Forgoing a Suppression Motion Is Not Ineffective Assistance When Reasonable Suspicion to Prolong a Traffic Stop Is At Least Debatable

Introduction

In Richard Norris v. United States, No. 24-13306 (11th Cir. Sept. 23, 2025) (per curiam) (non-argument calendar) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging counsel’s effectiveness during plea negotiations. The narrow issue certified for appeal was whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not pursuing a motion to suppress evidence on the theory that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop to await a drug-sniffing dog. The panel (Judges Jordan, Luck, and Tjoflat) held that because the record showed at least a reasonable likelihood that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, Norris could not establish deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington. The court therefore did not reach Strickland prejudice and affirmed.

The decision clarifies, in the guilty-plea context, how Strickland’s deficiency inquiry interacts with Fourth Amendment suppression issues after Rodriguez v. United States: where the viability of a suppression motion is at least debatable, counsel’s strategic choice to pursue a plea rather than litigate suppression is not constitutionally deficient—especially given the strong deference afforded to counsel’s judgments in plea negotiations.

Summary of the Opinion

Scope: The court’s review was confined to the narrow Certificate of Appealability (COA) question: whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress on the ground that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop to conduct a dog sniff.
Legal framework: Applying Strickland and its plea-specific refinements (Hill, Padilla, Premo), the court emphasized that both Strickland prongs turn on the viability of the unfiled suppression motion (citing Arvelo).
Fourth Amendment merits lens: Under Caballes and Rodriguez, an officer may not extend a stop beyond the time reasonably required to address the traffic mission absent reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is assessed under the totality of the circumstances and may be supported by nervous or evasive behavior (Wardlow; Pruitt), though nervousness alone carries limited weight (Perkins; Prouse).
Facts supporting reasonable suspicion: The officer perceived Norris’s conduct as evasive (lane changes, brief gas-station stop while the officer trailed him), delayed compliance in pulling over despite safe opportunities, unusually ready presentation of a driver’s license suggesting an effort to hasten the encounter, and the officer’s prior familiarity with Norris from an earlier narcotics-paraphernalia incident.
Holding on deficiency: Because these facts provided at least a “minimal level of objective justification” for reasonable suspicion (Braddy) to extend the stop by about six to seven minutes for the K-9’s arrival, no competent attorney was constitutionally compelled to file a suppression motion. Counsel’s chosen strategy—to secure a plea rather than litigate suppression after the prosecutor warned that a suppression hearing would trigger trial readiness—was reasonable.
Prejudice: Not reached, given the failure on deficiency.
Disposition: Affirmed; § 2255 relief denied.

Detailed Analysis

Factual and Procedural Background

Norris pleaded guilty to (1) possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II controlled substance and (2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. The plea was accompanied by a factual resume admitting that a Gulf Shores police officer (Childress) stopped Norris on September 16, 2019, observed suspicious behavior, recognized him from a prior incident involving narcotics paraphernalia, advised that a canine unit would check the vehicle, and—after the dog alerted—found a methamphetamine pipe, a digital scale, 58 grams of methamphetamine, and a pistol. Norris admitted the drugs were for distribution and that he possessed the firearm in furtherance of that felony.

Norris later filed a pro se § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance for failing to challenge the stop’s prolongation and the search. After an evidentiary hearing focused on counsel’s failure to advise of a Fourth Amendment defense and to file a suppression motion, the magistrate judge recommended denial but proposed a COA on the narrow “reasonable suspicion to prolong” issue. The district court denied relief but granted the COA, and Norris appealed.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): Establishes the two-prong test—deficient performance and prejudice. The “benchmark” is whether counsel’s conduct undermined the adversarial process to the point that the result cannot be trusted. This case supplies the fundamental framework.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985): Extends Strickland to the guilty-plea context, confirming its applicability to claims arising from plea advice.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010): Clarifies that to show plea-stage prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that rejecting the plea would have been rational under the circumstances. This raises the bar by tying prejudice to rational decision-making in the face of risks.
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011): Emphasizes heightened deference to counsel’s strategic judgments during plea bargaining (“the art of negotiation”). Critically, the opinion leverages Premo’s articulation that deficiency is not shown unless no competent counsel would have proceeded as counsel did—here, forgoing suppression in favor of plea benefits.
Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc): Underscores that courts review only what is constitutionally compelled, not what might be prudent; bolsters deference to professional judgment.
Arvelo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 788 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2015): In suppression-claim-based IAC challenges, both Strickland prongs turn on the motion’s viability. This case tightly couples the constitutional analysis to the likely outcome of the underlying Fourth Amendment motion.
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005): Dog sniffs during a traffic stop are permissible so long as they do not prolong the stop beyond the time needed to handle the traffic mission.
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015): A stop may not be extended—even briefly—beyond the mission of the stop absent reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. Rodriguez eliminated a “de minimis” extension exception.
United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965 (11th Cir. 2003): A stop may be prolonged if the officer can articulate reasonable suspicion of unrelated criminal activity; nervousness alone is often too weak, but it may contribute when combined with other factors.
United States v. Braddy, 11 F.4th 1298 (11th Cir. 2021): Describes reasonable suspicion as requiring a “minimal level of objective justification,” assessed under the totality of circumstances.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000): Nervous, evasive behavior can be pertinent for reasonable suspicion.
United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 1999): Evasive behavior (including reluctance to stop) can support reasonable suspicion.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979): Acknowledges that traffic stops are unsettling and may provoke nervousness, limiting the weight of that factor standing alone.
Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1994): Reinforces the highly deferential review of attorney performance, especially given the uncertainties and judgment calls inherent in litigation.
Rhode v. United States, 583 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2009) and Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 1998): Confine appellate review to the issues delineated in the COA.
Osley v. United States, 751 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2014) and Devine v. United States, 520 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2008): Address standards of review in § 2255 cases (de novo for mixed questions; clear error for facts).

These authorities collectively shape the court’s posture: a narrow COA, de novo review of the mixed Strickland question, strong deference to counsel in plea bargaining, and a Fourth Amendment framework that allows brief prolongation of a stop only upon reasonable suspicion, assessed holistically.

Legal Reasoning

1) The COA’s Narrow Frame

The COA asked only whether counsel was ineffective for not filing a suppression motion premised on a lack of reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for a dog sniff. Other potential Fourth Amendment issues (e.g., the legality of the initial stop or broader search doctrines) were beyond the appellate mandate.

2) Strickland’s Deficiency Prong as the Decisive Hurdle

Under Strickland and Premo, Norris had to show that “no competent attorney” would have forgone the suppression motion—that is, that the motion was so strong that counsel’s contrary strategy fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court answered “no” for two independent reasons:

Reasonable suspicion was at least likely present under the totality of the circumstances; therefore, a suppression motion was not clearly meritorious.
Counsel’s plea-bargaining strategy—especially after the prosecutor indicated that litigating suppression would effectively tee up trial—was a reasonable strategic judgment to preserve plea benefits.

3) Reasonable Suspicion to Prolong Under Rodriguez

Rodriguez holds that a stop cannot be extended for a dog sniff beyond the time needed to accomplish the traffic mission absent reasonable suspicion. The panel cataloged several specific facts supporting reasonable suspicion:

Evasive driving while being followed: lane changes and a short stop at a gas station before re-entering the road (Pruitt; Wardlow).
Delay in pulling over despite safe opportunities, after emergency lights were activated (Pruitt).
Unusually anticipatory behavior—already holding a driver’s license when the officer reached the window—suggesting an effort to expedite the encounter consistent with consciousness of guilt (a permissible inference among others).
Prior knowledge: the officer recognized Norris from a recent incident involving narcotics paraphernalia at a residence from which Norris had been evicted (relevance to the totality analysis).

Together, these factors provided at least the “minimal level of objective justification” (Braddy) for reasonable suspicion to extend the stop for approximately six to seven minutes for a K-9 unit. Importantly, while any single factor (especially nervousness) can be weak, the totality made the suspicion more than a mere hunch (Perkins; Prouse; Wardlow).

4) Counsel’s Strategic Plea Decision

The panel afforded special deference to counsel’s decisions during plea negotiations (Premo; Bolender; Chandler). Counsel testified that the prosecutor conveyed a clear consequence: if the defense pressed a suppression hearing, the government would prepare for it and, concomitantly, for trial. Against that backdrop—plus the at-best uncertain prospects of suppression—trial counsel’s choice to pursue a plea agreement to secure sentencing benefits was a reasonable, professional judgment.

5) No Need to Reach Prejudice

Because Norris failed to meet Strickland’s deficiency prong, the court did not reach prejudice. Had it done so, the standards would have required Norris to show that (a) the suppression motion would likely have been granted and (b) rejecting the plea would have been rational under the circumstances (Padilla; Premo). The facts of record—including Norris’s sworn admissions at the plea hearing and acceptance of a favorable guideline sentence—would have posed significant additional obstacles, though the panel had no need to address them.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished and not precedential, Norris carries several practical lessons for the Eleventh Circuit and beyond:

Ineffective assistance claims premised on unfiled suppression motions face a steep climb. Where reasonable suspicion to prolong a stop is at least debatable, deficiency will rarely be found. Arvelo’s reminder that both Strickland prongs turn on motion viability is front and center.
Plea-bargaining deference is robust. Premo’s enhanced deference to counsel’s negotiation decisions means that strategic choices designed to preserve plea benefits—even at the expense of litigating suppression—are generally insulated from Strickland deficiency claims, especially when the government signals that suppression litigation will jeopardize the plea posture.
Reasonable suspicion in the traffic-stop context remains a totality-of-circumstances analysis. Evasive driving behavior, delayed compliance with signals to stop, anticipatory conduct at the window, and known prior drug-related incidents can aggregate to justify a brief extension for a dog sniff.
Rodriguez’s “no de minimis extension” rule is alive and well. The fact that only six to seven minutes elapsed did not immunize the prolongation; rather, the court examined whether reasonable suspicion justified that delay.
Documentation matters. Officers who contemporaneously note the specific behaviors supporting suspicion (as the officer did here) strengthen the government’s position both at suppression and in collateral IAC litigation.
For defense counsel, early and frank assessments are key. Where reasonable suspicion is plausible and the prosecutor ties plea availability to litigation posture, counsel should (a) memorialize advice given to the client, (b) document the government’s representations about the plea’s contingency, and (c) consider whether a negotiated plea provides a better overall outcome than a risky suppression motion.

Because the opinion is unpublished, it is not binding, but it is persuasive within the Eleventh Circuit and consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance on Strickland and Rodriguez.

Complex Concepts Simplified

28 U.S.C. § 2255: A federal prisoner’s vehicle to attack a conviction or sentence on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds. It is not a substitute for direct appeal and often requires a higher showing to upset finality.
Certificate of Appealability (COA): A gatekeeping mechanism. The appellate court may consider only the issues specified in the COA. Here, it was narrowly framed to the reasonable-suspicion-to-prolong question and counsel’s failure to litigate it.
Strickland’s two prongs:
- Deficiency: Counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness—i.e., no competent attorney would have acted likewise.
- Prejudice: A reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different. In plea cases, the defendant must also show that rejecting the plea would have been rational.
Reasonable suspicion vs. probable cause: Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold—it requires specific, articulable facts suggesting criminal activity, judged under the totality of the circumstances. Probable cause requires a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found.
Mission of the stop: Tasks related to the traffic infraction (e.g., checking license, registration, and warrants). Non-mission activities (like a dog sniff) may not prolong the stop unless supported by reasonable suspicion.
Per curiam; non-argument calendar; unpublished: A per curiam opinion is issued by the court collectively. Non-argument calendar means the case was decided without oral argument. Unpublished opinions are generally not binding precedent but can be cited as persuasive authority depending on circuit rules.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Norris reinforces two intertwined principles. First, in the traffic-stop context post-Rodriguez, reasonable suspicion is evaluated holistically and may be supported by a blend of evasive driving behavior, delayed compliance, anticipatory conduct at the window, and prior drug-related knowledge. Second, in ineffective-assistance claims arising from guilty pleas, courts owe “doubly deferential” regard to counsel’s strategic choices, particularly when the government signals that suppression litigation will endanger plea negotiations. Because the officer here likely had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for a dog sniff, counsel’s decision to forgo a suppression motion in favor of a negotiated plea was not constitutionally deficient. The court accordingly affirmed without reaching prejudice.

While unpublished, the opinion offers a clear, practical roadmap: unless a suppression motion is plainly strong, defense counsel’s decision to prioritize plea benefits over uncertain Fourth Amendment litigation will typically survive Strickland scrutiny. For law enforcement, it underscores the importance of contemporaneously articulating specific, objective facts supporting reasonable suspicion when extending a stop for a K-9.