Fortunet, Inc. v. Coronel: No Prejudgment Interest on Sanction-Based Attorney Fees and Strict Limits on Duplicative Fee Awards

I. Introduction

The Nevada Supreme Court’s order in Fortunet, Inc. v. Coronel (Nov. 4, 2025) is the latest—and likely final—chapter in a long-running, multi-trial dispute between a gaming technology company and a former employee. Although the merits of the underlying contract and trade-secret claims had already been resolved in earlier appeals, this order addresses a distinct but critically important set of questions:

• When may a prevailing defendant recover attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) for allegedly frivolous claims?
• How do issue preclusion and the law-of-the-case doctrine limit repeat or overlapping fee awards?
• What documentation is required for large fee and cost awards?
• Can prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130 be awarded on sanction-based attorney fees?

The court affirms Coronel’s entitlement to fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b), but substantially curtails the amount awarded by enforcing both law-of-the-case and issue-preclusion limitations, tightening documentation requirements, and announcing a clear rule that prejudgment interest does not apply to sanction-based attorney-fee awards under NRS 18.010(2)(b).

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Parties and Claims

Appellant Fortunet, Inc. is a Nevada corporation in the gaming technology sector. It sued:

• Former employee Jack Coronel (the present respondent),
• Entities related to Coronel, known as the “Playbook entities,” and
• Coronel’s wife, Juli Rosten.

Fortunet asserted misappropriation of trade secrets and a range of tort and contract-based claims. Coronel and the Playbook entities, in turn, countersued Fortunet.

B. Three Trials and Multiple Appeals

1. Bankruptcy stay and first trial (2013 order)
   Before the first trial, Coronel and Rosten filed for bankruptcy, staying Fortunet’s claims against them. The first trial therefore proceeded only against the non-bankrupt defendants, including the Playbook entities, and adjudicated Coronel’s and the Playbook entities’ counterclaims.
   • The district court awarded attorney fees to another defendant, Bruce Himelfarb (and his firm), as a sanction against Fortunet.
   • But it denied Coronel and the Playbook entities their requested fees related to that first trial. This is referred to as the “2013 order.”
2. Second trial (claims against Coronel and Rosten) and Fortunet I
   After the bankruptcy stay was lifted, Fortunet’s claims against Coronel and Rosten were tried in a second trial, which Fortunet lost. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court:
   • Affirmed the judgment after the first trial,
   • Reversed the judgment after the second trial, and
   • Remanded for a new trial on claims against Coronel and Rosten.

   Fortunet, Inc. v. Playbook Publ’g, LLC (Fortunet I), No. 72930, 2019 WL 2725664 (Nev. June 25, 2019).

3. Summary judgment for Rosten and Fortunet II
   On remand, the district court:
   • Granted summary judgment in favor of Rosten, and
   • Awarded Rosten attorney fees, costs, and interest.

   In Fortunet, Inc. v. Rosten (Fortunet II), No. 85618, 2024 WL 390133 (Nev. Jan. 31, 2024), the Nevada Supreme Court:

   • Held that attorney fees for Rosten were appropriate under NRS 18.010(2)(b), but
   • Concluded that the district court had abused its discretion in awarding certain categories of fees, costs, and interest, and in failing to attempt to apportion fees and costs among defendants.
4. Third trial (remaining claims against Coronel) and Fortunet III
   Fortunet’s remaining claims against Coronel were then resolved as follows:
   • Partial summary judgment for Coronel on conspiracy and conversion;
   • Summary judgment for Coronel on deceptive trade practices; and
   • After a third trial, judgment as a matter of law for Coronel on the remaining claims.

   The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed in Fortunet, Inc. v. Coronel (Fortunet III), No. 86542, 2024 WL 3841864 (Nev. Aug. 14, 2024).

5. The present appeal: Coronel’s fee, cost, and interest award
   While the merits were being resolved, the district court awarded Coronel:
   • Attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b),
   • Costs, and
   • Prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130.

   Fortunet appealed this fee and cost award, leading to the present order.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

The Nevada Supreme Court:

• Affirms the district court’s decision to grant attorney fees to Coronel under NRS 18.010(2)(b), holding that Fortunet’s claims were frivolous/groundless and that issue preclusion did not bar the award.
• Reverses those portions of the fee, cost, and interest award that are barred by the law-of-the-case established in Fortunet II (e.g., fees for the joint bankruptcy, fees for the prior appeal, inadequately documented costs, and interest charged by attorneys on unpaid fees).
• Holds that Coronel cannot recover fees related to claims and counterclaims from the first trial that were already denied in the 2013 order, because those issues were actually and necessarily litigated and are final for issue-preclusion purposes.
• Vacates parts of the award for lack of adequate documentation:
  • Vacates the award of Reisman Sorokac’s attorney fees and remands for the district court to determine whether Coronel supplied the documentation required by NRCP 54(d)(2)(B)(v).
  • Vacates the award of certain costs and remands for a determination of which costs were supported by evidence that they were reasonable, necessary, and actually incurred.
• Announces a clear rule that prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130 may not be applied to attorney fees awarded under NRS 18.010(2)(b), because such fees are punitive rather than compensatory and are not ascertainable until judgment.
• Vacates the prejudgment interest on the cost award and remands for the district court to determine when the costs were incurred and to recalculate prejudgment interest, if appropriate.
• Declines to consider Fortunet’s complaint about an allegedly excessive supersedeas bond, holding that Fortunet failed to present meaningful argument on that point.

In formal terms, the Court affirms in part, reverses in part, vacates in part, and remands.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standards of Review and Governing Provisions

The Court reiterates the familiar standards:

• Attorney fees: Reviewed for abuse of discretion. Bobby Berosini, Ltd. v. PETA, 114 Nev. 1348, 1353–54, 971 P.2d 383, 386 (1998).
• Costs: Reviewed for abuse of discretion. Logan v. Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 267, 350 P.3d 1139, 1144 (2015).
• Prejudgment interest: Reviewed for abuse of discretion. M.C. Multi-Fam. Dev., L.L.C. v. Crestdale Assocs., Ltd., 124 Nev. 901, 916, 193 P.3d 536, 546 (2008).
• Conclusions of law (including issue preclusion and law of the case): Reviewed de novo. Alcantara v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 130 Nev. 252, 256, 321 P.3d 912, 914 (2014).

Key Nevada statutes and rules at issue:

• NRS 18.010(2)(b) – Authorizes attorney fees to a prevailing party when the opposing party’s claim or defense was brought or maintained “without reasonable ground or to harass,” and directs that it be “liberally construed in favor of awarding attorney’s fees in all appropriate situations.”
• NRS 17.130 – Governs prejudgment interest, treating it as compensation for the time-value of money wrongfully withheld.
• NRCP 54(d)(2)(B)(v) – Requires that a motion for attorney fees be supported by documentation “concerning the amount of fees claimed.”

B. Issue Preclusion and the 2013 Order

1. Fortunet’s argument

Fortunet argued that the 2013 order—denying Coronel and the Playbook entities attorney fees for the first trial—barred the later award of attorney fees to Coronel under NRS 18.010(2)(b) under the doctrine of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel).

2. The Five Star test and why preclusion did not apply

Under Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby, 124 Nev. 1048, 1055, 194 P.3d 709, 713 (2008), modified on other grounds by Weddell v. Sharp, 131 Nev. 233, 350 P.3d 80 (2015), issue preclusion applies only if:

1. The issue is identical to one decided in a previous proceeding;
2. The initial ruling was on the merits and is final;
3. The party against whom preclusion is asserted was a party (or in privity) in the prior case; and
4. The issue was actually and necessarily litigated.

The Court focuses on the fourth requirement. When the 2013 order was entered:

• Coronel and Rosten were in bankruptcy; Fortunet’s claims against them were stayed.
• Whether Fortunet’s claims against Coronel were brought or maintained without reasonable ground (or to harass) had not yet been litigated.
• It was not even clear who would ultimately be the “prevailing party” on those claims.

Because the bankruptcy stay meant Coronel’s personal exposure on Fortunet’s claims was not yet before the district court in 2013, no court had yet actually and necessarily decided whether those later claims were frivolous within the meaning of NRS 18.010(2)(b). Thus, issue preclusion did not bar a subsequent fee award to Coronel once the stay lifted and the litigation against him proceeded to judgment.

The Court reinforces this analysis with a practical observation from the Fourth Circuit in Introcaso v. Cunningham, 857 F.2d 965, 967 (4th Cir. 1988):

“Although in some instances a frivolous case will be quickly revealed as such, it may sometimes be necessary for defendants to blow away the smoke screens the plaintiffs had thrown up before the defendants may prevail.”

In other words, the frivolous nature of a case is not always apparent at an early stage. Here, the claims against Coronel remained dormant under the bankruptcy stay when the 2013 order issued; the district court could not have fully evaluated their merit at that time.

3. Contrast: preclusion for first-trial fees (Kirsch)

Later in its order, the Court draws a sharp distinction: while the 2013 order could not preclude fees on claims not yet litigated, it did preclude fees for work done on the claims that were litigated in the first trial.

Relying on Kirsch v. Traber, 134 Nev. 163, 167, 414 P.3d 818, 821–22 (2018), the Court notes that a judgment may be final, for issue-preclusion purposes, “as to a part of an action although the litigation continues as to the rest.” Thus:

• Coronel cannot recover fees incurred by Coronel or the Playbook entities for claims and counterclaims actually and necessarily litigated in the first trial that were denied by the 2013 order.

This dual use of preclusion doctrines leads to a nuanced result: the 2013 order cannot be used to bar fees for later claims that were not before the court, but it does bar any attempt to repackage or re-litigate fee requests for the first trial itself.

C. Attorney Fees Under NRS 18.010(2)(b): Frivolous or Groundless Claims

1. Liberal construction and definition of “frivolous”

NRS 18.010(2)(b) must be “liberally construe[d] … in favor of awarding attorney’s fees in all appropriate situations.” Interpreting this provision, the Court reiterates the standard from Capanna v. Orth, 134 Nev. 888, 895, 432 P.3d 726, 734 (2018):

“For purposes of NRS 18.010(2)(b), a claim is frivolous or groundless if there is no credible evidence to support it.”

The focus is not on whether the plaintiff ultimately loses, but on whether there was any credible evidentiary support for maintaining the claim.

2. Application to Fortunet’s claims against Coronel

The district court found that Fortunet had failed to produce “anything remotely resembling sufficient evidence” to support its claims against Coronel. The Supreme Court:

• Determines that substantial evidence supports the district court’s conclusion.
• Notes that this is consistent with its prior analysis in Fortunet III, where Fortunet’s claims against Coronel had already failed on the merits (through summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law).
• Holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Coronel attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b).

The Court also rejects Fortunet’s argument that NRS 600A.060(1) (the fee provision in the Nevada Uniform Trade Secrets Act) somehow undermined the fee award, emphasizing that the district court did not rely on that statute at all.

D. Law-of-the-Case from Fortunet II and Its Extension to Coronel

1. The law-of-the-case doctrine

The Court relies on Dictor v. Creative Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 126 Nev. 41, 44, 223 P.3d 332, 334 (2010), which explains:

“The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that when an appellate court decides a principle or rule of law, that decision governs the same issues in subsequent proceedings in that case.”

The doctrine applies to issues “explicitly or by necessary implication” decided. It promotes finality and prevents parties from relitigating issues simply because they now have better arguments or presentation. The Court reinforces this principle with Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975):

“The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings.”

2. What Fortunet II decided

In Fortunet II, the Supreme Court made several key rulings regarding Rosten’s fee and cost awards:

• The district court abused its discretion in awarding:
  • Attorney fees and costs incurred in the joint bankruptcy of Rosten and Coronel;
  • Attorney fees incurred in the appeal in Docket No. 72930 (Fortunet I);
  • Costs that were insufficiently documented; and
  • Interest charged by attorneys on unpaid fees.
• The district court further abused its discretion by failing to attempt to apportion fees and costs among the defendants—or to make findings showing that apportionment was impracticable.

The Court vacated those parts of Rosten’s award and remanded for apportionment and recalculation.

3. Applying Fortunet II to Coronel’s fee and cost award

In the present order, the Court holds that Fortunet II constitutes the law of the case for Coronel’s fee and cost claims as well, to the extent those claims relate to the same categories of fees and costs. Specifically, the Court rules that:

• To the extent Coronel sought—and the district court awarded—the other half of the very same joint-bankruptcy fees, appeal fees, inadequately documented costs, and attorney interest already disallowed in Fortunet II, those awards are barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine.
• Coronel essentially repeats the policy and statutory arguments advanced by Rosten and previously rejected in Fortunet II. Those arguments cannot revive categories of fees and costs already deemed improper.

Accordingly, the Court:

• Reverses any part of Coronel’s award that corresponds to:
  • Joint bankruptcy fees and costs,
  • Fees incurred in the earlier appeal (Docket No. 72930),
  • Insufficiently documented costs, and
  • Interest charged by attorneys on unpaid fees.
• Reaffirms that the district court must properly apportion fees and costs among defendants or make express findings that apportionment is impracticable.

E. Documentation Requirements for Fees and Costs

1. Reisman Sorokac’s fees and NRCP 54(d)(2)(B)(v)

The Supreme Court vacates the award of attorney fees to the law firm Reisman Sorokac and remands for the district court to determine whether Coronel provided “adequate supporting documentation” for those fees.

The Court cites NRCP 54(d)(2)(B)(v), which requires that a motion for attorney fees be supported by documentation addressing:

• The amount of fees claimed, and
• Sufficient detail to allow the court (and the opposing party) to evaluate the necessity and reasonableness of those fees.

By vacating and remanding on this point, the Court emphasizes that large fee awards must rest on a clear, documented record—billing entries, explanations of work performed, and the like. Conclusory or aggregated figures are not enough.

2. Costs: reasonableness, necessity, and actual incurrence

The Court also vacates Coronel’s cost award to the extent it was not addressed in Fortunet II, and remands for a determination of:

• Which specific costs were supported by evidence, and
• Whether those costs were reasonable, necessary, and actually incurred.

This requirement flows from Gibellini v. Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1206, 885 P.2d 540, 543 (1994), which requires proof of the actual reasonable costs incurred. Again, the Court insists on an evidentiary foundation for significant cost awards.

F. Prejudgment Interest on Attorney Fees and Costs

1. No prejudgment interest on NRS 18.010(2)(b) fee awards

The Court announces an important limitation: prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130 does not apply to attorney fees awarded under NRS 18.010(2)(b).

The reasoning has two parts:

1. Nature of prejudgment interest – compensatory, not punitive
   Citing Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Sharp, 101 Nev. 824, 826, 711 P.2d 1, 2 (1985), the Court stresses that prejudgment interest is:

   “Compensation for use by defendant of money to which plaintiff is entitled from the time the cause of action accrues until the time of judgment; it is not designed as a penalty.”

   By contrast, the purpose of attorney fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b) is expressly punitive: to “punish” parties for frivolous or vexatious litigation. Because these fees are not awarded to compensate for the time-value of money wrongfully withheld, but to sanction abusive litigation, they do not fit within the compensatory rationale of NRS 17.130.

2. Unascertainability of fees before judgment
   The Court further notes that it has previously prohibited prejudgment interest on awards that are not ascertainable until the entry of judgment. See, e.g., Jeaness v. Besnilian, 101 Nev. 536, 541, 706 P.2d 143, 147 (1985).

   Under NRS 18.010(2)(b), a district court “may make an allowance” of attorney fees to a prevailing party. There is:

   • No fixed entitlement to such fees in advance;
   • No ascertainable amount until the court has reviewed and evaluated the fee motion; and
   • No way to calculate what portion, if any, will be deemed reasonable and awarded.

   Accordingly, Coronel’s entitlement to attorney fees—and the amount thereof—was not determinable before the court’s fee decision. That precludes prejudgment interest.

On these grounds, the Court holds that the district court erred by applying NRS 17.130 prejudgment interest to the attorney fees awarded under NRS 18.010(2)(b), and it reverses that part of the award.

2. Prejudgment interest on costs: remand for timing evidence

The Court takes a more limited approach to prejudgment interest on costs. It does not hold that such interest is categorically improper. Instead, it vacates the interest award on costs and remands because “it is not clear whether Coronel proved when those costs were incurred.”

The timing matters because prejudgment interest compensates for the period during which the party was deprived of the money. As the Court notes, citing Albios v. Horizon Communities, Inc., 122 Nev. 409, 429, 132 P.3d 1022, 1035 (2006), the calculation of interest generally depends on proof of when the amounts became due or were incurred.

The district court is directed on remand to:

• Determine when the allowable costs were incurred, and then
• Recalculate prejudgment interest on those costs, if any, based on that evidence.

G. Waiver of Undeveloped Arguments

The Court notes, in a brief but instructive passage, that it will not consider Fortunet’s assertion that the district court required an excessive security bond to stay enforcement of the fee order. The reason: Fortunet “does not present meaningful argument on this point.”

Citing Edwards v. Emperor’s Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006), the Court reiterates that cursory, unsupported assertions on appeal are treated as waived. This is a reminder that even potentially meritorious objections can be lost if not briefed with adequate legal and factual support.

V. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

For non-specialists, the order uses several important doctrines. Here is a simplified overview.

1. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel)

Issue preclusion stops a party from re-arguing an issue that:

• Was already decided by a court,
• Was essential to that earlier decision,
• Involved the same parties (or their privies), and
• Resulted in a final ruling on that issue.

In this case:

• The 2013 order precludes re-asking for first-trial fees that were already denied.
• But it does not preclude later fees for separate claims that were still stayed in bankruptcy and had not yet been litigated.

2. Law-of-the-Case Doctrine

Law of the case means that when an appellate court decides a legal issue in a case, that decision controls the same issue in later stages of the same case. Parties cannot revisit it simply because they have a new angle or better brief.

Here, Fortunet II already:

• Disallowed fees for the joint bankruptcy,
• Disallowed fees for the prior appeal,
• Rejected inadequately documented costs and attorney interest, and
• Required apportionment among defendants.

Those rulings bind the parties and the district court in Coronel’s fee proceedings as well.

3. Prevailing Party and Sanction-Based Fees (NRS 18.010(2)(b))

A “prevailing party” is the side that wins the case (or the dispositive issues). NRS 18.010(2)(b) allows a Nevada court to award that party attorney fees where:

• The losing party’s claim or defense had no reasonable basis, or
• It was pursued to harass.

These fees are akin to sanctions: they punish baseless litigation and deter similar conduct. A claim is frivolous if there is no credible evidence supporting it.

4. Summary Judgment vs. Judgment as a Matter of Law

• Summary judgment – Granted before trial when there are no genuine disputes of material fact, so the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the existing record.
• Judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) – Granted during or after trial when, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable jury could find for that party.

In Fortunet III, Coronel obtained both forms of relief on different claims, underscoring the weakness of Fortunet’s case—a factor that underpins the finding of frivolousness.

5. Prejudgment Interest (NRS 17.130)

Prejudgment interest is extra money added to a judgment to compensate a party for being deprived of the money awarded before judgment. It is:

• Compensatory, not punitive, and
• Typically calculated from the date the loss occurred or the claim accrued.

Because sanction-based attorney fees (like those under NRS 18.010(2)(b)) are neither compensatory nor determinable before judgment, they are not eligible for prejudgment interest.

6. Apportionment of Fees and Costs Among Defendants

When multiple defendants are represented and fee requests are made, courts generally must:

• Allocate (apportion) the fees and costs among them according to:
  • Which defendant incurred which fees, and
  • Which claims those fees relate to;
• Or explain why such apportionment is impracticable.

Failing to apportion, or to explain why apportionment is impossible, is an abuse of discretion and will often result in vacatur and remand, as in Fortunet II and this order.

VI. Broader Impact and Practical Implications

A. Clarifying the Reach of NRS 18.010(2)(b)

The order reinforces and operationalizes NRS 18.010(2)(b) in several ways:

• Confirms the statute must be liberally applied in favor of fees in appropriate cases.
• Adopts a clear evidentiary standard: a claim is frivolous if there is “no credible evidence” to support it.
• Signals that a pattern of dispositive rulings against a plaintiff (summary judgment, JMOL, etc.) can help demonstrate frivolousness.

This will likely embolden prevailing defendants in Nevada to seek fees when claims appear unsupported by evidence and may encourage plaintiffs to reassess weak or speculative claims as litigation progresses.

B. Stronger Constraints on Duplicative and Poorly-Documented Fee Awards

The decision also tightens control over fee and cost awards by:

• Extending law-of-the-case constraints to prevent defendants from recovering the same types of fees and costs (e.g., joint bankruptcy work, appeal fees) under different labels or through different parties.
• Requiring strict compliance with documentation rules for attorney fees and costs, especially for large or complex multi-defendant matters.
• Reinforcing that partial final judgments (like the 2013 order) can bar later attempts to recoup fees that were already denied.

This will push litigants to:

• Fully present fee claims the first time, and
• Maintain detailed billing and cost records that link specific work to particular parties and claims.

C. Prejudgment Interest: Distinguishing Compensation from Punishment

By refusing to allow prejudgment interest on NRS 18.010(2)(b) fees, the Court draws a bright line between:

• Compensatory awards (like damages or costs), which may qualify for prejudgment interest when ascertainable, and
• Punitive or sanction-based awards (like fees for frivolous litigation), which do not.

This clarification adds predictability to fee litigation and avoids turning sanctions into a form of compound punishment through interest accrual.

D. Implications for Multi-Phase and Multi-Party Litigation

The Fortunet litigation involved multiple defendants, multiple trials, and multiple appeals, plus a bankruptcy overlay. This order therefore offers guidance for similarly complex cases:

• Bankruptcy stays mean that early orders may not preclude later fee awards on stayed claims, because the merits and frivolousness of those claims have not yet been “actually and necessarily litigated.”
• Partial finality ensures that once a court has fully resolved fee entitlement for a completed phase (e.g., the first trial), those issues cannot be reopened to recover the same fees under a different theory.
• Apportionment and consistency across co-defendants – Trial courts must ensure that, when husband-and-wife or related-entity defendants seek fees and costs, the total awards do not exceed what is legally permissible, and that no party “picks up” categories of fees already forbidden to another.

VII. Conclusion

The Nevada Supreme Court’s order in Fortunet, Inc. v. Coronel delivers several interconnected holdings that will shape fee and cost practice in Nevada:

• It upholds a significant attorney-fee sanction under NRS 18.010(2)(b) based on the absence of credible evidence supporting Fortunet’s claims against Coronel.
• It carefully applies issue preclusion and the law-of-the-case doctrine to:
  • Prevent re-litigation of first-trial fee denials, and
  • Extend prior rulings in Fortunet II to bar overlapping or duplicative fee and cost categories.
• It insists on rigorous documentation for both fees and costs, requiring proof of reasonableness, necessity, and actual incurrence.
• It establishes an important doctrinal line: prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130 does not apply to punitive, sanction-based attorney-fee awards under NRS 18.010(2)(b), and may only be applied to costs when the timing of those costs is proven.

Beyond resolving the parties’ dispute, the order offers a detailed roadmap for Nevada courts and litigants on how to handle sanction-based fees, repeated fee requests in multi-phase litigation, and the careful calculation of costs and interest. It reinforces that while Nevada courts will vigorously sanction frivolous claims, they will also closely scrutinize fee and cost requests to prevent overreach, duplication, and inadequate documentation.