Fourth Department Recognizes Nonwaivable Appellate Authority to Reduce Sentences in the Interest of Justice, Even After a Valid Appeal Waiver — People v. Hannah T. (2025)

Introduction

In People v. Hannah T., the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, took the rare step of reducing a negotiated sentence from 25 years to a determinate term of 5 years, notwithstanding a valid waiver of the right to appeal executed as part of a plea agreement. The case concerns a 17-year-old defendant who pleaded guilty to first-degree manslaughter for her role in the killing of her mother by a 16-year-old boyfriend. The appeal presented two principal issues: whether the appeal waiver was valid and whether the court could, or should, grant youthful offender status. The Fourth Department affirmed the validity of the appeal waiver and declined to confer youthful offender status. Yet, invoking its interest-of-justice authority, the court modified the sentence based on extraordinary mitigating circumstances, including severe, lifelong abuse and trauma supported by a mitigation report and corroborated history.

The decision establishes a consequential doctrinal point: the Fourth Department can exercise its “constitutionalized” interest-of-justice power to correct a fundamentally unjust sentence even when the defendant has validly waived the right to appeal. The majority articulates a balancing framework that weighs the strong public policy favoring enforcement of appeal waivers against the imperative to correct a fundamental injustice. Two justices dissented, arguing that this approach conflicts with Court of Appeals precedent and established constraints on appellate review.

Summary of the Judgment

The defendant pleaded guilty to Penal Law § 125.20(1) (manslaughter in the first degree) and validly waived her right to appeal.
The appeal waiver foreclosed the defendant’s challenges to the denial of youthful offender (YO) status and her request that the Appellate Division adjudicate her a YO in the interest of justice.
Nonetheless, the Fourth Department held that its interest-of-justice authority cannot be bargained away and may be exercised in extraordinary cases to correct a fundamentally unjust sentence, even where a valid appeal waiver exists.
Applying that power, the court reduced the custodial sentence from 25 years to a determinate term of 5 years, with the five-year period of postrelease supervision unchanged.
The court’s reduction relied on uncontested mitigating evidence: the defendant’s extreme childhood abuse (including years of torture by adoptive parents), clinical diagnoses (including RAD and PTSD), developmental impacts, minor status, the boyfriend’s role as the actual shooter, and the victim’s mother’s plea for leniency.
The court highlighted that the record strongly supported eligibility under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA), although no DVSJA hearing was requested below.
Two justices dissented, contending the majority’s approach conflicts with People v. Lopez and subsequent cases, violates the principle of party presentation, and is unnecessary given available post-judgment remedies.

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

Appeal waivers and their effect

People v. Thomas (34 NY3d 545 [2019]) and People v. Malcolm (231 AD3d 1503 [4th Dept 2024]): The majority affirms that the appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary, consistent with Thomas and similar Fourth Department precedent like Malcolm.
People v. Lopez (6 NY3d 248 [2006]): Lopez states that a valid appeal waiver includes relinquishment of “the right to invoke the Appellate Division’s interest-of-justice jurisdiction to reduce the sentence.” The majority acknowledges this line but emphasizes a distinct point: a plea agreement cannot extinguish the Appellate Division’s inherent, constitutionally rooted power to act in the interest of justice. Lopez itself recognizes that the Appellate Division’s interest-of-justice jurisdiction can only be divested by constitutional amendment and “is not reviewable by the Court of Appeals” on the merits. The majority reads these statements as preserving the court’s independent power, even if a defendant’s own ability to invoke it is waived.
People v. Seaberg (74 NY2d 1 [1989]): Seaberg underlines strong public policy in favor of enforcing appeal waivers, but also that such waivers do not interfere with the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction. The majority leans on the latter proposition to support the nonwaivability of the court’s power, distinguishing between a defendant’s ability to demand review and the court’s authority to act sua sponte.
People v. Callahan (80 NY2d 273 [1992]): Callahan cautions that “in most situations” appellate courts should honor appeal waivers. The majority treats this as an instruction to enforce waivers ordinarily, but not invariably, and thus uses a balancing test to identify rare exceptions.
People v. Jenkins (138 AD3d 102 [1st Dept 2016]): Cited by the majority as part of the broader policy framework favoring the finality of plea bargains and the enforcement of appeal waivers.

Constitutional and structural foundations for the Appellate Division’s power

NY Const, art VI, § 4(k); People v. Pollenz (67 NY2d 264 [1986]); People v. Farrell (85 NY2d 60 [1995]): These authorities emphasize that the Appellate Division’s interest-of-justice jurisdiction is constitutionally grounded and cannot be curtailed by the Legislature.
People v. Thompson (60 NY2d 513 [1983]) and People v. Alvarez (33 NY3d 286 [2019]): Recognize the unique discretionary jurisdiction of the Appellate Division and its nonreviewability by the Court of Appeals on the merits, underscoring that this power is qualitatively distinct.
People v. Miles (173 App Div 179 [3d Dept 1916]) and People v. Brisman (43 NY3d 322 [2025]): The majority quotes Miles for the proposition that the Appellate Division may correct a sentence “unjust in its relation to the crime,” a touchstone for interest-of-justice modifications. Brisman confirms modern vitality of this corrective function.

Balancing public policy against injustice

People v. Rivera (14 NY2d 441 [1964]); People v. Mahboubian (74 NY2d 174 [1989]); People v. De Lucia (20 NY2d 275 [1967]); Maryland v. Craig (497 US 836 [1990]): These decisions illustrate contexts where courts balance competing policies and, where necessary, override a policy preference to avert greater injustice or “inherent prejudice.” The majority analogizes to those balancing frameworks to justify overriding waiver-based finality in the rare, fundamentally unjust case.

Juvenile and adolescent development cases

Roper v. Simmons (543 US 551 [2005]); Graham v. Florida (560 US 48 [2010]); J.D.B. v. North Carolina (564 US 261 [2011]): These U.S. Supreme Court cases recognize diminished culpability and greater vulnerability of juveniles. The majority uses them to contextualize the defendant’s youth and susceptibility, especially in light of trauma and RAD diagnosis, when assessing proportionality and mitigation.

Youthful offender precedents

People v. Pacherille (25 NY3d 1021 [2015]); People v. Allen (174 AD3d 1456 [4th Dept 2019]); People v. Stackhouse (214 AD3d 1303 [4th Dept 2023]); People v. Burch (234 AD3d 1246 [4th Dept 2025]): These cases confirm that a valid appeal waiver forecloses appellate review of discretionary youthful offender determinations.
People v. Cruickshank (105 AD2d 325 [3d Dept 1985], affd sub nom. People v. Dawn Maria C., 67 NY2d 625 [1986]): Sets out factors guiding youthful offender adjudication. The majority references these in explaining why, even under its balancing approach, it declines to confer YO status here.

Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA)

Penal Law § 60.12: The majority stresses the record contains strong evidence supporting all three DVSJA criteria: substantial abuse by a family/household member at the time of the offense; abuse significantly contributed to the offense; and ordinary sentencing would be unduly harsh. Although no DVSJA hearing was requested, the court treats the evidence as highly probative in its interest-of-justice analysis.

Competing views: the dissent’s authorities and cautions

People v. Lopez and progeny: The dissent reads Lopez to mean that when a defendant validly waives the right to appeal, any discretionary disturbance of the negotiated sentence is foreclosed—whether requested by the defendant or undertaken “sua sponte” by the Appellate Division.
People v. Romano (45 AD3d 910 [3d Dept 2007]): The Third Department repudiated its earlier view that sentence review could proceed despite an appeal waiver and interpreted Lopez as precluding such discretionary reductions. The dissent here cites Romano’s majority as aligned with Lopez, and rejects the Romano dissent’s contrary position—the same position the Fourth Department majority now adopts.
People v. Bryant (28 NY3d 1094 [2016]): The Court of Appeals reversed a sentence reduction after holding the appeal waiver valid, without remitting for potential sua sponte reduction. The dissent invokes Bryant as evidence that the Appellate Division lacks the power to reduce a sentence after finding a valid waiver.
Principle of party presentation and fairness: The dissent faults the majority for granting relief the defendant never requested (a sentence reduction as unduly harsh), depriving the People of the chance to oppose, and thereby straying beyond traditionally recognized constraints on appellate adjudication.
Legislative context: The dissent notes proposed legislation (2025 Senate Bill S330; Assembly Bill A322) to authorize appellate sentence review “notwithstanding an otherwise enforceable waiver,” suggesting that current law does not permit what the majority does here absent such legislation.

2) Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Decision

The majority’s reasoning proceeds in three steps. First, it validates the defendant’s appeal waiver under controlling authority. The waiver therefore forecloses her requested relief as to youthful offender status and typical sentence-review arguments. Second, the court distinguishes between a defendant’s waivable right to request interest-of-justice review and the Appellate Division’s independent authority to exercise such power in extraordinary cases. Emphasizing the constitutional and structural independence of this jurisdiction (NY Const art VI, § 4[k]; Pollenz; Thompson; Alvarez), the court states that no plea bargain can extinguish the court’s own power or duty to correct a fundamental injustice. Third, it articulates a balancing test:

Ordinarily, courts honor appeal waivers given strong policy interests in finality and enforcing negotiated agreements (Seaberg; Callahan).
However, “as in most close issues of public policy,” the court must weigh that policy against the risk of perpetuating a sentence that is “fundamentally unjust.”
Where a sentence is fundamentally unjust and other safeguards have failed, the court is compelled to exercise its interest-of-justice power, notwithstanding the validity of the waiver.

Applying that framework, the majority finds this case “the rare” one in which intervention is required. The record powerfully demonstrates extraordinary mitigation: a harrowing history of childhood torture and deprivation, consequent neurodevelopmental impacts, clinical diagnoses (including Reactive Attachment Disorder), and remarkable susceptibility to manipulation. The defendant was a minor, did not fire the fatal shots, and the victim’s mother—also the grandmother—pleaded for leniency. The record would, in the court’s view, have supported DVSJA relief had a hearing been sought. Taken together, these factors render the 25-year determinate sentence “unjust and oppressive in relation to this crime and this defendant,” warranting a reduction to a five-year determinate term while leaving in place the five-year period of postrelease supervision.

Notably, the court declines to extend similar relief to adjudicate youthful offender status. While it acknowledges the same balancing analysis, it concludes YO is inappropriate given statutory factors and the public policy balance in this case.

3) Impact and Prospective Significance

A. A new, explicit balancing test for overriding appeal waivers in sentencing

The decision marks a significant doctrinal development in the Fourth Department: it opens a narrow but real pathway for the Appellate Division to correct “fundamentally unjust” sentences notwithstanding valid appeal waivers. Practically, this means:

Defense counsel may now argue, at least in the Fourth Department, that the court should exercise its inherent interest-of-justice authority to reduce a sentence in extraordinary cases, even if a waiver is valid and enforceable.
Prosecutors must anticipate and address the possibility of such reductions by ensuring that the record supports the proportionality of a negotiated sentence—especially in cases involving juveniles, trauma, or abuse histories.
Trial judges may be prompted to develop fuller records, including consideration of DVSJA eligibility, prior to sentencing in cases with substantial mitigation, to mitigate the risk of later interest-of-justice reductions on appeal.

B. Departmental dissonance and likelihood of further review

The dissent contends that the majority’s approach conflicts with Lopez, Romano (Third Department), and Bryant, raising the possibility of an interdepartmental split. Although the majority notes that the merits of an interest-of-justice reduction are not reviewable by the Court of Appeals, the dissent correctly observes that the legality of the corrective action is reviewable. This case therefore presents a likely vehicle for further clarification by the Court of Appeals on the scope of the Appellate Division’s authority in the face of valid appeal waivers.

C. DVSJA and mitigation-forward sentencing practices

The court’s reliance on DVSJA-analogous mitigation, even without a formal hearing request, signals a heightened sensitivity to trauma-informed sentencing. Counsel should:

Timely seek DVSJA hearings where the record supports the statutory criteria.
Develop comprehensive mitigation records, including expert assessments on the impact of trauma and adolescent development on moral reasoning and susceptibility to influence.
Recognize that failure to request DVSJA relief may give rise to post-conviction claims, an issue the dissent flags as an available safeguard that arguably obviates the need for sua sponte interest-of-justice intervention.

D. Plea bargaining dynamics and finality

Plea bargaining depends on certainty. The dissent warns that allowing appellate sentence reductions despite valid waivers risks undermining confidence in negotiated dispositions. The majority responds that such interventions will be rare—reserved for fundamental injustice—and that the Appellate Division’s constitutional authority cannot be contracted away. Expect litigants to frame the rarity and severity thresholds with care in future cases; the strength of mitigation and injustice must be exceptional to overcome the strong presumption in favor of enforcing waivers.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Waiver of the right to appeal: In New York, many plea deals require defendants to give up their right to challenge the conviction or sentence on appeal. Valid waivers generally bar appellate review of discretionary issues like whether a sentence is “unduly harsh or severe,” but not all claims (e.g., a truly illegal sentence or certain constitutional defects) are waivable.
Interest-of-justice jurisdiction: A unique, constitutionally grounded power of the Appellate Division to modify a sentence it finds unduly harsh or unjust, independent of errors of law. Traditionally robust, this power is said by the Fourth Department here to be nonwaivable by the parties, though ordinarily not exercised after a valid waiver. The legality of using this power is reviewable by the Court of Appeals; the merits of its discretionary application generally are not.
Sua sponte: Latin for “on its own.” The court acts without being asked by a party. The dissent argues that, practically, a reduction granted on a defendant’s appeal is not truly sua sponte if the issue was not briefed; the majority nonetheless treats the action as an exercise of its independent authority.
Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA): A statute permitting reduced sentences where the defendant was a victim of domestic violence, the abuse significantly contributed to the offense, and a normal sentence would be unduly harsh, considering the defendant’s history and condition. It typically requires a hearing and record development.
Youthful offender (YO) status: A discretionary adjudication that can replace a criminal conviction for eligible young defendants with a noncriminal status, often resulting in sealed records and reduced penalties. YO determinations are typically unreviewable on appeal after a valid waiver of appeal.
Determinate sentence and PRS: A determinate sentence is a fixed term of incarceration. Postrelease supervision (PRS) is a defined period of supervision following release from prison.
Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD): A serious psychological condition emerging from early severe abuse or neglect that impairs the ability to form stable attachments and can increase susceptibility to manipulation. The court credited RAD and related trauma as significant mitigation.
Principle of party presentation: Appellate courts ordinarily decide cases based on the issues and arguments the parties actually raise, not on issues raised by the court itself. The dissent relies on this principle to criticize the majority’s reduction where the defendant did not request sentence reduction as unduly harsh.

Key Takeaways

New rule in the Fourth Department: The Appellate Division may reduce a sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice even after affirming a valid appeal waiver, but only in rare cases where the sentence is fundamentally unjust and other safeguards have failed.
Strong mitigation can justify extraordinary relief: Documented, severe childhood abuse, adolescent vulnerability, mental health diagnoses, non-shooter status, and family pleas for leniency collectively drove the sentence reduction to five years.
Youthful offender remains distinct: Even as the court exercised its modifying power on the sentence, it did not extend that logic to adjudicate youthful offender status.
Expect further litigation: The dissent’s reliance on Lopez, Romano, and Bryant foreshadows potential further review on the legality of exercising this power post-waiver and possible interdepartmental divergence.
Practice pointers: Defense counsel should proactively seek DVSJA hearings where appropriate and fully develop mitigation; prosecutors and courts should build sentencing records that grapple with trauma and adolescent considerations to sustain negotiated sentences.

Conclusion

People v. Hannah T. stakes out a consequential position in New York appellate practice: that the Fourth Department’s interest-of-justice authority to correct a fundamentally unjust sentence persists even after a valid appeal waiver, though its exercise should remain exceptional. The court’s structured balancing approach—honor waivers in most cases, but intervene when justice so requires—reorients the interaction between plea-bargained finality and appellate oversight in cases of extraordinary mitigation.

While the majority grounds its holding in the constitutional independence of the Appellate Division’s power and the imperative to avoid “inherent prejudice,” the dissent warns of conflict with Lopez and a departure from settled constraints like party presentation. The decision’s immediate legacy is a dramatically reduced sentence for a traumatized adolescent whose case would have supported DVSJA relief; its broader significance will likely be tested in future appeals and potentially at the Court of Appeals. For now, the Fourth Department has articulated a clear principle: the court’s constitutional duty to remedy a fundamental sentencing injustice is not something the parties can bargain away.

Note: This commentary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.