United States v. Richard Smith, Jr.: Non-Retroactive § 924(c) Reform as an “Extraordinary and Compelling Reason”
Fourth Circuit, July 7 2025

Introduction

In United States v. Richard Smith, Jr. (4th Cir. 2025), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court’s denial of compassionate release and remanded with instructions to grant the motion. Although unpublished, the opinion is significant because it squarely holds that the dramatic sentence disparity created by the First Step Act’s elimination of “stacked” mandatory minimums under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) can constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), even though Congress declined to make the amendment retroactive.

The decision also delineates how district courts must weigh the § 3553(a) factors after finding extraordinary and compelling reasons, emphasizing that advanced age, serious medical conditions, robust rehabilitation, and low recidivism risk may collectively outweigh the punitive interests underpinning the original sentence.

Summary of the Judgment

• The panel (Judges Wilkinson, Gregory, and Benjamin) held that the district court abused its discretion by denying Smith’s compassionate-release motion.
• The Government conceded that Smith’s circumstances—including the 18-year sentencing disparity following the First Step Act—were “extraordinary and compelling.”
• The Fourth Circuit found the district court erred in applying the § 3553(a) factors, misappreciating Smith’s negligible recidivism risk, the deterrent value of the 25 years already served, and the weight of the sentencing disparity.
• The case was reversed and remanded with instructions to grant compassionate release, ordering Smith’s immediate eligibility for a reduced sentence.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The opinion weaves together existing Fourth Circuit authority and Supreme Court guidance:

• United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) – Highlighted the mandatory nature of the Guidelines at Smith’s original sentencing.
• United States v. Moody, 115 F.4th 304 (4th Cir. 2024) – Restated the compassionate-release framework and standard of review.
• United States v. Malone, 57 F.4th 167 (4th Cir. 2023) – Clarified that a district court abuses discretion if it fails to recognize when § 3553(a) factors “clearly favor release.”
• United States v. Davis, 99 F.4th 647 (4th Cir. 2024) – Confirmed that district courts need not address every argument but must give an adequate explanation.
• United States v. Brown, 78 F.4th 122 (4th Cir. 2014)
• United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468 (4th Cir. 2007)

Unlike earlier cases, Smith directly addresses the weight to be given a non-retroactive change in § 924(c) law when evaluating compassionate release—an issue on which circuits have diverged. The Fourth Circuit now places itself among those permitting the disparity to qualify as an “extraordinary and compelling” circumstance.

2. Legal Reasoning

• Step One – Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons. The court accepted, and the Government conceded, that the abolition of § 924(c) “stacking,” together with Smith’s age, deteriorating health (black lung disease, COPD, emphysema, heart arrhythmia), and exemplary prison record, satisfied § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
• Step Two – § 3553(a) Factors.
  • Recidivism & Public Safety ( § 3553(a)(2)(C) ). At 71, with multiple chronic illnesses and a low-security classification, Smith posed “exceedingly low” risk. The district court failed to articulate why further incarceration was necessary for public protection.
  • Deterrence ( § 3553(a)(2)(B) ). Serving nearly 25 years (of an effective 42-year sentence) sufficed to deter both Smith and others; an additional 18-year stacked term was not essential.
  • Just Punishment & Respect for Law ( § 3553(a)(2)(A) ). The panel found the district court under-considered rehabilitation (dozens of vocational courses, two minor infractions) and over-relied on outdated drug-quantity calculations that the Government itself had abandoned in earlier proceedings.
  • Sentencing Disparity ( § 3553(a)(6) ). The court emphasized that Smith’s 504-month sentence is now an outlier. A contemporary defendant with identical conduct would face 18 years less in mandatory incarceration because the second § 924(c) conviction would carry 84, not 300, months.
• Standard of Review. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the panel held the district court relied on erroneous premises and failed to give a satisfactory, non-conclusory explanation, thus mandating reversal.

3. Impact of the Judgment

While unpublished, Smith is poised to exert considerable persuasive authority:

• Confirms within the Fourth Circuit that non-retroactive § 924(c) “anti-stacking” changes may tip the scale toward compassionate release.
• Sets a practical benchmark: 25 years served + advanced age + severe health conditions may render continued incarceration unwarranted for serious drug/firearm offenders.
• Signals that perfunctory or conclusory treatment of § 3553(a) factors will not survive appellate scrutiny where the balance is unmistakably in the defendant’s favor.
• May influence district courts nationwide in treating First Step Act disparities as compelling, narrowing the split among circuits.
• Provides guidance for incarcerated persons whose sentences were driven by pre-2018 stacked § 924(c) counts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Compassionate Release (§ 3582(c)(1)(A)). A statutory “safety-valve” that allows a court to reduce an already-imposed sentence if (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist, (2) any Sentencing Commission policy statement is satisfied, and (3) the § 3553(a) factors support release.
• § 924(c) Stacking. Prior to the First Step Act (2018), multiple firearm counts in a single indictment triggered consecutively increasing mandatory minimums—e.g., 84 months for the first count, 300 months for the second. The Act abolished this “stacking” in the same proceeding, capping each count at 84 months unless the defendant had a prior § 924(c) conviction.
• Abuse of Discretion. An appellate standard requiring reversal when a lower court (a) misapplies legal principles, (b) relies on clearly erroneous facts, or (c) delivers an implausible or inadequate rationale.
• § 3553(a) Factors. A list of considerations, such as deterrence, public safety, and sentencing parity, that guide judges in imposing or reducing sentences.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Richard Smith, Jr. crystallizes an important principle: sentencing disparities produced by the First Step Act’s non-retroactive reforms can, coupled with age, health, and rehabilitation, furnish a compelling basis for compassionate release. By faulting the district court’s cursory evaluation of the § 3553(a) factors and underscoring the diminished necessity of continued incarceration, the panel provides a roadmap for both practitioners and judges. Going forward, defendants serving pre-2018 stacked § 924(c) sentences within the Fourth Circuit—and perhaps beyond—have a stronger precedential foothold from which to seek relief, while district courts have clearer guidance on how to balance public-safety concerns against profound sentencing inequities.