Fraud-on-the-Court, Collateral Estoppel in Attorney-Malpractice Suits, and Appellate Filing Bars: Commentary on Browne v. Ciobanu (7th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025)

Fraud-on-the-Court, Collateral Estoppel in Attorney-Malpractice Suits, and Appellate Filing Bars: Commentary on Browne v. Ciobanu (7th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential order in Kathy Browne v. Andrea Ciobanu, Nos. 25‑1441 & 25‑2237 (7th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025), consolidates two related appeals stemming from a fraught attorney–client relationship. Although issued as a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION” under Seventh Circuit practice, the order offers instructive guidance on:

  • the narrow scope of “fraud on the court” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3);
  • the application of Indiana collateral estoppel rules to bar an attorney‑malpractice action after prior federal rulings on a settlement and attorney’s lien;
  • district courts’ broad discretion in managing dockets, stays, and amendment of pleadings; and
  • the use of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 sanctions and a circuit‑wide filing bar against a vexatious litigant.

The parties are:

  • Kathy Browne, plaintiff–appellant, initially represented by attorney Andrea Ciobanu in a federal civil rights case, then proceeding pro se in later proceedings; and
  • Andrea Ciobanu, defendant–appellee, Browne’s former attorney and eventual target of a state‑law malpractice suit.

The court (Judges Hamilton, Jackson‑Akiwumi, and Lee) affirms two district court judgments:

  1. denial of Browne’s Rule 60(d)(3) “fraud on the court” motion in her original 2020 civil rights case, and
  2. dismissal with prejudice of her 2023 malpractice action based on collateral estoppel and failure to state a claim.

The panel also grants defense counsel’s motion for appellate sanctions, imposes a monetary sanction and fee‑shifting, and enters a filing bar applicable to all federal courts in the circuit until Browne satisfies the sanctions.

II. Case Background and Procedural History

A. The 2020 Civil Rights Action and Settlement (Case No. 2:20‑CV‑196 JD)

In 2020, Browne filed a federal civil rights action in the Northern District of Indiana alleging false arrest against:

  • individual defendant Jennifer Waldo, and
  • the City of Valparaiso, among others,

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Attorney Andrea Ciobanu represented Browne.

Key developments:

  • Settlement with a defendant. Browne reached a settlement with one defendant. Afterward, Ciobanu withdrew from representation.
  • Dispute over settlement enforceability. Browne argued that the settlement should not be enforced, alleging, among other things, that Ciobanu coerced her into settling.
  • Trust account and attorney’s lien. Despite having withdrawn, Ciobanu held the settlement funds in her firm’s trust account and then sent the settlement check to the district court clerk while seeking to enforce an attorney’s lien for unpaid fees and costs.
  • District court rulings.
    • Judge Van Bokkelen enforced the settlement agreement.
    • He also validated Ciobanu’s attorney’s lien, directing distribution of the lien amount to Ciobanu and the remainder to Browne.
  • Prior appeals.
    • Browne appealed the settlement enforcement; the Seventh Circuit affirmed in Browne v. Waldo, No. 24‑1497, 2024 WL 4719082 (7th Cir. Nov. 8, 2024).
    • She separately appealed the lien order (Browne v. Ciobanu, No. 23‑1520) but voluntarily dismissed that appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 42(b).

After these rulings, and after the case had been reassigned to Judge DeGuilio, Browne filed a post‑judgment motion under Rule 60(d)(3) seeking to set aside the orders as procured by “fraud on the court.”

B. The Rule 60(d)(3) Motion: Alleged “Fraud on the Court”

In May 2025, Browne filed a Rule 60(d)(3) motion in the 2020 case asserting “fraud on the court.” She accused Ciobanu of:

  1. Including a fictitious party “Mr. Back” in the amended complaint;
  2. Accepting a bribe from the City of Valparaiso in exchange for dismissing the City;
  3. Concealing from the court a sexually explicit video of Browne that she claimed supported her claims against Waldo; and
  4. Withholding Browne’s case file after the attorney–client relationship ended.

Ciobanu opposed the motion and sought sanctions. Judge DeGuilio denied both the Rule 60(d)(3) motion and the sanctions request, concluding:

  • “Mr. Back” was at most a scrivener’s error that neither misled the court nor harmed Browne.
  • Browne submitted no evidence to support the asserted bribery.
  • Any alleged withholding of the explicit video or case file was not substantiated as “fraud on the court.”
  • Sanctions were unwarranted given Browne’s pro se status and lack of clear bad faith.

This post‑judgment order became the subject of Appeal No. 25‑1441.

C. The 2023 Attorney‑Malpractice Suit (Case No. 2:23‑cv‑00164‑GSL‑AZ)

While the 2020 civil rights case was still ongoing, Browne filed a separate, diversity‑based malpractice action in May 2023 against former counsel Ciobanu. She alleged state‑law claims including:

  • legal negligence (malpractice);
  • misrepresentation;
  • breach of fiduciary duty; and
  • breach of contract,

claiming that Ciobanu mishandled the 2020 litigation and fraudulently induced her to settle.

Procedural steps in the malpractice action:

  • Browne filed “a flurry of motions,” including repeated attempts to amend her complaint.
  • Ciobanu moved to dismiss (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)) and requested sanctions and attorney’s fees.
  • Judge Lund stayed the case to address Browne’s many motions and then later lifted the stay.

Judge Lund ultimately:

  • Granted Ciobanu’s motion to dismiss with prejudice, holding that:
    • the claims were barred by collateral estoppel because the settlement’s validity and the attorney’s lien had already been adjudicated in the 2020 action, and
    • in the alternative, each claim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).
  • Dismissed as moot Browne’s pending motion to amend the complaint and other motions, including Ciobanu’s motion for sanctions.

Browne later filed a Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration, but after she filed a notice of appeal from the judgment, Judge Lund denied the reconsideration motion as moot. This judgment and the antecedent orders are the subject of Appeal No. 25‑2237.

D. Consolidation and Decision Without Oral Argument

The Seventh Circuit consolidated the two appeals and resolved them without oral argument under Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C), determining that the briefs and record adequately presented the issues.

III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Disposition

The court’s main rulings can be summarized as follows:

  1. Rule 60(d)(3) – Fraud on the Court. The denial of Browne’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion in the 2020 case is affirmed. Browne failed to make the “meaningful evidentiary showing” required to establish fraud on the court, and the alleged errors and misconduct were not of the “extraordinary and egregious” sort (e.g., bribery of a judge, forged documents) that corrupt the judicial process itself.
  2. Collateral Estoppel – Malpractice Suit. The dismissal of the 2023 malpractice action is affirmed. Applying Indiana issue‑preclusion law, the panel holds that:
    • there were final judgments on the merits (settlement enforcement and lien validation);
    • the same issues (e.g., alleged evidence withholding, coercion regarding settlement, overcharging) were already adjudicated; and
    • the parties were the same (Browne and Ciobanu).
      • Thus, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of those issues in the malpractice suit.
  3. Leave to Amend. Judge Lund acted within her discretion in denying leave to file a second amended complaint. Browne had already amended once as of right and repeatedly sought further amendments; the proposed amendment did not cure the identified defects.
  4. Case Management – Stays and Scheduling. The district court’s decision to stay the malpractice action while evaluating Browne’s numerous motions, and the delay in issuing a Rule 16 scheduling order, were within the court’s broad discretion to manage its docket.
  5. Post‑judgment Reconsideration Not Before the Court. The panel declines to review the denial of Browne’s Rule 60(b) motion in the malpractice action because Browne did not file a new or amended notice of appeal from that order, as required by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
  6. Appellate Sanctions and Filing Bar. The panel grants Ciobanu’s motion for sanctions under Fed. R. App. P. 38, finding Browne’s consolidated appeal frivolous and repetitive of previously rejected arguments. It:
    • imposes a $750 fine payable to the court within 14 days;
    • orders Browne to pay Ciobanu’s reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in responding to the appeal; and
    • directs that clerks of all federal courts in the Seventh Circuit return unfiled any papers submitted by or on behalf of Browne (except in criminal or habeas cases) until she pays the full sanction, subject to a possible modification upon a showing of inability to pay after two years.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Rule 60(d)(3) and the Narrow Concept of “Fraud on the Court”

1. Governing Standard and Precedents Cited

Rule 60(d)(3) preserves the court’s power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.” This is not a routine avenue for relief but a highly circumscribed doctrine aimed at protecting the integrity of the judicial process itself.

The Seventh Circuit relies on two key precedents:

  • In re Golf 255, Inc., 652 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2011): identified examples of fraud on the court such as forgery, perjury, bribery of a judge, or similar misconduct that affects the court’s ability to adjudicate fairly.
  • Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads v. Foxx, 815 F.3d 1068, 1080 (7th Cir. 2016):
    • describes fraud on the court as arising only in the “most extraordinary and egregious circumstances”; and
    • requires a party alleging such fraud to make a “meaningful evidentiary showing.”

These precedents establish that:

  • Routine litigation misconduct or discovery disputes, even if serious, usually do not rise to “fraud on the court.”
  • The fraud must be directed at the judicial machinery itself and be so severe that it undermines the process (e.g., bribing a judge, fabricating evidence submitted to the court).
  • Bald accusations are not enough; credible, concrete evidence is required.

2. Application to Browne’s Allegations

Browne’s allegations fall far short of this demanding standard:

  • The “Mr. Back” reference. The complaint contained a reference to “Mr. Back,” which the panel treats, as did Judge DeGuilio, as a likely scrivener’s error. There was no suggestion that this name was used to deceive the court or to alter the outcome. The error did not mislead the court or prejudice Browne. Such drafting mistakes are commonplace and do not constitute fraud, much less fraud on the court.
  • Alleged bribery by the City of Valparaiso. Browne accused Ciobanu of taking a bribe to dismiss the City. But she supplied no evidence. Under Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads, mere assertion is inadequate; a meaningful evidentiary showing is required. Without affidavits, documents, or other corroboration, the bribery claim cannot support relief under Rule 60(d)(3).
  • Alleged concealment of a sexually explicit video. Browne claimed the video supported her claims against Waldo and that Ciobanu hid it from the court. Two problems arise:
    • First, there was no meaningful evidentiary showing that the video was actually withheld or that it was material in a way that would have changed the outcome.
    • Second, disputes over what evidence counsel chooses to present or withhold are generally treated as issues of trial strategy or, at worst, ordinary litigation misconduct. They rarely qualify as fraud on the court unless coupled with intentional deception directed at the court itself.
  • Withholding the case file. Browne alleged that Ciobanu refused to turn over her case file after the representation ended. Judge DeGuilio found that Browne failed to show any such withholding. Even if there had been some delay or disagreement over file turnover, that would generally amount to a fee/disciplinary or malpractice issue, not fraud on the court.

Given these deficiencies, the panel concludes that Judge DeGuilio acted well within his discretion in denying the Rule 60(d)(3) motion. The order underscores:

  • the strong presumption of finality attached to judgments, and
  • the limited and exceptional nature of Rule 60(d)(3) relief.

B. Collateral Estoppel and the Attorney‑Malpractice Action

1. Indiana’s Collateral Estoppel Framework

Because the malpractice suit was a diversity action based on state‑law claims, federal courts must apply the preclusion rules of the state where the original judgment was rendered. The panel cites:

  • Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) – holding that federal diversity judgments adopt the state’s rules of claim‑preclusion unless a federal interest requires otherwise.
  • Cannon v. Armstrong Containers, Inc., 92 F.4th 688, 706 (7th Cir. 2024) – applying the relevant state’s preclusion rules in diversity cases.

Under Indiana law, as summarized by Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 646 (Ind. 2023), collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) requires:

  1. a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction;
  2. identity of the issues decided in the prior and current proceedings; and
  3. mutuality of the parties (or its functional equivalent, depending on the application).

The Seventh Circuit notes that the parties agree Indiana’s preclusion rules apply, and the panel applies those rules to bar Browne’s malpractice suit.

2. Final Judgments on the Merits

The court identifies two key final judgments:

  • The order enforcing the settlement agreement in the 2020 case; and
  • The order validating Ciobanu’s attorney’s lien on the settlement proceeds.

Both were final, appealable orders:

  • Browne appealed the settlement enforcement and lost (Browne v. Waldo, 2024 WL 4719082).
  • She appealed the lien ruling but voluntarily dismissed the appeal, leaving the lien order intact and final.

Thus, the “final judgment” requirement is plainly satisfied.

3. Identity of Issues Between the 2020 and 2023 Cases

Browne attempted to distinguish her malpractice claims (negligence, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract) as fundamentally different from her original civil rights claims. The panel rejects that framing. For collateral estoppel, the question is not whether the legal theories are the same, but whether the underlying issues of fact were already decided.

The panel points to several overlapping factual issues:

  • Whether Ciobanu withheld evidence (e.g., the explicit video).
  • Whether she induced Browne to settle with a defendant by improper means.
  • Whether she overcharged Browne and was unjustly enriched.

These same factual contentions:

  • were directly relevant to whether the settlement should be enforced, and
  • were litigated (or could have been litigated) in the context of the attorney’s lien dispute.

Indeed, the order notes that Browne “could also have raised—and in some instances did raise—the same arguments that she raised in the second suit to challenge the validity of the lien in the first suit.” Once the court enforced the settlement and upheld the lien, it necessarily rejected Browne’s allegations that Ciobanu’s conduct around the settlement and billing was improper in a way that would vitiate the agreement or defeat the lien.

Therefore, there is an identity of issues for collateral‑estoppel purposes: Browne cannot re‑litigate those same factual contentions by repackaging them as malpractice or fiduciary‑duty claims.

4. Mutuality of Parties

The mutuality requirement is also met. Both Browne and Ciobanu:

  • were parties in the 2020 case (in the lien and settlement enforcement proceedings); and
  • are the only parties in the 2023 malpractice suit.

Accordingly, Indiana’s mutuality requirement is satisfied.

5. Alternative 12(b)(6) Failure‑to‑State‑a‑Claim Holding

Although collateral estoppel was sufficient to dispose of the malpractice suit, Judge Lund also concluded, in the alternative, that each of Browne’s claims failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The appellate opinion notes this alternative holding but does not elaborate, likely because the preclusion ground fully supported the dismissal. The panel’s affirmance on collateral‑estoppel grounds leaves the 12(b)(6) analysis largely in the background, functioning as a belt‑and‑suspenders justification.

C. Denial of Leave to Amend the Malpractice Complaint

Browne argued that she should have been allowed to file a second amended complaint, which she claimed would state additional malpractice‑related facts. The Seventh Circuit affirms Judge Lund’s denial as a proper exercise of discretion.

Key points:

  • Browne had already amended her complaint once “as a matter of course” under Rule 15(a)(1).
  • She continued to seek additional amendments even before the court directed her to file a rule‑compliant motion for leave.
  • Under Rule 15(a)(2), further amendments require leave of court, which can be denied for reasons such as futility, undue delay, bad faith, or repeated failure to cure deficiencies.

The panel cites Circle Block Partners, LLC v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 44 F.4th 1014, 1023 (7th Cir. 2022), which recognizes that leave to amend may be denied when a proposed amendment does not cure the complaint’s defects. Here, the proposed second amended complaint:

  • did not add concrete, new factual allegations to overcome the preclusion problems or the substantive deficiencies; and
  • would therefore have been futile.

Given that, plus Browne’s repeated attempts to replead, the denial of further amendment was within the district court’s discretion.

D. Case Management: Stay and Rule 16 Scheduling Order

Browne also complained that:

  • Judge Lund’s decision to stay the malpractice case while she evaluated Browne’s many motions was improper; and
  • the court violated Rule 16 by failing to issue a scheduling order “as soon as practicable.”

The Seventh Circuit rejects these arguments. It emphasizes:

  • District courts have broad discretion to manage their dockets, including the use of stays. The court cites Alicea v. County of Cook, 88 F.4th 1209, 1218 (7th Cir. 2023), confirming this principle.
  • Rule 16(b)(2) indeed requires scheduling orders “as soon as practicable,” but practical timing is heavily influenced by the parties’ motions and the need to resolve threshold legal issues before discovery.

Here, Browne’s own “spate of motions,” especially multiple requests to amend, generated much of the delay. Judge Lund reasonably paused the case to clarify the pleadings and evaluate whether the suit should proceed at all. Once she concluded that the case was barred and deficient, it would have been pointless to enter a scheduling order. No abuse of discretion occurred.

E. Appellate Jurisdiction: Failure to Appeal the Post‑judgment Rule 60(b) Order

Browne contended that the district court erred in denying her post‑judgment Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration in the malpractice case. The panel does not reach the merits of this contention.

The reason is procedural. Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii):

  • If a party files a timely motion under Rule 60(b) (among other listed motions), and the court rules on that motion after a notice of appeal has already been filed, the appealing party must file a new or amended notice of appeal specifying that later order in order to vest appellate jurisdiction over it.

The panel cites Johnson v. Purdue, 126 F.4th 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2025) for this requirement. Browne did not file a new or amended notice of appeal after the district court denied her Rule 60(b) motion. As a result, the denial of that motion was not properly before the appellate court, and it could only review the judgment and antecedent rulings.

F. Appellate Sanctions, Fee‑Shifting, and Circuit‑Wide Filing Bar

1. Rule 38 Sanctions for a Frivolous Appeal

Ciobanu moved for sanctions under Fed. R. App. P. 38, which permits a court of appeals to award “just damages and single or double costs to the appellee” if it determines that an appeal is frivolous.

The panel finds Browne’s appeal frivolous because:

  • Her arguments merely rehash previously rejected claims about the settlement’s invalidity and the attorney’s lien.
  • She had received “multiple warnings” from both the district court and the Seventh Circuit about filing frivolous litigation.

Given this pattern and the lack of any substantial legal basis for the appeal, sanctions were deemed appropriate. The court cites Upchurch v. O’Brien, 111 F.4th 805, 813–14 (7th Cir. 2024), which discusses the use of Rule 38 in deterring frivolous appeals and compensating appellees.

The sanctions ordered are:

  • a $750 fine payable to the clerk of the Seventh Circuit within 14 days; and
  • reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by Ciobanu in responding to the appeal, with a schedule:
    • Ciobanu must file a statement of fees and costs within 14 days; and
    • Browne may file a response within 14 days of that filing.

2. Filing Bar Across All Federal Courts in the Circuit

Beyond monetary sanctions, the panel imposes a prefiling bar for civil and non‑habeas matters:

  • Clerks of all federal courts in the Seventh Circuit must return unfiled any papers submitted by or on behalf of Browne unless and until she pays the full sanction.
  • This filing bar excludes:
    • criminal cases; and
    • applications for writs of habeas corpus.

The court relies on:

  • In re City of Chicago, 500 F.3d 582, 584–86 (7th Cir. 2007); and
  • Support Systems Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186–87 (7th Cir. 1995),

which approve prefiling injunctions and sanctions against litigants who repeatedly file frivolous or vexatious suits. Such measures are justified to:

  • protect judicial resources,
  • shield opposing parties from harassment and unnecessary expense, and
  • uphold the integrity of the court system.

The panel further provides a safety valve: if Browne, “despite her best efforts,” cannot pay the sanctions, she may move to modify or rescind the order, but not earlier than two years from its date, consistent with the approach in In re City of Chicago and Mack.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

Below is a brief, nontechnical explanation of several important legal concepts in the opinion.

1. “Fraud on the Court” (Rule 60(d)(3))

  • Not the same as ordinary fraud between parties or perjury.
  • Refers to extreme misconduct that attacks the integrity of the judicial process itself (e.g., bribing a judge, fabricating documents filed with the court).
  • Requires a strong evidentiary showing—bare accusations are insufficient.
  • Used sparingly to protect final judgments.

2. Rule 60(b) vs. Rule 60(d)

  • Rule 60(b) provides enumerated grounds to relieve a party from a judgment (mistake, newly discovered evidence, fraud by an opposing party, etc.), generally with time limits.
  • Rule 60(d)(3) is a “savings clause” ensuring courts retain inherent power to set aside judgments for “fraud on the court” even beyond those time limits—but only for truly egregious misconduct.

3. Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion)

  • Prevents re‑litigation of an issue of fact or law that was already:
    • actually litigated,
    • determined by a valid final judgment, and
    • essential to that judgment.
  • Applies even when the new case has different legal theories (e.g., civil rights claim vs. malpractice claim), if the underlying factual questions are the same.

4. Attorney’s Lien

  • A legal mechanism allowing an attorney to claim a portion of a client’s recovery (such as settlement proceeds) to secure unpaid fees and costs.
  • Typically recognized by statute or common law, and enforced by a court order.

5. Rule 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim

  • Standard procedural device by which a defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint.
  • Court assumes factual allegations are true and asks whether they plausibly state a valid legal claim.
  • If the facts alleged, taken as true, do not amount to a recognized cause of action, the case can be dismissed at the pleading stage.

6. Rule 15 – Amendments to Pleadings

  • Parties may amend a pleading once “as a matter of course” early in the case.
  • Additional amendments require leave of court, which should be freely given when justice so requires—but can be denied for futility, undue delay, repeated failure to cure defects, or bad faith.

7. Rule 16 – Scheduling Orders

  • Requires courts to issue a scheduling order “as soon as practicable” to control the course of litigation.
  • However, courts retain wide latitude on timing, especially where threshold motions (like motions to dismiss) may dispose of the case.

8. Rule 38 Sanctions and “Frivolous” Appeals

  • An appeal is frivolous when it lacks any reasonable legal or factual basis.
  • Under Fed. R. App. P. 38, courts of appeals may impose monetary sanctions and costs to deter such appeals and compensate appellees.

9. Prefiling Injunction / Filing Bar

  • A court order restricting a litigant’s ability to file new cases or papers, typically used against vexatious or abusive litigants.
  • Often requires the litigant to obtain leave of court or, as here, to comply with conditions such as payment of sanctions before filings will be accepted.
  • Must be tailored and cannot completely foreclose access to the courts, particularly for criminal or habeas matters.

10. Nonprecedential Disposition

  • The Seventh Circuit labels this order as “NONPRECEDENTIAL,” meaning it is not binding precedent for future panels.
  • Under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, however, even nonprecedential orders may be cited, usually for persuasive value.
  • Practitioners should treat the decision as informative but not controlling authority.

VI. Practical Implications and Broader Impact

1. For Litigants Alleging Attorney Misconduct

The decision underscores a crucial warning: once a court has adjudicated issues concerning an attorney’s conduct in a prior case (especially in connection with a settlement or lien), those determinations can foreclose later malpractice or fiduciary‑duty suits based on the same facts.

Implications include:

  • Clients must recognize that challenging an attorney’s lien or the validity of a settlement may be their primary opportunity to litigate alleged misconduct arising from that representation.
  • Re‑packaging the same factual allegations into different common‑law claims (negligence, misrepresentation, breach of contract) will often be barred once those facts have been determined in prior proceedings.
  • Pro se status does not immunize litigants from preclusion doctrines or sanctions when they attempt serial relitigation.

2. For Attorneys Facing Malpractice Exposure

Attorneys may view this case as confirming that:

  • A properly adjudicated attorney’s lien proceeding can have issue‑preclusive consequences in later malpractice litigation, particularly where the client has already challenged the attorney’s conduct and billing.
  • It is worth fully defending such lien and fee disputes, creating a clear record, because favorable findings can later support a collateral‑estoppel defense.

At the same time, attorneys should not assume all malpractice exposure is extinguished; new or distinct factual issues not addressed in the original case may still be litigable in a separate malpractice suit.

3. For District Courts Managing Pro Se, High‑Volume Filers

The ruling reinforces that district courts:

  • have substantial discretion to stay cases while sorting through multiple motions; and
  • may defer issuing Rule 16 scheduling orders until they resolve threshold motions that may dispose of a case.

This is especially important in cases involving pro se litigants who file many overlapping or repetitive motions. The decision affirms that courts can prioritize resolving whether any claim survives preclusion and Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny before committing judicial resources to discovery management.

4. For the Appellate System and Vexatious Litigant Control

The imposition of both monetary sanctions and a circuit‑wide filing bar signals that:

  • The Seventh Circuit is prepared to escalate sanctions when a litigant persistently files frivolous appeals despite repeated warnings.
  • Rule 38 sanctions and prefiling injunctions are not tools of last resort only in extreme multi‑case situations; they can be applied when a pattern of abuse emerges within a more contained set of litigation.
  • Nonetheless, by excluding criminal and habeas filings and allowing a future motion to modify the order based on inability to pay, the court balances deterrence and judicial protection with access‑to‑justice considerations.

5. Clarifying the High Bar for “Fraud on the Court”

The decision also contributes to the growing body of Seventh Circuit authority reaffirming that Rule 60(d)(3) relief is reserved for truly extraordinary misconduct. Allegations of:

  • poor strategic decisions,
  • discovery disputes, or
  • even non‑disclosed evidence between counsel and client

will almost never suffice, absent convincing proof that the judicial process itself was corrupted. This should temper expectations for litigants who, dissatisfied with outcomes, seek to reopen final judgments under the banner of “fraud.”

VII. Conclusion

Although nonprecedential, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Browne v. Ciobanu offers a compact but instructive treatment of several important procedural doctrines:

  • It reaffirms that “fraud on the court” under Rule 60(d)(3) is an exceptional remedy, demanding both egregious conduct aimed at the judicial process and a meaningful evidentiary showing.
  • It demonstrates how Indiana collateral estoppel can bar a later malpractice suit when the factual issues about an attorney’s conduct were previously litigated and resolved in connection with settlement enforcement and fee‑lien disputes.
  • It underscores the discretion district judges possess in managing their dockets, including stays and the timing of Rule 16 scheduling orders, particularly in the face of numerous pro se filings.
  • It highlights procedural rigor on appeal, requiring compliance with Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii) for post‑judgment orders to be reviewable.
  • Finally, it illustrates the Seventh Circuit’s willingness to employ Rule 38 sanctions and prefiling injunctions to curb vexatious litigation, while preserving access to the courts for criminal and habeas matters and allowing future reconsideration upon a showing of inability to pay.

Taken together, the order functions as a cautionary roadmap for litigants and lawyers: finality matters; preclusion doctrines have real bite; extraordinary allegations require extraordinary proof; and repetitive, frivolous litigation can ultimately trigger serious monetary sanctions and broad filing restrictions.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Judge(s)

PerCuriam

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