tax issues would exceed its typical appellate jurisdiction, which presumptively lies with the Court of Appeals in non‑constitutional tax matters.

On remand, the superior court will have to:

Ensure that OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) service on the Attorney General is properly accomplished;
Allow the Attorney General to decide whether to appear as of right to defend OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l); and
Re‑adjudicate the constitutional claim (and possibly related issues) with the Attorney General’s participation or after a reasonable opportunity for such participation.

VI. Impact on Future Cases and Areas of Law

A. Broad Reach Across Civil Litigation

The most immediate impact of Chestnut Ridge is its clear holding that OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) applies whenever a statute or other specified governmental act is alleged to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid “as a part of any other action.”

That phrasing, combined with the Court’s reliance on the broad definition of “action” in OCGA § 9‑2‑1 and the concept of a “civil action” in OCGA § 9‑11‑2, suggests that the requirement reaches:

Appeals in tax cases (as here) under OCGA § 48‑5‑311(g);
Special statutory proceedings in superior court (e.g., certain administrative appeals, election contests, or license challenges) whenever a party contests the constitutionality of a state statute or regulation;
Civil suits in which a party attacks the underlying statute authorizing a governmental action or regulatory scheme (for example, business regulation, professional discipline, zoning enabling statutes, etc.);
Contract or tort cases where a party asserts that a statute affecting the case is unconstitutional, such as damage caps, statutes of repose, or state‑law immunities.

For any of these, if a party affirmatively alleges that a state statute is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid (for instance, under the Georgia Constitution, the U.S. Constitution, or principles of preemption), service on the Attorney General is now mandatory and jurisdictional as to that issue.

B. Tax Litigation and CUVA Disputes Specifically

In the tax context, Chestnut Ridge will have immediate practical consequences:

Taxpayers frequently raise constitutional objections to tax statutes or their application (e.g., equal protection, uniformity, due process, takings). Each such challenge in a superior court tax appeal now must be accompanied by service on the Attorney General.
Local boards of tax assessors and tax commissioners should be prepared to spot when a taxpayer’s pleadings or motions include constitutional attacks, and they may seek to enforce the Attorney General service requirement or raise the jurisdictional defect if the plaintiff fails to comply.
CUVA disputes, like this one, often implicate complex constitutional questions about classification, penalties, and due process; counsel litigating such cases must incorporate OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) compliance into their standard practice.

C. Litigation Strategy and Professional Practice

From a practitioner’s standpoint, several strategic and professional lessons emerge:

Early Identification of Constitutional Claims. Lawyers must now rigorously identify whether they are mounting a direct challenge to the validity of a statute (as opposed to arguing for a particular interpretation). If they are, OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) is triggered.
Proactive Service on the Attorney General. Best practice will be to serve the Attorney General promptly upon filing a pleading or motion that alleges a statute is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, and to document that service in the record.
Judicial Gatekeeping. Trial judges have reason to inquire, sua sponte if necessary, whether the Attorney General has been served whenever a constitutional challenge is raised. Otherwise, rulings risk later being vacated for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction.
Defensive Use by Opposing Parties. As illustrated by the Board’s strategy in Chestnut Ridge, defendants and respondents can raise OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) noncompliance even late in the litigation, including on appeal, to invalidate an adverse constitutional ruling below.

D. Scope and Open Questions

Although the Court’s reasoning is broad, some questions remain open:

Criminal cases. The decision relies on the concept of “civil action,” leaving open whether OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) applies in criminal proceedings in which a defendant attacks the constitutionality of a criminal statute. The statute’s text speaks broadly of “any action,” but the Court’s analysis centers on civil procedure provisions.
Defensive vs. offensive challenges. The opinion deals with an affirmative constitutional challenge raised by the plaintiff. The statute’s text (“is alleged…to be unconstitutional”) appears to cover constitutional arguments regardless of which side raises them, but future decisions may clarify whether and when service is required when a defendant raises a constitutional defense.
“Otherwise invalid.” The amendment also covers statutes alleged to be “otherwise invalid” (e.g., preempted, ultra vires, or in conflict with federal law). The Court did not explore this phrase, but its reasoning suggests that the same service requirement applies whenever a party seeks to invalidate a statute on any legal basis, not just on state constitutional grounds.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Conservation Use Value Assessment (CUVA)

CUVA is a Georgia tax program designed to encourage the preservation of agricultural and conservation land by offering a tax break in exchange for long‑term use restrictions:

The owner commits to maintain the property in a qualifying conservation use (such as agriculture, forestry, or environmentally sensitive land) for a fixed 10‑year term.
In return, the property is assessed at its “current use value,” which is typically much lower than fair market value, reducing property tax bills.
If the covenant is breached (for example, by disqualifying uses, ownership changes without required continuation applications, or failure to meet eligibility rules), the property owner usually must pay a penalty that may include rollback taxes and interest.

In Chestnut Ridge, the alleged breach arose because the buyer of part of the CUVA‑encumbered property did not timely apply to continue the covenant and, based on the citizenship requirement and failure to submit proof, may not have been eligible to do so.

B. Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction

“Subject‑matter jurisdiction” is a court’s power to hear and decide a particular kind of legal dispute. It cannot be waived by the parties and can be raised at any time. If a court lacks subject‑matter jurisdiction over an issue, any ruling it makes on that issue is void.

In this case:

The superior court had subject‑matter jurisdiction to hear a tax appeal under OCGA § 48‑5‑311(g).
But, as to the constitutional question, the law imposes a specific condition: the Attorney General must be served with a copy of any proceeding in which a state statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid.
Because that condition was not met, the court had no jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l). It did, however, retain jurisdiction over the non‑constitutional aspects of the tax dispute.

C. Declaratory Judgment vs. Special Statutory Proceedings

A declaratory judgment action is a lawsuit seeking a court’s declaration about the meaning or validity of a law, contract, or legal relationship, typically before any enforcement or breach has occurred.

A special statutory proceeding is a lawsuit whose structure and procedure are defined by a specific statute, such as:

tax appeals under OCGA § 48‑5‑311;
appeals from certain administrative agencies; or
election contests.

Before the 2022 amendment, Georgia courts generally read OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) as applying only to the first category—declaratory judgments. Chestnut Ridge holds that the statute now applies equally to constitutional challenges raised in special statutory proceedings and other civil actions.

D. Vagueness and Due Process (Conceptual Overview)

A statute is unconstitutionally vague under the due process clause if:

It fails to give ordinary people fair notice of what conduct is prohibited or required; and
It is so standardless that it invites arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.

Here, Chestnut Ridge contends that OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l)—the CUVA penalty provision applied to it—fails those tests. The Supreme Court did not reach that issue because of the jurisdictional defect; the vagueness argument remains to be decided on remand, after proper service on the Attorney General.

VIII. Unresolved Merits Issues on Remand

Because the Supreme Court’s decision is confined to the jurisdictional effect of OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c), several important substantive and procedural questions in the underlying tax dispute remain open, either for the superior court on remand or for a future appeal:

A. Vagueness Challenge to OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l)

The core constitutional issue is whether the CUVA penalty subsection applied to Chestnut Ridge is so unclear that it violates due process. Potential aspects of that challenge may include:

Whether the statute clearly defines what constitutes a “breach” in the context of partial transfers and successor owners;
Whether it provides adequate guidance on how penalties are calculated, especially in renewal vs. original covenants; and
Whether the interaction between various CUVA subsections (e.g., (k.1), (l), (x)) is sufficiently clear to satisfy due process.

Only after the Attorney General is properly served and given an opportunity to participate can the superior court address those questions.

B. Compliance with the Physical Inspection Requirement

OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(k.1) mandates:

Written notice of an alleged CUVA breach;
A 30‑day period to cease or remediate the alleged breach; and
A subsequent “physical inspection” by the Board, followed by a determination as to whether the breach has been cured.

Chestnut Ridge’s counsel asserted that “no physical inspection of the property had occurred” and argued that the Board’s failure to conduct the inspection rendered the breach determination and penalty invalid.

The Supreme Court did not decide whether the Board complied with this requirement or what the legal consequences of noncompliance would be (e.g., voiding the penalty assessment, remand to the Board, or some lesser remedy). Those questions remain to be litigated.

C. Which CUVA Penalty Provision Applies: OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l) vs. (x)

Chestnut Ridge argues that its covenant in effect for tax year 2015 was a renewal of a prior CUVA covenant, and therefore any breach should be penalized under OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(x), which imposes a less severe penalty than OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l).

The Board, and the superior court by implication, treated the covenant as falling under subsection (l), effectively doubling the penalty according to Chestnut Ridge’s argument. The Supreme Court expressly took no position on this statutory interpretation issue.

On remand, the superior court may need to:

Determine as a factual matter whether the 2015 CUVA covenant was an original covenant or a renewal;
Interpret the CUVA statute to decide which penalty provision applies in those circumstances; and
Assess whether any misapplication of the penalty framework is independently reversible error, even apart from the constitutional challenge.

D. Future Appellate Review

The Supreme Court notes that its opinion should not be read to impair Chestnut Ridge’s ability to raise its non‑constitutional challenges in a subsequent appeal, if any. This suggests the following likely procedural path:

On remand, the superior court addresses the constitutional challenge (after Attorney General service) and any remaining statutory issues, issuing a new final judgment.
If either party appeals, the presence (or absence) of a constitutional question will determine whether the appeal goes to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals under Georgia’s jurisdictional rules.
In that future appeal, both the constitutional and non‑constitutional issues may be revisited, including the inspection requirement and the proper CUVA penalty subsection.

IX. Conclusion

Chestnut Ridge, LLLP v. Hall County Board of Tax Assessors is an important procedural decision with broad implications across Georgia civil practice. Its central holding is that, after the 2022 amendment to OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c), any party who challenges the constitutionality or validity of a Georgia statute in any civil action—whether or not it is a declaratory judgment—must serve the Attorney General with a copy of the proceeding, and failure to do so deprives the trial court of subject‑matter jurisdiction over that challenge.

The decision:

Clarifies that the phrase “as a part of any other action” in OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) must be given full effect, extending the Attorney General service requirement beyond declaratory judgments to all civil actions, including special statutory proceedings such as tax appeals;
Reaffirms that subject‑matter jurisdiction defects can be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal, and that ignorance of statutory amendments is no excuse;
Ensures that the State, through the Attorney General, has a guaranteed opportunity to defend the constitutionality and validity of its statutes before courts rule on such challenges;
Leaves unresolved several substantive and procedural questions about Georgia’s CUVA program—particularly the alleged vagueness of OCGA § 48‑5‑7.4(l), the mandatory nature of the physical inspection requirement, and the proper penalty subsection for covenant renewals—which will now proceed on remand with the Attorney General’s participation.

For practitioners, the case is a clear directive: whenever you seek to invalidate a Georgia statute—or argue it is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid—in any civil action, you must build OCGA § 9‑4‑7(c) service on the Attorney General into your litigation strategy from the outset. Failure to do so risks not only delay and remand, but the voiding of any favorable constitutional ruling for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction.