Forfeiture Appeals and Sentence-Appeal Waivers: United States v. Dublynn (11th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Brian Dublynn, No. 24-12476 (11th Cir. Dec. 8, 2025), squarely addresses the intersection of criminal forfeiture, substitute assets, and sentence-appeal waivers in plea agreements. Although marked “Not for Publication,” the opinion provides a clear and detailed application of existing doctrine with practical implications for federal plea bargaining, forfeiture practice, and appellate waivers.

The case arises from a substantial health care and wire fraud conspiracy involving Safe Haven Recovery, Inc., a substance abuse treatment facility. After pleading guilty to conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1349, defendant-appellant Brian Dublynn faced a substantial forfeiture money judgment and loss of assets allegedly connected to, or substitutable for, the fraud’s proceeds. The government sought to seize his Fort Lauderdale home as a substitute asset under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), and the district court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture to that effect.

On appeal, Dublynn mounted a multi-pronged challenge to the forfeiture of his home:

He argued that the government had exceeded the scope of the forfeiture terms in the plea agreement, which expressly listed only “Safe Haven derived funds used to purchase” the home as directly forfeitable.
He claimed that his sentence-appeal waiver did not validly or knowingly extend to challenges to forfeiture of the entire property.
In the alternative, he contended that the district court violated due process and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1)(B) by not holding a forfeiture hearing.

The government invoked the sentence-appeal waiver contained in the plea agreement and moved to dismiss the appeal. The Eleventh Circuit agreed, enforcing the waiver and dismissing the appeal in its entirety.

The key contribution of Dublynn is its reinforcement—and clarification—of the principle that:

A valid, knowing, and voluntary sentence-appeal waiver, especially one that expressly includes “any appeal of the forfeiture,” bars appellate challenges to forfeiture orders, including disputes over substitute-asset forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), absent a governmental breach of the plea agreement or an expressly preserved exception.

It further confirms that a defendant can validly waive: (1) the procedural protections of Rule 32.2, including the right to a forfeiture hearing, and (2) any appeal of forfeiture, even where the plea colloquy does not specifically mention forfeiture so long as the record shows the defendant understood the waiver’s breadth.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Fraud Scheme and Indictment

A federal grand jury indicted Brian Dublynn and several co-conspirators in the Southern District of Florida for offenses stemming from a health care and wire fraud scheme at Safe Haven Recovery, Inc., a substance abuse treatment center. Safe Haven billed insurers for:

Substance abuse treatment that was not actually provided; or
Services and urine drug tests that were medically unnecessary.

Among other things, the superseding indictment alleged that certain property was subject to forfeiture as proceeds or property traceable to the offenses, including:

“Real property located at 1417 NE 17th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33305.”

Dublynn served as Safe Haven’s Vice President. He ultimately agreed to plead guilty to a single count of conspiracy to commit health care fraud and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss the remaining eleven counts.

B. The Plea Agreement: Appeal Waiver and Forfeiture Terms

The written plea agreement had two central features relevant to this appeal:

1. Sentence-appeal waiver

The plea agreement contained a broad sentence-appeal waiver in which Dublynn:

“[W]aives all rights conferred by [18 U.S.C.] Section 3742 to appeal any sentence imposed, including any restitution order, or to appeal the manner in which the sentence was imposed,”

subject only to narrow exceptions:

If the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, or
If the sentence resulted from an upward departure from the properly calculated guideline range.

Importantly, in a separate forfeiture section, the plea agreement provided that the defendant:

“agrees to waive … any appeal of the forfeiture.”

The agreement further memorialized that:

Dublynn discussed the appeal waiver with counsel;
He understood and accepted the waiver; and
The parties would jointly ask the district court to make a specific finding that his waiver was knowing and voluntary.

2. Forfeiture and substitute assets

On forfeiture, the plea agreement stated that Dublynn agreed:

“to forfeit to the United States voluntarily and immediately all property, real or personal, that constitutes or is derived, directly or indirectly, from gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, … pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7). In addition, the Defendant agrees to forfeiture of substitute property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p). The property subject to forfeiture includes, but is not limited to:

(i) A forfeiture money judgment in the amount of approximately $9,400,000.00, which represents the total amount of gross proceeds obtained as a result of [the conspiracy].

(ii) Directly forfeitable property including, but not limited to:
a. Safe Haven derived funds used to purchase the real property located at 1417 NE 17th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33305.”

Thus, under the original agreement:

Dublynn conceded liability for a $9.4 million forfeiture money judgment, reflecting the conspiracy’s gross proceeds;
He acknowledged that “Safe Haven derived funds used to purchase” the Fort Lauderdale property were directly forfeitable; and
He agreed that, if directly forfeitable property was unavailable, the government could seek substitute property under § 853(p).

He also agreed to:

Waive all constitutional, legal, and equitable defenses to forfeiture, including any Eighth Amendment “excessive fines” defense;
Waive “the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 and 43(a)”; and
Waive “any appeal of the forfeiture.”

Both Dublynn and his attorney signed the agreement after reviewing its terms.

C. The Amended Plea Agreement and Drafting Error

The next day, the government moved to “amend” the plea agreement to correct what it characterized as a purely technical error—replacing references to the “Indictment” with “Superseding Indictment.” Dublynn did not object, and the district court granted the motion.

However, the amended plea agreement inadvertently altered the forfeiture paragraph. In the amended version, the description of directly forfeitable property identified:

the real property located at 1417 NE 17th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33305

but omitted the qualifying phrase:

“Safe Haven derived funds used to purchase”

before the reference to the real property. Thus, on paper, the amended agreement appeared to list the entire real property as directly forfeitable, rather than only Safe Haven-derived funds used to buy the property.

On appeal, the government conceded that:

“The changes made to the forfeiture paragraphs of the Amended Plea Agreement were an inadvertent drafting error,”

and agreed that it was “bound by the forfeiture provisions in the original Plea Agreement.”

D. Government’s Forfeiture Motion and Substitute Assets

The government moved for a preliminary order of forfeiture, seeking:

The agreed $9.4 million forfeiture money judgment; and
The forfeiture of several items of substitute property to help satisfy that judgment, including Dublynn’s Fort Lauderdale home.

To justify substitute-asset forfeiture of the home, the government asserted:

Direct fruits of the fraud could not be fully located or were not available;
Some proceeds had been commingled with other funds and used to acquire or improve the property; and
Accordingly, the Fort Lauderdale property could be forfeited as a substitute asset under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) to satisfy the money judgment.

The government supported its motion with an FBI affidavit addressing the unavailability of directly forfeitable property.

Dublynn opposed forfeiture of the Fort Lauderdale property, arguing (among other things) that:

The government’s substitute-asset claim could not exceed the amount he personally received from the conspiracy; and
The original plea agreement identified only “Safe Haven derived funds used to purchase” the home as directly forfeitable, not the home itself.

E. Sentencing, Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, and Appeal

The district court sentenced Dublynn to 42 months’ imprisonment and reserved ruling on the forfeiture dispute at sentencing.

The government then filed an amended motion for a preliminary order of forfeiture, again seeking to forfeit the Fort Lauderdale home as a substitute asset. Dublynn did not respond to the amended motion. The district court thereafter granted the motion and entered a preliminary order authorizing seizure of the property.

Dublynn appealed the preliminary order of forfeiture. The government moved to dismiss the appeal based on the sentence-appeal waiver and the express forfeiture-appeal waiver in the plea agreement. The Eleventh Circuit carried that motion with the case and ultimately decided it on the merits.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding:

No breach of the plea agreement by the government.
The government did not breach the plea agreement by seeking forfeiture of the entire Fort Lauderdale home as a substitute asset. The agreement:
- Bound Dublynn to a $9.4 million forfeiture money judgment; and
- Expressly authorized forfeiture of substitute property under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) without restricting which assets could be used as substitutes.
The phrase “Safe Haven derived funds used to purchase the real property” limited only what was directly forfeitable, not what could be targeted as a substitute asset.
The sentence-appeal waiver and forfeiture-appeal waiver were valid and enforceable.
The waiver was entered knowingly and voluntarily:
- Dublynn signed the plea agreement containing the explicit appeal waiver and the separate waiver of “any appeal of the forfeiture.”
- During the Rule 11 plea colloquy, the district court clearly informed him that he was relinquishing most of his appellate rights, and he confirmed understanding.
Under Eleventh Circuit law, this sufficed to render the waiver enforceable despite the lack of detailed discussion of forfeiture at the colloquy.
The forfeiture challenge fell squarely within the scope of the waiver.
Because:
- Forfeiture is part of a criminal sentence, under Supreme Court precedent; and
- The plea agreement also contained an express waiver of “any appeal of the forfeiture,”
the court held that Dublynn’s challenges to the application of § 853(p) and the forfeiture of his home were barred.
Due process and Rule 32.2 hearing arguments were both procedurally defaulted and substantively waived.
The court rejected Dublynn’s late-arriving argument that due process required a forfeiture hearing:
- The argument was first raised in his reply brief and thus not properly before the court.
- Even if considered, the claim failed because Dublynn had expressly waived “the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2” in the plea agreement.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit granted the government’s motion and dismissed the appeal pursuant to the sentence-appeal waiver.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Criminal Forfeiture: Direct and Substitute Assets

1. Statutory basis in fraud cases

For health care fraud and related schemes, criminal forfeiture is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7), which mandates forfeiture of:

“any property, real or personal, that constitutes or is derived, directly or indirectly, from gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the offense.”

Courts often enter:

A forfeiture money judgment equal to the total proceeds of the offense (here, approximately $9.4 million); and
Forfeiture of specific, identifiable assets that constitute or are traceable to those proceeds.

2. Substitute asset forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)

When directly forfeitable property is no longer available—for example, because it has been dissipated, commingled, or transferred—21 U.S.C. § 853(p), incorporated by reference into § 982, authorizes forfeiture of substitute assets up to the value of the unavailable proceeds.

Section 853(p) applies if directly forfeitable property:

Cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
Has been transferred, sold, or deposited with third parties;
Has been commingled with other property; or
Has otherwise been diminished or concealed.

Once these conditions are satisfied, the court may order forfeiture of any other property of the defendant – even property not itself derived from crime – to satisfy the money judgment. That is what occurred when the government sought to seize Dublynn’s Fort Lauderdale home as a substitute asset.

B. Sentence-Appeal Waivers

A sentence-appeal waiver is a clause in a plea agreement where the defendant agrees not to appeal the conviction or sentence (subject to defined exceptions). The Eleventh Circuit enforces such waivers if:

The waiver was entered knowingly and voluntarily; and
The issue on appeal falls within the scope of the waiver’s language.

Under United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993), the government must show either:

The district court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver during the plea colloquy; or
It is “manifestly clear from the record” that the defendant understood the waiver’s significance.

As the Eleventh Circuit reiterated in King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363 (11th Cir. 2022), a valid appeal waiver:

“bars not only frivolous claims, but also difficult and debatable legal issues,” and even “blatant error.”

The only typical exceptions are narrow: sentences exceeding the statutory maximum or upward departures beyond the guideline range if such carve-outs are written into the agreement, or where the government breaches the plea agreement.

C. Forfeiture as Part of the Criminal Sentence

Supreme Court precedent, particularly Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995), holds that criminal forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following a conviction or guilty plea:

“Forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following conviction or, as here, a plea of guilty.”

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit treats:

Challenges to forfeiture as challenges to the sentence, and
Broad sentence-appeal waivers as encompassing forfeiture orders, absent explicit exclusion.

D. Rule 32.2 and Forfeiture Procedure

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 governs criminal forfeiture procedure. Rule 32.2(b)(1)(B) provides:

“If the forfeiture is contested, on either party’s request the court must conduct a hearing after the verdict or finding of guilty.”

However, like many procedural rights, parties may:

Waive Rule 32.2 procedural protections in a plea agreement; and
Agree to forfeiture without a separate hearing in exchange for negotiated benefits (e.g., dismissal of charges, sentencing concessions).

E. Plain Error Review of Unpreserved Breach Claims

When a defendant claims on appeal that the government breached a plea agreement but did not raise that argument in the district court, the Eleventh Circuit reviews only for plain error, under the framework from Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), and United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005).

Plain error requires:

Error;
That is “plain” (clear or obvious);
Affecting substantial rights (typically, outcome-determinative); and
Seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

This standard is intentionally demanding and applied “sparingly.”

V. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. No Government Breach of the Plea Agreement

1. Scope of the government’s promises

The court first addressed Dublynn’s argument that the government violated the plea agreement by seeking forfeiture of the entire Fort Lauderdale property, rather than only the “Safe Haven derived funds used to purchase” it.

Under United States v. Malone, 51 F.4th 1311 (11th Cir. 2022), when assessing an alleged breach, the court must:

Determine the scope of the government’s promises by examining the plea agreement’s terms; and
Apply an objective standard: did the government’s conduct conflict with the defendant’s reasonable understanding of those promises?

Here, the plea agreement:

Bound Dublynn to forfeit “all property, real or personal, that constitutes or is derived, directly or indirectly, from gross proceeds” of the conspiracy;
Specified a $9.4 million forfeiture money judgment; and
Required Dublynn to agree to the forfeiture of substitute property under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p).

The agreement then listed the Fort Lauderdale property as directly forfeitable only to the extent of the “Safe Haven derived funds used to purchase” it. This description limited direct forfeiture, not the universe of potential substitute assets.

2. The distinction between direct and substitute forfeiture

The key analytical move was the court’s recognition that the government did not seek to take the property as directly forfeitable. Rather, it proceeded under § 853(p) to forfeit the home as a substitute asset to partially satisfy the $9.4 million money judgment.

Because:

Dublynn agreed to the $9.4 million judgment;
He expressly agreed that substitute assets could be forfeited under § 853(p); and
The plea placed no restriction on which assets could be used as substitutes,

the government’s choice to target the Fort Lauderdale home as a substitute asset did not violate the plea agreement’s terms. As the court emphasized, even Dublynn conceded in his briefing that the government was “absolutely right” that it could seek forfeiture of the entire home via substitute-asset theory without breaching the agreement.

Thus, any challenge to whether the statutory conditions of § 853(p) were met (e.g., whether proceeds were unavailable, or properly traced) went to the merits of the forfeiture order, not to whether the government had honored the plea agreement.

3. Plain error and lack of preserved objection

Because Dublynn did not argue breach below, the court reviewed for plain error. It held there was:

No error at all, much less obvious or outcome-determinative error;
No conflict between the government’s conduct and any reasonable understanding of the plea terms; and
Therefore, no government breach that could overcome the appeal waiver.

B. Validity of the Sentence-Appeal Waiver and Forfeiture-appeal Waiver

1. Knowing and voluntary nature of the waiver

The court next analyzed whether the sentence-appeal waiver was “knowing and voluntary” under Bushert and Bascomb. Several facts were pivotal:

Dublynn signed a plea agreement that:
- Contained a robust sentence-appeal waiver; and
- Separately stated that he waived “any appeal of the forfeiture.”
He affirmed that he had read, understood, and discussed the agreement with his attorney.
The district court explained during the plea colloquy that he was waiving most rights to appeal his sentence, and he confirmed his understanding on the record.

Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, this combination of:

Written, explicit waiver language; and
On-the-record acknowledgment of understanding,

was sufficient to show that the waiver was entered knowingly and voluntarily—even though the court did not specifically discuss forfeiture at the colloquy.

2. Forfeiture as a component of the sentence

Invoking Libretti and related authorities, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that criminal forfeiture is part of the sentence. Accordingly:

A sentence-appeal waiver presumptively covers forfeiture challenges; and
An express waiver of “any appeal of the forfeiture” makes the coverage unmistakable.

The court also distinguished the unpublished decision in United States v. Charlemagne, 774 F. App’x 632 (11th Cir. 2019), on which Dublynn relied. In Charlemagne:

The plea agreement was silent on forfeiture; and
The panel found it was not “manifestly clear” from the record that the defendant understood she was waiving an appeal of her forfeiture obligations.

Here, by contrast:

The plea agreement explicitly called out forfeiture and waived “any appeal of the forfeiture”; and
Charlemagne is unpublished and not binding in any event, as noted in United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2013).

Thus, the court held that the waiver—both with respect to sentencing generally and forfeiture specifically—was valid and enforceable.

C. Scope of the Waiver: Bar on Forfeiture Challenges

The court then considered whether Dublynn’s specific appellate claims fell within the scope of the waiver. They did.

Dublynn’s primary arguments on appeal were:

That the district court erred in concluding the government satisfied § 853(p)’s requirements for substitute-asset forfeiture; and
That forfeiture of the entire home exceeded the “Safe Haven derived funds” described as directly forfeitable in the original plea agreement.

The first argument—a direct challenge to the sufficiency of the government’s § 853(p) showing—was a classic merits challenge to the forfeiture portion of the sentence. The second argument, properly understood, did not show breach but instead contested the district court’s application of forfeiture law to the facts.

Both claims were thus:

Challenges to the sentence; and
Explicitly within the scope of the waiver of “any appeal of the forfeiture.”

Under King, the waiver barred review even if Dublynn could show that the district court committed significant or “blatant” legal error in its § 853(p) analysis. Defendants “give up even the right to appeal blatant error” when they knowingly enter broad waivers.

D. Due Process and Rule 32.2 Hearing Argument

1. Procedural default: raised only in the reply brief

As an alternative argument, raised in passing, Dublynn asserted that due process required a forfeiture hearing under Rule 32.2(b)(1)(B), and that the court’s failure to hold such a hearing warranted remand.

The Eleventh Circuit declined to entertain this argument for two reasons. First, the due process claim was raised for the first time in Dublynn’s reply brief. Under United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004), issues first raised in a reply brief are deemed forfeited and are not considered.

2. Substantive waiver of Rule 32.2 requirements

Even assuming the claim was preserved, the court held it would fail on the merits. The plea agreement expressly states that Dublynn:

“agrees to waive … the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 and 43(a).”

Because Rule 32.2(b)(1)(B) is one of those “requirements,” the defendant had contractually waived any right to insist on a separate forfeiture hearing. Having knowingly waived these procedural protections, he could not invoke due process to resurrect them.

Taken together, the procedural default and the substantive waiver independently defeated the Rule 32.2/due process argument.

VI. Precedents Cited and Their Role

A. Breach of Plea Agreements and Plain Error

United States v. Hunter, 835 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2016) Clarifies that an appeal waiver does not bar a defendant from arguing that the government breached the plea agreement. The court invoked this to explain why it first analyzed Dublynn’s breach arguments before enforcing the waiver.
United States v. Malone, 51 F.4th 1311 (11th Cir. 2022) Sets out how courts determine whether the government breached a plea agreement: by examining the agreement’s unambiguous terms and asking whether the government’s conduct conflicted with the defendant’s reasonable understanding. The court applied this framework and found no breach.
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997) & United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005) Provide the four-part plain-error standard, emphasizing that plain error review “should be exercised sparingly.” Because Dublynn did not raise a breach argument below, the court used this standard and found no error, plain or otherwise.

B. Appeal Waivers: Validity, Scope, and Enforcement

United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993) & United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2006) Foundational cases on appeal waivers in the Eleventh Circuit. They hold that waivers are enforceable if entered knowingly and voluntarily and outline the two ways the government can demonstrate that.
United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 2008) Confirms that the appellate court reviews the validity of sentence-appeal waivers de novo.
King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363 (11th Cir. 2022) Emphasizes that valid waivers bar not only weak or frivolous appeals but also “difficult and debatable legal issues” and “blatant error.” This case underscores the breadth of what Dublynn relinquished.
United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2020) Clarifies that the “touchstone” for waiver validity is whether it was clearly conveyed that the defendant was giving up the right to appeal under most circumstances. The court uses Boyd’s formulation to support enforcing Dublynn’s waiver.
United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2001) Upholds a waiver where the defendant confirmed comprehension during the plea colloquy and acknowledged the binding nature of the agreement. Cited to reinforce that similar facts here show a valid waiver.

C. Forfeiture as Part of the Sentence

Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995) The Supreme Court’s leading case holding that criminal forfeiture is part of the defendant’s sentence. The Eleventh Circuit relies on this to conclude that:
- Sentence-appeal waivers cover forfeiture; and
- The defendant’s general and specific waivers include his current challenge.
United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850), 461 U.S. 555 (1983) Notes that criminal proceedings often include forfeiture as part of the sentence, reinforcing that forfeiture is integrated into sentencing.

D. Unpublished Decisions and Non-Binding Authority

United States v. Charlemagne, 774 F. App’x 632 (11th Cir. 2019) Unpublished case in which the plea agreement was silent on forfeiture, and the waiver was held not to clearly extend to forfeiture. The court distinguishes it because Dublynn’s plea explicitly mentioned forfeiture and waived “any appeal of the forfeiture.”
United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2013) Reaffirms that unpublished Eleventh Circuit decisions are non-binding, limiting Charlemagne’s persuasive force.

E. Forfeiture Procedure and Appellate Issue Preservation

United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) Holds that the court ordinarily will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. Applied here to reject Dublynn’s late-emerging due process/Rule 32.2 argument.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. What Is a Sentence-Appeal Waiver?

A sentence-appeal waiver is a contractual promise in a plea agreement. In simple terms, the defendant says:

“In exchange for the benefits of this plea deal, I give up my right to appeal my sentence, except in specific, narrow situations spelled out here.”

This prevents most post-sentencing appeals and is a key tool for the government to secure finality. Courts enforce these waivers like any other contract term if the defendant:

Knew what rights were being relinquished; and
Agreed voluntarily and with the advice of counsel.

B. Direct Forfeiture vs. Substitute Assets

Think of criminal forfeiture in two steps:

Direct forfeiture: Property that is directly tied to the crime (e.g., money stolen, funds in an account where the fraud proceeds are deposited, or a house bought entirely with tainted funds) is subject to immediate forfeiture.
Substitute assets: If the direct proceeds are gone—spent, hidden, commingled, or transferred—Congress allows the government to go after any other property the defendant owns (like a different house or car) up to the value of the missing proceeds. These are substitute assets under § 853(p).

In this case, the plea agreement treated:

“Safe Haven derived funds used to purchase” the home as directly forfeitable; but
The entire home could still be used as a substitute asset if direct proceeds were unavailable, given the agreed $9.4 million judgment and the absence of any restriction on which assets could be substituted.

C. Forfeiture Money Judgment

A forfeiture money judgment is a court order that the defendant owes the United States a specific sum, representing the total criminal proceeds. It is not tied to any single asset. Instead:

The amount is fixed (here, $9.4 million);
Any property the government can lawfully trace or substitute may be used to satisfy that amount over time.

This structure helps ensure that criminals cannot evade forfeiture simply by spending or moving the money before they are caught.

D. Plain Error Review

When a defendant fails to object at the right time in the district court, the appellate court applies plain error review. This is a very demanding standard. The defendant must show:

There was an error;
The error is clear and obvious under current law;
The error affected his substantial rights (usually, changed the outcome); and
The error seriously harms the fairness or integrity of the judicial process.

If any element is missing, the court will not correct the error. Plain error review reflects the idea that parties must raise issues in a timely manner, giving the district court the first opportunity to correct mistakes.

E. Waiving Rule 32.2 Forfeiture Procedures

Rule 32.2 includes procedural safeguards for forfeiture, such as:

Timing of preliminary orders of forfeiture;
Requirements for notice; and
Rights to a hearing if the forfeiture is contested.

However, these are statutory and rule-based procedural rights. Defendants can agree to waive them—just as they can agree to waive jury trial rights—if they do so knowingly and voluntarily. In this case, by agreeing to waive “the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2,” Dublynn effectively gave up any entitlement to insist on a separate adversarial forfeiture hearing.

VIII. Implications and Potential Impact

A. For Plea Agreement Drafting and Negotiation

United States v. Dublynn reinforces several drafting and negotiation lessons:

Explicit forfeiture-appeal waivers are enforceable. Where a plea agreement explicitly states that the defendant waives “any appeal of the forfeiture,” courts will treat that language as binding, even if the plea colloquy does not delve into the specifics of forfeiture.
Waiver of Rule 32.2 protections is effective. Counsel should assume that waiving “the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2” eliminates the right to demand a forfeiture hearing and many procedural objections later on.
Precision matters in distinguishing direct vs. substitute forfeiture. Listing an asset (or a subset of funds) as “directly forfeitable” does not, without more, limit the government’s ability to pursue other assets (including the same property) as substitute assets for a money judgment.
Drafting errors may be cured by concessions, but not to the detriment of clear, broader obligations. Here, the government conceded the drafting mistake in the amended plea and agreed that the original forfeiture language controlled. But that concession did not undo the independent obligations:
- To a $9.4 million money judgment; and
- To substitute-asset forfeiture under § 853(p).

B. For Defendants and Defense Counsel

The opinion underscores serious practical consequences for defendants:

Broad waivers dramatically limit appellate options. Once a defendant agrees to a robust sentence-appeal waiver that expressly includes forfeiture, the ability to challenge:
- The valuation of proceeds,
- The adequacy of the § 853(p) showing,
- The choice of substitute assets, or
- The lack of a forfeiture hearing,
is largely foreclosed.
Careful front-end litigation is essential. Defendants who wish to preserve the ability to challenge forfeiture must:
- Negotiate narrower waivers; or
- Decline to waive Rule 32.2 rights and forfeiture appeals; or
- Raise and litigate forfeiture issues clearly in the district court before sentencing.
Understanding “forfeiture as sentence” is critical. Some defendants may view forfeiture as a separate, ancillary issue. Dublynn underscores that forfeiture is part of the sentence, subject to appeal waivers and the same finality principles as imprisonment and fines.

C. For the Government and Forfeiture Practice

For prosecutors, Dublynn highlights the value of clear waiver language and plea structures:

Including “any appeal of the forfeiture” in plea agreements is highly protective. This language, combined with boilerplate sentence-appeal waivers, provides strong insulation against later appellate challenges to forfeiture orders.
Substitute-asset targeting is protected against post hoc disputes. Provided the defendant has agreed to a money judgment and substitute forfeiture, challenges to what property is seized as a substitute asset are likely to be treated as barred by waivers, not as violations of the plea agreement.
Technical drafting errors should be promptly corrected and clarified on the record. The government’s concession that the original plea agreement controlled helped remove any argument of bad faith and allowed the court to focus on the broader, unambiguous forfeiture obligations.

D. Doctrinal Clarification, Even in an Unpublished Opinion

While designated “Not for Publication” and thus non-precedential, United States v. Dublynn reinforces and concretizes several doctrinal points in the Eleventh Circuit:

Appeal waivers, especially those addressing forfeiture explicitly, are broadly enforced;
Claims that the district court misapplied § 853(p) are classic sentencing challenges and fall squarely within waiver language;
Rule 32.2 hearing rights and similar procedural protections are waivable; and
Alleged government breach will be assessed carefully, but absent a clear conflict with the agreement’s terms, will not defeat otherwise valid waivers.

IX. Conclusion: Key Takeaways from United States v. Dublynn

United States v. Dublynn is best understood not as a radical doctrinal shift but as a rigorous and practical application of existing forfeiture and waiver law with clear takeaways:

Forfeiture is part of the sentence. Under Libretti and Eleventh Circuit practice, forfeiture—including substitute-asset forfeiture—is treated as an integral component of the criminal sentence.
Broad sentence-appeal waivers, especially those explicitly referencing forfeiture, are enforceable and sweeping. Defendants who sign such waivers generally cannot later contest:
- The sufficiency of the evidence supporting § 853(p) findings;
- The scope or extent of forfeiture; or
- The lack of procedural steps (like hearings) that they agreed to waive.
Alleged government breach will be narrowly construed against the defendant’s reasonable understanding, not post hoc dissatisfaction. Listing specific items as directly forfeitable (e.g., certain funds used to purchase a house) does not bar the government from pursuing the same or other property as substitute assets when the defendant has agreed to a large forfeiture money judgment and substitute forfeiture.
Waiving Rule 32.2 means what it says. A defendant who waives “the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2” cannot later invoke that Rule—or due process premised on it—to demand a forfeiture hearing.
Appellate courts will not rescue parties from the consequences of clearly worded waivers, absent government breach or specific carve-outs. Even potentially serious or debatable claims of legal error are foreclosed where the waiver is valid.

In short, Dublynn underscores that the practical battle over forfeiture—its amount, targets, and procedures—is largely fought and won at the plea bargaining stage. Once a defendant agrees to a comprehensive waiver and forfeiture package, appellate review of those aspects of the case will be exceedingly narrow, if not entirely foreclosed.