Fourth Circuit Confirms Dual Appellate Paths Under CAFA: Remand Orders Appealable as-of-Right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291

Introduction

In Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. v. Goldberg, Nos. 24-141 et al. (4th Cir. Aug. 1, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted a recurring procedural dilemma in Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) litigation: when a district court remands a putative class action to state court under CAFA’s local-controversy exception, must an aggrieved defendant seek review exclusively through a time-compressed petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c), or may it instead (or also) file a conventional notice of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291?

The question arose after Baltimore residents sued two companies—Television Tower, Inc. (“TTI,” a Maryland corporation) and Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. (“Skyline,” a Colorado corporation)—alleging that hydro-blasting a 1,300-foot TV tower showered their neighborhood with toxic lead paint chips. Defendants removed under CAFA; the district court remanded under the local-controversy exception; and defendants filed both § 1453(c) petitions and § 1291 notices of appeal.

Judge Wynn, writing for a unanimous panel, issued a published opinion that:

(1) holds § 1291 provides an independent, non-exclusive avenue to obtain appellate review of remand orders premised on CAFA exceptions,
(2) dismisses the § 1453(c) petitions as unnecessary, and
(3) affirms the remand, elaborating the evidentiary burden and interpretive methodology for the local-controversy exception.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit adopted the majority view of the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits that § 1453(c) is permissive, not exclusive; therefore, § 1291 appeals are allowed so long as 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)’s bar does not apply. Because a remand under the local-controversy exception is not based on subject-matter-jurisdiction loss or a procedural defect within § 1447(c), § 1447(d) does not preclude review.

On the merits, the court upheld the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs satisfied the four-element local-controversy exception:

In-state citizenship > two-thirds: property-owner residency data from Maryland’s tax database created a rebuttable presumption of Maryland citizenship easily exceeding 80% of the class.
Significant local defendant: TTI, a Maryland citizen, was a “primary focus”—its own negligence and oversight formed a “significant basis” for liability and “significant relief” was sought from it.
Principal injuries in Maryland: lead contamination occurred entirely within Baltimore.
No similar class action in last three years: uncontested.

Thus, remand was mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976) – limited § 1447(d) immunity to orders invoking § 1447(c) grounds; foundation for allowing § 1291 review when remand is “extra-statutory.”
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995) & Quackenbush v. Allstate, 517 U.S. 706 (1996) – reaffirmed Thermtron narrow reading; Congress legislated CAFA against this interpretive backdrop.
Hinson v. Norwest Financial S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2001) – earlier Fourth Circuit precedent recognizing § 1291 appeals of remand orders outside § 1447(c).
Cheapside Minerals, Ltd. v. Devon Energy, 94 F.4th 492 (5th Cir. 2024); Jacks v. Meridian Res., 701 F.3d 1224 (8th Cir. 2012); Simring v. GreenSky, 29 F.4th 1262 (11th Cir. 2022) – each held § 1453(c) non-exclusive, reinforcing the court’s conclusion.
Quicken Loans Inc. v. Alig, 737 F.3d 960 (4th Cir. 2013) – supplied earlier guidance on “at least one defendant” language, which the panel extends here.
Numerous circuit cases (e.g., Mason v. LAN, 842 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2016)) on citizenship presumptions and evidentiary burdens shaped the court’s articulation of a rebuttable residency–citizenship presumption.

Legal Reasoning

a. Jurisdictional Gateway

1. § 1447(c)/(d) interaction: A CAFA local-controversy remand is not for lack of jurisdiction or removal defect; therefore § 1447(d) does not bar appeal.
2. § 1453(c) text: Provides an additional, not exclusive, avenue; nothing explicitly displaces § 1291.
3. Statutory harmony: § 1453(c) covers denials of remand and remands barred by § 1447(d); § 1291 covers final remand orders falling outside § 1447(d)’s scope. The statutes are complementary.

b. Local-Controversy Application

Citizenship > 2/3:
- Paralegal affidavit collected 2,785 properties within 4,000-ft radius; data showed ≥ 84% owners list property as “principal residence.”
- Court adopted nationwide consensus: evidence of residency creates rebuttable presumption of domicile; defendants produced no contradictory proof.
“At least one” significant local defendant:
- TTI’s ownership, permit omissions, and hiring decisions central; liability plausibly equal to or exceeding Skyline’s; “significant” ≠ “most significant.”
- Court followed comparative approach from Kaufman; rejected “plus-factor” / superlative tests.
Principal injuries & no prior similar action: undisputed.

Impact of the Decision

Appellate Strategy: Defendants can now rely on a 30- or 60-day notice of appeal under § 1291 rather than the 10-day § 1453(c) petition timeframe in the Fourth Circuit; practitioners may still file both to hedge.
Judicial Efficiency: Removes the 60-day merits-disposition clock of § 1453 for many cases, reducing pressure on circuit dockets.
Burden of Proof Clarified: Plaintiff bears preponderance burden to prove CAFA exceptions; residency creates rebuttable citizenship presumption—lowering evidentiary bar and easing remand in genuinely local disputes.
Substantive Environmental Torts: Reinforces that local property contamination cases against an in-state owner are paradigmatic “local controversies.”
Precedential Reach: Aligns Fourth Circuit with majority view; isolates Tenth Circuit’s unpublished contrary dicta (Reece) and nudges national uniformity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CAFA (28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)) – Expands federal diversity jurisdiction to large, minimally diverse class actions; yet includes exceptions returning “local” disputes to state courts.
Local-Controversy Exception (§ 1332(d)(4)(A)) – Mandatory remand when (i) > 2/3 plaintiffs are local citizens, (ii) at least one significant local defendant, (iii) principal injuries local, (iv) no similar recent class action.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 – General statute giving courts of appeals jurisdiction over “final decisions” of district courts; a remand order ends federal proceedings and is “final” if not barred by § 1447(d).
28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) – CAFA-specific provision allowing discretionary appellate review of remand orders via petition within 10 days; includes 60-day decision clock.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) – Broadly bars appeals of remand orders, but only when the order relies on § 1447(c) grounds (subject-matter jurisdiction or removal defects).
Preponderance of the Evidence – More likely than not (>50%); default civil standard applied to both removal jurisdiction and CAFA exceptions.
Residency vs. Citizenship – Residency = where one lives; Citizenship/Domicile = residence + intent to remain indefinitely. Court allows residency to presumptively establish citizenship in CAFA exception context.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s opinion provides a clear blueprint for navigating the procedural thicket surrounding CAFA remand orders. By confirming that § 1291 remains a viable—indeed ordinary—route for appellate review when a remand rests on CAFA’s abstention-type exceptions, the court removes doubt, harmonizes with sister circuits, and supplies litigants with greater time and flexibility.

Simultaneously, its thorough treatment of the local-controversy exception lowers unnecessary evidentiary hurdles, ensuring that communities harmed by truly local environmental or consumer wrongs can litigate in their home forums. The judgment therefore advances CAFA’s dual objectives: federal fora for nationwide class actions and state fora for truly local disputes, all while maintaining coherent, predictable appellate procedures.