Introduction

This commentary analyzes the recent decision in Diego Penaranda Arevalo v. Pamela Bondi, United States Attorney General rendered by the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit on March 7, 2025. The judgment raises significant questions regarding procedural requirements in immigration removal proceedings—most notably, the treatment of the time-and-place requirement contained in a Notice to Appear as delineated in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). The case involves a petitioner, Mr. Penaranda Arevalo, an Ecuadorian national unlawfully present in the United States, who sought relief from removal through a cancellation application. His application was denied on the basis of findings of false testimony and the consequent failure to establish good moral character, as well as an untimely objection to a technical defect in his notice to appear.

Two critical petitions were considered in tandem. In the first, Mr. Penaranda challenged the Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) adverse factual findings regarding his testimony and the standard applied in evaluating the bona fides of his marriage to Lucy. In the subsequent petition, he raised a procedural argument contesting the omission of a specific date and time in his Notice to Appear, arguing that this omission rendered his removal order invalid under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). The decision has now established important procedural clarifications regarding claim‐processing rules versus jurisdictional requirements.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court considered and decided two petitions. First, with respect to the objection based on the missing time-and-place information in the Notice to Appear (the 2024 petition), the Court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Banegas Gomez v. Barr that such a requirement is non-jurisdictional. The Court held that because Mr. Penaranda failed to raise the objection in a timely manner before the conclusion of the IJ proceedings, his right to contest this procedural defect was forfeited. Therefore, his petition regarding the procedural challenge was denied.

In the second petition (the 2023 petition), Mr. Penaranda challenged the IJ’s factual determinations that he gave false testimony—testimony that was crucial in denying his cancellation of removal application—and argued that the IJ improperly applied an overly strict standard of proof. The Court found that factual determinations about false testimony are nonreviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and that the raised question regarding the standard of proof did not, in fact, demonstrate an error in legal analysis. Therefore, this petition was dismissed in part and denied in part.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment builds on several important precedents:

• Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2019): This case established that the time-and-place requirement in a Notice to Appear is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but rather a claim‐processing rule. The Court reaffirmed this analysis in the current case, determining that failure to raise any objection to the notice on time amounts to forfeiture.
• Matter of Fernandes and Matter of Nchifor: Both of these decisions are noted for emphasizing that certain procedural requirements—while mandatory—do not create independent jurisdictional thresholds. Instead, such requirements ensure orderly progression of litigation and may be waived or forfeited if not timely raised.
• Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): Although Mr. Penaranda relied on this decision to suggest that agency interpretations should not receive deference, the Court clarified that independent statutory analysis of claim‐processing rules remains intact. As a result, the characterization of Section 1229(a) underpins the decision.
• Other Circuit Decisions: The opinion also references decisions from various circuits such as the Third, Tenth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, all of which consistently deem Section 1229(a)(1)’s requirements non-jurisdictional.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in two major parts. In the first part, regarding the procedural objection, the Court analyzed the statutory language of 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) and concluded that the requirement to include both the time and place in a Notice to Appear is meant to promote orderly litigation rather than serve as a jurisdictional limitation. This reasoning is consistent with the view that such requirements are “claim‐processing” in nature and can be forfeited if not timely raised.

In the second part, addressing the cancellation of removal petition, the Court examined the substantive allegations regarding false testimony. The Court held that issues relating to whether the petitioner deliberately provided false testimony—especially when tied to his subjective intent to obtain an immigration benefit—are questions of fact. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), such factual determinations are not reviewable on appeal. Consequently, even though the petitioner argued that the IJ applied an overly stringent standard of proof (i.e., clear and convincing evidence rather than a preponderance standard), the Court found this challenge unpersuasive because the IJ’s statements and the record did not support a misapplication of the law.

Impact on Future Cases and the Relevant Area of Law

This judgment reinforces the principle that procedural claims tied to notice requirements in immigration proceedings are non-jurisdictional. As such, litigants must assert such objections in a timely manner during initial proceedings or risk forfeiture. This clarification will likely guide future challenges in removal proceedings and reinforce the boundaries of appellate review concerning factual determinations of intent and credibility.

Moreover, by rejecting arguments based on alleged misapplications of proof standards in the determination of false testimony, the Court reaffirms the substantial leeway given to immigration judges in evaluating credibility and the quality of evidence. This could affect similar cancellation cases, making litigants more cautious in raising late procedural arguments and challenging the factual findings of the IJ.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Several complex legal ideas emerge in this opinion:

• Non-Jurisdictional Claim-Processing Rule: This concept means that a requirement (here, the notice to appear’s time-and-place detail) is meant to ensure procedural order rather than to limit an adjudicating court's power. If a party fails to raise an objection about such a defect at the appropriate time, that failure effectively means the objection is waived.
• Forfeiture of an Objection: If a petitioner does not timely object to a procedural defect, the law does not allow this argument to be raised later on appeal.
• Reviewability of Factual Findings: The Court explained that factual determinations—especially regarding a petitioner’s credibility or intent—are generally not reviewable. This prevents appellate courts from re-weighing evidence that was assessed by the more proximate fact-finder, the immigration judge.
• Standard of Proof in Administrative Proceedings: Although the petitioner argued that a lower standard such as preponderance of the evidence should have applied, the Court clarified that the higher standard emerges only in contexts where there is a presumption (e.g., a fraudulent marriage during removal proceedings) that must then be rebutted.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the decision in Diego Penaranda Arevalo v. U.S. Attorney General has substantial implications for immigration law. The Court decisively held that:

• The requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) mandating that a Notice to Appear include the time and place of a hearing is a non-jurisdictional claim‐processing rule. As such, a party may forfeit the right to contest this omission if not raised in a timely fashion.
• Appellate review cannot extend to factual determinations about whether a petitioner gave false testimony for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit. These credibility and intent assessments are reserved for the fact-finder.
• Even challenges involving the applicable standard of proof are limited by what the record supports, reinforcing discretion in the IJ’s evaluation process.

The judgment serves as a cautionary tale for those facing removal proceedings: procedural objections must be raised promptly, and challenges to factual findings related to credibility and intent will generally not be reexamined on appeal. This decision further clarifies the balance between protecting the orderly administration of immigration proceedings and ensuring that substantive due process rights are preserved.

Final Takeaways

This opinion stands as an important precedent in immigration law by underlining that:

• The time-and-place requirement in removal proceedings is procedural and, if not timely objected to, is forfeited.
• Factual determinations, particularly those involving a petitioner’s intent and credibility, remain insulated from appellate review.
• Legal challenges against the application of a higher standard of proof, where not clearly demonstrated by the record, will not succeed.

As immigration courts and litigants move forward, this decision will influence the strategy in both presenting evidence and raising procedural issues, ensuring adherence to strict timelines and highlighting the boundaries of review in discretionary relief cases.