Fourth Circuit: Cumulative Punishment Under § 5861(d) and § 922(o) for the Same Machinegun Possession Violates Double Jeopardy

Introduction

In United States v. Patrick Tate Adamiak, No. 23-4451 (4th Cir. Oct. 14, 2025) (unpublished), a Fourth Circuit panel (Judges Agee, Richardson, and Berner) affirmed most of a multi-count conviction arising from the possession, receipt, and transfer of prohibited firearms and destructive devices, but held that the imposition of cumulative convictions and consecutive sentences for violating both 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (possession/receipt of an unregistered firearm) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (possession/transfer of a machinegun) based on the same conduct violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court remanded with instructions to vacate one of the two overlapping convictions and to resentence.

The case grew out of a federal investigation that uncovered, among other items, a PPSH machinegun, an M79 40mm grenade launcher, an M203 40mm grenade launcher, and two RPG-7 variant recoilless antitank projectors. A jury convicted Adamiak of:

Receiving and possessing an unregistered firearm (26 U.S.C. § 5861(d));
Possessing and transferring a machinegun (18 U.S.C. § 922(o)); and
Three counts of receiving and possessing unregistered destructive devices (26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)).

On appeal, Adamiak raised multiple challenges: (1) Double Jeopardy, (2) adequacy of the indictment, (3) sufficiency of the evidence, (4) jury-instruction error, (5) sentencing error, (6) Second Amendment invalidity, and (7) unconstitutional vagueness of the statutes. Only his Double Jeopardy claim succeeded.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit held:

Double Jeopardy: The convictions and consecutive sentences for both § 5861(d) and § 922(o) (as charged and proved here) constitutionally duplicate the same “offense,” because the jury could convict on the same facts—knowing possession of a machinegun—without any additional element unique to § 922(o). Absent clear congressional authorization for cumulative punishment, one conviction must be vacated. The case is remanded to vacate either Count One (§ 5861(d)) or Count Two (§ 922(o)) and to resentence accordingly.
Indictment: Adequate. It tracked statutory elements and identified the specific items forming the basis of each count, satisfying notice and double jeopardy purposes. It did not need to specify which sub-definition of “machinegun” or “destructive device” applied.
Jury Question: Properly submitted. Whether an item qualifies as a “machinegun” or a “destructive device,” given the statutory definitions, was an ultimate issue for the jury to decide by applying the court’s instructions to the facts.
Sufficiency: The evidence, including law enforcement testimony, a cooperating informant, a firearms retailer, and expert witnesses, permitted a rational jury to find each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jury Instructions: Accurate statements of law.
Second Amendment: Foreclosed by circuit precedent, notably Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024).
Vagueness: The relevant statutes are not unconstitutionally vague.
Sentencing: No error, subject to the vacatur and resentencing required by the Double Jeopardy ruling.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Blockburger v. United States doctrine: The panel applied the “same-elements” test articulated through modern Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit formulations. See:
- United States v. Whitley, 105 F.4th 672, 677–78 (4th Cir. 2024) (reaffirming Blockburger; offenses are the “same” if one does not require proof of a fact the other does);
- Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977) (lesser-included offense principle);
- Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366–67 (1983) and Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691–93 (1980) (cumulative sentences require clear congressional authorization);
- Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498–99 (1984) (Double Jeopardy’s multiple-punishments protection tracks legislative intent on the unit of punishment).
These cases framed the dispositive Double Jeopardy analysis and the remedy.
United States v. Kuzma, 967 F.3d 959, 977 (9th Cir. 2020): Cited for concluding that, as charged, § 922(o) and § 5861(d) can overlap such that one does not require proof of a fact the other does. The Fourth Circuit aligned with Kuzma in finding multiplicity here.
Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864 (1985): Provided the remedial rule. Where multiple convictions represent the same offense, the district court must vacate one of them, not simply impose concurrent sentences. The panel remanded with instructions to vacate either Count One or Count Two and resentence.
Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994): Established that the government must prove the defendant knew the characteristics that bring a weapon within the statute (e.g., that it is a “machinegun” or an NFA “firearm”). The panel relied on Staples to state the mens rea needed under both § 5861(d) and § 922(o).
Indictment sufficiency and notice:
- Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117–18 (1974): Indictments may track statutory language if accompanied by sufficient factual detail;
- United States v. Barringer, 25 F.4th 239, 246–47 (4th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Perry, 757 F.3d 166, 171 (4th Cir. 2014): Recited the governing standard;
- United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 109–10 (2007): No hyper-technical detail is required beyond informing the accused of the nature of the charge.
The panel used these to reject the indictment challenge.
Bill of particulars: United States v. Powers, 40 F.4th 129, 136 (4th Cir. 2022) (defendants may seek particulars for more evidentiary detail). The court noted this optional route was not pursued.
Jury’s constitutional role:
- United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995) and United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 2014): The jury must apply the law to the facts and reach the ultimate conclusion of guilt;
- United States v. Lindberg, 39 F.4th 151, 160 (4th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds: Clarifying division of labor between judge (law) and jury (facts and application).
These authorities supported submitting the “classification” questions (machinegun/destructive device) to the jury under proper instructions.
Sufficiency of the evidence:
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) and Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 654 (2012): The rational-juror standard; deference to jury verdicts absent a clear failure of proof;
- United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010), Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978), United States v. Madrigal-Valadez, 561 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 2009): Reinforcing the high bar for reversal on sufficiency grounds.
Second Amendment landscape: Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438, 453 (4th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 704 (4th Cir. 2024): The panel treated these as foreclosing the Second Amendment challenges to the machinegun/destructive device prohibitions at issue.

Legal Reasoning

1) Double Jeopardy and the Blockburger Test

The Double Jeopardy Clause shields defendants from multiple punishments for the same offense unless Congress clearly authorizes cumulative penalties. Applying Blockburger (as articulated in Whitley), the panel examined the “as charged” elements and proof in Counts One and Two. The government conceded, and the court agreed, that the jury could convict for both § 5861(d) and § 922(o) based on identical facts—knowing possession of a machinegun—without any additional fact necessary to establish the § 922(o) violation beyond what was needed for § 5861(d). Relying on Ninth Circuit precedent in Kuzma, the panel concluded these counts were the “same offense” for Double Jeopardy purposes on the record here.

Critically, the court emphasized the absence of any clear legislative authorization for cumulative punishment across these two statutes. Under Missouri v. Hunter and Whalen, this silence defeats multiple-punishment outcomes when the offenses collapse under Blockburger. Consequently, under Ball, one of the two convictions must be vacated to cure the constitutional violation. The panel remanded with instructions to vacate either Count One or Count Two and to resentence “in a manner consistent with this opinion.”

Practice note: The court’s reasoning turns on the overlap “as charged.” If prosecutors distinguish counts by separate acts (e.g., different weapons, different occasions, or a transfer distinct from possession) or elements that truly require proof of a different fact, the multiplicity problem may be avoided. But where both counts rest on the same machinegun possession and proof tracks identical facts, stacking § 5861(d) and § 922(o) risks a Double Jeopardy violation.

2) Indictment Adequacy

The indictment tracked statutory elements for § 5861(d) and § 922(o), and it specifically identified the weapons forming the basis for each count (the PPSH machinegun for Counts One and Two; the M79, M203, and RPG-7 variants for Counts Three through Five). That level of detail sufficed to:

Notify the defendant of the charges to prepare a defense, and
Enable pleading double jeopardy in a future prosecution for the same offenses.

The panel rejected the argument that the indictment was defective because it did not specify which statutory definition of “machinegun” or “destructive device” applied. No authority requires that granularity at the indictment stage, particularly where the indictment invokes the statutes and identifies the specific items at issue. If finer evidentiary particulars were needed, the proper vehicle would have been a bill of particulars—an option the defense did not pursue.

3) Jury’s Role in Classifying the Weapons

The district court correctly allowed the jury to decide whether the seized items met the statutory definitions of “machinegun” and “destructive device.” The judge’s role is to instruct on the legal definitions; the jury’s role is to determine facts and apply the law, as Gaudin underscores. The panel found no error in giving this ultimate-issue determination to the jury, given proper instructions and evidentiary support.

4) Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury Instructions

The evidence—agent testimony, a cooperating informant, a firearms retailer’s testimony, and expert opinions—was adequate for a rational trier of fact to find each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that the jury instructions were accurate statements of the governing law, including the mens rea requirement from Staples (knowledge of a weapon’s characteristics that bring it within the statute).

5) Second Amendment and Vagueness Challenges

The panel deemed the Second Amendment challenge “squarely foreclosed” by Fourth Circuit precedent (Bianchi and Hunt). It also rejected vagueness attacks on § 5861(d) and § 922(o), concluding the statutes provide sufficient notice and do not invite arbitrary enforcement.

6) Sentencing

The court found no procedural or substantive error in the district court’s sentencing determinations, apart from the necessity to remove one conviction under the Double Jeopardy holding and to resentence accordingly.

Impact and Practical Implications

Charging Strategy: Within the Fourth Circuit, even though this opinion is unpublished and thus nonbinding, it persuasively cautions against stacking § 5861(d) and § 922(o) counts when both rest on the same act of possessing the same machinegun. Prosecutors seeking multiple counts should ensure that each count requires proof of a different fact—e.g., separate weapons, distinct temporal episodes, or a transfer event separate from mere possession.
Trial Practice: The opinion reaffirms that classification questions (machinegun/destructive device) are properly jury issues, highlighting the importance of expert testimony and clear jury instructions that track statutory definitions.
Indictments: The court confirms that indictments may track statutory language and identify the specific items, without pleading sub-definitional theories. Defense counsel desiring more detail should use a bill of particulars rather than expect dismissal for lack of specificity.
Second Amendment Litigation: Post-Bruen challenges to categorical prohibitions on machineguns and destructive devices remain foreclosed in the Fourth Circuit by Bianchi and Hunt. Litigants should anticipate that such claims will not prevail at the panel level.
Remedies for Multiplicity: Under Ball, the remedy is vacatur of one conviction—not merely concurrent sentencing. District courts should remove the duplicative conviction and then resentence on the remaining counts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Double Jeopardy—Multiple Punishments: The Constitution bars punishing a person twice for the “same offense.” Courts use Blockburger’s “same-elements” test: if each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not, they are different offenses. If not, they are the same offense, and cumulative punishment is barred unless Congress clearly says otherwise.
Multiplicity: Charging the same offense in multiple counts. When multiplicity results in multiple convictions for the same offense, one conviction must be vacated.
§ 5861(d) (NFA): Prohibits receiving or possessing an NFA “firearm” (which includes machineguns and destructive devices) that is not registered to the defendant. The government must prove the defendant knew the weapon had the characteristics that bring it within the NFA (Staples).
§ 922(o) (GCA): Prohibits possession or transfer of a “machinegun.” The government must prove knowledge of the features that make the weapon a machinegun (Staples).
Indictment Sufficiency: An indictment generally suffices if it tracks statutory language, lists essential elements, and includes enough facts (like identifying the specific weapon) to inform the defendant and allow a future double jeopardy plea if needed.
Jury vs. Judge: The judge instructs on the law; the jury finds the facts and applies those legal definitions to decide guilt—e.g., whether a particular object, as a matter of fact, meets the statutory definition the judge has given.

Conclusion

United States v. Adamiak establishes, in an unpublished but carefully reasoned decision, that cumulative convictions under § 5861(d) and § 922(o) for the same machinegun possession violate the Double Jeopardy Clause absent clear congressional authorization for multiple punishments. The remedy is to vacate one conviction and resentence. Beyond the double jeopardy holding, the opinion provides useful guidance: indictments need not plead sub-definitional theories so long as they track statutory elements and identify the items at issue; classification of weapons under federal firearms statutes is a jury question guided by proper instructions; and post-Bruen Second Amendment challenges to machinegun and destructive-device prohibitions remain foreclosed in this circuit.

Practically, the decision will influence charging decisions and trial strategies in federal firearms cases within the Fourth Circuit. Prosecutors should take care to avoid multiplicity when charging overlapping firearms offenses based on identical conduct, while defense counsel should vigilantly preserve multiplicity objections and consider pretrial motions to clarify the factual bases for each count. The panel’s thorough treatment underscores a fundamental constitutional limit: when two statutes collapse to the same offense on the facts charged and proved, courts must not impose cumulative punishments.