Fourth Circuit: No Interlocutory Jurisdiction Over Qualified-Immunity Appeals Turning on Disputed Facts (Autopsy Evidence Can Create a “Genuine” Dispute)

1. Introduction

This published Fourth Circuit decision arises from the fatal shooting of Adrian Roberts, a military veteran experiencing severe mental-health distress, during execution of an involuntary commitment order at his home. Sabara Fisher Roberts—individually and as administrator of Adrian’s estate—brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourth Amendment violations, including excessive force, against Deputy Justin Evans.

The litigation pivoted on a stark factual disagreement: Sabara alleged Adrian’s back was turned when Evans fired; Evans asserted Adrian charged officers with a machete, necessitating deadly force. The district court denied qualified immunity and summary judgment on the excessive-force claim due to disputes of material fact—especially in light of the autopsy report indicating gunshot wounds to Adrian’s upper left back and arm.

The key appellate issue was not whether the force was lawful, but whether the Fourth Circuit had interlocutory jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity at the summary-judgment stage when the denial rested on disputed facts.

2. Summary of the Opinion

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The court’s jurisdictional analysis is built from a line of Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit cases delimiting interlocutory review of qualified-immunity denials.

• Halcomb v. Ravenell — Cited for the general proposition that denials of qualified immunity on summary judgment are ordinarily reviewed de novo under the same standards as the district court. The citation sets the baseline before the court turns to the jurisdictional limitation unique to interlocutory posture.
• Ortiz v. Jordan (quoting Johnson v. Jones) — The controlling Supreme Court framework. Ortiz emphasizes that interlocutory jurisdiction exists only for a “purely legal issue,” and Johnson bars interlocutory review when the district court’s order rests on the existence of genuine fact disputes. The Fourth Circuit uses these cases to demarcate what it may and may not decide at this stage.
• Pegg v. Herrnberger — Provides a circuit articulation: jurisdiction exists over an argument that there is no violation of clearly established law when accepting the facts as the district court viewed them; no jurisdiction exists over an argument that the plaintiff lacks enough evidence to prove their factual version occurred.
• Hensley ex rel. N.C. v. Price — Reinforces that the appellate court cannot credit the defendant’s evidence, weigh competing proof, or resolve factual disputes in the defendant’s favor on interlocutory review.
• Hicks v. Ferreyra — Used twice to underscore a practical point: even if the court of appeals would assess the record differently, it cannot re-evaluate factual disputes in this posture. The Fourth Circuit characterizes Evans’s appeal as precisely the kind of attempt to “correct the district court’s view of the evidence” that Hicks disallows.
• Iko v. Shreve — Supplies the method: the appellate court must “carefully consider” the district court’s order to identify the basis for decision. Applying Iko, the panel finds the denial was expressly grounded in genuine disputes of material fact.
• Stanton v. Elliott — Plays a dual role. First, it provides the “clearly established” benchmark assumed by the district court: shooting an unarmed person in the back while retreating/running away violates clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Second, it supports the evidentiary point that back-wound evidence can call an officer’s account into question and preclude qualified immunity at summary judgment. The panel uses Stanton to validate the district court’s conclusion that the autopsy evidence creates a jury question.
• Scott v. Harris — Invoked for the “genuine dispute” limitation: courts view facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant only when there is a genuine dispute; where objective evidence “blatantly contradict[s]” a party’s version, no genuine issue exists. The Fourth Circuit distinguishes Scott because this case lacks video or equivalent objective proof that conclusively negates Sabara’s account.
• Elliott v. Leavitt — Cited for the proposition that interlocutory jurisdiction may exist where the asserted fact disputes are not genuinely supported by evidence. The Fourth Circuit distinguishes Leavitt because there the plaintiffs offered speculation without evidence contradicting officer testimony; here, the autopsy report constitutes material evidence supporting Sabara’s version.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The opinion is a disciplined jurisdictional decision: it does not decide whether Evans used excessive force, nor whether qualified immunity should ultimately apply. Instead, it enforces the separation between (i) appealable legal questions and (ii) unappealable factual disputes at the summary-judgment stage.

The panel identifies the district court’s explicit basis: genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether Adrian posed an immediate threat or was resisting, and whether he was shot while unarmed/retreating. The court singles out the autopsy report—shots to the upper left back and arm—as evidence that “conflict[ed]” with Evans’s charging-with-a-machete narrative, at least enough to create a jury question.

From there, the Fourth Circuit frames Evans’s appeal as non-jurisdictional because it seeks fact review: Evans argued deadly force was reasonable because Adrian charged with a machete, but that is exactly the disputed fact the district court held must be resolved at trial. The court refuses to “credit” Evans’s version, “weigh” officer testimony against the autopsy, or re-decide the “genuineness” of disputes except under the narrow Scott v. Harris exception.

Addressing that exception, the panel explains why the disputes are “genuine”: unlike Scott, there is no video “blatantly” contradicting the plaintiff’s version; and unlike Elliott v. Leavitt, Sabara’s position is not speculation untethered to evidence. Even if “far from overwhelming,” the autopsy report is material evidence permitting a reasonable jury to infer Adrian was facing away/retreating when shot—making the district court’s fact-bound denial unreviewable now.

3.3 Impact

Although formally “just” a jurisdictional dismissal, the decision has meaningful practical effects in Fourth Amendment and qualified-immunity litigation, especially officer-involved shootings.

• Reinforces strict limits on interlocutory qualified-immunity appeals. Defendants cannot convert a fact dispute into an appealable legal question by arguing the district court misread the record. Appeals that hinge on “what happened” rather than “what law applies to the assumed facts” face dismissal.
• Underscores the evidentiary significance of autopsy/pathology in deadly-force cases. The panel treats autopsy findings as potentially sufficient “contradictory evidence” to prevent summary judgment where the only surviving witnesses are officers. This complements the caution expressed in Stanton v. Elliott against accepting self-serving officer accounts when the decedent cannot testify.
• Shapes litigation strategy and record development. Plaintiffs may rely on forensic evidence to establish “genuine” disputes; defendants seeking interlocutory review will need objective evidence akin to Scott v. Harris (e.g., video) to argue no reasonable jury could credit the plaintiff’s version.
• Maintains the jury’s role in credibility disputes. The decision preserves the allocation of functions: appellate courts decide law; juries (and trial courts at trial/post-trial stages) resolve contested facts and credibility.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified immunity: A doctrine that can shield government officials from damages liability unless (1) they violated a constitutional right and (2) the right was “clearly established” at the time. It is often litigated at summary judgment.
• Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling where the court may decide a claim without a trial only if there is no “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
• Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before final judgment. Denials of qualified immunity can sometimes be appealed immediately—but only on legal questions, not fact disputes.
• “Purely legal issue” (for interlocutory review): Whether, taking the plaintiff-favorable facts as assumed by the district court, the law clearly establishes a constitutional violation. It does not include arguments that the plaintiff’s evidence is weak, or that the district court should have believed the defendant’s version.
• “Genuine” factual dispute: A dispute supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could decide the fact either way. Under Scott v. Harris, a dispute is not “genuine” if objective evidence so decisively contradicts one side that no reasonable jury could believe it.
• Clearly established rights in this context: The opinion references circuit law (via Stanton v. Elliott) that shooting an unarmed person in the back while retreating/running away violates clearly established Fourth Amendment protections.

5. Conclusion

Sabara Fisher Roberts v. Deputy J. Evans cements a procedural but consequential principle: when a district court denies qualified immunity because the excessive-force claim turns on genuinely disputed facts—here, whether the decedent charged with a machete or was shot in the back while unarmed/retreating—the Fourth Circuit lacks interlocutory jurisdiction to review that denial. The decision also highlights that forensic evidence such as an autopsy report can be enough to create a genuine dispute even against multiple officers’ accounts, thereby preserving the jury’s role in resolving contested narratives in deadly-force cases.