Introduction

In Bellar v. Stancil, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA) to a Colorado state prisoner who sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after being convicted of felony murder at a second trial. The order—nonprecedential but citable for persuasive value—addresses three pivotal subjects:

• How the stringent COA standard incorporates AEDPA’s deference to state-court merits decisions.
• Why a novel attack on AEDPA’s deference regime, premised on the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, fails when not preserved in the district court or advanced on plain-error review.
• The limits of federal double jeopardy habeas relief after a hung jury: (1) successive prosecution claims where there was no prior acquittal on the same offense; and (2) issue-preclusion (collateral estoppel) claims when an acquittal on a greater offense (aggravated robbery) does not necessarily decide facts dispositive of a later felony-murder retrial predicated on different, lesser felonies (robbery or attempted robbery).

The petitioner, Peter Bellar, argued both that his second trial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and that AEDPA’s deference to state-court decisions is unconstitutional in light of Loper Bright. The Tenth Circuit rejected the latter on preservation grounds and denied a COA on the former, concluding that reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s denial of habeas relief.

Summary of the Opinion

• COA standard and AEDPA overlay: To obtain a COA, Bellar had to show that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s resolution of his § 2254 application. Because his claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court, AEDPA’s deferential standard also applied at the COA stage.
• Loper Bright–based challenge forfeited: Bellar’s argument that Loper Bright renders § 2254’s deference unconstitutional was not preserved in the district court, and he did not ask for plain-error review. The court therefore declined to consider it.
• Successive prosecution claim denied: There was no prior acquittal on the “same offense.” The first jury hung on felony murder and acquitted only aggravated robbery. Retrial for felony murder predicated on robbery or attempted robbery did not violate double jeopardy. The state court’s resolution was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
• Issue-preclusion claim denied: The acquittal on aggravated robbery did not necessarily decide facts that would foreclose proof of robbery or attempted robbery as the felony-murder predicate at the second trial. Under AEDPA, the Colorado Court of Appeals’ analysis was at least reasonable, defeating habeas relief and any COA.
• Disposition: COA denied; appeal dismissed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000): Establishes the COA standard: a petitioner must show reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have been resolved differently or deserves encouragement to proceed further. The Tenth Circuit uses Slack as the threshold lens.
• Pacheco v. El Habti, 62 F.4th 1233 (10th Cir. 2023), and Cortez-Lazcano v. Whitten, 81 F.4th 1074 (10th Cir. 2023): Emphasize AEDPA’s “formidable barrier” and that COA review incorporates AEDPA deference to state-court adjudications on the merits.
• House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 2008): Clarifies “clearly established Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1) means Supreme Court holdings with closely related or similar facts. Also summarizes the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” pathways and warns against relying on abstract generalities divorced from comparable facts.
• Meek v. Martin, 74 F.4th 1223 (10th Cir. 2023): Reiterates that it’s insufficient to show error; the state-court decision must be so obviously wrong that no reasonable judge could agree. Reflects the “fairminded jurists could disagree” principle that forecloses relief under AEDPA.
• United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2019): An unpreserved issue not argued under plain error is ordinarily unreviewable. Used to reject the Loper Bright–based attack on AEDPA deference.
• Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984): A hung jury does not terminate jeopardy; retrial is permitted. Anchors the rejection of the successive prosecution claim.
• Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970); Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462 (2005); McElrath v. Georgia, 601 U.S. 87 (2024): Cases involving acquittals that bar retrial. The Tenth Circuit explains these are factually distinguishable because Bellar was never acquitted of felony murder, robbery, or attempted robbery.
• Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Incorporate issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) into double jeopardy: an issue necessarily decided by a valid and final judgment cannot be relitigated. Yeager adds that hung counts cannot be used to infer what the jury decided. The court finds the state court’s application reasonable given the distinct facts.
• Currier v. Virginia, 585 U.S. 493 (2018): Reiterates that issue preclusion applies only when the earlier acquittal necessarily resolved the same ultimate fact; it is not enough that it is likely or even highly likely.
• Owens v. Trammell, 792 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2015): Restates the general rule of issue preclusion in criminal cases, as adopted in Ashe.
• Anderson v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2003); Frost v. Pryor, 749 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2014): Emphasize that relief lies only where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with Supreme Court precedent.
• Davis v. Roberts, 425 F.3d 830 (10th Cir. 2005): Allows denial of COA on alternative grounds supported by the record, which the panel notes in affirming the result even if its reasoning varies slightly from the district court’s.
• People v. Gallegos, 572 P.3d 136 (Colo. 2025): A Colorado Supreme Court decision cited for the proposition that felony murder is a strict liability offense under Colorado law; intent to kill or knowledge of wounding is not required. This matters to the issue-preclusion analysis of what the first jury’s acquittal necessarily decided.

Legal Reasoning

1) The COA gatekeeping function under AEDPA

The court begins with the layered standard: Slack’s COA requirement is filtered through AEDPA’s § 2254(d) deference when the state courts have already adjudicated the claims on the merits. In practical terms, a habeas petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether the district court erred in concluding that the state-court decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court holdings on materially similar facts. Under Meek’s formulation, it is not enough to show the state court was wrong; it must be so wrong that no reasonable judge could agree.

2) Loper Bright attack on AEDPA deference: forfeiture and plain error

Bellar argued that Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)—which abrogated Chevron deference in the administrative context—undermines the constitutionality of AEDPA’s deferential approach to state-court decisions. The Tenth Circuit declined to entertain this theory because Bellar did not raise it in the district court and did not seek plain-error review on appeal. Citing United States v. Leffler, the panel reiterated that unpreserved arguments not presented under plain-error review are ordinarily not reviewed at all. Importantly, the court deliberately left unresolved whether Loper Bright has any implications for AEDPA; the denial rests solely on preservation.

3) Successive prosecution after a hung jury: no “same offense” acquittal

The first jury hung on felony murder, acquitted Bellar of aggravated robbery, and the verdict form did not invite or return any finding on robbery or attempted robbery. The State then retried Bellar for felony murder based on robbery/attempted robbery as predicate felonies. Under Richardson, a hung jury does not terminate jeopardy; retrial on the same charge is permitted. The Supreme Court cases Bellar invoked—Price, Smith, and McElrath—involved retrials (or midtrial reversals) following an acquittal on the same offense. Because Bellar was not acquitted of felony murder, robbery, or attempted robbery, those holdings do not supply clearly established law barring retrial on facts materially indistinguishable from his case. Applying House v. Hatch, the panel concluded that the state appellate court’s decision neither contradicted Supreme Court governing law nor confronted materially indistinguishable facts while reaching a contrary result.

4) Issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) and “necessarily decided” facts

The Double Jeopardy Clause embraces collateral estoppel: an issue of ultimate fact once determined by a valid final judgment of acquittal cannot be relitigated between the same parties (Ashe; Yeager). But the test is exacting. Under Currier, a second trial is barred only if the prosecution must prevail on an issue the first jury necessarily resolved in the defendant’s favor—not merely probably or even very likely. Here, the Colorado Court of Appeals reasoned that the aggravated robbery acquittal could have rested on determinations that do not foreclose robbery or attempted robbery:

• The jury might have concluded that nothing of value was taken (defeating aggravated robbery), while leaving open whether there was an attempted taking (supporting attempted robbery as a predicate).
• Or it might have concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the “aggravating” element—such as knowingly wounding or striking with a deadly weapon—while leaving open whether the elements of simple robbery were met.

Because felony murder under Colorado law is a strict liability offense (Gallegos), the State at the second trial did not need to prove that Bellar knowingly wounded the victim to secure a felony-murder conviction predicated on robbery or attempted robbery. On this record, the state court’s conclusion—that the first acquittal did not necessarily decide facts precluding the second trial’s predicates—was, at the least, a reasonable application of Ashe and Yeager. Under AEDPA, that ends the matter and defeats a COA.

5) The “clearly established law” and factual similarity requirement

Central to the panel’s reasoning is House v. Hatch’s admonition: “clearly established Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1) emanates from Supreme Court holdings in cases with closely related or similar facts. General double jeopardy principles—standing alone—do not suffice to show a state court was “contrary to” clearly established law. Because Bellar could not identify a Supreme Court decision with materially similar facts that would prohibit his retrial or compel issue preclusion, he could not meet AEDPA’s high bar. The panel emphasized this point in both the successive-prosecution and issue-preclusion analyses.

Impact

• Preservation of structural challenges post-Loper Bright: Litigants seeking to leverage Loper Bright beyond the administrative state—here, to challenge AEDPA’s deference regime—must preserve the argument in the district court and, on appeal, present a plain-error framework if unpreserved. This order flags a procedural gate that will likely foreclose similar attempts absent careful preservation.
• Double jeopardy habeas claims after hung juries: Richardson remains a powerful obstacle. If the first jury hung on the offense later retried, and the defendant was not acquitted of the same offense or the precise predicate facts, a successive-prosecution claim is unlikely to succeed on federal habeas, particularly under AEDPA’s deference.
• Issue preclusion in multi-theory prosecutions: When an acquittal is on a greater offense with additional elements (e.g., aggravated robbery), state courts have substantial leeway—especially under AEDPA—to conclude that the acquittal did not necessarily resolve the elements of a lesser predicate (robbery or attempt). Defense counsel should recognize the strategic importance of verdict form design and seek special interrogatories or tailored instructions that clarify the basis of an acquittal to preserve later issue-preclusion arguments.
• COA practice under AEDPA: The order reinforces that, at the COA stage, petitioners must do more than cite broad constitutional principles; they must tether their claims to Supreme Court holdings with fact patterns closely mirroring their own. Absent such authority, courts will find that fairminded jurists could disagree with the petitioner’s position and deny a COA.
• Felony-murder predicates and estoppel: Because Colorado felony murder is strict liability, acquittals tied to aggravating elements (like “knowingly wounding”) often will not preclude retrial theories that do not require those elements. This analytical path may influence future cases where the State pivots to alternate predicates after a partial acquittal and a hung count.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Certificate of appealability (COA): A permission slip to appeal the denial of habeas relief. Granted only if reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s disposition or the issues deserve encouragement to proceed.
• AEDPA deference (§ 2254(d)): Federal courts defer to state-court merits decisions unless those decisions are contrary to, or involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent (or rest on an unreasonable determination of the facts, which Bellar did not argue). It is a highly deferential standard.
• “Clearly established Federal law”: Only holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court, not lower-court or state decisions, and only in cases with closely similar facts. Generalized principles are rarely enough.
• “Fairminded jurists could disagree”: If reasonable judges could disagree about the correctness of the state court’s decision, federal habeas relief is off the table.
• Hung jury vs. acquittal: A hung jury means no final decision was reached; retrial is permitted. An acquittal is final and ordinarily bars retrial for the same offense.
• Successive prosecution (Double Jeopardy): The government cannot try a defendant again for the same offense after an acquittal. This protection does not apply when the first trial ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury.
• Issue preclusion / collateral estoppel (in criminal cases): If an issue of ultimate fact was necessarily decided by an acquittal, the State cannot relitigate that fact in a subsequent prosecution. “Necessarily decided” means the acquittal could not have occurred without resolving that fact in the defendant’s favor.
• Felony murder and predicate felonies: Felony murder allows a murder conviction when a death occurs during the commission or attempt of certain felonies. The “predicate felony” is the underlying crime (e.g., robbery or attempted robbery). In Colorado, felony murder is strict liability; the prosecution need not prove intent to kill.
• Aggravated robbery vs. robbery/attempt: Aggravated robbery includes extra elements (such as knowingly wounding/striking with a deadly weapon) not required for simple robbery or attempted robbery. An acquittal on aggravated robbery does not automatically establish that simple robbery or attempted robbery was not committed.
• Preservation and plain error: Arguments not raised in the district court are typically forfeited on appeal. To obtain review, an appellant must invoke plain-error analysis and meet that demanding standard.

Conclusion

Bellar v. Stancil is a careful application of well-settled rules to a familiar procedural posture. The Tenth Circuit declined to entertain a Loper Bright–inspired structural challenge to AEDPA due to lack of preservation and absence of a plain-error argument. It then enforced AEDPA’s demanding standards to deny a COA on two double jeopardy theories.

On the successive prosecution claim, the absence of an acquittal on the same offense (felony murder) or on the specific predicate felonies (robbery/attempted robbery) placed the case squarely within Richardson’s rule allowing retrial after a hung jury. On issue preclusion, the aggravated-robbery acquittal did not necessarily resolve facts that would bar proof of simple robbery or attempt as felony-murder predicates, particularly in light of Colorado’s strict-liability view of felony murder. Under House, Meek, and related AEDPA authorities, the state court’s reasoning was at least reasonable, foreclosing habeas relief and a COA.

The key takeaways are procedural and substantive. Procedurally, litigants seeking to expand Loper Bright beyond administrative law must preserve those arguments. Substantively, double jeopardy claims arising from hung juries and partial acquittals face steep hurdles on federal habeas: only acquittals on the same offense or necessarily determined facts—and Supreme Court holdings closely matching the petitioner’s facts—will suffice to overcome AEDPA’s formidable barrier.

Note on Precedential Status

The order states it is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel, but it may be cited for persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.