Form AO 247 Is Enough: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms Minimal-Explanation Denials of Amendment 821 Motions When the Original Sentencing Record Addresses § 3553(a)

Introduction

In United States v. Gerald Bass, Nos. 25-1297/1303 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025) (not recommended for publication), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court’s denial of a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) following the Sentencing Commission’s 2023 Amendment 821. The case centers on two questions:

Whether the district court mistakenly deemed Bass ineligible for relief under Amendment 821; and
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying relief through the use of a form order (Form AO 247) without a fuller written explanation.

The panel—Judges Moore, Bush, and Davis, with Judge John K. Bush writing—held that the district court did not misunderstand eligibility and did not abuse its discretion in using the form order. The opinion clarifies, in the Sixth Circuit, that a form order suffices to deny a § 3582(c)(2) motion where the original sentencing record already reflects a thorough consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, especially where public-safety concerns drove an upward variance to the statutory maximum.

Summary of the Opinion

Eligibility: Although an earlier order mistakenly stated that Probation had found Bass ineligible, the district court corrected that scrivener’s error on reconsideration and acknowledged Bass’s eligibility under Amendment 821. There was no evidence the denial rested on a misunderstanding of eligibility.
Standard of Review: Denial of a § 3582(c)(2) motion and the adequacy of the court’s explanation are reviewed for abuse of discretion (citing United States v. Davis-Malone, 128 F.4th 829, 833–34 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2827 (2025)).
Two-Step Framework: Consistent with Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010), the district court must (1) determine eligibility and (2) decide, in its discretion and in light of § 3553(a) and post-sentencing conduct, whether a reduction is warranted.
Explanation Adequacy: Relying on Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109 (2018), and the Sixth Circuit’s recent Davis-Malone decision, the court held that Form AO 247 offered adequate explanation under the circumstances, because the original sentencing record already addressed the key § 3553(a) factors and the same judge presided at both stages.
Merits: The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce a 264-month sentence imposed as an upward variance to protect the public, particularly where the defendant’s motion did not meaningfully rebut those public-safety concerns and the record included a relatively recent prison assault infraction.
Disposition: Affirmed.

Case Background

Bass was convicted by a jury for his role as the ringleader of an extensive credit card fraud and identity theft operation. At the 2014 sentencing, the district court calculated a criminal history category VI and an offense level 25, yielding a Guidelines range of 110–137 months, which effectively became 134–161 months because one offense carried a mandatory two-year consecutive term. Concluding that an upward variance to the statutory maximum of 264 months was necessary “to protect the public from further criminal activity,” the district court imposed that sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in 2015 (United States v. Bass, 785 F.3d 1043 (6th Cir. 2015)).

After numerous unsuccessful collateral attacks, Bass filed the present motion in light of Amendment 821, which retroactively lowered certain criminal history scores. All parties agreed he was eligible, and Probation’s memorandum confirmed eligibility. The government nonetheless opposed a reduction on public-safety grounds, asserting Bass remained “a danger to the community.”

The district court denied the motion using Form AO 247. An earlier order included a scrivener’s error stating Probation found Bass ineligible; the court corrected that error and confirmed it had reviewed Probation’s (eligibility) recommendation before denial. Bass appealed, arguing both that the court misunderstood eligibility and that a form order was inadequate to support denial.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010): Establishes the two-step process for § 3582(c)(2) motions. Step one asks eligibility under the Commission’s retroactive amendments and policy statements (here, Amendment 821 and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10). Step two asks whether, in the court’s discretion and with due consideration of § 3553(a) and post-sentencing conduct, a reduction is warranted. The Sixth Circuit applied Dillon to frame the analysis.
Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109 (2018): Holds that a district court’s use of a form order can be adequate where the original sentencing record already reflects consideration of the salient § 3553(a) factors and the same judge presides. The Sixth Circuit relied heavily on Chavez-Meza to conclude that Form AO 247 sufficed here.
United States v. Davis-Malone, 128 F.4th 829 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2827 (2025): A recent Sixth Circuit decision upholding a form order denying an Amendment 821 motion, based on the adequacy of the original sentencing colloquy and the context. The court analogized Bass’s case to Davis-Malone.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), and Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007): These decisions establish the general principles for explanation of sentences and appellate review. The panel invoked Gall’s admonition to evaluate explanation adequacy in light of “the circumstances of the particular case” and Rita’s observation that the degree of explanation required can vary with context.
United States v. Studabaker, 578 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Mahbub, 818 F.3d 213 (6th Cir. 2016): Provide contours of abuse-of-discretion review in sentencing: significant procedural error, legal error, clearly erroneous factual findings, inadequate explanation, or sentences that are arbitrary or unreasonable.
United States v. Erker, 129 F.4th 966, 979–80 (6th Cir. 2025): Recognizes Amendment 821’s retroactivity, providing context for step-one eligibility under § 3582(c)(2).
Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 149 (2024): Cited in a footnote for the interpretive point that different statutory terms can carry different meanings; the panel used it to suggest that Congress’s inclusion of an explanation requirement in § 3553(c) but not in § 3582(c)(2) implies no categorical explanation requirement for sentence-modification orders—though the court did not resolve that question because it found the explanation adequate even if required.

Legal Reasoning

Eligibility under Amendment 821: The parties and Probation agreed Bass was eligible; his amended Guidelines range would have decreased to 124–149 months. A district court order briefly and erroneously stated the opposite, but the court corrected that scrivener’s error on reconsideration, expressly confirmed it had reviewed Probation’s recommendation, and denied on the merits. Because Bass offered no evidence that the denial was premised on ineligibility, the Sixth Circuit rejected this argument.
Discretionary denial based on § 3553(a) and post-sentencing conduct: Proceeding to Dillon’s second step, the district court concluded that a reduction was not warranted. The original sentencing transcript—62 pages—showed the court’s extensive findings:
- Bass orchestrated over 100 instances of identity theft and credit card fraud, causing losses exceeding $150,000 to seven victims.
- He had a lifelong pattern of fraud and identity theft, even following prior substantial custodial sentences, and had never held legitimate employment, deriving income solely from criminal activity.
- The court viewed Bass as a persistent public-safety risk who was unlikely to comply with the law, probation, or supervised release, and imposed an upward variance to the statutory maximum to protect the public.
The reduction motion, by contrast, emphasized minimal educational programming (about two hours per year) and a largely clean prison record but did not address the core public-protection concerns that drove the original upward variance; moreover, the record reflected a prison assault infraction two years before the motion, underscoring ongoing risk. On this record, the denial was not an abuse of discretion.
Adequacy of explanation via Form AO 247: Under Chavez-Meza and Davis-Malone, the adequacy of an explanation in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings depends on context. The Sixth Circuit examined the entire record—especially the original sentencing—and observed that:
- The same judge presided at both the original sentencing and the reduction motion.
- The original sentencing included a detailed, individualized colloquy addressing the very § 3553(a) factors still at issue, principally the need to protect the public.
- The motion offered nothing that materially undermined those original concerns.
In these circumstances, the use of Form AO 247 adequately conveyed the basis for denial; a longer written explanation was unnecessary. The panel also noted that, while the Supreme Court has not decided whether § 3582(c)(2) requires any explanation at all, the explanation here sufficed even assuming one was required.

Impact and Forward-Looking Consequences

Although designated “not recommended for publication,” Bass meaningfully reinforces Sixth Circuit practice in § 3582(c)(2) cases post–Amendment 821:

Form orders remain sufficient when the record speaks: District courts in the Sixth Circuit may continue to use Form AO 247 to deny § 3582(c)(2) relief after Amendment 821 where the original sentencing record demonstrates individualized consideration of § 3553(a), particularly public safety. The case extends Davis-Malone’s logic to a scenario where the original sentence reflected a substantial upward variance to the statutory maximum.
Eligibility ≠ entitlement: Even where Amendment 821 reduces a defendant’s Guidelines range and eligibility is uncontested, courts retain broad discretion to deny relief at step two based on § 3553(a) and post-sentencing conduct. A lowered range alone is not a ticket to a shorter sentence.
Scrivener’s errors, when corrected, are not reversible: Clerical mistakes that are promptly corrected—especially where the court clarifies it reviewed Probation’s recommendation—will not warrant reversal absent proof of substantive misunderstanding.
Defense practice point: To prevail on § 3582(c)(2) motions after Amendment 821, movants should engage the specific concerns that drove the original sentence (e.g., public-protection, deterrence), marshal concrete evidence of rehabilitation and lawful conduct, and explain why those developments alter the § 3553(a) calculus. Minimal programming and a thin disciplinary record may not overcome a robust original record finding persistent danger.
Institutional efficiency: By affirming form-order denials tied to an existing record, Bass promotes efficient adjudication of high-volume Amendment 821 motions while preserving meaningful appellate review through the “whole record” approach.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 3582(c)(2) sentence reductions: A limited mechanism allowing courts to reduce an imposed sentence when the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the applicable Guidelines range. It involves a two-step process: eligibility under the Commission’s policy statements, then a discretionary decision based on the § 3553(a) factors and post-sentencing conduct.
Amendment 821 (2023): A Sentencing Commission amendment that, among other things, reduces certain criminal history scores and is retroactive, allowing some defendants to seek sentence reductions.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10: The policy statement governing motions for sentence reductions under § 3582(c)(2), including which amendments are retroactive and the limits on reductions.
Form AO 247: A standardized federal form used to grant or deny sentence-reduction requests. It allows courts to check boxes and briefly mark their decision without a lengthy written opinion.
Upward variance: A sentence above the Guidelines range based on statutory sentencing factors (§ 3553(a)). Courts must justify variances by reference to case-specific considerations.
Mandatory consecutive sentence: A statutory requirement that a term of imprisonment be served consecutively to any other term. In Bass, one conviction carried a mandatory two-year consecutive term, effectively increasing the overall range.
Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard under which a decision is reversed only if grounded in a significant procedural or legal error, a clearly erroneous factual finding, an inadequate explanation, or an arbitrary/unreasonable outcome.
Scrivener’s error: A clerical mistake in a court order or document. When promptly corrected and contradicted by the broader record, it typically does not warrant reversal.

Conclusion

United States v. Bass reaffirms a practical but important principle for post-Amendment 821 sentence-reduction litigation in the Sixth Circuit: A district court’s use of Form AO 247 can be an adequate explanation for denying § 3582(c)(2) relief when the original sentencing record already addresses the key § 3553(a) considerations, especially the need to protect the public, and the same judge presides at both stages. The decision underscores that eligibility under Amendment 821 does not compel a reduction, and that defendants must directly confront the reasons that drove their original sentences—mere recalculations of Guidelines ranges or minimal rehabilitative efforts will often be insufficient. While unpublished, Bass complements Chavez-Meza and Davis-Malone, promoting efficient adjudication of retroactivity motions without sacrificing meaningful appellate review rooted in the whole record.