Forward-Looking Loss-of-Support as the Governing Standard for Apportioning Wrongful Death Settlements Between Parents in Idaho

Introduction

The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Rossman Law Group, PLLC v. Holcomb and Carraway, Docket No. 51745-2024 (Nov. 19, 2025), squarely addresses an emotionally charged and legally unsettled question: how should courts divide wrongful death settlement proceeds between parents who are both statutory beneficiaries, but whose parenting histories differ significantly in quality and conduct?

The case arises from the tragic death of 22-year-old Connor Holcomb, killed by a drunk truck driver. His parents, Hillary Carraway (mother) and Denny Holcomb (father), each brought separate wrongful death actions that were later consolidated and settled. When they could not agree on how to divide the settlement, the funds were interpleaded, and the trial court—sitting in equity—awarded 75% to Hillary and 25% to Denny, heavily emphasizing Denny’s past failures as a parent and his role in Connor’s drug use.

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. It held that the district court misapplied Idaho’s wrongful death damages law. The proper measure is “loss of support,” which is forward-looking and compensates for the future loss of financial and relational benefits (companionship, comfort, services, etc.) that the decedent would have provided. The trial court erred by effectively “grading” the parents’ past conduct and apportioning the settlement as a moral judgment rather than as a measure of their respective future losses.

At the same time, the Court clarified an important nuance: past parental conduct is not categorically irrelevant. It can be considered to the extent it informs what kind of future relationship and support the parent reasonably could have expected from the deceased child. Thus, Idaho adopts a principled middle ground between two competing out-of-state approaches—those that disregard parenting quality entirely, and those that treat past misconduct or abandonment as a direct bar to recovery.

The Court also rejected Denny’s argument that an oral 50/50 division agreement was contractually binding, finding insufficient evidence of a “meeting of the minds.” Finally, it declined to award attorney fees to either party on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The wrongful death and litigation

In May 2021, 22-year-old Connor Holcomb was killed when a heavily intoxicated semi-truck driver (blood alcohol content over 0.20%, having run three red lights) rear-ended Connor’s car while he was stopped at a traffic light. Both parents brought wrongful death suits against the driver and the trucking interests:

• Hillary Carraway, Connor’s mother, represented by Rossman Law Group, PLLC.
• Denny Holcomb, Connor’s father, initially represented by Monteleone Law Offices.

The separate actions were consolidated. Shortly before trial, the parties mediated and reached a global settlement with the tort defendants.

The settlement funds were paid to Hillary’s counsel (Rossman Law Group), which held them in trust. Hillary and Denny, however, could not agree on the allocation of the settlement between themselves as co-beneficiaries of the wrongful death claim.

B. Interpleader and equitable adjudication

Rossman Law Group filed an interpleader action, asking the district court to:

1. Accept the settlement funds into the court’s control; and
2. Determine how to divide the net proceeds between Hillary and Denny.

Interpleader, as the Supreme Court notes, is an equitable proceeding, invoking the trial court’s broad equitable jurisdiction (McCauley v. Sears, 3 Idaho 676, 34 P. 814 (1893); modern secondary sources also cited). At the interpleader hearing:

• Denny appeared with counsel but then discharged his attorney and proceeded pro se.
• The court granted interpleader, made Hillary and Denny opposing claimants, and set an evidentiary hearing.

C. The family history and evidence at the hearing

The district court heard detailed testimony from multiple witnesses, including Hillary, Denny, Connor’s girlfriend, and Connor’s employer. Its factual findings (as summarized by the Supreme Court) painted a starkly asymmetric picture of the parents’ past roles:

1. Early childhood and custody

• Hillary and Denny’s relationship ended when Connor was about four.
• From ages five to ten, Connor primarily lived with Hillary but spent some weekends with Denny.
• Hillary later married Darren Carraway; she and Connor moved in with Darren.
• At age ten, Hillary was granted full legal and physical custody; Denny did not attend the custody proceedings.

During this period:

• Denny was ordered to pay child support but did not pay.
• Denny received Social Security disability payments on Connor’s behalf for about eight years, but:
  • He did not disclose these payments to Hillary, and
  • He did not transfer any of these funds for Connor’s support.
• Denny had three DUI convictions and was abusing prescription pain medications.

2. Adolescence, drugs, and shifting residences

At age 16, Hillary caught Connor with marijuana; Connor then ran away to Denny’s house. Hillary allowed Connor to live with Denny from that point on:

• Before moving to Denny’s, Connor was a good student and participated in football and wrestling.
• After moving, Connor quit sports and had poor school attendance.
• Hillary saw him every couple of weeks and talked several times a week, but no custody modification was sought.

After high school, Connor continued to live with Denny. He obtained a job and began a serious relationship; his girlfriend moved into Denny’s home. It is here that the most troubling evidence emerged:

• Denny regularly used illegal drugs (heroin, cocaine) with Connor and his girlfriend.
• Denny would give them money specifically to buy hard drugs, which they then used together in Denny’s house.
• When Connor was 19, he overdosed on fentanyl at Denny’s home. Denny reportedly performed CPR and called Hillary, who went to the hospital.
• Neither Hillary nor Connor’s girlfriend recalled Denny visiting Connor in the hospital.

Following the overdose:

• Connor was later arrested for DUI and possession of drug paraphernalia.
• He entered rehab; Hillary participated actively in the parent program.
• After rehab, Connor lived briefly with Denny, then in a duplex Hillary had found for him.
• Connor resumed using drugs about 4–5 months after rehab, including using with Denny.

Eventually, Connor and his girlfriend moved into a guesthouse on Hillary and Darren’s property, where they lived for about two years until Connor’s death. Connor continued to use illegal drugs, including with Denny, during this period.

3. Circumstances near the time of death

• Connor’s employer informed Hillary that Connor seemed emotionally unwell and had fallen asleep on equipment.
• Connor sometimes stayed at a company house in McCall or at Hillary’s and Darren’s cabin in Cascade when working in Valley County.
• After Connor’s death, Denny texted the employer asking him to retrieve Connor’s belongings but not to tell Hillary and Darren what he found.
• The employer discovered needles, syringes, and burnt residue on clothing and called Darren, who involved law enforcement.
• An autopsy showed heroin in Connor’s system, but there was no causal link between drug use and the collision (the crash was plainly caused by the truck driver’s intoxication and reckless driving).

4. The parents’ grief testimony

Both parents testified to their deep emotional loss:

• Hillary described her life since Connor’s death as “hell,” struggling daily with grief, stating her remaining children kept her going. Her husband Darren testified that Connor and Hillary had an “unbelievable” relationship, and that her grief profoundly altered her personality and family relationships.
• Denny testified that Connor was “his world,” that they leaned on each other for everything, and that he was distraught and unable to function after the death. He admitted making “bad choices” but insisted everyone knew how much Connor meant to him and emphasized that Connor, as an adult, could make his own decisions.

D. Competing positions on settlement allocation

Regarding the division of the settlement, the parties took sharply different positions:

• Denny testified that:
  • Before mediation, he and Hillary agreed informally to split any recovery 50/50.
  • At mediation, Hillary (allegedly through her counsel) attempted to shift to an 80/20 or 70/30 split in her favor.
  • He maintained he should receive 50% of the proceeds.
• Hillary testified that:
  • During mediation she learned, apparently from Connor’s girlfriend, that Denny had been using illegal drugs with Connor up to the date of his death.
  • This was the first time she fully appreciated the ongoing nature of Denny’s involvement in Connor’s drug use.
  • She asked the court to award Denny none of the proceeds because of his drug use with Connor; alternatively, she requested any share allocated to Denny be placed into a trust with conditions limiting his use of the funds to lawful purposes.

E. The district court’s ruling

The district court:

• Recognized that wrongful death damages in Idaho follow a “loss of support” theory, compensating for lost:
  • Companionship
  • Protection
  • Bodily care
  • Intellectual culture
  • Moral training
• Noted the absence of Idaho precedent specifically dealing with apportioning wrongful death proceeds between parents when one parent’s parenting was seriously deficient.
• Surveyed out-of-state cases:
  • Some jurisdictions hold that a parent’s recovery is not reduced based on the “quality” of their parenting.
  • Other jurisdictions reduce or deny a share when a parent abandoned or seriously failed to care for the child.
• Ultimately awarded:
  • 75% of the net proceeds to Hillary.
  • 25% to Denny.

The court’s reasons focused squarely on past parental conduct:

• Denny:
  • Did not pay court-ordered child support.
  • Kept Social Security disability payments made on Connor’s behalf.
  • Failed to contribute to Connor’s funeral expenses.
  • Used illegal drugs with Connor and funded Connor’s drug purchases.
  • “Deviated from the normal care, parental love, and affection expected from a parent.”
• Hillary (and Darren):
  • Provided consistent financial and emotional support.
  • Facilitated rehab, housing, and employment for Connor.
  • Maintained a supportive and close relationship with him.

The district court declined Hillary’s request to impose a trust on Denny’s share. Denny appealed, challenging the unequal division and arguing entitlement to 50% of the settlement under contract and under Idaho wrongful death law.

II. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Issues on appeal

The Supreme Court addressed two main issues:

1. Did the district court err in apportioning the settlement proceeds between Hillary and Denny?
2. Is either party entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121?

B. Holdings

The Court’s key holdings are:

1. No enforceable 50/50 contract:
   • Denny failed to prove the existence of a binding oral contract with Hillary to split the settlement proceeds evenly. His testimony showed only his subjective belief, not a mutual meeting of the minds.
2. District court applied the wrong legal standard in apportionment:
   • Idaho’s wrongful death statute and caselaw adopt a forward-looking “loss of support” measure of damages.
   • The district court, however, based its apportionment largely on the parents’ historic conduct, effectively punishing Denny and rewarding Hillary for past parenting behaviors.
   • This was inconsistent with the governing legal standard and thus an abuse of discretion under Lunneborg v. My Fun Life.
   • The Court reversed, vacated the judgment, and remanded for a new apportionment using the correct standard.
3. Past conduct may be relevant, but only as it bears on future expectations:
   • The Court rejected Denny’s argument that past conduct is categorically irrelevant.
   • It held that past parental behavior can be considered if it helps determine what the parent reasonably could have expected in terms of the child’s future earnings, support, and companionship.
   • The key question remains the nature and value of the future relationship lost by each parent.
4. No attorney fees awarded on appeal:
   • Hillary was not the prevailing party and thus could not recover fees.
   • Although Denny was the prevailing party, he failed to argue or show that Hillary’s defense of the appeal was frivolous or unfounded, as required by I.C. § 12-121; his fee request was therefore denied.

III. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Interpleader, equity, and standard of review

The Court begins by situating the case as an equitable interpleader action. In interpleader, a neutral stakeholder (here, Rossman Law Group) who faces competing claims to the same fund asks the court to resolve the dispute and discharge the stakeholder from liability. Historically and doctrinally, interpleader lies in equity:

• McCauley v. Sears, 3 Idaho 676, 34 P. 814 (1893), is cited for the proposition that interpleader is an equitable remedy.
• Modern secondary authorities (C.J.S., Am. Jur. 2d) affirm that view.

Because the trial court was acting in equity, its ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Under Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 421 P.3d 187 (2018), discretion review asks whether the trial court:

1. Recognized the issue as discretionary;
2. Acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion;
3. Acted consistently with the applicable legal standards; and
4. Reached its decision via an exercise of reason.

The Supreme Court focuses primarily on the third prong: whether the district court acted “consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it.” That is where the district court faltered—by misapplying the law governing wrongful death damages.

B. The alleged oral contract to split proceeds 50/50

1. Preservation of the contract issue

Hillary argued that Denny failed to preserve a contract theory below. The Court rejects this argument, clarifying Idaho’s doctrine of issue preservation. An issue is preserved if:

• The party presents the issue with sufficient argument and authority to the trial court, or
• The trial court rules adversely on the issue.

See State v. Miramontes, 170 Idaho 920, 517 P.3d 849 (2022); Streamline Builders, LLC v. Chase, 174 Idaho 765, 560 P.3d 508 (2024); Siercke v. Siercke, 167 Idaho 709, 476 P.3d 376 (2020).

The Court acknowledges that:

• Denny did not use precise contract-law terminology below (offer/acceptance/consideration), but
• He repeatedly asserted that:
  • He and Hillary had agreed to a 50/50 split,
  • He relied on that understanding, and
  • He felt betrayed when Hillary sought a different allocation at mediation.

On appeal, Denny’s argument is characterized as a “refinement” of the same substantive issue rather than a new theory. This is a useful clarification for practitioners: a party may refine the legal framing of an issue on appeal so long as the substance of the position remains the same.

2. Substantive contract analysis

On the merits, the Court holds that Denny failed to prove a binding contract. The governing principles:

• A contract must be “complete, definite and certain in all its material terms” or capable of being made certain. Seward v. Musick Auction, LLC, 164 Idaho 149, 426 P.3d 1249 (2018); Unifund CCR, LLC v. Lowe, 159 Idaho 750, 367 P.3d 145 (2016).
• Formation requires a meeting of the minds, manifested by an offer and acceptance. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Hafer, 158 Idaho 694, 351 P.3d 622 (2015); Justad v. Ward, 147 Idaho 509, 211 P.3d 118 (2009).
• The party asserting a contract (here, Denny) bears the burden of proof. Taylor v. Taylor, 169 Idaho 806, 504 P.3d 342 (2022).

Critically, the Supreme Court notes:

• Denny’s evidence consisted only of his own testimony stating his belief that an agreement existed.
• He did not offer:
  • Evidence of who made an offer,
  • The precise terms of the offer, or
  • Evidence of Hillary’s acceptance.
• Hillary never testified that she agreed to a 50/50 split.

The Court addresses a potentially confusing statement in the district court’s written decision: that “Hillary and Denny agreed to pursue a lawsuit for the wrongful death of [Connor], and that they would split any proceeds evenly.” In context, however:

• The only cited “evidence” was Denny’s own testimony.
• In the very next paragraph, the district court found that the parties ultimately did not have an agreement on allocation.

The Supreme Court treats that statement as, at most, a reflection of Denny’s belief, not an actual finding of a contract. Even if construed as a finding of fact, it would be unsupported by “substantial and competent evidence,” and thus clearly erroneous. See Browning v. Ringel, 134 Idaho 6, 995 P.2d 351 (2000).

Accordingly, the Court affirms that no enforceable contract existed to mandate a 50/50 division.

C. Idaho’s wrongful death framework and precedents

1. Statutory basis: Idaho Code § 5-311

Idaho’s wrongful death statute, I.C. § 5-311, allows an action to be brought by specified beneficiaries (including parents) for damages resulting from the wrongful death of a person. As the Court reiterates (quoting Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130 P.2d 859 (1942)):

“[D]amages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just.”

The statute itself does not detail the measure of damages or how to apportion them among multiple beneficiaries. That has been fleshed out in case law.

2. The “loss of support” theory in Idaho caselaw

The Court’s analysis centers on Pfau v. Comair Holdings, Inc., 135 Idaho 152, 15 P.3d 1160 (2000), which synthesizes a century of Idaho wrongful death jurisprudence. Pfau observed:

• Idaho has long adopted a loss of support theory of wrongful death damages.
• Under this theory, “just” damages include recovery for:
  • Loss of companionship,
  • Protection,
  • Bodily care,
  • Intellectual culture, and
  • Moral training,

  provided it appears that pecuniary damages resulted from such loss.

• This formulation traces back to early cases like:
  • Wyland v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 48 Idaho 789, 285 P. 676 (1930).
  • Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130 P.2d 859 (1942).

For the death of a child, Pfau further quoted Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982):

The recoverable damages include “contributions which the parents might reasonably have expected to receive from the earnings of the deceased during minority and/or the comfort, society and companionship that the deceased would have afforded to the parents.”

Idaho Civil Jury Instruction (IDJI) 9.05 reflects this measure, identifying compensable elements in wrongful death, including:

1. Funeral expenses;
2. Medical expenses prior to death;
3. The value of loss of the decedent’s services, training, comfort, and society to the plaintiff;
4. The plaintiff’s loss of financial support from the decedent.

This doctrinal framework has two crucial attributes:

1. It is pecuniary in nature: even losses like companionship are compensable only insofar as they have a pecuniary (economic or economically measurable) dimension.
2. It is forward-looking: it compensates for what the decedent would have provided in the future, not for past wrongs or grievances among living parties.

D. The core error: apportioning based on past parental conduct instead of future loss

1. Where the district court went wrong

The Supreme Court identifies the district court’s legal error succinctly:

• The trial court acknowledged Idaho’s loss-of-support theory but failed to apply it when dividing the proceeds.
• It did not evaluate:
  • The monetary contributions each parent might reasonably have expected from Connor, or
  • The comfort, society, and companionship each might reasonably have expected to receive from Connor going forward.
• Instead, it focused on:
  • Denny’s failure to pay child support.
  • Denny’s misuse of Social Security disability payments earmarked for Connor.
  • Denny’s lack of contribution to funeral expenses.
  • Denny’s longstanding drug misuse with Connor.

The Supreme Court characterizes this as an apportionment based on “past conduct,” essentially using the settlement as a vehicle to:

• Reward Hillary for her “good” parenting, and
• Punish Denny for his “bad” parenting.

That is not what wrongful death damages are for. As the Court puts it:

“In cases involving the wrongful death of a child, the measure of wrongful death damages is not intended to compensate, reward, or punish each parent for their past parental acts.”

Because the district court used the wrong legal measure, it failed the third prong of the Lunneborg abuse-of-discretion test—acting inconsistently with the controlling legal standards. The Supreme Court therefore:

• Reverses the apportionment order;
• Vacates the judgment; and
• Remands for further proceedings to apply the proper measure of damages.

2. Forward-looking loss of support: what should have been done

Under Idaho law, the trial court on remand must:

1. Determine the total wrongful death damages reasonably attributable to Connor’s death—economic and non-economic elements as delineated in Pfau, Volk, and IDJI 9.05.
2. Then, as between multiple beneficiaries (here, two parents), apportion that recovery based on:
   • The relative magnitude of each parent’s future loss of:
     • Financial support from Connor.
     • Services, care, and assistance Connor would likely have provided.
     • Companionship, society, and comfort Connor would have afforded.

In other words, the trial court must ask: What did Connor’s future realistically hold in terms of economic contributions and relational support to each parent, and how does each parent’s loss compare? That is an inherently fact-intensive and, at times, speculative inquiry, but it must be anchored in evidence relating to future expectations.

E. The nuanced role of past parental conduct

1. Rejecting a categorical bar on considering past conduct

Denny argued on appeal that, because loss-of-support damages are forward-looking, past parental conduct is categorically irrelevant and should never be considered. The Supreme Court declines to go that far.

Instead, invoking its authority to give guidance on remand (N. Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. City of Hayden, 164 Idaho 530, 432 P.3d 976 (2018); Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (2000)), the Court articulates a more nuanced rule:

“[P]ast parental conduct may be relevant to measuring loss of support damages if the proponent of the evidence demonstrates that the conduct did or likely would impact the quality or expectation of the parent's future relationship with the decedent.”

Put differently:

• The relevance of past conduct lies in its predictive value—what does it tell us about what the future relationship would likely have been?
• If past conduct so damaged the relationship that the child likely would not provide much future support, companionship, or contact, that can reduce the parent’s recoverable loss.

2. Harmonizing Idaho with out-of-state authorities

The district court had relied on decisions from other jurisdictions, including:

• Dove v. Carver (Ga. Ct. App.)
• In re Estate of Williams (Ill. Ct. App.)
• Miller v. Bunch, 657 S.W.3d 890 (Ky. 2022)
• In re Estate of Brown-Elliott, 930 N.W.2d 51 (Neb. Ct. App. 2019)
• Perry v. Williams, 70 P.3d 1283 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003)
• In re Estate of Lovely, 848 P.2d 51 (Okla. Civ. App. 1993)

Some of these decisions reflect an approach where parental abandonment or severe misconduct can drastically reduce or even eliminate a parent’s share; others emphasize that the “measure of loss” to a parent is not necessarily diminished by parenting “quality.”

The Idaho Supreme Court reads these cases not as authority for punishing moral failings per se, but as examples where:

• The court used past conduct to ascertain the nature of the relationship actually lost, and therefore
• To determine whether the parent realistically could have expected meaningful future contact, support, or affection.

For example, in Brown-Elliott, evidence of abandonment by a parent was used to show that the parent likely would not have enjoyed a future relationship with the child—making the parent’s loss smaller. The Idaho Court embraces this logic as consistent with the loss-of-support theory.

Accordingly, Idaho stakes out the following position:

• Past parental conduct is not a freestanding basis to punish or reward parents through unequal distributions; but
• It is admissible and relevant to the extent it shows how deep and stable (or fragile and minimal) the parent-child relationship actually was, and what the reasonable future trajectory of that relationship would have been.

F. Attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121

Both Hillary and Denny sought attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-121, which authorizes fees to a prevailing party when the opposing party's case was “brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.”

The Court disposes of these requests as follows:

• Hillary is not the prevailing party, as the judgment was reversed and remanded. Thus she cannot recover fees.
• Denny is technically the prevailing party, but:
  • He did not offer any argument explaining why Hillary’s defense of the appeal was frivolous or unreasonable.
  • Idaho law requires that a fee request be supported by authority and argument. Marlar v. Gearhart, 175 Idaho 262, 564 P.3d 1195 (2025); Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 P.3d 723 (2003).
  • Absent such argument, the Court will not award fees.

This reiterates a recurring procedural point: a bare, conclusory request for I.C. § 12-121 fees is insufficient. The requesting party must show why the opposing party’s position fell into the statute’s “frivolous/unreasonable” category.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Wrongful death and “loss of support” in plain terms

A wrongful death claim is a lawsuit that certain family members (or the estate) may bring when someone dies due to another’s negligence or wrongful act. In Idaho, parents can sue for the wrongful death of their child.

The damages in such cases are not about compensating the deceased (who is no longer alive), but about compensating the surviving beneficiaries for the losses they suffer. “Loss of support” includes:

• Economic support: money, services, or help the deceased likely would have provided (e.g., helping with bills, providing caregiving, contributing to a household, helping in parents’ old age).
• Relational support: companionship, comfort, affection, and guidance the deceased would have provided—which, in Idaho’s framework, are recognized as having a pecuniary dimension even though they are intangible.

“Forward-looking” means the law asks: “What would this person probably have done in the future, and how has their death deprived the survivors of those benefits?” It does not ask: “Which surviving parent behaved better in the past, and how should we reward or punish them now?”

B. Interpleader explained

An interpleader occurs when a neutral third party (often holding money or property owed to someone) faces competing claims from two or more people and does not know who is legally entitled to it. To avoid multiple lawsuits and conflicting judgments, the stakeholder:

1. Deposits the money with the court;
2. Asks the court to determine who among the claimants is entitled to what; and
3. Is typically discharged from further liability once the court takes control of the funds.

Because it is an equitable procedure, courts have broad discretion to fashion fair relief—but they still must comply with substantive legal standards (like the correct measure of damages).

C. “Abuse of discretion” in practical terms

Courts often have choices—they may choose one of several reasonable outcomes. On appeal, “abuse of discretion” does not mean simply that the appellate court would have decided differently. It means:

• The trial court failed to recognize the issue was discretionary; or
• Went beyond the permissible range of options; or
• Applied an incorrect legal standard; or
• Did not reason logically from the evidence and law.

Here, the Supreme Court focused on the third aspect: the district court used the wrong legal measure (backward-looking moral judgment instead of forward-looking loss of support). Once that is shown, the trial court’s decision cannot stand.

D. “Meeting of the minds” in contract law

A contract comes into existence only if the parties mutually agree to the same material terms. Lawyers call this a “meeting of the minds.” It is not enough that one party believes there is an agreement; there must be:

• An offer: a clear proposal with defined terms,
• An acceptance: an unqualified assent to those terms, and
• Agreement on the material elements (here, at minimum, how the settlement would be divided).

In Rossman, Denny’s testimony that he “thought” it would be 50/50, without corroboration or clear evidence of Hillary agreeing to that arrangement, was not enough to show an enforceable contract.

E. Idaho Code § 12-121 attorney fees

Attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-121 are not automatically granted to the winner. Instead:

• The party must be the prevailing party, and
• The court must find that the losing party’s position was:
  • Frivolous,
  • Unreasonable, or
  • Without foundation.

“Frivolous” here means more than simply “unsuccessful.” It suggests that the position had no reasonable basis in fact or law. Because Hillary’s defense was not obviously baseless—and because Denny did not argue that it was—the Court refused to award fees.

V. Impact and Significance of the Decision

A. Clarifying the framework for apportioning wrongful death proceeds among parents

This decision is significant because it fills a doctrinal gap in Idaho law: how to apportion wrongful death recoveries between multiple statutory beneficiaries—particularly parents—when their relationships with the decedent differ.

Key clarifications include:

• There is no automatic 50/50 split between parents in wrongful death recovery.
• Apportionment must be grounded in the relative loss actually suffered by each beneficiary, using the loss-of-support measure.
• The trial court’s equitable discretion in interpleader does not permit it to disregard binding wrongful death principles or to convert apportionment into a moral inquest.

On remand—and in future cases—trial courts will need to:

• Take evidence on the actual and anticipated nature of the decedent’s relationships with each beneficiary.
• Estimate, as best as evidence allows, the economic and relational support the decedent likely would have provided to each beneficiary.
• Apportion the total recovery accordingly, with explanation tied to those forward-looking findings.

B. A balanced approach to parental misconduct and abandonment

The Court’s nuanced stance on past conduct will likely influence future litigations involving:

• Estranged parents seeking a share of wrongful death proceeds.
• Parents accused of abuse, neglect, or enabling harmful behaviors (e.g., drug use).

Rather than:

• Automatically granting equal shares regardless of history, or
• Automatically disqualifying or harshly penalizing disfavored parents based solely on moral judgment,

Idaho’s approach requires:

• Proof of how past conduct impacted (or likely would have impacted) the future relationship and support the parent could reasonably expect from the child.

In practice, this means:

• A truly absent or abusive parent, whose relationship with the child was severely damaged or nonexistent, may be found to have suffered relatively little future loss—and thus receive a correspondingly small or even negligible share of the recovery.
• A parent with a complex but still close and Loving relationship, despite past failings, may still show that he or she reasonably expected substantial future companionship and mutual support.

This introduces nuance and prevents any formulaic rule, but it also:

• Anchors results in actual relational realities, and
• Avoids using wrongful death proceeds as a vehicle for retroactive, non-statutory punishment.

C. Guidance for trial courts on discretionary decisions in equity

The decision reinforces an important appellate principle: even in equity, where courts have broad discretion, misapplication of the governing legal standard is an abuse of discretion.

Here, the district court might have viewed its equitable role as giving it latitude to “do what seems fair” in light of the parents’ conduct. The Supreme Court confirms that such equitable discretion is constrained by:

• Statutory directives (I.C. § 5-311), and
• Decisional law on the proper measure of damages (Pfau, Volk, Wyland, Hepp).

Accordingly, trial courts are reminded to:

• Identify the correct legal rules before exercising their equitable balancing, and
• Explain how their particular equitable ordering fits within those legal rules.

D. Practical implications for litigation strategy

For practitioners in Idaho:

• In wrongful death cases with multiple beneficiaries, it will be crucial to:
  • Develop detailed evidence regarding each beneficiary’s past and expected future relationship with the decedent.
  • Link that evidence explicitly to future loss of support and companionship, rather than moral judgments about parenting quality.
• Allegations of parental abandonment, neglect, or misconduct must be framed in terms of:
  • Effect on the actual relationship, and
  • Whether the decedent would likely have provided meaningful support or companionship to that parent in the future.
• Any pre-settlement allocation agreements between beneficiaries should be:
  • Carefully documented,
  • So as to satisfy contract-formation requirements, and
  • Avoid the evidentiary pitfalls illustrated in Denny’s failed contract claim.

Additionally, for appeals:

• Requests for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 must be supported by arguments explaining why the opposing position was frivolous or unreasonable, or they will be denied even to the prevailing party.

VI. Conclusion

Rossman Law Group, PLLC v. Holcomb and Carraway is a significant decision in Idaho wrongful death law because it:

• Reaffirms and applies the forward-looking loss-of-support theory of wrongful death damages in the specific context of intra-family apportionment between parents.
• Holds that wrongful death damages are not an instrument for rewarding or punishing parents for their historical parenting performance.
• Clarifies that past parental conduct can be relevant only insofar as it illuminates what future relationship, support, and companionship the parent could reasonably have expected from the decedent.
• Reverses a trial court’s apportionment that was driven largely by moral judgment about past conduct, thereby emphasizing the limits of equitable discretion when statutory and doctrinal standards are clear.
• Provides practical guidance on issue preservation, contract formation involving settlement-split agreements, and the requirements for attorney-fee awards on appeal.

Going forward, Idaho trial courts, attorneys, and parties must approach the division of wrongful death settlements through the lens of relative future loss, not retrospective blame. The opinion reinforces that the central inquiry remains: What did this child’s life reasonably promise, by way of financial support and relational companionship, to each parent, and how should those lost expectations be fairly valued and apportioned under Idaho’s wrongful death statute?