Fortunet, Inc. v. Rosten: No Prejudgment Interest on NRS 18.010(2)(b) Attorney‑Fee Sanctions and Clarified Standards for Impracticable Apportionment

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Nevada Supreme Court’s order in Fortunet, Inc. v. Rosten, No. 89395 (Nev. Nov. 4, 2025), a post‑remand appeal arising from a long‑running commercial dispute involving Fortunet, Inc. (“Fortunet”), a former employee (Jack Coronel), related entities (the Playbook entities), and Coronel’s wife, respondent Juli Rosten.

After Fortunet sued Coronel, the Playbook entities, and later Rosten on various tort and contract theories, Coronel and his entities countersued. As relevant to this appeal, the district court ultimately granted summary judgment in Rosten’s favor and awarded her attorney fees and costs under NRS 18.010(2)(b) on the ground that Fortunet’s claims against her were frivolous or vexatious.

In an earlier appeal (Fortunet II), the Nevada Supreme Court:

• upheld the district court’s authority to award attorney fees to Rosten under NRS 18.010(2)(b); but
• reversed and vacated several categories of fees, costs, and interest, and remanded for the district court to:
  • exclude specific impermissible items from the award; and
  • make proper findings on apportionment of fees and costs among Rosten and the Coronel defendants.

On remand, the district court:

1. removed certain fee and cost categories (bankruptcy fees, appellate fees, interest charged by prior counsel, and undocumented costs);
2. found that any apportionment of defense fees between Rosten and Coronel other than a 50/50 division during the period when Rosten was a defendant was impracticable; and
3. applied prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130 to the entire (recalculated) award of attorney fees and costs from the date Rosten was first added as a defendant.

Fortunet appealed again, challenging (1) the apportionment determination and (2) the prejudgment interest rulings. The Supreme Court’s new order both clarifies and sharpens Nevada law in two important ways:

• It expressly holds that prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130 is not available on attorney‑fee awards made under NRS 18.010(2)(b), because those fees are punitive (to punish frivolous or vexatious claims) rather than compensatory.
• It reiterates and applies strict rules governing when prejudgment interest may be awarded on costs and how a party must prove the timing of incurring those costs.

At the same time, the Court affirms the district court’s conclusion that a detailed apportionment of fees between Rosten and Coronel was impracticable, providing further guidance on how Nevada courts may handle fee apportionment in multi‑defendant litigation involving intertwined claims.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Nevada Supreme Court:

1. Affirmed the district court’s apportionment ruling. The district court acted within its discretion in concluding that a more granular apportionment of defense fees and costs between Rosten and Coronel was impracticable, given:
   • the interrelationship of Fortunet’s claims against all “Coronel defendants”;
   • the common nature of discovery and trial preparation activities; and
   • the difficulties created by a 12‑year litigation history and changes in counsel.
   The court accepted a 50/50 division of fees between Rosten and Coronel during the period when Rosten was a defendant.
2. Reversed the award of prejudgment interest on the attorney fees granted under NRS 18.010(2)(b). Relying on the principle that:
   • prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130 is compensatory, not punitive; and
   • NRS 18.010(2)(b) attorney fees are punitive and discretionary sanctions, not compensation for a pre‑existing “debt,”
   the Court held that prejudgment interest cannot be awarded on NRS 18.010(2)(b) fee awards.
3. Vacated in part and remanded the prejudgment interest awarded on costs. While NRS 17.130 permits prejudgment interest on costs, under Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc. such interest:
   • runs from the time each cost was actually incurred; and
   • only if the prevailing party proves when those costs were incurred; otherwise, interest on costs runs only from the date of judgment.
   Because the district court had awarded interest on the total cost award from the date Rosten was first joined as a defendant—rather than from the dates specific costs were incurred—the Supreme Court remanded for recalculation consistent with Albios.

The overall disposition: the judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

The opinion is relatively short, but it is dense with references to existing Nevada precedent. Those cases provide the doctrinal scaffolding for the Court’s conclusions on discretion, apportionment, and prejudgment interest.

1. Standards of Review and the Nature of Fee/Cost/Interest Awards

• Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 350 P.3d 1139 (2015) – Cited for the standard of review on cost awards. In Logan, the Court confirmed that the award of costs is reviewed for abuse of discretion. That principle underpins the Court’s deferential approach to both the apportionment of costs between multiple defendants and the decision whether to award interest on those costs, subject to statutory limits.
• M.C. Multi‑Family Dev., L.L.C. v. Crestdale Assocs., Ltd., 124 Nev. 901, 193 P.3d 536 (2008) – Cited twice:
  • for the rule that prejudgment interest is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion; and
  • for the specific prohibition against awarding prejudgment interest on amounts that are not “ascertainable or calculable” until the entry of judgment.
  This case establishes that a party cannot receive prejudgment interest on a legal entitlement that did not exist—or could not be quantified—before judgment. That concept becomes crucial in the discussion of NRS 18.010(2)(b) fees, which the Court characterizes as inherently discretionary and not fixed until judgment.
• Bobby Berosini, Ltd. v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 114 Nev. 1348, 971 P.2d 383 (1998) – Cited for the standard of review on attorney‑fee awards. Berosini confirms that fee awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion, which gives district courts significant leeway in determining reasonableness, allocation, and amount—subject again to statutory bounds and sound findings.
• Aguilar v. Lucky Cab Co., 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 1, 540 P.3d 1064 (2024) – Used to clarify that when the interest award turns on a legal question (e.g., whether a category of award is even eligible for prejudgment interest under the governing statutes), the Supreme Court’s review is de novo. This is why the Court does not defer to the district court’s view on applying NRS 17.130 to NRS 18.010(2)(b) fees; instead, it resolves the statutory question independently.

2. Apportionment of Fees and Costs Among Multiple Defendants

• Mayfield v. Koroghli, 124 Nev. 343, 184 P.3d 362 (2008) – This is the governing Nevada authority on apportionment of fees and costs among multiple defendants when claims are based on a common set of facts.
  • Mayfield recognizes that, where “a plaintiff pursues claims based on the same factual circumstance against multiple defendants,” apportionment may be “rendered impracticable by the interrelationship of the claims against the multiple defendants.”
  • It also imposes a procedural requirement: the district court must attempt to apportion and must make specific findings explaining why a finer‑grained apportionment is or is not practicable in the circumstances of the particular case.
  The Court relies heavily on Mayfield to assess whether the district court satisfied its remand obligation from Fortunet II and to justify affirmance of the 50/50 apportionment between Rosten and Coronel.

3. The Concept and Function of Prejudgment Interest

• Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Sharp, 101 Nev. 824, 711 P.2d 1 (1985) – The Court quotes Ramada Inns for the foundational proposition that:

  “Prejudgment interest is viewed as compensation for use by defendant of money to which plaintiff is entitled from the time the cause of action accrues until the time of judgment; it is not designed as a penalty.”

  This compensatory, non‑punitive view of prejudgment interest is the linchpin of the Court’s holding that such interest cannot be tacked onto punitive attorney‑fee sanctions awarded under NRS 18.010(2)(b).
• Jeaness v. Besnilian, 101 Nev. 536, 706 P.2d 143 (1985) – Cited, together with M.C. Multi‑Family, for the principle that prejudgment interest cannot be applied to awards that are not ascertainable or calculable until judgment. This rule serves as an independent basis for denying prejudgment interest on NRS 18.010(2)(b) fees, which are inherently discretionary and subject to post‑trial evaluation.

4. Prejudgment Interest on Costs

• Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc., 122 Nev. 409, 132 P.3d 1022 (2006) – The decisive authority for the treatment of prejudgment interest on cost awards under NRS 17.130. Albios holds:
  • Prejudgment interest may apply to costs, but only from the time the costs were actually incurred.
  • The recovering party bears the burden of proving when each cost item was incurred; failing such proof, interest on costs is awarded only from the date of judgment.
  In Fortunet v. Rosten, the Supreme Court finds the district court misapplied this rule by running interest on all costs from the date Rosten was joined as a defendant rather than from the dates the costs were actually incurred.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Apportionment of Attorney Fees and Costs Between Rosten and Coronel

The first major issue concerns the district court’s apportionment of fees and costs between Rosten and Coronel. In Fortunet II, the Supreme Court had criticized the district court for:

• failing to attempt an apportionment; and
• failing to make sufficient findings explaining why apportionment was impracticable.

On remand, the district court:

• endeavored to re‑examine the record over a 12‑year litigation history;
• recognized that any defense work performed by counsel was largely directed to defending all “Coronel defendants” collectively; and
• ultimately concluded that a more nuanced allocation than a 50/50 division between Rosten and Coronel (for the period when Rosten was a named defendant) was impracticable.

Crucially, the district court made specific findings, as required by Mayfield, including:

• The claims against Coronel and Rosten were interrelated, arising from a common core of factual allegations.
• Fortunet’s discovery activities and trial presentation were directed broadly to the conduct of all Coronel‑related defendants; they were not cleanly divisible by individual defendant.
• The practical obstacles to more precise apportionment included:
  • a lengthy, 12‑year case history;
  • the fact that some law firms or lawyers who had represented Rosten were no longer in business or at the same firm; and
  • the marital relationship between Coronel and Rosten, such that, in the district court’s view, the precise allocation of fees “to which Coronel and Rosten were collectively entitled” was largely inconsequential.
• The court had made a “reasonable attempt” at a more particularized allocation but could not achieve it without an “unreasonable burden.”

Applying Mayfield, the Supreme Court held:

• The district court had complied with its obligation to attempt apportionment and to make specific findings explaining the impracticability of a more precise allocation.
• Because substantial evidence supported those findings, the decision to adopt a 50/50 apportionment fell within the district court’s discretion.

Important here is the Court’s deference: it did not require mathematical perfection and accepted the district court’s explanation that more granular apportionment would impose disproportionate burdens relative to any incremental accuracy achieved, particularly in light of the common factual core of the claims and the shared defense strategy.

2. Prejudgment Interest on Attorney Fees Awarded Under NRS 18.010(2)(b)

The central new legal holding of this decision is that prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130 does not apply to attorney‑fee awards under NRS 18.010(2)(b).

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two main steps, grounded in both the nature of prejudgment interest and the character of NRS 18.010(2)(b) fees:

a. Prejudgment interest is compensatory, not punitive

Invoking Ramada Inns, the Court reiterates:

“Prejudgment interest is viewed as compensation for use by defendant of money to which plaintiff is entitled from the time the cause of action accrues until the time of judgment; it is not designed as a penalty.”

Thus, prejudgment interest presupposes:

• an underlying monetary entitlement—an amount that the defendant effectively “owes” the plaintiff and has the use of before judgment; and
• a compensatory goal: to make the plaintiff whole for being deprived of the use of that money during the litigation period.

By contrast, the Court characterizes NRS 18.010(2)(b) as a punitive fee‑shifting provision. Its purpose is to:

“punish for … frivolous or vexatious claims.”

In other words, NRS 18.010(2)(b) is a sanctioning mechanism, not a vehicle to “compensate” a party for an existing debt. The defendant (or, here, the prevailing party) does not have a pre‑judgment right to the fees; rather, the entitlement arises only if and when the court exercises its discretion to impose sanctions for abusive litigation conduct.

Given this mismatch between the nature of prejudgment interest (compensatory) and the nature of NRS 18.010(2)(b) fees (punitive), the Court holds that the two cannot be combined:

“Prejudgment interest therefore does not apply to attorney fees awarded under NRS 18.010(2)(b)….”

b. NRS 18.010(2)(b) fee awards are not ascertainable before judgment

As an independent (and reinforcing) rationale, the Court also notes its prior holdings in cases such as M.C. Multi‑Family and Jeaness that prejudgment interest may not be applied to awards that are not “ascertainable or calculable” until judgment.

Under NRS 18.010(2), a district court:

“may make an allowance” of attorney fees to a prevailing party under certain circumstances.

The statute’s use of “may” and its reliance on a post‑hoc assessment of whether a claim was “brought or maintained” without reasonable grounds, or to harass, underscore that:

• there is no fixed right to such fees during the pendency of the case; and
• both entitlement and amount depend on discretionary judicial evaluation after the litigation conduct has unfolded—typically only after judgment has been entered or a clear prevailing party has emerged.

Accordingly:

• Rosten’s entitlement to NRS 18.010(2)(b) fees was not certain before judgment; and
• even if some fee invoices existed during the case, the reasonableness and sanctionable nature of those fees were not judicially determined until the fee motion was decided post‑judgment.

Because prejudgment interest cannot be awarded on amounts that are not ascertainable or calculable until judgment, the Court concludes that the district court erred by applying NRS 17.130 to the NRS 18.010(2)(b) award.

The Court therefore reverses that aspect of the order: no prejudgment interest may be awarded on the NRS 18.010(2)(b) attorney‑fee sanction in favor of Rosten.

3. Prejudgment Interest on Costs

The final substantive issue relates to prejudgment interest on costs. Unlike the analysis for attorney fees, the Court acknowledges that NRS 17.130 may authorize prejudgment interest on costs. However, the central constraint comes from Albios.

Under Albios:

• prejudgment interest on costs runs from the time the costs were incurred; and
• the recovering party must prove when the costs were incurred. If the party fails to meet that burden, prejudgment interest on costs can only run from the date of judgment.

In Fortunet v. Rosten, the district court awarded prejudgment interest:

• on the entire (recalculated) cost award; and
• starting from the date Rosten was added as a defendant.

The Supreme Court found this approach inconsistent with Albios because:

• the date Rosten was joined as a defendant does not establish that any particular cost items had been incurred on that date; and
• interest must be linked to the actual incurrence of costs, not to a procedural milestone such as joinder of a party.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court:

• vacated the portion of the district court’s order awarding prejudgment interest on costs from the date of joinder; and
• remanded for the district court to determine:
  • whether Rosten proved when the various costs were incurred; and
  • to recalculate prejudgment interest consistently with Albios—running from the date of incurrence, or, absent proof, from the date of judgment.

C. Impact and Practical Implications

1. Clarification of the Legal Character of NRS 18.010(2)(b) Fees

By explicitly stating that prejudgment interest cannot be awarded on NRS 18.010(2)(b) attorney fees, the Court solidifies the understanding that such fees are sanctions rather than compensation for a pre‑existing debt.

Practical implications include:

• No “interest multiplier” on sanctions. Parties (and counsel) seeking sanctions under NRS 18.010(2)(b) cannot enhance the punitive effect of the sanction by adding years of prejudgment interest. The sanction is limited to the reasonable attorney fees themselves as determined under the statute.
• Clearer settlement calculus. Potentially sanctioned parties now know that delay does not generate interest on NRS 18.010(2)(b) exposure. This may influence settlement strategy and risk assessment, as the monetary consequence of a sanction is more predictable.
• Doctrinal consistency. The decision harmonizes Nevada’s interest jurisprudence with the widely recognized distinction between compensatory remedies (to which interest may attach) and punitive/sanctioning remedies (to which it generally does not).

2. Guidance on Apportionment of Fees in Multi‑Defendant Litigation

The Court’s application of Mayfield in this case confirms and fleshes out several important principles:

• Interrelated claims can justify non‑apportionment. Where a plaintiff’s claims against multiple defendants rest on the same factual core and where defense work is inherently joint (e.g., consolidated discovery, unified motion practice), the district court may conclude that precise apportionment is impracticable.
• However, an attempt and findings are mandatory. District courts must:
  • make a good‑faith attempt to apportion; and
  • enter specific, case‑specific findings explaining why finer apportionment is not feasible.
  The Fortunet order underscores that boilerplate or conclusory statements are insufficient.
• Practical constraints matter. The Court gives weight to:
  • the 12‑year length of the litigation;
  • the disappearance or reorganization of counsel over time; and
  • the fact that the defendants were spouses, making their economic interests largely intertwined.
  These practical context factors legitimized the district court’s conclusion that more granular allocation would impose an “unreasonable burden.”
• Record‑keeping incentives. Implicitly, the case encourages defense counsel in multi‑defendant cases to keep detailed time records identifying which defendant(s) benefited from which tasks. Where that is done, a more precise apportionment may be possible and appropriate; where it is not, courts may resort to rough allocation (like a 50/50 division) or treat apportionment as impracticable.

3. Reinforcement of Burdens and Limits on Prejudgment Interest on Costs

The Court’s insistence on strict adherence to Albios has several practical consequences:

• Evidence of timing is essential. Prevailing parties who seek prejudgment interest on costs must be prepared to document when each cost was incurred (e.g., via invoices, billing records, or dated receipts). Failure to do so will limit interest to the period after judgment.
• Courts may not “estimate” from arbitrary dates. Choosing a convenient procedural date—like the date of joinder—as the start of interest on all costs is impermissible. Interest must track economic reality: the actual out‑of‑pocket expenditure dates.
• Increased case‑management clarity. This decision encourages both counsel and courts to treat costs and their timing as discrete, provable items rather than as an undifferentiated lump sum. For long, complex cases (like this 12‑year dispute), that can affect significant sums in interest.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

The opinion uses several technical concepts that are worth unpacking in more accessible terms.

1. NRS 18.010(2)(b) Attorney Fees

• What it is: A Nevada statute that allows a court to order one side to pay the other side’s attorney fees as a sanction if it finds that the losing party brought or maintained a claim or defense:
  • without reasonable grounds; or
  • to harass the opposing party.
• Key features:
  • Discretionary: The statute says the court “may” award these fees; it is never automatic.
  • Punitive/Deterrent: The purpose is to punish and deter frivolous or abusive litigation conduct, not simply to reimburse the winner for every dollar spent.
  • Post‑judgment determination: The court typically decides these fees only after it sees how the case was litigated and who prevailed.

2. Prejudgment Interest (NRS 17.130)

• What it is: Interest that a successful party may receive on a money judgment for the period before the judgment is entered, usually running from when the claim “accrued” (e.g., when the wrong occurred or when the defendant should have paid).
• Purpose: To compensate the winning party for being deprived of the use of money that should have been paid earlier. It is not meant to punish the loser.
• Limits:
  • It generally applies only where there was a fixed or readily calculable amount the defendant effectively “owed” the plaintiff before judgment.
  • It does not apply to sanction‑like remedies that did not exist as a “debt” until ordered by the court (as with NRS 18.010(2)(b) fees).

3. “Ascertainable or Calculable Until Entry of Judgment”

• Meaning: For prejudgment interest to be awarded on a particular component of a judgment, the amount must have been determinable—based on facts and law—before the court entered judgment.
• Why it matters: If the amount depends on:
  • future judicial discretion (e.g., whether to sanction a party), or
  • a post‑trial reasonableness analysis,
  then it is not considered “ascertainable” in advance, and prejudgment interest is typically disallowed for that component.

4. Apportionment of Fees Among Multiple Defendants

• Problem: When a lawyer represents multiple defendants together, how should a court divide (or “apportion”) that lawyer’s fees among them—especially when fee‑shifting is available only as to some defendants?
• General rule (from Mayfield):
  • The court should attempt to allocate fees proportionally where feasible.
  • If the claims against different defendants are so intertwined that separation would be artificial or impossible, the court can find apportionment “impracticable,” but must explain why.
• In practice: Courts may:
  • use rough percentages (e.g., 50/50) where precision is not possible; or
  • allow a single recovery where defendants’ interests and defenses are indistinguishable.

5. Abuse of Discretion and Substantial Evidence

• Abuse of discretion: A deferential standard of review. The Supreme Court will not overturn the district court’s decision simply because it might have decided differently; it will reverse only if:
  • the decision is arbitrary or capricious; or
  • rests on an incorrect legal standard or a clearly erroneous factual finding.
• Substantial evidence: Evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if contrary evidence exists. If substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings (e.g., that claims were interrelated and apportionment was impracticable), those findings will generally be upheld.

V. Conclusion

Fortunet, Inc. v. Rosten offers significant guidance on several recurring issues in Nevada civil practice, especially in complex multi‑defendant cases.

First, the decision firmly characterizes attorney‑fee awards under NRS 18.010(2)(b) as punitive sanctions rather than compensatory remedies. On that basis, and because such awards are not ascertainable until judgment, the Court holds that prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130 cannot be added to NRS 18.010(2)(b) fees. This is a clear, categorical rule that will influence how parties evaluate both the risks of frivolous litigation and the potential rewards of fee‑shifting motions.

Second, the Court reinforces Mayfield’s framework for apportioning attorney fees and costs among multiple defendants. District courts must make a serious effort to apportion, and must provide concrete, record‑based reasons if they find apportionment impracticable. Yet, when claims are factually interwoven and defense efforts are joint, a rough allocation such as a 50/50 split can be within the court’s discretion, particularly in long, procedurally complex cases where more precise separation would be unduly burdensome.

Third, by vacating the prejudgment interest on costs and remanding for an Albios-compliant calculation, the Court reiterates that:

• prejudgment interest on costs is available, but only from the date each cost was actually incurred; and
• the party seeking such interest bears the burden of proving those dates, failing which interest runs only from the judgment date.

Taken together, these rulings underscore a consistent theme in Nevada jurisprudence: remedial and sanctioning tools must be applied with precision, in conformity with their statutory purposes and doctrinal limits. Prejudgment interest is a compensatory device tethered to ascertainable monetary entitlements; sanctions under NRS 18.010(2)(b) are discretionary punishments for abusive litigation; and fee/cost apportionment must balance fairness with practical constraints.

For litigants and practitioners, Fortunet v. Rosten is therefore an important reference point on:

• how far fee sanctions can go;
• how prejudgment interest can (and cannot) be used; and
• what is expected of district courts when allocating litigation expenses among multiple, jointly defended parties.