Fourth Circuit Clarifies Enforceability of Appeal-Waivers after § 924(c) Vacatur: A Commentary on United States v. Stanislav Yelizarov (2025)

1. Introduction

In United States v. Stanislav Yelizarov, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit confronted a procedurally tangled record stretching over a decade and addressed two central issues: (1) whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, and (2) whether his 30-year sentence—re-imposed after the court vacated a defective § 924(c) conviction—was procedurally or substantively unreasonable.

The appeal presented the Court with an opportunity to articulate the extent to which (i) post-conviction vacatur of a § 924(c) count affects a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) (Type-C) plea agreement, and (ii) a defendant’s waiver of appellate rights remains enforceable when the predicates for a § 924(c) charge are subsequently invalidated. Judge John A. Gibney Jr., writing for a unanimous panel, affirmed the district court’s denial of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and dismissed the sentencing challenge as barred by a valid appeal-waiver.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Ineffective Assistance Claim: The Court applied Strickland and concluded that—even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient—Yelizarov failed to prove prejudice. Contemporaneous evidence showed he would have accepted the plea regardless of any alleged misadvice about a potential 2009 murder charge.
Appeal-Waiver Enforcement: The panel enforced the waiver because (a) it was entered knowingly and voluntarily during a detailed Rule 11 colloquy, (b) it expressly covered challenges to the length and reasonableness of the agreed-upon 360-month sentence, and (c) no “miscarriage of justice” exception applied after the court had already vacated the § 924(c) count and resentenced in accordance with the original Type-C agreement.
Procedural / Substantive Reasonableness: In dicta, the panel emphasized that a sentencing court need not “robotically tick through” every § 3553(a) factor; failure to mention sentencing disparities verbatim is not per se error so long as the record reflects meaningful consideration.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – Groundwork for ineffective assistance; the Court bypassed the performance prong and resolved on lack of prejudice.
Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357 (2017) – Emphasized need for “contemporaneous evidence” when a defendant claims he would have gone to trial. The panel used Lee to discount Yelizarov’s “post-hoc” affidavit.
United States v. Mayhew, 995 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2021) – Reiterated that misadvice cured by a thorough Rule 11 colloquy negates prejudice; heavily relied upon to defeat Yelizarov’s claim that he misunderstood the plea’s reach.
United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc) & United States v. McKinney, 60 F.4th 188 (4th Cir. 2023) – Simms held Hobbs-Act conspiracy is not a “crime of violence”; McKinney created a miscarriage-of-justice exception where a § 924(c) conviction remains intact despite a cognizable innocence claim. The panel distinguished McKinney: here the § 924(c) count had already been vacated.
Friend, 2 F.4th 369 (4th Cir. 2021) – Cited to reinforce that sentencing courts need not “exhaustively” enumerate every § 3553(a) factor.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Ineffective Assistance — The Court accepted the district judge’s credibility determinations (deferential “clear-error” review) and found no reasonable probability that Yelizarov would have rejected the plea because:

Plea trajectory: Defendant sought—and received—a better deal after learning of the pending murder suspicion.
Type-C leverage: The 360-month ceiling was substantially below potential exposure (life) had he gone to trial.
Rule 11 curing effect: Judge Motz’s colloquy explicitly confined the plea’s non-prosecution promise to factual conduct in the stipulation (which omitted the 2009 murder).

b. Appeal-Waiver Enforcement — Applying a two-step inquiry (validity & scope), the panel held:

The waiver was knowing and voluntary (“properly conducted” Rule 11 colloquy).
The issues on appeal (procedural/substantive reasonableness) fall squarely within the waiver’s language.
No equitable exception applied: Ineffective-assistance theory failed; miscarriage-of-justice inapposite because § 924(c) count was already vacated and the 360-month sentence had been contractually agreed upon.

c. Sentencing Explanation — Though not necessary to the judgment, the Court reaffirmed that district courts “need not recite magic words” when addressing § 3553(a). It stressed substance over form, signaling deference to discretionary sentencing so long as the record shows consideration.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

Type-C Pleas & Conditional Clauses: Prosecutors and defense counsel may draft “fallback” language anticipating volatile precedent. Yelizarov affirms that such clauses, once accepted, bind both sides even when later legal developments invalidate part of the indictment.
Appeal-Waiver Doctrine: The opinion cabins the McKinney miscarriage-of-justice carve-out, clarifying it is narrow and triggered chiefly when an unvacated conviction is itself legally impossible.
Sentencing Procedure: District judges in the Fourth Circuit may rely on this case to fend off arguments that failure to explicitly mention a specific § 3553(a) factor equals reversible error.
Defense Strategy: Counsel must advise clients that waivers survive statutory and case-law shifts unless exceptions—ineffective assistance or actual innocence of an intact conviction—are provable.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11(c)(1)(C) (Type-C) Plea: A plea agreement where the parties specify a particular sentence or sentencing range. If the judge accepts the agreement, that sentence is binding; if the judge rejects it, the defendant can withdraw the plea.
§ 2255 Motion: Federal prisoners’ primary vehicle to challenge their conviction or sentence on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds. It functions like habeas corpus for federal convictions.
Strickland Test: Two-pronged standard (deficient performance + prejudice) governing ineffective-assistance claims.
§ 924(c): Federal statute criminalizing use or possession of a firearm “in furtherance of” or “during and in relation to” a “crime of violence” or drug trafficking crime, carrying mandatory consecutive penalties.
Hobbs Act Conspiracy: An agreement to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by robbery or extortion. Post-Simms, it no longer qualifies as a “crime of violence” for § 924(c) purposes.
Waiver of Appeal: A contractual surrender of the right to challenge certain issues on direct appeal, normally enforced unless (a) unknowing/involuntary, or (b) enforcement would cause a miscarriage of justice.
§ 3553(a) Factors: Statutory considerations guiding federal sentencing (e.g., nature of offense, history of defendant, deterrence, sentencing disparities).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Yelizarov consolidates several doctrinal threads: (1) The prejudice prong of Strickland remains a formidable barrier where the record shows a defendant would have accepted a plea irrespective of counsel’s alleged missteps; (2) Appeal-waivers in Type-C agreements endure even when later jurisprudence erodes a predicate offense, provided the sentence falls within the bargained-for framework; and (3) District courts are not required to incant every § 3553(a) factor to survive appellate scrutiny.

The judgment fortifies the predictability of negotiated pleas and underscores the judiciary’s reluctance to unwind them absent strong evidence of injustice. Practitioners should heed its lessons: craft precise plea language, conduct meticulous Rule 11 colloquies, and recognize that waivers—once knowingly made—are exceedingly difficult to escape.