Forfeiture of Untimely Statute-of-Limitations Arguments and Futility of Amendment: A Commentary on Kode v. Pargin (5th Cir. 2025)

Forfeiture of Untimely Statute-of-Limitations Arguments and Futility of Amendment:
A Structured Commentary on Kode v. Pargin, No. 24-50759 (5th Cir. Aug. 7 2025)

1. Introduction

The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Kode v. Pargin addresses a sprawling pro se civil-rights and RICO action brought by Siddharth Kode against a host of county entities and private neighbors. Although the district court dismissed all claims, the appeal was narrowed to those against two neighbors—Joseph and Kimberly Pargin—including claims under:

  • the Fair Housing Act (FHA),
  • 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1982 (Civil Rights Act of 1866),
  • 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985 (Ku Klux Klan Act),
  • Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
  • civil RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962), and
  • a pendent Texas Fair Housing Act claim.

The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal on statute-of-limitations and pleading-deficiency grounds, denied leave to amend as futile, and upheld rejection of a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. Significantly, the panel clarifies that:

  1. a statute-of-limitations argument raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration is forfeited, and
  2. amendment is futile where a pro se plaintiff cannot articulate additional facts capable of curing the deficiencies identified under Rules 8(a), 9(b), or 12(b)(6).

2. Summary of the Judgment

Applying de novo review, the Fifth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court’s multi-faceted dismissal:

  • Civil-rights claims (FHA, §§ 1981/1982, §§ 1983/1985, Title VI) were barred by Texas’s two-year limitations period. The court rejected Kode’s reliance on the continuing-violation doctrine and held that his belated assertion of a four-year period for § 1981 was forfeited.
  • RICO claims failed Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard because the complaint lacked transaction-specific facts linking each defendant to predicate acts of fraud.
  • Leave to amend was properly denied as futile: Kode had already amended once and could not identify additional non-conclusory facts to salvage his claims.
  • Rule 59(e) reconsideration was denied because Kode merely re-hashed arguments and introduced new theories that should have been raised earlier.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Pleading & Dismissal Standards

  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) & Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) – plausibility requirement.
  • Petrobras America, Inc. v. Samsung Heavy Industries, 9 F.4th 247 (5th Cir. 2021) – de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.
  • Williams v. WMX Technologies, 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997) – Rule 9(b) applies to RICO fraud predicates.

Statute-of-Limitations & Tolling

  • Jones v. Alcoa Inc., 339 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2003) – limits defense on the face of the pleadings.
  • Price v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1988) – two-year limitations for §§ 1981/1983 in Texas.
  • Heath v. Southern University Board, 850 F.3d 731 (5th Cir. 2017) – continuing-violation doctrine elements.

Amendment & Reconsideration

  • Stripling v. Jordan Production, 234 F.3d 863 (5th Cir. 2000) – futility standard for amendments.
  • Templet v. HydroChem, 367 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2004) – Rule 59(e) is extraordinary; cannot raise new theories.
  • U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Verizon Commc’ns, 761 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2014) – issues first raised in reconsideration motions are forfeited on appeal.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Statute of Limitations
All civil-rights claims accrued no later than October 2021. Texas’s two-year residual limitations period, borrowed for federal civil-rights statutes lacking their own limitations, expired October 2023—months before suit was filed (December 2023). The court rejected:

  • the continuing-violation doctrine because Kode identified no actionable discriminatory act by either Pargin within the two-year window; and
  • the belated four-year § 1981 argument as forfeited; new limitations theories cannot be sprung in a Rule 59(e) motion or on appeal.

b. Pleading of RICO Fraud
Rule 9(b) demands “who, what, when, where, and how.” Kode’s allegations were global assertions of a “racketeering enterprise” without dates, communications, or fraudulent transactions involving the Pargins. Absence of transaction-level detail warranted dismissal.

c. Futility of Amendment
Because Kode could not specify additional non-barred events or concrete facts, any amendment would also fail Rule 12(b)(6). The court therefore exercised discretion to deny further leave despite Kode’s pro se status.

d. Rule 59(e)
Reconsideration requires manifest error or newly discovered evidence. Simply invoking a longer limitations period, without supporting authority or newly found facts, did not satisfy that narrow standard.

3.3 Potential Impact

  • Forfeiture Doctrine Clarified – The case reinforces that litigants must timely raise limitations defenses and tolling theories; waiting until a Rule 59(e) motion risks permanent forfeiture on appeal.
  • Pleading Stringency for RICO – Underscores that broad conspiracy narratives will not survive Rule 9(b) scrutiny absent date-, content-, and role-specific allegations.
  • Limits on Pro Se Leniency – While courts grant latitude to pro se litigants, Kode confirms that repeated insufficient amendments coupled with vague promises of new facts justify refusal of further leave.
  • Continuing-Violation Doctrine Narrowed – The decision serves as a caution that the doctrine requires at least one independently actionable event within the statutory window; innocuous or non-discriminatory acts are inadequate.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Statute of Limitations
The period within which a lawsuit must be filed. If the deadline passes, the claim is barred unless a tolling doctrine applies.
Continuing-Violation Doctrine
Allows plaintiffs to sue for a series of related wrongful acts if at least one act occurred within the limitations period. Acts outside the window are then considered timely.
Rule 9(b)
A Federal Rule requiring fraud allegations to be pled with detailed specificity—who did what, when, where, and how—so defendants know the precise misconduct alleged.
Futility of Amendment
Courts may deny leave to amend a complaint if the proposed amendment would still be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6); i.e., it cannot possibly cure the deficiencies.
Rule 59(e) Motion
A post-judgment request asking the trial court to alter or amend its judgment due to manifest errors or newly discovered evidence. It is not meant for presenting new arguments that could have been made earlier.

5. Conclusion

Kode v. Pargin illustrates the Fifth Circuit’s unwillingness to relax procedural safeguards merely because a case involves civil-rights allegations or a pro se litigant. The decision reiterates:

  1. a two-year limitations period governs most Texas-based federal civil-rights claims unless a timely argument establishes otherwise,
  2. continuing-violation doctrine requires a discriminatory act within the window,
  3. fraud-based RICO claims demand Rule 9(b) particularity, and
  4. post-judgment motions cannot be used to inject new theories.

The ruling therefore serves as a practical guidepost for future litigants: articulate all tolling arguments early, plead fraud with granular detail, and be prepared to demonstrate exactly how proposed amendments will cure deficiencies. Failing to do so will, as here, leave the judgment “AFFIRMED.”

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

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