Forfeiture at the Hearing: Cain v. Bisignano Solidifies the Seventh Circuit Rule on Vocational-Expert Objections and Reaffirms the “Minimal Articulation” Standard

Introduction

In Jonathan D. Cain v. Frank Bisignano, No. 24-1590 (7th Cir. Aug. 4 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed two recurring themes in Social Security disability litigation: (1) the degree of explanation an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) must give when evaluating medical opinions under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c (the “minimal articulation” question), and (2) whether a claimant’s failure to challenge a vocational expert’s (VE) methodology or qualifications during the administrative hearing forfeits that issue on appeal.

Plaintiff-appellant Jonathan Cain alleged disability due to degenerative disc disease, migraines, obesity, depression, and anxiety. An ALJ found him capable of certain sedentary work and denied Supplemental Security Income (SSI). After the district court affirmed, Cain appealed, asserting a litany of errors regarding medical-opinion evaluation and the reliability of VE testimony. Judge Maldonado, writing for a unanimous panel (Ripple and Scudder, JJ.), affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit held:

The ALJ satisfied the “minimal articulation” standard by adequately explaining the supportability and consistency factors when weighing competing medical opinions.
The ALJ permissibly discounted portions of the consultative physical therapist’s report that were inconsistent with other objective evidence, without rejecting Cain’s subjective complaints outright.
The ALJ properly harmonised and relied upon state-agency psychologists’ Mental Residual Functional Capacity (MRFC) findings, translating moderate mental limitations into an RFC that limited Cain to simple, routine, repetitive work with limited social interaction.
Under Brown v. Colvin, Donahue v. Barnhart, and the recent Fetting v. Kijakazi, a claimant who fails to object to a VE’s methodology or qualifications at the hearing forfeits those arguments in court. Sims v. Apfel’s non-exhaustion principle does not rescue such forfeiture.
Even absent forfeiture, the VE’s methodology—pulling data from Department of Labor sources, Census figures, and professional experience—was sufficiently reliable under circuit precedent.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Crowell v. Kijakazi, 72 F.4th 810 (7th Cir. 2023) – reiterated the substantial-evidence standard and “logical bridge” requirement; the Cain court anchored its deferential review to this framework.
Warnell v. O’Malley, 97 F.4th 1050 (7th Cir. 2024) – emphasised that ALJs face only “minimal articulation” obligations; invoked to uphold the succinct discussion of § 416.920c factors.
Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2018) – requires an ALJ to confront contrary evidence; Cain court found this satisfied by the ALJ’s acknowledgment of the physical therapist’s restrictive sitting assessment.
Prill v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 738 (7th Cir. 2022); Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118 (7th Cir. 2014) – guideposts on handling medical opinions grounded in subjective complaints; used to validate the ALJ’s discounting of unsupported limitations.
Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2015) & DeCamp v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2019) – stress that MRFC check-box findings cannot be ignored; court held the ALJ incorporated them by restricting Cain to simple work.
Pavlicek v. Saul, 994 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2021) – precedent that “moderate” CPP (concentration, persistence, pace) limitations are generally accommodated by simple, routine, repetitive tasks; cited to sustain the RFC.
Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247 (7th Cir. 2016); Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2002); Fetting v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 332 (7th Cir. 2023) – constellation of cases creating the forfeiture rule for VE testimony; Cain fortifies this rule.
Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000) & Carr v. Saul, 593 U.S. 83 (2021) – illustrate difference between issue-exhaustion before Appeals Council (not required) and contemporaneous objection at the hearing (still required); Cain clarifies that Sims does not eliminate hearing-level forfeiture.
Hohman v. Kijakazi, 72 F.4th 248 (7th Cir. 2023) & Ruenger v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 760 (7th Cir. 2022) – discuss acceptable VE methodologies; relied upon to uphold Dunleavy’s data synthesis.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

Substantial-Evidence and Minimal-Articulation Framework. By citing Crowell and Warnell, the panel reiterated that appellate review is “extremely limited.” The ALJ need only identify a “logical bridge” between record evidence and conclusions, particularly regarding supportability and consistency of medical opinions.
Medical-Opinion Evaluation.
- Physical therapist’s sitting and break limitations were discounted because they stemmed chiefly from Cain’s subjective statements and clashed with treatment notes showing adequate sitting tolerance.
- State-agency psychologists’ moderate checkbox findings were integrated into the RFC; the narrative portions were consistent with each other and other record evidence, rendering remand unnecessary.
- ALJ was not obligated to re-contact Dr. Lovko to clarify the phrase “attend to tasks for a sufficient period” because the record already allowed assessment—addressing Simila/Barnett precedent.
Forfeiture of VE Challenges. Re-affirming Brown/Donahue/Fetting, the court deemed objections to VE testimony waived when not raised at the hearing. Sims was distinguished as addressing Appeals Council exhaustion, not hearing-level contemporaneous objection.
Reliability of VE Methodology. Even on the merits, the VE’s use of Occupational Employment Survey data, county-business patterns, Census statistics, and professional judgement satisfied the reliability concerns addressed in Hohman. Lack of personal job placements in those exact occupations did not undermine his expertise.

C. Potential Impact

Cain v. Bisignano is poised to influence Social Security disability litigation in three main ways:

Solidified Forfeiture Doctrine. Claimant advocates must lodge specific, on-the-record objections to a VE’s foundation, job-number methodology, or qualifications during the administrative hearing—or risk irreversible forfeiture.
Clarified Minimal-Articulation Threshold. The decision underscores that detailed parsing of every checkbox or subjective complaint is unnecessary where the ALJ meaningfully weighs supportability/consistency and builds a rudimentary logical bridge.
Endorsement of Hybrid VE Methodologies. The court’s acceptance of Dunleavy’s multi-source, experience-infused estimation signals continuing tolerance for pragmatic—rather than purely statistical—job-number derivations, provided the VE can articulate a “reasoned explanation.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

ALJ (Administrative Law Judge): A federal agency judge who conducts the initial formal hearing in Social Security disability cases.
RFC (Residual Functional Capacity): The most a claimant can do in a work setting despite medical impairments; expressed in terms of exertional level (sedentary, light, medium, etc.) and specific mental/social limitations.
MRFC Form: A standardized “Mental Residual Functional Capacity” checkbox form used by psychologists to rate mental limitations such as concentration, persistence, pace (CPP).
Supportability vs. Consistency (20 C.F.R. § 416.920c): Supportability asks, “How well does the medical opinion cite and rely on objective medical evidence?” Consistency asks, “How well does the opinion line up with the rest of the record?” These are the two most important factors an ALJ must discuss when weighing medical opinions.
Vocational Expert (VE): A specialist who testifies about a hypothetical claimant’s ability to perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, drawing on labor-market data and expertise.
Forfeiture vs. Exhaustion: • Forfeiture – losing an argument because it was not raised in a timely manner (here, at the ALJ hearing). • Exhaustion – completing all available agency review steps before going to court. Sims dispensed with exhaustion at the Appeals Council level, but Cain reaffirms that forfeiture still applies to issues not raised at the hearing itself.

Conclusion

Cain v. Bisignano is less about substantive disability criteria and more about procedural rigor. The precedential takeaways are clear:

An ALJ’s brief yet reasoned discussion of supportability and consistency suffices under the “minimal articulation” standard.
Moderate mental limitations in an MRFC can legally translate to a restriction to simple, routine, repetitive work, provided the record as a whole supports that translation.
Objections to vocational-expert testimony must be made—specifically and on the record—during the administrative hearing; later attempts to challenge the VE’s numbers or expertise will normally be deemed forfeited.
Hybrid methodologies that blend public-data sources with professional judgment remain acceptable for job-number testimony as long as the VE can articulate the process logically.

Future litigants and counsel should therefore: (1) craft precise VE challenges before the ALJ closes the record; (2) recognise that perfect explanatory detail from an ALJ is not required, so long as the decision reflects consideration of supportability and consistency; and (3) anticipate that moderate checkbox limitations, without more, may be deemed satisfied by a simple-work RFC. Cain thus reinforces procedural discipline for both advocates and adjudicators within the Seventh Circuit, likely influencing nationwide practice in Social Security appeals.